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The gift of 

Utb. Herbert E* Cuphinan 








rvoFEWOR (IP Pf(\'rn(>f.OGT in harvard VNITKRflITT 





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library i 

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KUetrotyper and Printer, 
New York. 







It» distinctioQ from perception. 1. Its cognitive function — 
mcquaintance with qualities, ^ No pure sensations after the first 
day« of life. 7. The ' relativity of knowledge/ 9. The law of 
contrast. 13. The psychological and the physiological theories 
of it. 17. Bering's experiments, 20. The ' eccentric projection ' 
of sensations, 81. 

Imagination' 44 

Our images are usually vague. 45. Vague images not neces- 
sarily genersl notions, 48. Individuals differ in imagination ; 
GaltfmV researches, 00. The 'visile' type. 58. The 'audile' 
typt'. 90. The ' motile ' type. 61. Tactile images. 65. The neural 
process of imagination. 9S. Its relations to that of sensation, 73. 

The l*i:i:< EHTiox OK 'Thixo.V 76 

Perrepiiou and sensation, 76. Perception is of definite and 
]*n>Uable things, 82. Illusions. 85:— of the first type, 86 :— of 
the MT^-v^nd t3'pe. 05. The neuml process in perception, 108. 
' Ap|irrcepCion.' 107. Is perception an unconscious inference? 
111. Hallucinations, 114. The neural process in hallucination. 
l-i-i. Binefs theory. 139. ' Perception-time,' 181. 

The PKk« KiTiox OF, 134 

The ftfling of crude extensity. 134. The percepllou of spatial 
onli-r. 145. Space-' relations.' 148. The nu*aiiiiig of localization. 
153. ' Local signs.' 155. The couHtrtiction of ' real * space. 166. 
The ftutnlif ir^ion of the original sense-si^aces, 167. The seusiatiou 





oi motion over surfaces, ITl. The measoremeni of the seii<e- 
spacet bj each other. 177. Their summation, l^i. Feelings of 
morement in joints, 189. Feelings of muscular contraction. 197. 
Summary so far, 202. How the blind perceiTe space, t2i)3. 
Visual space, 21 1. Uelmboltz and Reid en the test of a sensation, 
216. The theory of identical points, 22^ The theory of projection. 
228. Ambiguity of retinal imprestlotts, 231 ;— of eye-movemeois, 
234. The choice of the Tisual reality, 237. Sensations which 
we ignore, 240. Sensations which seem suppressed. 243. Dis- 
cussion of Wundt's and Helmholtz's reasons for denying that 
retinal sensations are of extension, 248. Summary, 268. His- 
torical remarks, 270. 

The PEBCEPnox of Reality, -283 

Belief and its opposites, 283. The vmrioua orders of reality, 
287. ' Practical ' realities, 298. The sense of our own bodily 
existence is the nucleus of all reality, 297. The paramount reality 
of sensations, 299. The influence of emotion and active impulse 
on belief, 807. Belief in theories, 811. Doubt. 318. Relations 
of belief and will, 320. 

Reasoning, 323 

' Recepts/ 827. In reasoning, we pick out essential qualities, 
829. What is meant by a mode of oonceiTing, 882. What is 
involved in the existence of general propositions. 887. The two 
factors of reasoning, 840. Sagacity, 848. The part played by 
association by similarity, 845. The intellectual contrast between 
brute and man : association by similarity the fundamental human 
distinction, 848. Different orders of human genius, 860. 



The Prodlt'tiox of Movement, 373 

The diffusive wave, 373. Every sensation produces retiex 
effectH on the whole organism, 374. 

Instinct, 383 

Its definition, 383 Instincts not always blind or invariable, 
389. Two principles of non uniformity in instincts : 1) Their 
inhibition by babitH, 304 ; 2) Tbeir transitoriness, 398. Man has 

coirrBNi'8. V 


more- inMinctfl tkan any other mammul, 403. Keflex impulses, 
404. Imitation. 406. Emulation, 409. Pugnacity, 409. bym« 
pfttby. 410. The bunting instinct, 411. Fear. 415. Acquisitive- 
ne*i*,' Att. ConstruclivencM, 426. Play. 427. Curiosity, 429. 
SflK i.ibility and shyness, 480. Secretiveuess. 482. Cleanliness, 
434. i^bame, 485. Love, 487. Maternal love, 489. 


The Kmotiuns, 443 

JnMiuctiye reaction and emotional expression sbade imper- 
c r|itibly into eacb otber, 442. The expression of grief, 448 ; of 
ft-ar. 446 : of hatred, 449. Emotion is a consequence, not the 
4-auvr. uf the iKxlily expression. 449. Difficulty of testing this 
view, 454. Objections to it discussed, 456. The subtler emotions, 
46t*. No special brain-centres for emotion. 472. Emotional dif- 
ferences between indiTiduals. 474. The genesis of the various 
t: mot ions. 477. 

Will 486 

Voluntarj- movements : they presuppose ii memory of invol- 
uniiiry movements. 487. Kinsesthetic impressions, \\S6. No need 
Ut a«<>iimf feelings of innervation, 508. Tlie ' mental cue ' for a 
movt-nifut ma}' In* an image of its visual or auditory effects as * 
v»«-Il AM an image of the way it feels, 518. Ideo motor action, 522. 
Artion after deliberation, 528. Five types of deiisiou, 531. The 
ff^liniT of effort. 585. Unhealthiness of will: 1) The ex- 
pUMiivr type. 537 ; 2) The obstructed tyiw. 546. Pleasure and 
(«in arr* not the only springs of action, 549. All cous<'iousnes8 is 
impiiUivf. 551. What we will depends on what idea dominates 
iri i»ur mind. 559. The idea's outward effects follow from the 
c« rt-bral machinery, 560. Effort of attention to a naturally 
rrfiuiriiant idea is the essential feature of willing. 562. The 
frt^- will controvt'rn}', 571. Psychology, as n Kcience, can safely 
P«t«!ulate determinism, even if fnH»-will Ix; true, 576. The edu- 
\Uf*n of the Will, 579. Hyitothetical brain schemes, 5^2. 


H\rM»Ti^M 504-616 

MiKles of operating and susceptibility, 594. Theories about 
tbr bypnofir state, 596. The syniptom** «»f the trance. 601. 




Xec'E-SsABY Trcths and the Effects of Experience, . 617 

Programme of the cbj^>ter, 617. ElementAiy feelings are 
innate, 618. The question refers to their combinations, 619. 
What is meant by 'experience/ 620. Spencer on ancestral ex- 
perience, 620. Two ways in which new cerebral structure arises : 
the ' back-door ' and Che ' front-door ' way, 625. The genesis of 
the elementary mental categories, 6S1. The genesis of the 
natural sciences, 683. Scientific conceptions arise as accidental 
variations, 686, The genesis of the pure sciences, 641. Series pf 
evenly increasing terms. 644. The principle of mediate compari- 
son, 645. That of skipped intermediaries, 646. Classification, 
646. Predication, 647. Formal logic, 648. Mathematical 
propositions, 652. Arithmetic, 658. Geometry. 656. Our doc- 
trine is the same as Locke's, 661. Relations of ideas r. couplings 
of things. 668. The natural sciences are inward ideal schemes 
with which the order of nature proves congruent. 666. Meta- 
physical principles are properly only postulates, 660. ^Esthetic 
and moral principles are quite incongruent with the order of 
nature, 672. Summary of what precedes, 675. The origin of 
instincts, 678. Insufficiency of proof for the transmission to the 
next generation of acquired habits, 681. Weismann's views, 683. 
Conclusion, 688. 




Afteb inner perception, outer perception ! The next 
three chapters will treat of the processes by which we cog- 
nize at all times the present world of space and the mate- 
rial things which it contains. And first, of the process 
called Sensation. 

snraATXov ▲vd fxbosption disttnoutbh wi>. 

T*f unrrid Sen&ation and Perception do not carry very 
definitely disi*riminated meanings in popular speech, and in 
Psyoh(>log\' also their meanings run into each other. Both 
r»f them name pHK^esses in which we cognize an objective 
world ; lM>th (under normal conditions) need the stimula- 
tit in of incoming uer>'es ere they can occur; Perception 
always involves Sensation as a portion of itself ; and Sensa- 
Qf>n in turn never takes place in adult life without Percep- 
tion also being there. They are therefore names for dif- 
ferent c^ignitive functions^ not for different sorts of mental 
fiM-t. The nearer the object cognized comes to being a 
simple quality like 'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'jmin,' ap- 
preheuded irrelatively to other things, the more the state 
«#f mind appniaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations 
the (»bjec*t is, on the contrary ; the more it is sometliiug 
<-laff«e4l, located, measured, compared, assigned to a func- 
tion, etc., etc.; the more unreservedly do we call the state 
<if mind a perception, and the relatively nmal'ler is the part 
in it which sensation plays. 

jSfiuaf JOM, then^ 90 long us tee take the analytic point of 






rvnrKstioR op pi«Trm>i.ooY iK harvaed VNirEBBrrr 






of discoarse, with their relations not brought oni The first 
time we see lights in Condillac's phrase we are it rather 
rather than see it But all onr later optical knowledge is 
abont what this experience gives. And thongh we were 
struck blind from that first moment, our scholarship in the 
subject would lack no essential feature so long as our mem- 
ory remained. In training-institutions for the blind they 
teach the pupils as much abovi light as in ordinary schools. 
Reflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether-theory, etc., 
are all studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil of 
such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge which the 
least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show him 
what light is in its ' first intention ' ; and the loss of that 
sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace. All this 
is so obvious that we usually find sensation ' postulated ' 
as an element of experience, even by those philosophers who 
are least inclined to make much of its importance, or to 
pay respect to the knowledge which it brings.* 

.« 'I 

The seusatioDs which we postulate as the si^s or occasions of our 
ptTceptions " (A. Seth: Scottish Philosophy, p. 89). "Their existence is 
•apposed only because, without them, it would be impossible to account 
for the complex phenomena which are directly present in consciousness " 
(J. Dewey: Psychology, p. 34). Even as great an enemy of Sensation as 
T. II. Green has to allow it a sort of hypothetical existence under protest. 
" Perception presupposes feeling " (Contemp. Review, vol. xxxi. p. 747). 
Cf . also sucli passages as those in his Prolegomena to Ethics. g§ 48, 49. — 
Physiologically, the sensory and the reproductive or associative processes 
may wax and wane independently of each other. Where the part directly 
due to stimulation of the sense-organ preponderates, the thought has a 
Hcnsational character, and di£ferK from other thoughts in the sensational 
direction. Those thoughts which lie farthest in that direction we call sen- 
HOtMom, for practical convenience, just hh we call conceptions those which 
lie nearer the opposite extreme. But we no more have conceptions pure 
than we have pure sensations. Our most rarefied intellectual states involve 
some bodily sensibility, just as our dullest feelings have some intellectual 
scope. Common -sense and common psycliology express this by saying 
that the mental slate is composed of distinct fmctional parts, one of which 
is sensation, the other conception. We, however, who believe every 
mental state to be an integral thing (p. 276) cannot talk thus, but must 
speak of the degree of sensational or intellectual chanicter. or function, of 
the mental state. Professor Hering puts, as usual, his finger better upon 
the truth than any one else. Writing of visual perception, he says : *' It 
is Inadmissible in the present state of our knowledge to assert that first 
and last the same retinal picture arouses exactly the sameptir^ sensation, 

aBXaATlOK. 5 

Bat the trouble in that most, if uot all, of those who 
lituX it, admit it &» a {ractiooal part of the thought, iu the 
'litt-Jtahiiuieil »t'>Diii>tio sense which we have so often criti- 

Take the pstu called toothache fur example. Again 
wui •gain we feel it and greet it us the same real item in 
•ii» oiUTerHe. Wo iiiuat therefore, it ia supposed, have a 
liittinct porkct for it in oar mind into which it and nothing 
»L<w will lit. Tills pocket, when tilled, ia the seusation of 
IbuUiadie ; and mnst be either tilled or half-filled whenever 
uwl Qudor whatever form toothache ia pre-sent to our 
tbuogbt, and whether much or little of the rest of the 
minil be lillecl at the same time. Thereupon of coiirae 
cumeii np the paradox and mystery: If the knowledge of 
b>otW-he lie jwnt np in thia aeparate mental poeket, how 
cut U be known rum tJto or brought into one view with 
ujlluRg ehie ? This pocket knows notliing else ; no other 
[un iif the mind knows toothache. The knowing of tooth- 
Kie mm a/to lauHt bo u toirucle. And the minu-le must 
ham an Agi'Ut And Uie Agent muat be a Subject or Ego 
'out o( time,' — and all the rest of it, as we saw in Chapter 
X And then begins the well-worn rouud of recrimination 
bttmHt the MDHationaliats and the spiritualists, from which 
*t m nved by our determination from the outset to accept 
tti* psychological poiut of view, and to admit knowledge 
■lw<her of (timple t'Kitliaches or of philosophic systems as 
« sltinate fucL Xhere are realities and there are * atateB_ 
t-f Blin d,' and tlie latte r know^hejornjer ; and it is just aa^ 
vomlrrfal fur a atjito nl uiiud ti> be a ' seusatiou ' aud kuo»f| 
*uaiple pain a^ for it to be a thought aud know a systeni/ 

fraatW Am. 

•eBHUlon, In ^'UMcqueiiiM; <if pisciict^ aiid experionce. U dlfirr- 
ibr Uu ilino. «ii<l i.'Uburai«d itilo • dlSer«iil porccptloo 
Fnr Uie only n»\ daUi un-. nn tlic one band, t]ic phynfml 
tbe rctin>,— and tliat ■■ bulb tituoilhc mni!; nnd, (in tliu uibcr 
raulUnl ttmUi ut c<iiiM'iouKiii;aB fuufrtiile Brnpfiitdnngtamiplai) 
. b IkiUi ilinei dlMlncl. f>f riny (Arrrf lAing. uamtlg, <i jnin $en- 
ut tibatrm tUt rttiKoi and Ift mtnlal j/iflum, if* know itolhinp. 
I, (^mmiiA tootMif all hypot/irtit. only tag Ihat tht nerwmappa- 
diffennttao." (Hcnuum's Udbcb.. 

6 P8TCH0L0QT. 

of related things.* But there is no reason to suppose that 
when different states of mind know different things about 
the same toothache, they do so by virtue of their all cfynr- 
taining faintly or vividly the original pain. Quite the re- 
verse. The by-gone sensation of my gout was painful, as 
Beid somewhere says ; the thought of the same gout as by- 
gone is pleasant, and in no respect resembles the earlier 
mental state. 

Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innu- 
merable things, and then are replaced by thoughts which 
know the same things in altogether other ways. And 
Locke's main doctrine remains eternally true, however 
hazy some of his language may have been, that 

** though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may 
be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations ; yet 
they all terminate in^ and are concerned about, those simple ideas f 
either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials 
of all our knowledge. . . . The simple ideas we receive from sensation 
and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts ; beyond which, the 
mind whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot ; nor 
can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and 
hidden causes of those ideas/' t 

The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be 
unravelled till the nexus between the brain and conscious- 
ness is cleared up. All we can say now is that sensations 
ATeJirst things in the way of consciousness. Before con- 
ceptions can come, sensations must have come ; but before 
sensations come, no psychic fact need have existed, a nerve- 
current is enough. If the nerve-current be not given, 
nothing else will take its place. To quote the good Locke 

**It is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged under- 
standing, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame 

* Yet even writers like Prof. Bain will deny, in the most gratuitous 
way, that sensations know anything. "It is evident that the lowest or 
most restricted form of sensation does not contain an element of knowl- 
edge. The mere state of miud called the sensation of scarlet is not knowl- 
edge, although a necessary preparation for it. " ' Is not knowledge about 
scarlet ' is all that Professor Bain can rightfully say. 

t By simple ideas of sensation Locke merely means sensations. 

ifisBay c. H. U., bk. ii. ch. xziu. § 29 ; ch. xxv. § 9. 

seysATioy. 7 

tu !■« iitBplo idcK [i.e. itcnsatioD] in the mind. . . . t would have 
ui MM 117 ta fanry Anjr bule which hod never aSected hb palate, or 
(nac ihr kl«a of b aoeui he had never smell ; and when be can do this, 
1 wi 4lK> ccnclodd that a blind roan hath ideas of colon, and a deaf 
■^ (ni« dutiDct notions ot sounds." * 

Tie braiu ut »o mode thnt all currents in it nm one way. 
ConcioaBaeM of sume 8ort goes with all the currents, but 
itwobty when oew corrents are entering that it has the 
Muatiooal loi»g. Anil it is only tLeu that conficiousuess 
dincUy fnatttnien (to ose u word of Mr. Bradley's) a real- 
ilTOBtside itself. 

Tbe diff<ir<^nc<> between such encounter auiJ all concep- 

tttl kiHivltHlKe is very ^eat A blind man may know all 

^•^thn Mky'ft blueuesH, auJ I may know all about your 

intbache. couoeptually ; trHciu^r their causes from primeval 

diaoa, and their consequences to the crack of doom. But 

MloDg w h» bftH Dot felt the blu(4ues.s, nor I the toothache, 

irkhtiwlcdKe. wide ns it is, of these realities, will be hollow 

d itiadeqaatf*. Somebody must /«■/ blueuess, Homebody 

t toothache, to make human knowledge of these 

Com-«ptual Hystems which neither began nor 

uttMitioiiti would be like bridges without piers. 

nit fact must plnn>{e themselves into sensation 

a ])lDugc their piers into the rock. Sensations are 

^■taUa nxik. the ierminiM ayuoanil iht^ fermirnui mi qium 

kHbifliL Tu find such termini is our aim with all our 

It conceive tirst when and where a certain sensa- 

B bad. Atiil then ttihave it. Finding it strips dis- 

■Fulare to find it kills the false conceit of 

Uuly when you (le<luce n posaible sensation 

i> fnim your theory, and give it to me when and where 

■ theory requires do I liogin to be Hure that your thought 

i aurthiug to do with truth. 

firmrptttiona fOH €ndy he. ivalited in th^ earti^al dayao^li/e. 

..-.-r »re all but imi>oit«ible to adults with memories and 

unjv* of ansociations acquired. Prior to all impressions 

00 aeDiie-orftKuti the brain is plunged in deep sleep and eon- 

■ i* praclicAlly non-exiatenL Even the first weeks 

" {ItL ott. bk. It. clL n. I S. 

8 P87CH0L0QT. 

after birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by human 
infants. It takes a strong message from the sense-organs to 
break this slumber. In a new-bom brain this gives rise to 
an absolutely pure sensation. But the experience leaves 
its ' unimaginable touch ' on the matter of the convolutions, 
and the next impression which a sense-organ transmits 
produces a cerebral reaction in which the awakened vestige 
of the last impression plays its part. Another sort of feel- 
ing and a higher grade of cognition are the consequence ; 
and the complication goes on increasing till the end of life, 
no two successive impressions falling on an identical brain, 
and no two successive thoughts being exactly the same. 
(See above, p. 230 flF.) 

The first sensation which an in/ant gets is /or him the Uni- 
verse, And the Universe which he later comes to know is 
nothing but an amplification and an implication of that first 
simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand and in- 
tussusception on the other, has grovm so big and complex 
and articulate that its first estate is unrememberable. In 
his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there^ 
a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term 
this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellec- 
tual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed 
by the bare interjection * lo ! '), the infant encounters an ob- 
ject in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all 
the ' categories of the understanding * are contained. It has 
objectivity f unity, substantiality, causality, in the /uU sense in 
which any later object or system of objects has these things. 
Here the young knower meets and greets his world ; and 
the miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as 
much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the highest 
achievement of a Newton's brain. The physiological con- 
dition of this first sensible experience is probably nerve- 
currents coming in from many peripheral organs at once. 
Later, the one confused Fact which these currents cause to 
appear is perceived to be many facts, and to contain many 
qualities.^ For as the currents vary, and the brain-paths 

* "So far is it from being true that we necessarily have as many feel- 
ings in consciousness at one time as there are inlets to the sense then played 
upon, that it is a fundamental law of pure sensation that each momentary 


1 by tlieu, other thoughts with other ' objects * 
Hatoe thiug' which was appreheuded as a 
( flooQ figoreo as a past thai, about which many 
■BflU|»cted thiD^H have coaie to light. The principles of 
' ■ ikvelapDietil havi.- been laid down already iii Chapters 
il XTTT, and nothing more need here be added to 

To tbf reader who is tired of »o much Erkrtintniaslheoric 
I cu imly aay that I am so myself, but that it is judisjieu- 
a)ite,Ln the actual state of opiuions about Sensation, to try 
todaar np joat what tlie word meanK. Locke'et pupils seek 
l»4otlM iui|KMMible with s^usatinuH, aud agaiuttt thoui we 
WBrtotioc again insiitt that seuHatiitus 'clustered together' 
ewDiri baild up our more intellectual states of mind. 
PUId'h Bsrli4>r pupilu used to admit Heusatiou'^ existence, 
pvdgingly, bat they trampled it in the dust as somethiug 
c^itpureal, uou -cognitive, and vile.* Hia latest followers 

•*->!•«( Ibe urgauuiu^ielib bui <iui' rti-Uug, lioweTer uuiueraustiuf be lU 

itrnudJiaeipoMirei. . . . TolbUoHgliutl Unity urconsdousneseilmakes 

> - W i rm c i tlMI lb' tribuuriiH to lite fiog\v teellug are beyond lb« or(nin. 

'«kM*d of nliltin II, Id ui outside objerl wltli M:ver«l seuslble prtiper- 

r^ iwr«i1 nt III ibr llvinj; lutlf Willi iu Beveml aensilive functions. , . . 

" "-"v t' n '. n i. not uuile by ■ asmclBtioD ' of BcTerDJ coiuponetilai 

■iiiiwl hy lUttocintion at unauBp«cled varielles wltbin 

:>:iilve iblng bvlug an product of Byuiliesb, but ibe 

ill :! r. ri-,:t.ilau." <J, MtiUiKHii ; A Siudy of Rfiiglou <ieS8). 

\n-\ ■ c <.in|»ir alio V. II. Biailli-y. Loglr. book i. chap, ii, 

' imeb (w^»j|n lulltc tolluwitig nbouod iuaulfsenulinitalUl iiieralurc: 

Vdw b ft klul of iliill, eonfuMil. «i>) nluiiid prircpllon obtruded upon 

W loal frm wtUioul. wbfraby It perri'lvca the nllmUons and motions 

mUa iu own body, awl lalta coiniinuir-c uf Individual bodies cxUliii); 

h«Ml iboiil 11. but ikN* not cinrly iMtnpri-licud wliat tbey art- nor prtie- 

«vf bale Um ulurcot tltrai, it bving intrndtrd by iiKluri^. a» Ploilnua «praks, 

■M M propvrly tor k»t^Udgf w for lb« u»t <^ l\e body For the soul »uf- 

M^ OBdnr ihaX whlr-h il ptccItm liy way of ptiwiim canuDl nwsler or 

tefwrit, UmI lilo lay. Iinnv orundrntaudll Fur no AUBxai^unalu Arli' 

Mir T«T dlljr esproM* tlw tuturir i>t knowlrdgc and IniellvclioiJ uoder 

lk«aolia« tif &«riMri>V' Whvnforc il ts uec«iBary, tlqcc Ihv mind under- 

Madi all ihlofK ibai It ahould he fntc from mliturr anil puslon. for ibU 

m4. M AaaxagunM «[walu, tb*t it niay Ix- able la matter and epnjuer 111 

1^1 IB. ik*l I* W mf, la jfcnpw and uadfrttaad Ibem. In Ukr luanupr PIo- 

tlaa^ laUftbookvf SeoMaadUemury, iu«katii)*(f^<iraiiit to ttt-vn^trrd 

•Baaa, w *1m i« !*«« and to mnfiwr; for wblcb rca>ua ht- ronclndoibal 

10 P8TCH0L0QT, 

seem to seek to crowd it out of existence altogether. The 
only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be rdor 
tions, relations without terms, or whose terms are only 
speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls dl 
relations finer still in infinitum, 

''£xclude from what we have considered real all qualities oonsti- 
tuted by relation, we find that none are leff '' Abetract the many 
relations from the one thing and there is nothing. . . . Witboat the 
relations it would not exist at all."* ''The single feeling is nothing 

that which suffers doth not know. . . . Sense that suffers from external 
objects lies as it were prostrate under them, and is oyercome by them. 
. . . Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent percep- 
tion of that passive part of the soul which is as it were asleep in the body, 
and acts concretely with it. . . . It is an energy arising from the body and 
a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together 
with it. The perceptions of which impound, or of the soul as it were half 
asleep and half awake, are confused, indistinct, turbid, and encumbered 
cogitations very different from the energies of the noetical part, . . . which 
are free, clear, serene, satisfactory, and awakened cogitations. That is to 
say, knowledges." Etc., etc., etc. (R. Cudworth: Treatise concerning 
Eternal and Immutable Morality, bk in. chap, n.) Similarly Male- 
branche: "Theodore. — Oh, oh, Ariste! God knows pain, pleasure, warmth, 
and the rest. But he does not feel these things. He knows pain, since he 
knows what that modification of the soul is in which pain consists. He 
knows it because he alone causes it in us (as I shall presently prove), and he 
knows what he does. In a word, he knows it because his knowledge has 
no bounds. But he does not feel it. for if so he would be unhappy. To 
know pain, then, is not to feel it. Ariste. — That is true. But to feel it 
is to know it, is it not? Theodore.— No indeed, since Qod does not feel 
it in the least, and yet he knows it perfectly. But in order not to quibble 
about terms, if you will have it that to feel pmin is to know it, agree at least 
that it is not to know it clearly, that it is not to know it by light and by 
evidence — in a word, that it is not to know its nature; in other words and to 
speak exactly, it is not to know it at all To feel pain, for example, is to 
feel ourselves unhappy without well knowing either what we are or what 
is this modality of our being which makes us unhappy. . . . Impose silence 
on your senses, your imagination, and your passions, and you will hear the 
pure voice of inner truth, the clear and evident replies of our common mas- 
ter. Never confound the evidence which results from the comparison of 
ideas with the liveliness of the sensations which touch and thrill you. The 
livelier our sensations and feelings (sentiments) are. the more darkness do 
they shed. The more terrible or agreeable are our phantoms, and the more 
body and reality they appear to have, the more dangerous are they and fit 
to lead us astray." (Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, 8me Entretien, ad 
init.) Malebranche's Theodore prudently does not try to explain how 
God's 'infinite felicity ' is compatible with his not feeling joy. 
♦ Green: Prolegomena, gj^ 20, 28. 


ntL' -On tba tvougnitUin of reUliuns na constituting the nature of 
^_. ^.. .i„ —ii^jjjy pf |j„y i«|,»ble theory of Iheir rtMilit}-. " 

Sicli qiiotati4)U8 aa these from the late T. H. Greeu* 
s' ilii Iki mAltvrH of cnrioBitr rather thau of importance, 
■ • IV it not that HeiutntioDiLliHt writers themselves believe iu 
1 v-cklleil 'Belativity of Kuowledge,' which, if they only 
-ientood it, they would see to be identical with Professor 
r<Yn's doctrine. They tell us that the relation of (>eusa- 
.. ii* to etLcb other in something beloD^ing to their essence, 
:.<1 thai oo one uf them has an absolute content : 

'nat, eg., blwk imn nnlj' bo Iclt in contrast to white, oral least 
- '±«tiiictKin tntma palerorA deopur black; similarly atoneora sound 
1; in tlKraaUoti with othttra or with silence; and in like roHiuior a 
vil, a taste, a touch, only, so to speak, in italu naaoendi, whilst, wlien 
I' HmbIw wpitauea. all wniaatlon diaappears, Tbia all seems at first 
.Hi b tai •pkndidlj ooDsUient both with it«elf and with (be facts. 
I -' Mol at mom eloMly, It is seen that neither is theciise."t 

' limd. Iu Hume, ^ IW, 188. It U bard lo lell Just wbnl tills siiobIo- 
k k^MB bvi&f but sirrnuoUHly feebJi; wrilcr mesiia by relation tiuiae- 
so ii trans ki slauil tor syhlcm of related fact. The tibliiufly of the 
MTinkifUt's fallacy ' <we p 194) In liii pogrs. bis inn'SBaiil Irnnlng on 
- - i*fMinn bnvpL-a the tbiog knowu. lb*; iboiigbt that knows U. aud the 
''."teTiUnpkniiwii sixiul tlial tiling and abuut thai tbuught by talerond 
•N.Uaaal Iboughn). make ll InipiMsfble lo cIcAr up bis meaulug. (.'oui]>are. 
hNmr. whli Um utumut-cs In llic text sucb others as these: " The wnk- 
N«( B«ir-««MJoianic» from Uipslnp of BeuHvii nu absolute ni-w begln- 
aiV. and Mitktiic (IU oumv wllbiu Ihe ' tTyxtal spbcm ' of IntclllgFUce 
tUft ai tt la daiennloMl b7 Iui(-I1ig«tic«, Whaisousi' <■ to seusc Unurb- 
^ Wtkougbt. What stosr lain Ihongbt. it Uas detenu incil bj/ lliougbt. 
TWn &o.Uimf(irR. Iw no 'rmljly' in scONiUon to which Ibc world nf 
ttaaikt CMi be refnre^." (Edward Cairdi PhiloBupby of Kant. Ul wl. 
^^ M-t.) " WbvB," mjt Ureen again, " tcvllug a paiu or pleasure of 
kit I pnr^lTt ll to b« (wnnvctcd wllb tlie arilon of approaching the dre, 
«l aN [ancrfTlnE a relation ^ Mieh ont eontUtuenU at any rate, ii a 
'^mnmiMimf TH* Inw «Miwr ii. A'o." "Perception. In tu liuiplesl 
Wk . . — prrirplionM the Onl sight or touch of an object Id which 
IMklaf Imt what I* scfn or touched Is rccognisml— nM(A«r w nor rontaint 
■■Mtas" (CoaiMDp Rot.. XXXI, pp. 746, 750.) "Mere senBatlon Is In 
nttaphfaar Ibai rrpraraita nn reality." " Hero feeling, then, lu ■ mat. 
Irr sfnnnnl by ihnugbt. baa no place in the world of facts, <ii Hie conmoa 
•( r»^bl<- ci|<rr1eo<e " < Prokgoniena Ui Klhic^ f% W, S<I.)~I have ex- 
Kwnl BivK ■ lliilo iiiorr fully on thU nubjecl In Mind, x. 37 II. 

• dtampf Toapii rti'>kiglir. i. pp. T, S. Itubties'a phrwe. *ml>ra lemptr 
HmH mm mntirwii tdim rvni/unl. la generally treated as Ihe original slalo- 
•M wf Dm ntatltrtly dootrltie. J. S. Mill (Enainn. of llamlllon. p. 6} 


The ivo leading ImcXa from which the doctrine of nni*^ 
Tersal relatiTitj derires its wide-«preftd credit are these : 

1; The pgyciologioal /ad that so mnch of our actaaL 
knowledge is of the relations of things — eren oar simplest: 
sensations in adult life are habitoallv referred to classes, 
as we take them in ; and 

2) The pkjfsidlogiocd /ad that oar senses and brain masfe 
have periods of change and repose, else we cease to feel anci 

Neither of these facts proves anything aboat the 
presence or non-presence to oar mind of absolute quali- 
ties with which we become sensiblv acquainted. Surely 
not the psychological fact ; for our inveterate love of 
relating and comparing things does not alter the intrin- 
sic qualities or nature of the things compared, or undo 
their absolute givenness. And surely not the physio- 
logical fact ; for the length of time during which we can 
feel or attend to a quality is altogether irrelevant to the 
intrinsic constitution of the quality felt The time, more- 
over, is long enough in many instances, as sufferers from 
neuralgia know.* And the doctrine of* relativity, not proved 
by these facts, is flatly disproved by other facts even more 
patent So far are we from not knowing (in the words of 
Professor Baiu) " any one thing by itself, but only the dif- 
ference between it and another thing," that if this were true 
the whole edifice of our knowledge would collapse. If all 
we felt were the difference between the G and /?, or c and d, 
on the musical scale, that being the same in the two pairs 
f)l notes, the pairs themselves would be the same, and lan- 
guage could get along without substantives. But Professor 
Bain does not mean seriously what he says, and we need 
spend no more time on this vague and popular form of the 
doctrine. t The facts which seem to hover before the minds 

and Bain (Seuscs and Intellect, p. 321; Emotions and Will, pp. 650. 670-8. 
Logic, I. p. 2, Body and Mind. p. 81) are subscribers to this doctrine. Cf. 
also J. Mill 8 Analysis, J. 8. Mill's ediUon, u. 11, 12. 

* We can steadily hear a note for half an hour. The differences be- 
tween the senses are nuirked. Smell and taste seem soon to get fatigued. 

t In the popular mind it is mixed up with that entirely different doc- 
trine of the ' Relativity of Knowledge ' preached by Hamilton and Spencer. 
This doctrine says that our knowledge is reUtive to us, and is not of the 

taebimpioiu are tlins^ which are best described utider 
bra) of ■ pbjKiotogical law. 

ram law of contbast. 
U Ant cminierate the main fact^ which fall nnder 
1 then remark apon what seemn to tot^ their sig- 
t paychologv.* 
s art) thv phmiomena of voutraet better exhib- 
l their laws more open to accurate stndj, than in 
I with the 8<>DH« of sight Here both kinds — 
looa and »uci;fenKive — can easily be obsen-ed, for 
Antnot oonstant oecurreuee. Ordinarily they remain 
wntiffed, in accordance with the general law of economy 
■ladi cwuw Bn to aelect for couttciouH notice only such 
-VoMts erf oar object an will serve us for lesthetic or prac- 
:<-aliitQity, and to nej^lect the rest; just as we i^ore the 
i'yMt iinafiefi, the mouchea volatiie/i, etc., which exist for 
i-vemxif. bat which are not discriminated without careful 
KUotuio. But by attention we may easily discover the 
it*Mnl faelH involved in contrast. We lind that in gmend 
*r nivr ttmii brigblnfa* nf aw i^jfti niipayn iippnrcntly nfffci the 
•or and brightttftiit o^any otk^r object sfen «imulta7u^owily tcith 
■ ar immediaielg after. 

Id thf firHt place, if we look for a moment at any surface 
u4 tbeD tarn our even elsewhere, the complementary color 
*m1 o|f[MMUte degree of brightness U> that of the tirut surface 
feod to mingle thf^mi*elves with the color and the brightness 
4 liie wcond. Thia ia miroetinw cmtrwri. It finds its ex- 
H*Mtin& in the fatigue of the organ of sight, causing it to 
fisjioBd Ui any particalar stimulus less and less readily the 
iMpraach atimuluM continues tu act. This isshown clearly 
■ A9 verF marked changes which occur in case of contiu- 
nrf ftzfttioD of one particalar point of any field. The field 
(tutetu slowly, becomes more and more indistinct, ami 
iaallj, if one ia practised enough In holding the eye ]>er- 

ttpn m Ow laim b Id <(M-1f. It lua nothliiK bi ilu wtlh Ibo ijuntfon 
•kick wa have bem dbruMliiK. nt wbellier our object* of kDowtedge cuu- 
ito •tariwU urmt or foiwIiiI •ilofr'^'r of rrlatloos. 

* Wfeai tallow* tn Iir«ckct«, m far u p ST, i* (mm Ibr pen of inj fritnd 
nd pnpU Mr. E. B. DdaliaiTe. 

14 P87CH0L0OT. 

fectly steady, slight differences in shade and color may" 
entirely disappear. If we now turn aside the eyes, a nega- 
tive after-image of the field just fixated at once forms, and 
mingles its sensations with those which may happen to 
come from anything else looked at This influence is dis- 
tinctly evident only when the first surface has been * fixated ' 
without movement of the eyes. It is, however, none the 
less present at all times, even when the eye wanders from 
point to point, causing each sensation to be modified more 
or less by that just previously experienced. On this ac- 
count successive contrast is almost sure to be present in 
cases of simultaneous contrast, and to complicate the 

A visual image is modifed not only by other sensations just 
previously experienced, but also by aU those experienced simvl- 
taneously with it, and especially by such as proceed from oofi" 
tiguous portions of the retina. This is the phenomenon of 
simultaneous contrast In this, as in successive contrast, both 
brightness and hue are involved. A bright object appears 
still brighter when its surroundings are darker than itself, 
and darker when they are brighter than itself. Two colors 
side by side are apparently changed by the admixture, with 
each, of the complement of the other. And lastly, a gray 
surface near a colored one is tinged with the complement 
of the latter.* 

The phenomena of simultaneous contrast in sight are so 
complicated by other attendant phenomena that it is diffi* 

* These phenomeoa have close analogues in the phenomena of contrast 
presented by the temperature- sense (see W. Preyer In Archiv f. d. ges. 
Phys., 6d. XXV. p. 79 ff.). Successive contrast here is shown in the fact 
that a warm sensation appears warmer if a cold one has just previously 
been experienced : and a cold one colder, if the preceding one was warm. 
If a finger which has been plunged in hot water, and another which has 
been in cold water, be both immersed in lukewarm water, the same water 
appears cold to the former finger and warm to the latter. In simultaneous 
contrast, a sensation of warmth on any part of the skin tends to induce the 
sensation of cold in its immediate neighborhood ; and vice versd. This 
may be seen if we press with the palm on two metal surfaces of about an 
inch and a half square and three-fourths inch apart- ; the skin between them 
appears distinctly warmer. So also a small object of exactly the tempera- 
ture of the palm appears warm if a cold object, and cold if a warm object, 
touch the skin near it. 

SKySATIOff. 16 

oil to isolate tbem aa<l obtierve them in tlieir purity. Yet 
il H eTiiUoU y of tLe greatest importaDce to do so, if oue 
> 'dM conduct bis iitveKtigatiouH acciirntely. Neglect of 
'I- pnofiplei has led to tuuDj' mistakes b^ing made in 
. -'Mating fur the factn observed. As we have seen, if the 
' is kIIiiwmI U> wander here aod there ubout the field as 
' < niioftrily does, successive coutraMt results and allowHDce 
M be madfl fur itH prfHeQi.-^. It i-au be avoided only bj' 
'Kiffiilly fixntibg with the well-rested eye a point of oue 
Mitud by then observjug the changes which occur iu 
tliis field whtMi the contrasting tield is placed by its side. 
Socii h rouDM- will inMure pure simultaneous contrast. But 
*T« thus it laatB in i\» purity for a moment only. It 
rrvJiw ila maximum of effect immediately after the iutro- 
Ast^Db of thn iN>ntrmHUug field, and then, if the ti:;ation is 
(oetiBaM), it begins to weaken rapidly and soon disappears ; 
iKu andnrgoiu^ changes similar to those observed when 
«V^1<] wbftl*'TiT is fiiuteil st<'HdiIy and the retina liecomes 
'fs^tal by tini-hanging stimuli. If one continues still 
::tli« In fixate the same i>oint, the color and brightness 
' "De firld t^nd Ui sprftid themselves over and mingle with 
' •- enlor and brightness of the neighboring fields, thus 
-'l>titating 'niHu/fanAMw iWurfioH ' for .simultjineous cou- 

Si-t only must we recognize and elimJunte the effects of 

' :rii>natvi> mutnwt, of temporal changes due to fisatlon, 

' 'i iif oiuultaueiius inductioD, in analyzing the phenomena 

I r^U.i:i-'r.:t-. i'nntruitt,but we must also take into aofount 

;. .JK^r ihfhirwv ichKli modifff if" effwis. Under favor- 

' i-. Miii-t;iii ■*■« the contrast-effects are very striking, 

•'•■'■} alwaj's occur as strongly they could not fail 

' ih.- ati«ntioiL But tliey are uot always clearly 

- I wing to variooH disturbing causes which form ixo 

t- the laws of contrast, but which have a luodi- 

t ou itM phenoiua^ua. ^'hen, for instance, the 

I -'-rvi-d haM many distinguishable features — a 

/> «iiii^cior, intrictUe pattern, etc. — the cou- 

: -< w«aker. This di>efl not imply that the 

■ '. ;ire abHent, but mtTidy that the resulting 

— iiiatiuiis are nviTjioweri'd by the many other stronger sen- 


Bations which entirely occupy the attention. On snch 9^ 
ground a faint n^ative after-image — undoubtedly due to 
retinal modifications — may become iuTisible ; and even 
weak objective differences in color may become imper- 
ceptible. For example, a faint spot or grease-stain on 
woollen cloth, easily seen at a distance, when the fibres are 
not distinguishable, disappears when closer examination 
reveals the intricate nature of the surface. 

Another frequent cause of the apparent absence of con- 
trast is the presence of narrow dark intermediate fields, such 
as are formed by bordering a fidi with black lines, or by the 
shaded contours of objects. When such fields interfere with 
the contrast, it is because black and white can absorb much 
color without themselves becoming clearly colored ; and 
because such lines separate other fields too far for them to 
distinctly influence one another. Even weak objective 
differences in color may be made imperceptible by such 

A third case where contrast does not clearly appear is 
where the color of the contrasting fidds is too weak or too in- 
tense^ or where there is mvch difference inbrightness between the 
tioo fields. In the latter case, as can easily be shown, it is 
the contrast of brightness which interferes with the color- 
contrast and makes it imperceptible. For this reason con- 
trast shows best between fields of about equal brightness. 
But the intensity of the color must not be too great, for then 
its very darkness necessitates a dark contrasting field which 
is too absorbent of induced color to allow the contrast to 
appear strongly. The case is similar if the fields are too 

To obtain the best contrast-effects, therefore, the contra^ing 
fields shoxdd be near together, should not be separated by shadows 
or bUvck lines, shoidd be of homogeneous texttire, and should be of 
about equal brightness and medium intensity of color. Such 
conditions do not often occur naturally, the disturbing in- 
fluences being present in case of almost all ordinary objects, 
thus making the effects of contrast far less evident To 
eliminate these disturbances and to produce the conditions 
most favorable for the appearance of good contrast-effects. 

kiiperiiiieDts have been densed, which will be ex- 
B oonapartug the rival theories of esplauatioo. 

lien ue tu>o ihenrir» — the pnych^ogicnl and (he pkyaio- 
•/W— which attempt to exploiQ the phenomena of cun- 

l(f these the jmfcholfyical nw waH the first to gain prom- 
ij'-iK*. //* iHori aUe mivocale hfi« ft«wi Hfhnhiilx. It erplaim 
.jtJrvMlma KEixmoN OF jui>oiiE>T. In ordioarj life oiir 
waMttmit hnvt' intemnt for us only so far as they give 
u pnctical knowledge. Oar chief cuucem is to recognize 
I, aiid we have no occasion to estimate exactly their 
• brightnoHs and color. Hence we gain no facility 
D doing, balnirglect the constant changes in their shade, 
ttn wy nuoert&in as t<i the exact degree of their 
I or too© of thMr color. When objects are near 
" we are inclined to consider those differences 
I BT* clearly and sorely perceived as greater than 
•V«* which appear onc^rttUn in perception or which must 
'• jqdged by aid of meiDorj'," * jntit as we see a medium- 
•;.-rd Bum taller than he really is when he stands beside a 
■iKirttiuui. 8uch deccptiiiUB art" more easily possible in 
It- jadgment of small differences than of large ones ; 
i-*>j vber^ there is but one element of difference instead of 
jur. In s largo unraber of cases of contrast, in all 
' "liicb a whitish spot is surrounded on all aides by 
> mInnsJ unrfacc — Meyer's experiment, the mirror experi- 
■«t, oolored shadowtn, etc,, ttoon to be described — the 
"Vtrast u prodnced. according to Helmholtz, by the fact 
"Kcolon^ illamination or a transparent colored cover- 
I t») bu spmad owt over the field, and obser- 
I does not show directly that it fikils on the white 
"t We therefore believe that we see the latter 
I fonoer color. Now 
• kaw Uwdr grealMtt importAnco for us in bo far as ibey art 
tf bodle* and mn iUTrv« u aigtu (or tbo rc<.-o|;iil(ion ot 
. W« have bpcome acoDtrtompil, in forminK a jQilgment in 
1 to tb* oolfln of bodlea, to olitniiiaU) tho vnrjing bri({htne« and 

" tIalBilwIu. PUydolog. Upilk, [• 893, 
f Im. (A. p. «07. 

18 P8YCU0L00T. 

color of the illumination. We have sufficient opportunity to investigate 
the same colors of objects in full sunshine, in the blue light of the clear 
sky, in the weak white light of a cloudy day, in the reddish-yellow light 
of the sinking sun or of the candle. Moreover the colored r^ectioDS 
of surrounding objects are involved. Since we see the same colored 
objects under these varying illummations, we learn to form a correct 
conception of the color of the object in spite of the difference in illumi- 
nation, i.e. to judge how such an object would appear in white illumi- 
nation ; and since only the constant color of the object interests ns, 
we do not become conscious of the particular sensations on which omr 
judgment rests. So also we are at no loss, when we see «n object 
through a colored covering, to distinguish what belongs to the color of 
the covering and what to the object. In the experiments mentioned we 
do the same also where the covering over the object is not at all colored, 
because of the deception into which we fall, and in consequence of which 
we ascribe to the body a false color, the color complementary to the 
colored portion of the covering.'' * 

We think that we see the complementary color through 
the colored covering, — for these two colors together woidd 
give the sensation of white which is actually experienced. 
If, however, in any way the white spot is recognized as an 
independent object, or if it is compared with another ob- 
ject known to be white, our judgment is no longer deceived 
and the contrast does not appear. 

^' As soon as the contrasting field is recognized as an independent 
body which lies above the colored ground, or even through an ade- 
quate tracing of its outlines is seen to be a separate field, the contrast 
disappears. Since, then, the judgment of the spatial position, the 
material indepi^ndence. of the object in question is decisive for the 
determination of its color, it follows that the contrast*color arises not 
through an act of sensation but through an act of judgment.^' f 

In short, the apparent change in color or brightness 
through contrast is due to no change in excitation of the 
organ, to no change in sensation ; but in consequence of a 
false judgment the unchanged sensation is wrongly inter- 
preted, and thus leads to a changed perception of the bright- 
ness or color. 

In opposition to this theory has been developed one 
which attempts to explain all cases of contrast as depend- 

* Loc. cit. p. 408. 
t Tjoc. cit. p. 406. 


nlv on pktftiological actiov y fhf terminal apparaitta of 
Hfrirtg u the moat prominent siipjxrrter of this view. 
IHgTRtlnrifiinnlitr in devinJii)^ es]ieriiiieiitH uuil by insint- 
[.^Lii rigiil CATP in coQtluctitii; tli«ui, lie has be^n aIiIb to 
<-ii«l Um" faull.4 iu tlu- j>»ychological theory Hud to jtraoti' 
tllv ntobliith the vuliility of Lis own. Ever^- t-ieual setisa- 
:i<{i.lw maintitmH, in correluted to ti plijsical proc«sa in the 
-rTooh appantus. ControHt ia occasioned, not by a faltie 
:-• resulting (nun nnconscioun conclujsious, but by the 
'•■'. that tb)> excitation of any portion of the retina— -aiid 
■i- nmHeqQent sensation— depends not only on its own 
ilimination. but on ttiat of the rest of tho retina as well. 

U llna pafchct-phyaii^nl procMg is nroiued. as usually happens, by 
-1^1 nji iBtpkn^D^ on ibe retina, lis naliire depends noi only on the 
' itiK* of iluw rnjn, bnt alim on (he coiMlilutlou of ihe eiiUri! nervous 
cfostBt which is monected with the orfcan of rJsion. and on the Btat« 

Wlum a limitfiO portion of tlie retina is aroused by ex- 
ixful •timali, Uu* r«>st of the retina, and especially the 
laaediatelT eontlguoas jiarts, tends to react also, and in 
Mill a way as to produce therefrom the sensation of the 
vpuwtf (l*Kn>« of briKhtnesn and the couipleuieutary color 
' (ku of tbe direiilr-vxc'ited portion. "When a gray spot 
" ta alone, and again when it apjmars colored through 
''tad, the obji-ctive light from the spot is in both cases 
'l" muam. Helmlioltz ntaiutaius that the neural process 
t»i the eorrespondiuf* aewmtton also remain uucbauged, but 
uvAlfleniBtly interprried ; Hering, that the neural process 
u>l the M!>iii«aticiu arrv tbeuiMelves changed, and that the 
iiii«rpr*tation ' is th« direct conscious correlate of the 
' ttred mtinal «iuiUtious. Acconliug to the one, the vou- 
inMt ta psy I'lii I logical in its origin ; according to the other, 
• parvly pbysiolikgical. In the cases cited above where 
h roatraat'C.'olor is uo longer apparent — ou a ground with 
My dtati Bguia ba hi e features, on a tield whose honlers are 
i with blac-k lint's, eto., — tht- psychological theory, as 
Utk ••«□, attribntoti this t^i the fact that auder these 
I we JDilge the auialler patch of color to be an 

ft RmUtg. In Hormann' 

; Pliy-aolosli-, 

I. p, ( 


independent object on the surface, and are no longer d^— 
ceived in judging it to be something over which the colox* 
of the ground is drawn. The physiological theory, on i\x& 
other hand, maintains that the contrast-effect is still pro— 
duced, but that the conditions are such that the slight^ 
changes in color and brightness which it occasions become 

The two theories, stated thus broadly, may seem equally 
plausible. Hering, however, has conclusively proved, by 
experiments with after-images, that the process on one part 
of the retina does modify that on neighboring portions, 
under conditions where deception of judgment is impossi- 
ble.^ A careful examination of the facts of contrast will 
show that its phenomena must be due to this cause. In all 
the cases which one may investigate it tviU be seen that the up- 
holders of the psychological theory have failed to conduct their 
experiments with sufficient care, Thej' have not excluded 
successive contrast, have overlooked the changes due to 

* Bering : 'Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne.' — Of these experiments the fol- 
lowing (found on p. ^ ff.) may be cited as a typical one : " From dark 
gray paper cut two strips ^-4 cm. long and \ cm. wide, and lay them on a 
backgtound of which one half is whit« and the other half deep black, in 
such a way that one strip lies on each side of the border-line and parallel 
to it, and at least 1 cm. distant from it. Fixate i to 1 minute a point on 
the border-line between the strips. One strip appears much brighter than 
the other. Close and cover the eyes, and the negative after-image appears. 
. . . The difference in brightness of the strips in the after-image is in gen- 
eral much greater than it appeared in direct vision. . . . This difference 
in brightness of the strips by no means always increases and decreases with 
the difference in brightness of the two halves of the background. ... A 
phase occurs in which the difference in brightness of the two halves of 
the background entirely disappears, and yet both after-images of the strips 
are still very clear, one of them brighter and one darker than the back- 
ground, which is equally bright on both halves. Here can no longer be 
any question of contrast-effect, because the conditio sine qua non of con- 
trast, namely, the differing brightness of the ground, is no longer pres- 
ent. This proves that the different brightness of the after-images of the 
strips must have its ground in a different state of excitation of the corre- 
sponding portions of the retina, and from this follows further that both 
these portions of the retina were differently stimulated during the original 
observation ; for the different after-effect demands here a different fore- 
effect. ... In the original arrangement, the objectively similar strips 
appeared of different brightness, because both corresponding portions of 
the retina were truly differently excited." 



ad have failed to properly accoaot for the 
ifying mfluencea whtt-b have I>een mentioned 
win L'wi cattily establish thin if we examiue the ino»t 
-:nkmg ^iperimeuts iu simnltuaeoUR contrast. 

Oi Uiane one of the l>e«t known and most euHily arranged 

• tiul Inown a« Meyer'" experiment. A scrap of (<ray paper 

• iiImmI on B i-olured background, and both are covered 
. 1 slieet (if transpareat white paper. The gray spot then 

."UBr-s ■ cuutriMt-rolor, complemeDtary to that nf the 
' b kpvniul, whi^'h Hbines with a whitish tiuge thr&iigh the 
. iwrwhich covers it. Helmholtz explains the pheiiome- 

If llw bachpMand Ui Kr«en, the covert ng-paper ilself appeitra to be 
' 1 pHtiMb KoXot. If now tbp Mibstntii-i' of the paper extends without 
;<'*nKl loierruprkim over the graj^ which iiea under it. we think that 

• ■• an nbjmri Ki'miirriiift through Ihe Kreeniah paper, and stiich nti 
•4 oiiMl in turn Ix' ruee-red. In order to give white light. If. how- 
't tht fjwj Kpiit ha* its tiinit« so tlxud Iluil it appeftrs to he an inde- 

. ''Imt r4i)eei. the mnlinally with the greenish portion of the surface 
' 1 uA wc r^pird ii a* a ({ray objiwi which liw ou this surfacu." * 

The contrast-color may thus be made to disappear by 

Vinftt: in black iha ontlines of the gray scrap, or by plac- 

i »bfiTP the tissoe paper another gray scrap of the same 

'/rx' '.( lirightiieHK,Hi)d comparing together the two grays. 

r of tliem Ainm tin- coiitraat-color now appear. 

. + abows clearly that this interpretation is incor- 

:liHltbi> disturbing factors are to be otherwise 

In the firat place, the experiment can be so 

' tliat we coald not posHibly be deceived into l>e- 

livt we Kee the gray through a colored medium. 

' .: i-l a ttiieot of gray paper out strips 5 mm. wide in such 

■ >»»• lliat there will be alternately an empty space and a 

-■•'. j;r»y, lK)th of the same width, the bars being held to- 

I iIk' iuicate«]gvH of the gray aheett^ thus presenting 

iiiK^e tike a gridiron). Lay this on a colored back- 

- -a- grM>n — cover lx)th with transparent pajier. 

'»! lixjve all put a bUu'k frame which covers all the edges, 

^tiM|{ ruible only the barx, which are now alternately 

■ tlclmbolu. Pbyalolog. Opllk, p. 407. 
t In Arcbh f- d. ti«- Pbyilol- ~ 

xu. S. 1 a. 


green and gray. The gray bars appear strongly colored 
by contrast, although, since they occupy as much space as 
the green bars, we are not deceived into belieying that we 
see the former through a green medium. The same is true 
if we weave together into a basket pattern narrow strips of 
green and gray and cover them with the transparent paper. 

Why, then, if it is a true sensation due to physiological 
causes, and not an error of judgment, which causes the 
contrast, does the color disappear when the outlines of the 
gray scri^ are traced, enabling us to recognize it as an 
independent object ? In the first place, it does not neces- 
sarily do so, as will easily be seen if the experiment is 
tried. The contrast-color often remains distinctly visible 
in spite of the black outlines. In the second place, there 
are many adequate reasons why the e£fect should be modi- 
fied. Simultaneous contrast is always strongest at the 
border-line of the two fields ; but a narrow black field now 
separates the two, and itself by contrast strengthens the 
whiteness of both original fields, which were already little 
saturated in color ; and on black and on white, contrast- 
colors show only under the most favorable circumstances. 
Even weak objective differences in color may be made to 
disappear by such tracing of outlines, as can be seen if we 
place on a gray background a scrap of faintly-colored 
paper, cover it with transparent paper and trace its out- 
lines. Thus we see that it is not the recognition of the 
contrasting field as an independent object which interferes 
with its color, but rather a number of entirely explicable 
physiological disturbances. 

The same may be proved in the case of holding above the 
tissue paper a second gray scrap and comparing it with that 
underneath. To avoid the disturbances caused by using 
papers of different brightness, the second scrap should 
be made exactly like the first by covering the same gray 
with the same tissue paper, and carefully cutting a piece 
about 10 mm. square out of both together. To thoroughly 
guard against successive contrast, which so easily compli- 
cates the phenomena, we must carefully prevent all previ- 
ous excitation of the retina by colored light This may be 
done by arranging thus : Place the sheet of tissue paper 



I rests ou four supports ; uuiler the 

y Bcraj). By meanu ot a wire, fasten 

tk Neond gny sera]) 2 or 3 cm. above the glass ]iliit«, 

B-dh »cr«|M appear exactly alike, except ut Hm edges 

Itur law at both scraps, with eves not exactly acfommo- 

itki, ao that tbey appear near one auother, with a very 

B*mi» t{>noe Iw'twe*'!!. Shove now a colored field (greeu) 

iii»di>nieath thi> glass plate, and the cotitnist appears at 

«r ou both scraps. If it appears less clearly on the 

jL.j*f acrap, it is twcause of its bright and darlc edges, itti 

i:>nfiutitiett, its grain, etc ^lieu the accommodation is 

fUfi, there Is no essential change, althuugh then on the 

Tiyfrt «cnp tht* bright edge on the side toward the hght, 

uJth'T dark edge on the shadow side, ilititurb sumewhut. 

li'd fixation the contrast becomes weaker and 

<K to KimuItaueoUH induction, causing the scraps 

iiidistiuguLKliubh^ from the ground. Betuove 

ti'ld and both scraps become greeu, by succes- 

iKin. If the sye moves about freely these last- 

I ' iiomotiado not appear, but the contrast continues 

Iv nnd becomes stronger. When HelmholU found 

II 'Htrast on Uie lower scrap disappeared, it watt 

iiei-aune he then really held the eye fisetl. This 

< :ii may bo di-tturbml by holding the up]>er scrap 

: ^' ■■ iiiid by the dilTerencvs in brightness of its edges, 

-.Li. r in*>t|nulities, but not by that recognizing of it 

mm iQdi']tendent bfHly lying above the colored ground,' 

felhirh the pHychoh)gicHl explanation rests. 

~B like raanuer the claims uf the psychological explauu- 

■be shown to be inadequate in other eases of coq- 

^frvqueot as» are revolving disks, which are 

FttlBcieiit in showing good contrast-phenomena, 

~] inequalities of the ground disappear and leave 

lly homiigvueous surfai'e. On n white disk are ar- 

dl caitnred secttirs, which are interrupted midway by 

\ fields in such a way tliat when the disk is re. 

I white iM^imes mixed with the color and tho 

i( a colored disk of weak saturation on which 

I gnj ring. The latter is colored by contrast with 


the field which surrounds it. Helmholtz explains the fact 
thus : 

^^ The difference of the compared colors appears greater than it really 
is either because this difference, when it is the only existing one and 
draws the attention to itself alone, makes a stronger impression than 
when it is one among many, or because the different colors of the sur- 
face are conceived as alterations of the one ground-color of the surface 
such as might arise through shadows falling on it, through colored 
reflexes, or through mixture with colored paint or dust. In truth, to 
produce an objectively gray spot on a green surface, a reddish coloring 
would be necessary.''* 

This explanation is easily proved false by painting the 
disk with narrow green and gray concentric rings, and giv- 
ing each a different saturation. The contrast appears 
though there is no ground-color, and no longer a single dif- 
ference, but many. The facts which Helmholtz brings for- 
ward in support of his theory are also easily turned against 
him. He asserts that if the color of the ground is too in- 
tense, or if the gray ring is bordered by black circles, the 
contrast becomes weaker ; that no contrast appears on a 
white scrap held over the colored field ; and that the gray 
ring when compared with such scrap loses its contrast-color 
either wholly or in part. Hering points out the inaccuracy 
of all these claims. Under favorable conditions it is impos- 
sible to make the contrast disappear by means of black en- 
closing lines, although they naturally form a disturbing 
element ; increase in the saturation of the field, if disturb- 
ance through increasing brightness-contrast is to be avoid- 
ed, demands a darker gray field, on which contrast-colors 
are less easily perceived ; and careful use of the white scrap 
leads to entirely different results. The contrast-color does 
appear upon it when it is first placed above the colored 
field; but if it is carefully fixated, the contrast-color di- 
minishes very rapidly both on it and on the ring, from causes 
already explained. To secure accurate obser\'ation, all 
complication through successive contrast should be avoided 
thus : first arrange the white scrap, then interpose a gray 
screen between it and the disk, rest the eye, set the wheel 
in motion, fixate the scrap, and then have the screen re- 

* Helmholtz, loc, cii, p. 412. 

lie coutnutt nt imt-e itpi)ears I'learly, and its din- 
I through contiuned fixation cau be accurately 

firi^f n«Dtiun of a few otber eases of contrast mast suf- 
ii.T, Tbe so-called mirror experimeut consists of placing 
i; ill »iinl«* of 45" a green (or otherwiBe colored) pane of 
. iM-. forming an angle with two white surfaces, one hori- 
i nul ami the other Tertical. On each white surface is a 
liirk ■>[<ut The one on the horizontHl mirface is seen throi^^h 
u ^'I.tK« and ap|it*ars dark green, tlie otber is reflected 
!; c, tLe nnrfM'G of the glass to tiie eye, and appears by 
rurimt n-d. Tht- experiment may be so arranged that we 
u- ii'ii uware of the presence of the green glass, but think 
till «i- »re looking directly at a surface mth gi'eeu and red 
':• u up"fi it ; in such a ease there is no deception of judg- 
i-'Dt I'AiiKed by making allowance fur the colored medium 
i:.r iCi*)! which we think that we see the spot, and therefore 
'.-' fihji-hological explanation df>eR not apply. On exclud- 
' .- 4aiv<-MAiv<> eonlraMt by Hxatiou the contrast soon disap- 
>>r<iiii in all niniilar experiments.* 

Ojlvnd aluidotai have long been thought to afford a con- 

nndng proof of the fact that simultaneous contrast is 

pncliokj^ical in itK origin. They are fornieil whenever an 

ofwqae obJM't is illatnioated from two separate sides by 

li(ttt» of different eolora. Allien the light from one source 

H white, itM fthadiiw ia of the color of the other light, and 

tlwMcond hIjmIow itf of a color complementary to that of 

Ik* field illnmiuated by both liglita If now we take a tube, 

Uacbuied inside, ami through it look at tbe colored shadow, 

UM of th« nnrronnding tield Iteiug visible, and then have 

tht cnlorenl light n>m»ved, the shadow still appears colored, 

■Hlioagh 'thv ctrcnmstaiices which caused it have ilisap- 

^MMtmL' This is reganled by tbe psychologists as coa- 

^^■iTe #ridence that the color is due to deception of judg- 

^^BL It can, however, easily Ix> shown that the persistenee 

l^^fte color seen through the tube is due to fatigue of tho 

feliaa through ibt! pmvailuig light, and that when tbe 

flotored light U removed tbe oohir slowly diitap])ear8 as the 

*aM Hvriiic : Arrblv f. d gv* PlijrRinl . HA. xi.i. H. 338 ff. 


eqoilibrinm of the retina becomes gradually restored. When 
snccessive contrast is carefully guarded against, the simul- 
taneous contrast, whether seen directly or through the tube, 
never lasts for an instant on removal of the colored field. 
The physiological explanation applies throughout to all the 
phenomena presented by colored shadows. * 

If we have a small field whose illumination remains con- 
stant, surrounded by a large field of changing brightness, 
an increase or decrease in brightness of the latter results 
in a corresponding apparent decrease or increase respect- 
iveh' in the brightness of the former, while the large field 
seeiiiH to be unchanged. Exner says : 

** This illusion of sense shows that we are inclined to regard as con- 
stant the dominant brightness in our field of vision, and hence to refer 
the changing difference between tliisand the brightness of a limited field 
to a change in bright ncs-s of the latter/* 

The result, however, can be shown to depend not on 
illusion, but on actual retinal changes, which alter the sen- 
sation experienced. The irritability of those portions of 
the retina lighted by the large field becomes much reduced 
in consequence of fatigue, so that the increase in brightness 
becomes much less apparent than it would be without this 
diminution in irritability. The small field, however, shows 
the change by a change in the contrast-effect induced upon 
it by the surrounding parts of the retina, t 

The above cases show clearly that physiological processeSy 
and not deception of judgment, are responsible for contrast q^ 
color. To say this, however, is not to maintain that our 
perception of a color is never in any degree modified by 
our judgment of what the particular colored thing before us 
may be. We have unquestionable illusions of color due to 
wrong inferences as to what object is before us. Thus Von 
Kries:}: speaks of wandering through evergreen forests cov- 
ered with snow, aud thinking that through the interstices of 
the boughs he saw the deep blue of pine-clad mountains, cov- 

♦Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol.. Bd. XL. S. 172 ff. ; DeUbwre: 
American Journal of Psychology, n. 686. 

t Hering : Archiv f . d. ges. Physiol., Bd. xli. 8. 91 II. 
X Die Gesichtsempfindungen u. ihre Analyse, p. 128. 

fSATlON. 87 

I vHli raov and liKbtod by brilliiuit suasUue ; whereas 
t li« rwilly nMw waa the whib> kuow oh tieeo neur by, 

li ft nietake as this U Tiu<loubteilIy of pflvcliologiciil 
It is a wronf; dmsi^cation of the nppeoraDceM, 
< the aittUMtl of intrioatt^ {irocfsseu of aseociatlon, 
uDnB|p(t which in tbu »u|,;Keatioii of a diSereiit hue from 
tktt really bffore the eyes. lu the ensuing chapters Buch 
iUiMiiiiHt av ihiit will l>e troated of iu couaiderable detail. 
)l il it IM a mistake to iuk^rpret t)ie itiinpler cases of con- 
rut in the liRht of such illusiouu ah these. These illu- 
■: u van be rectitied iu an inntaut, aud we then wimder 
km Umt ixmld h»\v been. They come from iuHufficietit 
tUriitinD. or from the fact that the itDpressiou which we 
^ ii a >t^ of more than one [lousible ol>ject, and cau lis 
invrprvled in either way. Iu uoue of these points du they 
MMDlble ainple cuIor-contraHt, which unquettvmaUy is a 
fiammaum oftnualioit immfdiatfly aroustd. 

I liaie dwelt u)>ob the facta of color-contrast at such 
rrrat tenKth iNtcaiute tliey form »ci f(ood a t«'xt to comment 
"t in wy ■tmtwie aKsinst the view that seusatiotis are im- 
::tahh* |>««ychic thingH which coexist with higher mental 
'urttoua. Both KensatioDHliittH and iuttjllectiialixts n^ee 
I exist. They /w; say tlie pure ^*Pll- 
the higlier mental function ; they 
( by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the 
aiilUetaalista. 1 myself ha\-<' contfuilcil that thvy do nof 
aitt IB or alongside of the higher mental function when 
Ibatttxiala. The thingH which arouse them exist; and Ihe 
Ugbcr tDvulal function also knows these same things. Itut 
)■■( aa ito knowledge of the things supersedes and displaces 
lfc«r knowletlge, no it aniwrsedes and displaces them, 
«k«o it oiiineiH, Iwiug as much as they are a lUrevt result- 
ant id whatever momentary braiu-conditioUH may obtain. 
The paychnk)gii-al theitry of contrast, on the other hand, 
^oUm th« acoflatiiMia still to exist in tliemselves uuchauged 
fcefor* the mhid, whilst the 'relating activity' of the latter 


deals with them freely and settles to its own satisfaction 
what each shall be, in view of what the others also are. 
Wundt says expressly that the Law of Relativity is '^not a 
law of sensation but a law of Apperception ;" and the word 
A]:)perception connotes with him a higher intellectual spon- 
taneity.^ This way of taking things belongs with the phi- 
losophy that looks at the data of sense as something earth- 
born and servile, and the 'relating of them together' as 
something spiritual and free. Lo! the spirit can even 
change the intrinsic quality of the sensible facts themselves 
if by so doing it can relate them better to each other ! But 
(apart from the difficulty of seeing how changing the sen- 
sations should relate them better) is it not manifest that 
tlie relations are part of the 'content' of conscioasness, 
part of the 'object/ just as much as the sensations are? 
Wliy ascribe the former exclusively to the hMywer and the 
latttu* to tlie hiotm ? The knotoer is in every case a unique 
pulso of thought corresponding to a unique reaction of the 
brain upon its conditions. All that the facts of contrast 
hIiow us is that the same real thing may give ns quite 
ditforont sonsations when the conditions alter, and that we 
must thoroforo be careful which one to select as the thing's 
truost represtMitrttive. 

Thnr air mauy other facts beside the phenomena qfconirasi 
whioh pvovt* that when tiro objects ad together an tis the 
w*H.^ition irhich either uvuM give alone becomes a differeni 
aen^^^tion. A oortnin amount of skin dipped in hot water 
givt's tho (HMvcption of a certain heat More skin immersed 
makt's tho hoat nmoh more intense, although of course the 
uator*s hoat is i\w sanu\ A i^ertain extent as weU as in- 
tousit>\ in tho quantity of the stimulus is requisite for any 
qucilitv to bo fob. Kick and Wunderli ooidd not distin- 
guish hoat f nMw touoh w hon In^th were applied through a 

• rivx-^^^l l\uU . \ •^NJ, 4>V^ ^^ Tho iwXi iittnilTof tbe law of rela- 
tit>\x S Im><i to tv 36«vn i?\ WumltV in^mKnU wb^ir ibe freiA ' mngm mt in w 
KvHtrn ^ )^iii»K-Uv> \:^xvk«\i to **x\Min: for WcNfi*f kw as well as for 
iKir i^Vt-^'.^Mwcw* of ^NNr.Jt^vt *r%i «^;*n> o!h^T TOAtKrk cam obIt be defined as 
a v;svr„'\ V -^ a:: 7\%\pt >% nf:jir^^% t/ /^x'*^ f^Xf^^ B5«* its little soall 
^V;: x^>,\ ,VsrH tt xtv^ \\\< t:\inc* ^v >^^^« :^ «>»w ^«*1* the«i in lelationF 


^nlr to a card, anil so confinpd to a amall pfti-t of the skin. 
SuBtUrir Uiere is a chromatic minimum of size in objet-la. 
T^ iaiKgv tlipy ciMt on tlie retina must needs have a iwr- 
uirril^nt, or it will Rive no sensatioo of color at all In- 
'trwlj, mors intensity in the ontward impression may 
T.iit the anbjoctivA object more extensive. This liappens, 
'• vill bft iihowu in Chapter XIX, when the illumination 
>nrreaflfHl: The whole room expands and dwindles ac- 

I pihhf as we raise or lower the gas-jet. It is not enity 
I' tspUin any of these resalts as illusions of judgment 

i 1" to tb« taferenco of a wrong objective cause tor the sen- 
wlwiB which »'e gei No more is this easy in the case of 
^Wber'fi obtiervation that a thaler laid ou the skiu of the 
:' n^htwl fM-U hiMLvier when cold than when warm ; or of 
>xttMHlft~ihli'a obser^-ariou that small wooden disks when 

•tii-i to 122" Fahrenheit often feel heavier than those 
liifliare Urge r but not thns warmftd;* or of Hall's ob- 
-nstion that a heavy point moving over the skin seema 
t' iro tarter than a lighter one moving at the same rate of 

Dlpoler and LehmaDD some years ago called attention 
! ' * itnuige idiosTUiTasy found in some persons, and con- 
' <liatt IB the fa4>t tliat impressions on the eye, skin, etc., 
»'Tc «-onm[iKiued by distinct sensations of MvumLt Cdorrd 
L.r'^ j-i the name sometimes given to the phenomenon, 
• K;. L I.HH m.w l*wn re]>eat<?(ily described. Quite lately the 
("I'liinMM- sariKt I'rbantschitsch has proved that these cases 
Vf kdIj extreme examples of a very general law, and that 
kll oar twnse^irgans influence each other's sensations. § 
"Hf bun of patches of ecdor so distant as not to be recog- 
"4 was imme<liately, in IJ.'s patients, perceived when a 
-uiiiK-fork was sounded close to the ear. Sometimes, on 
— ' rtinttarr, thi> field was darkened by the sound. The 
vnity of vision was increaspd, so that Intters too far otf to 
H* rvad roah) be read when the taninj^-fork wiu« hearil. 
iatM.-hitficb, varying his experiments, found that their 

; Pkr^L Prjch.. p. 848. 
L. X. OR. 

rip LtctatanpllBdiing diirch Schall (L«ipslg. IS61). 
i PflB|W-i Anbiv, xui. IM. 


results were mntual, and that sounds which were on the 
limits of audibility became audible when lights of yarioos 
colors were exhibited to the eye. Smell, taste, touch, sense 
of temperature, etc., were all found to fluctuate when lights 
were seen and sounds were heard. Individuals Taried much 
in the degree and kind of e£fect produced, but almost everj 
one experimented on seems to have been in some wa]f 
affected. The phenomena remind one somewhat of the 
' dynamogenic ' effects of sensations upon the strength oi 
muscular contraction observed by M. F6r6, and later to be 
described. The most familiar examples of them seem to be 
the increase of pain by noise or light, and the increase oj 
nausea by all concomitant sensations. Persons suffering ii 
any way instinctively seek stillness and darkness. 

Probably every one will agree that the best way of for- 
mulating all such facts is physiological : it must be that the 
cerebral process of the first sensation is reinforced or other- 
wise altered by the other current which comes in. No one, 
surely, will prefer a psychological explanation here. Well^ 
it seems to me that oR cases of mental reaction to a plural- 
ity of stimuli must be like these cases, and that the phy- 
siological formulation is everywhere the simplest and the 
best When simultaneous red and green light make us see 
yellow, when three notes of the scale make us hear a chord, 
it is not because the sensations of red and of green and oi 
each of the three notes enter the mind as such, and there 
* combine ' or * are combined by its relating activity ' into 
the yellow and the chord, it is because the larger sum ol 
light- waves and of air-waves arouses new cortical processes, 
to which the yellow and the chord directly correspond. 
Even when the sensible qualities of things enter into the 
objects of our highest thinking, it is surely the same. Theii 
several sensations do not continue to exist there tucked 
away. They are replaced by the higher thought which, 
although a different psychic unit from them, knows the 
same sensible qualities which they know. 

The principles laid down in Chapter VI seem then to 
be corroborated in this new connection. You cannot build 
up one thought or one sensation out of many; and only dired 


in/brm ti» of wlutl uv shaU perceive wJien m« 
I at once. 

rs* • MoontTBtc pbojxotion - of BEHSATIONS. 
Veoftra lifwr tim opiniou expresserl tbat nil imr sensa- 
'-'-Qs at fint Appear to na as subjective or internal, and ttre 
'^MvanlK «tiil liy a special act on our part ' pstratlited " or 
rrTtjecled ' no as to appear located iu an outer world. 
Iam w» read io Professor Ladd's valuable work that 

" liiiwlliwiii . . . nrv pdycliicnl stnti-i« trhum- }>iarr^*o far ait th^y can 
t mMIu ba*«oue— U thf miml. The (mnsferenue uf these seosations 
'-*«un iBMttal ttate* ui |>hy>iicai iinxinsnt loc-atol in the periphery 
'. 1^ faddjr, or l*> qualllit^ «( things projMtec) In space external to tbo 
■ Jf, ba mmtal wt. It may nilhor busaid to l>Hn mental achievement 
■ t'wlvqflh. aliovi", m ui knoKlpdKo being <:oiiquering], for ft io au act 
' ivb ta it* pvrftwiiou r«iiltA from a lung and Iniricnte pmcesa of de- 
't^ant. . . . Two nnh>wonUy siiigM, »t ' vpovh-taaiilug' acbieve- 
-vui M IW pmcMB of elaborating the preseuistioiiB of senile, require 
' <7nU nNuMMiiliaci. Thv«- arv • liieaiiralion,' <ir the tratisfen^tice 
' ihf MMpoaii* ttaDMiions from tiipr« states of the mind to prooeaHM 
-' MsiUlaak KnomiaBd mh taking )>la(Hi at tnori^ ur k-bs ileliiiilely &xrd 
roMHerHMsol tbrbod)'; and ■ra^ntrir. prqjfction' tmawtime^ called 
««mnic ^rcrptum') or Uif giving to ibme M.'usatiuii»aQ ubjfclive 
MMcow im ibr riilliirt wnw of Ihp word '(ibJM'live') n« qua1ili«« of 
t^u «itua)nl M fihih a fli^ld of Ajiace and in contact with, or man or 
-• mantrly dntanl fron. tbe body." * 

It •e«mtt tn me that tlierfi ia uot a vestige of evidem.'e for 
: -;• riew. It liaa^ toge tliiT witb tlie opiniou tbat our seu- 
MOotu are orieinaJly devoid of all spatial eouteut, t an 
• >ploi<ru which 1 ctrnfetta that 1 am wholly at a toas to uiider- 
•UaiL As I look at my )K>oki«lu>lf opjxjKtte I cannot frame 
: ' oiyaidf an idea, however imagiuary, of any feeling which 

•old evor poasiblj have got from it except the feeliug of 

* nrrfalockal Pqrcliolog;. 88S, M7. See abo such paaaget as tlui to 
■ : TW Sous nd Utr Iniellect. pp. 884-«. 

* "ft^aeWly atiMwr avoid alt atianpts, wliMlieraTowed or concealed, 
a for tka tpwtiat qualttin of tlie preMoUAloni of teaae by merely 
r Iha qoallliM of lb* (Imple Htuailonii and tk« mod^ of tbefr 

It b podthMi and exlciulnn in apoco which (miMltuleii the 
J of Uie objedit ■■ no longer man iwosationii or allectlonii uf 
Mated. Aa MOialiov*. Ibey are tudUier out at ounrlvca nur piieieued of 
b^MlftlwUldlCMMlkyllwwonlfpfMd-out." il^d. or> ri'f p 801.1 


the same big extended sort of outward fact which I now-^ 
perceive. So far is it from being true that our first way o^ 
feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective or men — 
tal, that the exact opposite seems rather to be the tmtlL. 
Our earliest, most instinctive, least developed kind of con — 
sciousness is the objective kind ; and only as reflection be — 
comes developed do we become aware of an inner world 
all. Then indeed we enrich it more and more, even to th( 
point of becoming idealists, with the spoils of the oute 
world which at first was the only world we knew. Bu 
subjective consciousness, aware of itself as subjective, d 
not at first exist Even an attack of pain is surely felt a 
first objectively as something in space which prompts 
motor reaction, and to the very end it is located, not in thi 
mind, but in some bodily part. 

** A sensation which should not awaken an impulse to move, nc^ 
any tendency to produce an outward effect, would manifestly be 
less to a living creature. On the principles of evolution such a se 
tion could never be developed. Therefore every sensation originall 
refers to something external and independent of the sentient creatu 
Rhizopods (according to Engelmann's observations) retract their pseud 
podia whenever these touch foreign bodies, even if these foreign bodi 
are the pseudopodia of other individuals of their own species, whiU^-'^ 
the mutual contact of their own pseudopodia is followed by no sue 
contraction. These low animals can therefore already feel an oot^ 
world — even in the absence of innate ideas of causality, and probabl; 
without any clear consciousness of space. In truth the conviction tha- 
something exists outside of ourselves does not come from thought. T 
comes from sensation; it rests on the same ground as our conviction o» 
our own existence. ... If we consider the behavior of new- 
animals, we never find them betraying that they are first of all oon. ' — 
scious of their sensations as purely subjective excitements. We fa 
more readily incline to explain the astonishing certainty with 
they make use of their sensations (and which is an effect of adaptatio 
and inheritance) as the result of an inborn intuition of the outer world ^-^ 
. . . Instead of starting from an original pure subjectivity of sensa — 
tion, and seeking how this could possibly have acquired an objectiv^^ 
signification, we must, on the contrary, b(»gin by the possession of objee- — 
tivity by the sensation and then show how for reflective consciousnee^ 
the latter becomes interpreted as an effect of the object, how in sborC^ 
the original immediate objectivity becomes changed into a remote 

* A. Riehl: Der Philosophischer Eriticismus, Bd. n. Theil ii. p. %L 

fUIXSATl'JX. 83 

AaothtT confasion. luacli mnre cominoii thau the ileuiiil 

if til »lij»ctiv^ c!iara43ter to sntiiMttious, is the ii»giimptioQ 

' ^tli«<Tan< nil originullylooiiteili'iMiV/f fA^Amfy iuhI are pro- 

.-i-lwi (latwan] b_v a sei-oatlan' net. This secondary jndg- 

^•-at » a]wH_vH falfte, acconiia^ to M. Taiiie. hu far as the 

- I." nf tlip )M>ii)uition itself goes. Uut it liappeiis to IiH a 

.. < lij<'ot which is at the puint towHlds which the seiisatinii 

1 n.jil'-il ; HO we may null its lesiilt, aecorfling to this 

uiliu,', a vrriiiicat haUucimition.* The word Seiisatinn, to 

'■In lB(HI]pnc«, part it. bk. tt. cliap. ti gg vn. tiii. Compare fucb 

umn^ •! IboMr : "Tbe consequetice U iLnl whrn n seimlioti bus Tor 

JUL' mDilItinn ibe pmrtK^e at an objpci more or h-u dislani from uiir 

• ^Dil ■ \\irTiriun liaa oiiic mailf us acquainted wilh this illslUDCt^. we 

. . I: :^-.ti' out ••rawttlitD at ibU dUlaiicr.— This, Em taet. is tbu ciue 

. ir^Mii.inii of b*«rli]g and niglil. The periphcrnl cxlrtimftjr of the 

.<:- Lcrrr U In Xhf d(*iiM«lrd cbambor of Uiu car. Thai of tba 

tiif U in Utc tni»t Inner rrci-w of tbe eye. Bill Mill, (n our 

t: iu:- . Br ncTiT liliinie uur wuioiiious of soiiud or color in lht:se 

--' >ni- ■• liliDul III. mad ufttrn Dt a consldorabli' distniic« from us. . . . 

1 II uTiqilona uf color arc ilius proJ(r<-leit oiil of our body, and cloibc 

- . f ^u illntanl ub]rrl*, fiirnlliirc, walla, hotiM'h. trees, the sky, and the 

TLit i> why. wbon wc afierwaril* rcUccI on Uirm, wo ccaac Id at- 

■ c iliMii III nurwlvn: tbpy are alienated and detai-bwl from iis, hi far 

: ^l>;'nr iimcmit from uh. Pmjeded from lii(< nrrvuiig MiTfii(« in 

I ■! liM-Blixc ibe majiirlty of the olhi!rs, Ibe lie which eoiinctlcd 

-^ I'l iti< oilicM and lo ouniclfcs i* undone. . . . Thus, nil our oi-iisa- 

I III •> iimslf (ilaalcd. and tbu rvd color \» no more cxleiidcd un ibe 

:i <Ur Ibaa ibv BCDaittoa of llugling ia altuatt-d at my Angers' enda. 

''■Tn ill ■itualtnl in Ibe neiinory cvulrcs of tbe ciiccpbalon; all npp<-ar 

JMri ebrwbrre. and a rommon Inw allola to each of tbetn jta apparent 

•ifciB-iViil. (I. pp. 47-68, (-Similarly Scbopriihaiier : -I will now 

■-•' IW mm9 by tbv »cn$Kt of sight The immrdlnlc dalum is bcro 

^^^ u> the aptiwilna of Ibr retina which. It <a IniP, admits nf con. 

■•iaMt dWmllj, brit nt l)i>lliiin tVTerU to ibe Imprcnlim of light 

•hi Awt wllb ibrlr nbadek. and tbai of colors, Thiw M-uwliiin U 

i*n«|h ud tbtnuitb RiibJcctlTi', that ix. intddc of ihe urganiam and 

■tMllwBkia." ISrhi'pniiiaiier; Rair. voiii Gruiide. p. S8-) Thiaplillom- 

7**: '1.-1 tiiuini-mtr. •rriiili'm Hiinl the Intellecl llui-a lo make the orlgl- 

■nr. 1) It luma It bottom aide up; 2) it 

- 3iii cbaneca lt«tlaiiic«Blo Holldlly; and 

:rLiiii [bn eye. Again. " SmmtioHi ara 

*■ - . ' "iir leniva, in so far aa Ihcy euinn ti> our 

(Ldw a. •utrt iif niir own iHMly, specially of our nervuu* 
■: «ra> rail them frnvpHotia when we form out of thoin the repte. 
a' (Mitar iifajwta" (H**'™^"'"' TonempAndungen, 18T0, p. 101. > 
■cm : " 8riiMib>n U ilwny* aixompliabcd in Uie paycble cenlrc*. 
»tfM« il—it al the exciled inrt <<r ilir p>-riphery. In mher wunU. 


begin with, is constantly, in psychological literature, used 
as if it meant one and the same thing with the physical hn- 
pression either in the terminal oi^ans or in the centres, 
which is its antecedent condition, and this notwithstanding 
that by sensation we mean a mental, not a physical, fact 
But those who expressly mean by it a mental fact still 
leave to it a physical place, still think of it as objectively 
inhabiting the very neural tracts which occasion its appear- 
ance when they are excited ; and then (going a step farther) 
they think that it must place itself where they place it, or be 
subjectively sensible of that place as its habitat in the 
first instance, and afterwards have to be moved so as to 
appear elsewhere. 

All this seems highly confused and unintelligible. Con- 
sciousness, as we saw in an earlier chapter (p. 214) cannot 
properly be said to inhabit any place. It has dynamic re- 
lations with the brain, and cognitive relations with every- 
thing and anything. From the one point of view tuc may 
say that a sensation is in the same place with the brain (if 
we like), just as from the other point of view we may say 
that it is in the same place with whatever quality it may be 
cognizing. But the supposition that a sensation primi- 
tively /eW^ either itself or its object to be in the same place with 
the brain is absolutely groundless, and neither a priori 
probability nor facts from experience can be adduced to 
show that such a deliverance forms any part of the original 
cognitive function of our sensibility. 

Where, then, do we feel the objects of our original sensa- 
tions to be ? 

Certainly a child ut^vly born in Boston, who gets a sen- 
sation from the caudle-tlanie which lights the bedroom, or 
from his diaper-pin. does not feel either of these objects to 

<>ue is a)nscious of the phrnomonoii in tlio uervous centres, . . . but one 
perceives it in the jHTipheric t»r4r»uis. Tliis phenomenon depends on the 
experience of the sH'nsntions tlioinselves. in which there is a r^fiecUon of 
the subjective phenomenon and h tendency on the part of perception to 
return as it were to the external i*auj4e wliich has roustni the mental state 
because the latter is t\)nnecled with the former.'* ^Sergi: Psychologie 
Phj'siologique (Paris. 1888). p. 189 ) Tlie ch^arest and l>est passage I know 
is in Llebmann: Der Ohjivlive Anl»Uck vl86»). pp. e7-7'2. but it is unfortu- 
nately too \^VL^ to quote. 


- *ittiiit«d in longitade 72" W. iui<l latitude 41° X. He 
."C4 itot f««I tbem to be iu the tliinl v.U>ry of the houtie. He 
B not »veD feel them in aur distinct manner to be to the 
r tlif> left of any of the other Henstitious which he 
f lir gnttiuj; from other objects iu the room at the tuiuie 
Be dtien not, in short, kuow anything ahout their 
e-ralktioEui t^i nuytliing else iu the world. The fhtiiie 
1 |iU»>, tlie )tain*tiilc< its own place ; but titt yet 
N Are neither identified with, uor di»crimiiiated 
tber plac«H. That comes later. For the places 
mibly ktiown are eleiiieut» of thechild'tt »pace- 
1 remain with him all his life ; and hy memory 
i.iIUler t^xjierieuue he learnt* a vuat number of tluugs aboat 
' <M>plM«» whicb at (Intt he did not know. But to the 

■ Hit (if timv oertaiu placeit of the world remain detiued for 
-lUiu the plA4>ej>i tchtrf Ihowterutiilions K^cre; and his only 
I'-wible answer to the question where anyihmij U will be to 
■li "firrr,' and to uame some sensation or other like those 
- 'Atones, which shall identify the 8i>ot. Space means but 
'"'^tii^ref^te of all our possible sensations. There is no 

lihcate space known aliumle, or created by an 'epoch- 
'tiing arbievement ' iitUt which our Heusatious, origiually 
';m«I^im, are dropped. They hrimf spHce auil all its places 

■ "« intellect, and do not derive it tbence. 

Bt kilt ImhIv, then, the child later means simply fhai place 

'Irr t}ii^ |MUn from the pin, and a lot of otiier sensations 

i* it, wt-re or are felt. It is no more true to say that he 

iv ■> tii»t |Muu in his IhiiIt, than to say that he locates his 

'^ II. liint pail). Both axf true: that pain ispurtofwhat 

r.-.i.:. //j( ihr tconi body. Just so by the outer world the 

i ii'-iiiib Dotltin^ more than that ptiiee tehere the caudle- 

< ■ II. .1 A jot of other sensations like it are felt. He no 

'lalt-a the candle in the outer world than he locates 

||<Miler world in the candle. Unce aKain, he does both ; 

He iM part of what he mains by ' outer world.' 

soems to mei will be admitt^^d, and will (T trust) 
• atill more plausible in the chapter on the I'ercep- 
b of Spafc. But the later developments of this percep- 
I ant so w>mplieat4Hl that these simple principles fiet 

36 P8Y0H0L0QT, 

easily overlooked. One of the complications comes from 
the fact that things move^ and that the original object which 
we feel them to be splits into two parts, one of which re- 
mains as their whereabouts and the other goes off as theii 
quality or nature. We then contrast where they were with 
where they are. If we do not move, the sensation of when 
they were remains unchanged ; but we ourselves presently 
move, so that that also changes ; and * where they were ' 
becomes no longer the actual sensation which it was origi- 
nally, but a sensation which we merely conceive as possible. 
Gradually the system of these possible sensations, takes 
more and more the place of the actual sensations. * Up * 
and * down ' become * subjective * notions ; east and west 
grow more * correct * than * right ' and * left * etc.; and things 
get at last more * truly ' located by their relation to certain 
ideal fixed co-ordinates than by their relation either to 
our bodies or to those objects by which their place was 
originally defined, Notv this revision of our original locali- 
zations is a complex affair; and contains some facts which may 
very naturally come to be described as translocations whereby 
sensations get shoved farther off" than they originally appeared. 
Few things indeed are more striking than the change- 
able distance which the objects of many of our sensations 
may be made to assume. A fly's humming may be taken 
for a distant steam-whistle ; or the fly itself, seen out of 
focus, may for a moment give us the illusion of a distant 
bird. The same things seem much nearer or much farther, 
according as we look at them through one end or another of 
an opera-glass. Our whole optical education indeed is 
largely taken up with assigning their proper distances to the 
objects of our retinal sensations. An infant will grasp at the 
moon; later, it is said, he projects that sensation to a dis- 
tance which he knows to be bevond his reach. In the 
much quoted case of the * young gentleman who was bora 
blind,' and who was * couched ' for the cataract by Mr. 
Chesselden, it is reported of the patient that " when he first 
saw, he was so far from making any judgment about dis- 
tances, that he thought all objects whatever touched hifi 
eyes (as he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin." 
And other patients born blind, but relieved by surgical op- 

K^ysA rioN. 31 

tntioo, b>v» be«ii dtiscribod us bringing their hand oloRe 
111 Uwir eye« to feci [or the objects which thej at first bhw, 
tt(l nnlr (i^radaallr stretchiiig nut their huncl wheu th^y 
tmil thni nil voiitavt occurred. Mauj have conelniled 
(ruBi thfsp fsrtH that ooT eurlieHt nnanl objects nin»t neein 
in tium>HUjt« L-outact with our py^8. 

But twrtilt.' nbjcctit lUxii mnv be HfiTected with a like nm- 
lii^iiitY of situation. 

I If tiiif of the hairH of our head 1»© pulled, we are pretty 
rabily setifiible of thc> direction of tlie pulHng by the 
m«utD iniparteil to the head,* But the feeliog of the 
i>d, not in that part rif the hair's length wLich 
I hold, hut in the se^ilp itself. Thia seems con- 
'\ the tact that our hair hardly serves at all as a 
In creatures witli vthriaaiF, however, and in 
p qua(lm[H*d>« whone nljinkerH are tactile organs, it cnu 
illy Im> iloubted that the feeling is projected out of the 
|l into Uif uliaft of the hair itself. We ourselves have an 
ich to this when th« heard as a whole, or Uie hair as 
M«, U touched. We perceive tlie contact at some dis- 
p fmni the skin. 
When filed nud hard ajipendages of tlie body, like the 
terth and uiulu, are touched, we feel the contact where it 
tirely is. and not d4'ei>cr iu. where the uer^-e•termina- 
li*. If, however, the tooth is loose, we feel two 
opatiitlly Kppnrated, one at its root, one at its 

tbi>« COM' to that of n hard body not organically 

■ted with the tiarface, hut only accidentally in contact 

tmuBitiou is immediate. With the point of a 

traoe lftt«int in the air or ou a wall just as with 

tp: uid ill «o doing feel the size and shape of 

Ib^^l by the cane's tip just as immediately as, 

& cnat; vf should feel the path descrilwd by the 

liugor. Similarly the draughtsman'tt immediate 

ptioD seems to be of thn point of his {wncil, the sur- 

•Uli !■ prawad by Webrr'* dwtcp ot oiislng tlie lieu] lo be dnnly 
■ -^^ ifTilif a Hpport by anoUier pcrsuu. wlicrciipou ibe Jlrrclloo of 
viiea HM8I to ht pcrcolrrd 


geon's of the end of his knife, the duellist's of the tip of his 
rapier as it plunges through his enemy's skin. When on 
the middle of a vibrating ladder, we feel not only our feet 
on the round, but the ladder's feet against the ground far 
below. If we shake a locked iron gate we feel the middle, 
on which our hands rest, move, but we equally feel the sta- 
bility of the ends where the hinges and the lock are, and 
we seem to feel all three at once.* And yet the place 
where the contact is received is in all these cases the skin, 
whose sensations accordingly are sometimes interpreted as 
objects on the surface, and at other times as objects a long 
distance off. 

We shall learn in the chapter on Space that our feelings 
of our own movement are principally due to the sensibility 
of our rotating joints. Sometimes by fixing the attention, 
say on our elbow-joint, we can feel the movement in the 
joint itself ; but we always are simultaneously conscious 
of the path which during the movement our finger-tips 
describe through the air, and yet these same finger-tips 
themselves are in no way physically modified by the motion. 
A blow on our uluar uerve behind the elbow is felt both 
there and in the fingers. Refrigeration of the elbow pro- 
duces pain in the fingers. Electric currents passed through 
nerve-trunks, whether of cutaneous or of more special sen- 
sibility (such as the optic nerve), give rise to sensations 
which are vaguely localized beyond the nerve-tracts 
traversed. Persons whose legs or arms have been ampu- 
tated are, as is well known, apt to preserve an illusory 
feeling of the lost hand or foot being there. Even when 
they do not have this feeling constantly, it may be occa- 
sionally brought back. This sometimes is the result of 
exciting electrically the nene- trunks buried in the stump. 

'* I recently faradized," says Dr. Mitchell, *' a case of disarticalated 
shoulder without warning my patient of the possible result. For two 
years he had altogether ceased to feel the limb. As the current affected 
the brachial plexus of nerves he suddenly cried aloud, ' Oh the hand,— 
the hand ! ' and attempted to seize the missing member. The phantom. 

♦ Lotze: Med. Psych., 428-438; Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenle- 
bens, 582. 

SKySATloy 3)1 

I tmt a a t iv tti up flwifll; dua)>poAre«l. but ho spiriL loiikl bnvu mom 
Mini ibit num. ao nvJ did it seem." * 

Si>w thp apparent ponitiiin of the Io»t extiviiiitv varios. 
fHtra tht^ foot seems cm tlie ground, or follows tlie poKition 
111 tb«- artificial foot, wli«re one ih uHed. Souietiuieii where 
tbf am in Inxt tlif clItDw \iill Kfem bent, aiid the liand in a 
ttni [MKiitinn on the lireant. 8oim>times, again, the potiitinn 
^s^nn II -natural, and the hand will seem to bitd straight imt 
ft» ahonldar, or the foot to be nu tlie same level with the 
Bof tbe remaining leg. HonietimeM, ugain, tlip position 
; and winietimes it \h ambiguous, na in another 
i^Dr. W>ir MiU-hell'» who 

f at Ihr age iif i-li-v<-ii. mill rL'nii*iu)Hins tliut the fixit by 
KbnI. and at ln«l rt'ocliixl (ho knee. When lie t>egan lo 
^■v n artilirial lef it nuiiBumt<d in limv its old pMiiimi, and he is 
"T«i tin«nil awTiTr of ibr kg «* shortenwl, uiitcw for Rnme lime he 
u Mil tUnkA iif Ihe fltump. and of the miaung teg. wlien . . . ibn 
..!>ritrttti>t atienlt'iii tii the (mrt i^aUMsa fef^ling of diseonifort, ntirl llic 
' '^wlltv >dua<i<in of scllve and unplensant movement of lli(.> loes 
~ li iWm- ftwltiigp n-tuniM ut unci! thu dcliinliiii of lhi> fool tm bi-lng 
t^ •) Ibe kDin'." 

.^11 tbi>w> faclit, and othera like tlieiu, can easily l>e de- 
ities] lUi if oar iMMiaationM might be indui'ed bv trircnin- 
— t- . tiiiprale from their original Jocnlity near the brain 
i>' tiirfacf* of the bodv, nud to ap{>eai- farther otF; 
I -r difforent ciroiiinutiiiiceK) to return again after 
'lag migrated. Rllt a little anal^aia of what hap]ien» 
' "% OB that thin deat'ription is inaoenrate. 

TV •Jijfetivitif u-ifh tohieli etieh c^ our eemtationn origimdly 

.-• fpi u*. tht rotimi/ inui npnfuil chamdrr which m n primi- 

■ firi ■/ itn txWraf, I'ji nirf I'a thejirit instantr rrfative to any 

■■ 'ilUm. The fimt time we open our eyes we get an 

i I'-ct which in n plac^, but which in not vet pliiml in 

■ rtuy other object, nor identified with any place 

-■ kuowu. It in a place with which so far we are 

\ ■Hjf,„iinlftl. When later we know that this same place 

n 'front "of ua, that only ineana that we have learned 

■Mtliinif »&mrf it. OAtnrly, that it lit amgrwnl uith thai 

* UJoriM lA Ntrrai (PliiliulclfliU. 1872), p. 390 fl. 


other place, called ' {mnt/ wliicli is given ns by certain seu- 
sations of the arm and hand or of the head and body. Bal 
at the first moment of onr optical experience, even thougli 
we already had an acquaintance with onr head, hand, and 
body, we could not possibly know anything about theii 
relations to this new seen object. It could not be immedi- 
ately located in respect of them. How its place agrees witt 
the places which their feelings yield is a matter of whicl 
only later experience can inform us; and in the next 
chapter we shall see with some detail how later experience 
does this bv means of discrimination, association, selection, 
and other constantly working functions of the mind. When, 
therefore, the baby grasps at the moon, that does not mean 
that what he sees fails to give him the sensation which he 
afterwards knows as distamv : it means only that he has 
not learned at what tactile or Monfuthtijitance things which ap- 
|)ear at that visiuit dhtunce are.* And when a person jusi 
operated for cat^iract gropes close to his face for far-ofl 
objects, that only means the same thing. All the ordinary 
optical signs of differing distances are absent from the poor 
creature's seusiitiou anvhow. His vision is monocular 
(only one eye being ojH?rated at a time); the lens is gone, 
and everything is out of focus; he feels photophobia, lachry- 
mation, and other painful resident sensations of the eyeball 
itself, whose place he has long since learned to know in 
tactile terms ; what wonder, then, that the first tactile reac- 
tion which the new sensations provoke should be one 
associated with the tactile situation of the organ itself? 
And as for his assertions about the matter, what wonder, 
again, if, as Prt>f. Paul Janet siiys, they are still expressed 
iu the tjictile lau»j:uatj:o which is the onlv one he knows. 
" To be touched means for him to receive an impression with- 
out first making a movement." His eye gets such an 
impression now ; so he can only say that the objects are 
' touching it/ 

*• All his languagts lx>rn>wiHl fn>ni touch, but applied to the objects 
of his sight, make us thiuk that ho iH^rctMvos diflferently from ourselves, 

♦ In reality it prohftbly int^ans only a n»stloss moveiueut of desire, which 
ne might make eveu after he had lK»i'ome aware of his impotence to touch 
the object. 

SSXSATloy. 41 

», lU Itfllom, it Udiily lii^'liiri'tviil wuynf lalkiii^nlKMit Ilie nAmt- 

Utn ntltrr cHM>i) of trausIocHtiou of our seoaatioQs are 

inuU}' eaMiir iiibTpreted ndtliout Hiipposiii^ a&y 'projec- 

(1 ■ from A centre at which they are originally perceived, 

' >f>>rtubitt«ly the details are intricate ; and what I say now 

.1 'loly Iw ujmIo fully dear wlien we come tu the next 

i,i}ilpr. We fiball then see that we are eoDHtantly ((elect- 

,' oertniu nf our HentiationH au realities and degrading 

•hm Im thf ittatii» "f Migiui of theue. Wheu we get one of 

- _ I . .1 1' think of the reality signified ; and the strange 

■'..ii then the reality (which need not be itself a 

>! nil lit tho time, Itut uuly an idea) is so interest- 

:'. Jiciioires an hallucinatory strength, which may 

; "I- lh»t (if thf relatively uninteresting mgu and eu- 

' 'I our attention (roiu the latter. Thus the seu- 

■ » liich onr joints give rise wheu they rotate are 

luit, thniugli a large number of other sensations, 

. I i>)ititrnl. ne have come to know as the movement 

111- »iii>lc limb. This movement of the whole limb is 

■■ lit wf tkint of' when the joint's nerves are excited in that 

-j>:atid iU place ia iu' much more important than the 

. ntV place that onr sense of the latter is taken up, ao to 

'A, iu(i> onr iH-rceptiou of the former, and the sensation 

' til* moT^'moiit Mvvms to diffiii^e it-self into our very fingers 

& But bv abstracting our attention from the sug- 

of tlie entire extremity we can perfectly well per- 

■ the winie Keuxatiou as if it were concentrated in one 

Vie c%a identify it with a differently W-ated tactile 

i riiioal image of * the joint ' itself. 

tJiMt M} when we feel the tip of our cane against the 

The pocnliar sort of movement of the hand ^im- 

jbin one direction, but free in evenr- other) which 

B wbeu tlie tip touches 'the ground,' is a sign 

I of thiB Tiaaal and tactile object which we already 

' RcviM PhOoMpUiqar. vit. p. I B.. Hii nJnilnkble crllk-al nrticle. In tb« 
■ntct wUoh H. JuiM llret a blbliugnpliy of llii< ctkws la quntliiin. 
-■ ilto Ounaa; •MA uv. ISS-T. TUry at« also (liBciinsril tinil iiluiilittly 
•^Timnl bf T, K. Abbni . gr^hl and Touch (18M|. cliiiprcr x. 


know under that name. We think of ' the ground ' as being 
there and giving us the sensation of this kind of movement 
The sensation, we say, comes /rom the ground. The gi'ound*s 
place seems to be its place ; although at the same time, 
and for very similar practical reasons, we think of another 
optical and tactile object, ' the hand ' namely, and consider 
that its place also must be the place of our sensation. In 
other words, we take an object or sensible content A, and 
confounding it with another object otherwise known, B, or 
with two objects otherwise known, B and C, we identify it» 
place with their places. But in all this there is no ^projed- 
ing ' (such as the extradition-philosophers talk of) of A out 
of an original place; no primitive location which it first 
occupied, mvay from these other sensations, has to be con- 
tradicted ; no natural ' centre,' from which it is expelled, 
exists. That would imply that A aboriginally came to us 
in definite local relations with other sensations, for to be 
out. of B and C is to be in local relation with them as much 
HH to be mthem is so. But it was no more out of B and O 
than it was in them when it fii*st came to us. It simply 
had nothing to do with them. To say that we feel a sen- 
Hati()n*s seat to be * in the brain ' or ' against the eye ' or 
' uiidor the skin * is to sav as much about it and to deal 
with it in as non-primitive a way as to say that it is a mile 
<»ir. Theso aro all secondary perceptions, ways of defining 
the Ht^nsation's soat per aliud. They involve numberless 
HHHoriationH, idontitications, and imaginations, and admit a 
gnuit (IimU of vHi'illation and uncertainty in the result.* 

/ vom^iulr, (hm, that there is no truth in the * eccentric pro- 
jWtloti * theory. It is due to the confused assumption that 
tho bodily j>rorossos which cause a sensation must also be 
its Ht»at. t Hut sonsations have no seat in this sense. They 

» M'l 

Tlu) iutoriuiHllury uiul shortciKni KH'utious of the lost hand and foot in 
ihtMiiiipututioi) ruHUN ulm) sliow thU. It is oasv to see why the phantom 
foni iiii^ht iHUilluuo to follow \\\v iH>sition of the artificial one. But I 
f'oiifittM thHt I fuiinot oxpUiii itM hnlf wHy-(x>sition8. 

f It 1h fit till thin ooiifiiHtHi HMtuinption that the time-honored riddle 
f-oiiieti. of how, with nii upHlilr-down picture on the retina, we can see 
thlngH right hith* up. Our rtmnrituisiuv^^ is M4i4iv/jr suppoeed to faihabit the 



r wicb other, aa fast as experience associates 
ler: but that violates uo primitive seat posueiiued 
bT uj one of them. And thoagh oar seuBatioim caiiunt 
'u w> anftlyze atid talk of tliemHelves, yet at their very 
-I appearance quite as uui'h oa st auy later date are they 
;niiuut rif all those qualities which we end by extracting 
■ i <y)nceiviDg under the uamea of objfrh'vUy, Pxferiority, 
.\rxir»t. It is surely subjectirity and interiority which 
-I- the BotioDH latest acquired by the human mind. * 

-iirr ««il lo r«] Ibi? piclurc'* po«iliun aarelnlml luoltierobjecuof apice. 

; ihr imth U iliki tbt^ iiiuluru is uoD-exiBtvuiellliFraaiklmliUiiliir lis any- 

•■t cbe, for ImmnliHle i-oiiwIoumims, Our notioD of il is an euunnoui- 

ti« tiin<-«piiou. 'lliv ouler object It given fmniedUlely witb hII i\im» 

J -t~ which UU-r «rr named and delernilued In rvlalion lo olhw mjumi- 

- ^ The ' boUom ' of IhU object is wlierc we mx wbal by touch wi: 

ifwfw ih know «■ mtxfiet. thi? ' lop ' \* thti place in wliicti we see wimt 

•*kB«« •• oUier people'H livadf. etc., etc, Berkeley long ago mntlc lliia 

■Mior parfedly clvar ((ee his EsMy townrds a uew Theory of Vision. 

* fb> full )DMiflmii<K] ilie render miisl mm? Ilie next dmpter. He nniy 
Tt. MfalaM Uie >ummBry account K'ven now. Ibal in a babe'H inmclialc 
"I irfrtiian the variolic llilng« which appear are located tvlatitiilji t" earh 
••WfitiM ih( oiilM^ I adnitt Ihal if diten'minaled, Ihey would appuir >«> 
■and But they arr )Mir1t of the cnntent of one sensatiou, nut senmlions 
vpUMdj eJIpRTlonccd. «ich na the (exi Ik concerned with. The fully ([u- 
wl»9«j - wtiTlil.' in which nil uur wnsaiions ultinialely Qud localion, is 
Mttlir but an iwaKioary object framed after the pattern of the Held of 
*yw, ij tbe addition and eoiillnuation ot one scniuijon upon another lu 
■ Wdnljraadqrvteoiatlc way. In corroboration of my text I must n-fcr 
*|y Cr-ti ot fttchl'ii book iiuoled above on page 83, and to L'pliucs, 
VitnthRiuBK ua<l Enipflndung (1886), especially the Einifitiing Bad 



Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism^ 
so that copies of them arise again in the mind after the orig- 
inal oidtvard stimvltis is gone. No mental copy, however, 
can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation which has 
never been directly excited from without. 

The blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds, 
for years after they have lost their vision or hearing ; * but 
the man bom deaf can never be made to imagine what sound 
is like, nor can the man bom blind ever have a mental 
vision. In Locke's words, already quoted, " the mind can 
frame unto itself no one new simple idea." The originals 
of them all must have been given from without Fantasy, or 
Imagination, are the names given to the faculty of repro- 
ducing copies of originals once felt. The imagination is 
called * reproductive ' when the copies are literal ; * pro- 
ductive ' when elements from different originals are recom- 
bined so as to make new wholes. 

After-images belong to sensation rather than to imagi- 
nation ; so that the most immediate phenomena of imagi- 
nation would seem to be those tardier images (due to what 
tlie Germans call Sinnesgeddchtniss) which were spoken of 
in Vol. I, p. 647, — coercive hauntings of the mind by echoes 
of unusual experiences for hours after the latter have taken 
place. The phenomena ordinarily ascribed to imagination, 
however, are those mental pictures of possible sensible 

* Prof. Jastrow has ascertained by statistical inquiry among the blind 
that if their blindness have occurred before a perio<l embraced between the 
fifth and seventh years the visual ciMitres seem to decay, and visual dreams 
and images are gradually outgrown. If sight is lost after the seventh 
year, visual imagination seems to survive through life. See Prof. J.'s in- 
teresting article on the Dreams of the Blind, in the New Princeton Review 
for January 1888. 



i^x^mncM, to which the ordinary processes of associa- 
''•' thought give rise. 

ffhen r^presenteil witli surrouudiiigs coucrete enough 
>i>iuititut4^ a tiafe, theae pictures, when they revive, form 
—&ftiouM. W'f have (Uready studied the machinery of 
ilfitirin in Chnpter XVI. When the mental pictures 
f iiii,^ (reely combined, and reprodncing no past com- 
I! 1: ■■.vactly, we have acts of imagination properly 


[>! tlif ordinary 'aiialytic' psychology, each senMibiy 
-.Tnilile element of the object imagined is repre- 
tilHt by itH own separate idea, and the total object 
imAl^JDed by a 'claater' or 'gang' of ideas. We have 
:j iliiioiiMut reason torejectthisviewtsee p. 276 £F,). An 
._in. ,i .ibject, however complex, is at any one moment 
:i;iit lu one idea, which is aware of all its qualities t^i- 
- -huT. If 1 slip into the ordinary way of talking, and 

■ ak of varioua ideas 'combining.' the I'eader wilt uuder- 
1 ind that this is only for popularity and convenience, and 

■ vill not constrne it into a concession to the atomistic 
:■• ;iry in psychology, 

Hntut' was the hero of the atomistic tlieory. Not only 

'^> i<l--nx copies of original impressions made onthetiense- 

. ,Li-. Km they were, according to him, completely ade- 

ii'.r. ,v>pi<-)«, and were all so separate from each other as 

vi j>o«»ciw no manner of connection. Hume proves ideas 

n the imsfd^uation to be completely adequate copies, not 

hr appeal to olwervatiou, but hv h priori reasoning, as fol- 

"Ttw mind canniit form nny notion nf (juantity or quality, without 
'■niag m previse notion of llie dogreeit of each," for *' 'tis confessed 
■Ulaoubjrcl ran MpiN-ar tn ihcseiisra: or in otber words, that no im- 
fmiaa* can t>««ni« prvwnl lo the mind, without being delenniued in 
n ii^nm bixb •>! imtntity and {)ualii;. The confusion in which im- 
iriwjimi MT ontntitimw involved proceeds only from their faintnees 
Md UMtiwlincM. noi from Any capacity iu the mind tn receive any im- 
pfwiwi, which in its rml exintence has no imnicnlar degree nor pro- 
fwiidn. That U a mntnuliction in terms; and oven implies the QatlMt 

* liDpre«l«U meuis wrusHiiuu (or Uume. 

46 P8YCH0L0QT, 

of all ooKtradictioQS, viz,, that ^tis possible for the same thing both t 
be and not to be. Now since all ideas are derived from impressioiifl 
and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever i 
true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other. Impree 
fiions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity. The forego 
ing conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity. I 
cannot therefore be affected by any variation in that particular. Ai 
idea is a weaker impression ; and as a strong impression must neoes 
sarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be tb 
same with its copy or representative. " ♦ 

The slightest introspective glance will show to anyon< 
the falsity of this opinion. Hume surely had images o 
his own works without seeing distinctly every word am 
letter upon the pages which floated before his mind's eye 
His dictum is therefore an exquisite example of the way ii 
which a man will be blinded by a priori theories to th< 
most flagrant facts. It is a rather remarkable thing, too 
that the psychologists of Hume's own empiricist schoo! 
have, as a nile, been more guilty of this blindness thai 
their opponents. The fundamental facta of consciousness 
have been, on the whole, more accurately reported by th< 
spiritualistic writers. None of Hume's pupils, so far as ] 
know, until Taine and Huxley, ever took the pains to con- 
tradict the opinion of their master. Prof. Huxley in hh 
brilliant little work on Hume set the matter straight in the 
following words : 

** When complex impressions or complex ideas are reproduced a 
memories, it is probable that the copies never give all the details of th< 
originals with perfect accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so 
No one possesses a memory so good, that if he has only once observec 
a natural object, a second inspection does not show him something thai 
he ha* forgotten. Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefon 
sketches, rather than portraits, of the originals — the salient feature 
are obvious, while the subordinate characters are obscure or unrepre 

**Now, when several complex impressions which are more or lea 
different from ont^ another let us say that out of ten impressions ii 
each, six are tlie ^4ame in all, and four are different from all the rest- 
are successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must Ix 
the nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impresuom 
will strengthen the six oorrea|)oiuling elements of the complex idea, 

* Treatise on II\uniin Nnture, part i. g vii. 



rvfutv •niuire greater vividnoKs ; while the four differing 
Ti »»i!l n«l imly acquire no greater strongili thnri Ihey 
, ill auoordance with the law of associaiion, tbey will 
lU B«d M «|)piwr at uttctt, atid will tliUH neutralize oae another. 

' Tku mvntal opnation may be rendered comprcheosible by ooiisid- 

: i Bbai t*ktn pluH.- lu the formation of compound photographs — 

'J ibi' iniaipqi <il ilic foues of six sitters, fur exitmjilr, are each re- 

,n\ ou the Muue photographiu p]al«, for a siitli of the time requisite 

ii\t ooo portmit. The Dual result is that all those points tn which 

- -w fM.i« a^:r«v are bronght out strongly, while all those in which 
; dtffKT an- left vague : aiitl thus what may be termed a generic por- 

'ii c4 the siK, in conimdistliicliuii t« a Jipeclflc [lortrait of any one, is 

TIiB» onr idau of single complex impressions are incomplete in 
■»y, anil those of numerous, more or less similar, ooraplex im- 
-''iMisuTi inouinpUtle In another way ; that is to g»j', thoy are gen- 
-' . otA tpenffte. And hence it follows ihat our ideas of the impres- 
.',. ta ijaratton are nut, in the Htriol sense of the word, eopiesof those 
, :v*iMi> ; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind iii- 
,--nd«nily iif language. 

The grDono ideas which are formed from several similar, but not 
nueal, romplex experiences are wluit are called abstract or general 
■If. and Berkeley endeavored to prove that all general ideas are 
'tilagbat partteular ideas annexed to a certain term, which gives 
'ID atanre extetisive fligultlcalion, and makes them recall, upon oc- 
:'iTa. ocber indiridtials winch are similar to them. Hume says that 
"•^fo^ this a# 'one of Ihr greatest and the most valuable discovor- 

■ Ihat haa bPMi made of lale yearw in the republic of letters.' and en- 
Miifi in imnftrm it in sueh n munnir that it shall be ' put beyond 

'l(i«ht and eontroveray, ' 

' I Hwy vrniure to nxpresK n doubt whclbcT he has succeeded in his 
'.•vt : Iml the subject is an nbstru^e one ; and I must content my- 

' wUb the rvniark. that though Berkeley's view apiiears to be l«rgr>ly 
'^<€a^AB to such Ei-nernl idcni> as are formed after language has been 

■ .vii«t, KoA lo all the more atatraet sort of eoneeptions, yet that gen- 
ii ideaa of Kn»iblr nhjeclii may n evert 1 1 el ess be ))ro<1iiced in the way 
'lii^tM. aJMl may exist independently of language. In dreams, one 

— houMS, Irmi. and other objects, which are perfectly reeugnixablu as 
!i, (iBt which remind one of the actual objects ns seen ' out of the 

"ii» of ibi« eje.' Of of the pictures ibrown by a badly-foonsaed magic 
>ni. A man arldrwwen n- who is like a figure set-n in twilight ; or 
TTire! (broDfcb eonntriea where every feature of the scenery b vagnc ; 
luHirip-i iif the hlHs are ill-marle<l. and the rivers have no define<l 
Vfifv arv, in nbort. generic ideas of many jwist impreasions of 
■i il« niti) river*. An anaiomint who occupies himself intently 
'i th- .'inminnlioa of wreral speeimMi^ of some new kind of animal. 
■-an* of time nc<|uirM so vivid a conception of its form and siruu- 

48 P8YCH0L0Q Y, 

tare that the idea may take visible shape and become a sort of wakin^^ 
dream. But the figure wliieh thus presents itself is generic, not spe- 
cific. It is no copy of any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of 
the series ; and there seems no reason to doubt that the minds of chil- 
dren before they learn to speak, and of deaf-mutes, are peopled wi»h 
similarly generated generic ideas of sensible objects/' * 

Are Vagve Images * Abstract Ideas ' ? 

The only point which I am tempted to criticise in this 
account is Prof. Huxley's xdentifixxdion of these generic images 
tvith * abstract or general ideas ' in the sense of universal concep- 
tions. Taine gives the truer view. He writes : 

'*Some years ago I saw in England, in Kew Gardens, for the first 
time, araucarias, and I walked along the beds looking at these strange 
plants, with their rigid bark and compact, short, scaly leaves, of a 
sombre green, whose abrupt, rough, bristling form cut in upon the fine 
softly-lighted turf of the fresh grass-plat. If I now inquire what this- 
experience has left in me, I find, first, the sensible representation of an 
araucaria ; in fact, I have been able to describe almost exactly the form 
and color of the plant. But there is a difference between this represen- 
tation and the former sensations, of which it is the present echo. The 
internal semblance, from which I have just made my description, i^ 
vague, and my past sensations were precise. For, assuredly, each of 
the araucarias I saw then excited in me a distinct visual sensation ; 
there are no two absolutely similar plants in nature ; I observed perhaps 
twenty or thirty araucarias ; without a doubt each one of them differed 
from the others in size, in girth, by the more or less obtuse angles of its 
branches, by the more or less abrupt jutting out of its scales, by the style 
of its texture ; consequently, my twenty or thirty visual sensations were 
different. But no one of these sensations has completely survived in its 
echo ; the twenty or thirty i*evivals have blunted one another ; thus 
upset and agglutinato<l by their resemblance they are confounded 
together, and my present representation is their residue only. This is 
the product, or rather the fragment, which is deposited in us, when we 
have gone through a series of similar facts or individuals. Of our 
numerous exjHjriences there remain on the following day four or five 
more or less distinct n>collections, which, obliterateil themselves, leave 
bt^hind in us a simple colorless, vague representfition, into which enter 
as components various reviving sensations, in an utterly feeble, incom- 
plete, and abortive state. — /^f*/M*.v represefUation w not tJie general and 
abstract idea. It is but its actttmiHinitnent, and, if I may say so, the 
ore from which it is extracted. For the repn^sentation, though badly 
sketched, is a sketch, the sensible sketch of a distinct individual. . . . 
But my abstract idea corresponds to the whole class : it differs, tbeOr 
from the representation of an individual.- Moreover, my abstract idea 

♦Huxley's \\\\n\t\ pp. 92-W. 

tMAUlSATlON. 49 

'Jisir anil ilt^tcrDiiimle ; now Ibitt I poAs«6S il, I never full 
■■ an amnn>ria ntniing the THrious plants wliich may \ic shown 
- r^ iben from the confused and flouting representation T have 

I Ti].-r woriK a t>liirre(} picture IB just an much uuiogU 
: ,1 ' >i't an H sharp picture in ; iiud the use of either picture 

. ,',w »..«/ to lymfxilite « whole doss of {ndtvidudia is a new 
.,-..':i; iL,„ciion, reqiiiiing some other modificattoa of coa- 
-ii u-ntKs thitu liie mere perception that the picture ia 
•b>tii)>'t or noL I may bewaii the indiutinctness of my 
m-duI iiR«Ke of my absent frieiid. That does not prevent 
■T IhoDftht fnmi loeiiiiitiff Inm aloue, however. Audi liiay 
■•■ti »ll manktjid, with perhaps a very sharp image of one 
nan to toy niDdV eye. Tlie meaning is a function of the 
3WT» • truiflitive ■ pnrtt of conaciousueas, the ' fringe ' of 
■ l.tioiw which we feel fiurroun<ting the image, be the latter 
:.srp or iliiu. Tliis was explaiued in a previous place (see 
473 ff^ pdjiccially the note It} page 477), aud I would not 
neb upon the matter at all here but for its historical 

"i-ar idfiw or imageH of piiat sensible experiences may 
;t!ier distinct and adequate or dim, blurred, and 
:■ . It in likely that the ilifferent degrees in which 
:i;>>u arv nblr Ut make them sharp aud complete 
■ !tiething to do with keeping up such philosophic 
L- that of Berkeley with Locke over abstract ideas, 
■ i t<i upokon of our possessing ' tlie general idea of a 

-ii^le' which "must be neither oblique nor rectangle, 

:iiM>r equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and 

11" of ihcsf at oni:e." Berkeley says : 

II anj nan Uaa the fucully iif frnminx in his mind hhi'Ii an idea of 
r-Ujrt«^ M i» li«re dfficritMid, il is in vain to pretend to dispute him 

■ ■( It. nor vuuld I ip> alxiul it. All I desin is that the reader would 

• lad itrrutnl; inforin htroself whoihtr A< has such au idea or no." ( 

I'atil very recent years it was supposed by all pbllosu- 

ii>-M thiit there was a typical human mind which all iudi- 

>' ~inds wervi like, and that propositions of universal 

< iild be laid down about such faculties as 'the 

, . ;,iii«tio«(N. y.i, vol.' It, p I8» ~^ 

iMii'ijAo. Inlrud, f IS. Cumpnti! iitsu Xhe (Hisspgt^ i|iiol('d nbovc 



Imaginatiou.* Lately, however, a mass of revelations have 
poured in, which make us see how false a view this is. 
There are imaginations, not ' the Imagination/ and thejr 
must be studied in detail 


The first breaker of ground in this direction was Fechner, 
in 1860. Fechner was gifted with unusual talent for sub- 
jective observation, and in chapter xiiv of his * Psychophy- 
sik' he gave the results of a most careful comparison of Ub 
own optical after-images, with his optical memory-pictures, 
together with accounts by several other individuals of their 
optical memory-pictures.* The result was to show a great 

* The differences noted by Fechner between after-images and images 
of imagination proper are as follows : 


Feel coercive ; 

Seem unsubstantial, vaporous ; 

Are sharp in outline ; 

Are bright ; 

Are almost colorless ; 

Are continuously enduring ; 

Cannot be voluntarily changed. 
Are exact copies of originals. 

Are more easily got with shut than 
with open eyes ; 

Seem to move when the head or eyes 
move ; 

The field within which they appear 
(with closed eyes) is dark, con- 
tracted, flat, close to the eyes, in 
front, and the images have no 
perspective ; 

The attention seems directed for- 
wards towards the sense-organ, in 
observing after-images. 


Feel subject to our spontaneity ; 

Have, as it were, more body ; 

Are blurred ; 

Are darker than even the darkeil 
black of the after-images ; 

Have lively coloration ; 

Incessantly disappear, and have to 
be renewed by an effort of wilL 
At last even this fails to revlfe 

Can be exchanged at will for others. 

Cannot violate the necessary laws of 
appearance of theiroriginals — e.g., 
a man cannot be imagined from 
in front and behind at once. The 
imagination must walk roimd him, 
so to speak ; 

Are more easily had with open than 
with shut eyes ; 

Need not follow movements of head 
or eyes. 

The field is extensive in three dimen- 
sions, and objects can be imagined 
in it above or behind almost m 
easily as in front. 

In imagining, the attention feels as 
if drawn backwards towards the 

Finally, Fechner speaks of the im}K>s8ibility of attending to both after* 

tMAOlNATlOy. fil 

(vtwnul divenitT. "It woald be interesting," he writes, 
"to work op the subject ststiBtically ; and I regret tbat 
■ -r nccupatJons hate kept me from fulfilling my earlier 
fttntinu Ui proceed iu this W113-." 
'[■•'chner's iulentjoti waa independently execnted by Mr. 
Ibxi, the publientiou nf whose results in 1880 niuy be 
d to bavp made an era in descriptive Psychologj-. 

A nmwiir}'." Miys Oalton, " lo iroDble the reader with my 

"« 6tep». After th« inquiry had been fairly stArted it took 

nlttlng A curtain number of printed qnestioos u> h Uige 

Thero is hardly any motv difHcult task than thai 

f i|DeMionii wbiuh are not likely to be misnnderstood. whlcli 

il 'i «•«}- reply, ami which cover the G^und uf Inqairy. 1 did my 

'-: ID limn rtaipi'ct-', without forgetting the moEl imporiant part of 

iiaiiM'Jy, to t«mpt my corr(«pcind<iDts lo write freely in fuller ex- 

-. jtno of tliiitr replii-H, and on cogiiale topics aa well. These sepa- 

. iKitn hkTc pmrpd more instructive and interesting by far than the 

; :i-« 10 thv irt quwtlons. 

tte UnU gronp of llie rather long mnet of qneriefl relnted to the 
-xitwikMi, <b-JStiltiuii. and coloriUR of the menial imnge, and were 

[>r'jn> addrcMtng yonrwU to any of the QueaiioDs on the opposite 

I. "[ Mine d«An)te object— suppose it is your breakfast^table 

'.■■*i\ lo it this morning— and consider carefully the picture 

. fi-re your mind's eye. 

: .'j.'uuUntmon.- Islheimagedimorfairly clear? Is its bright- 

K lamjiarabli: to ibal of the actual scene! 

■ I. l)*Jlnition.~~\TK all Ihe objects pretty well defined at the same 
=>, « it th« place (if sharpest deAnilion at any one momeut more con- 
ical tlua it is in a ml scniui f 

"■I tWortntf.— AKrihectilorBofthechina. of the [oast, bread-crust, 
. twil. MiMt, paral«y. or whatever may have been on the table, qDit« 
4 net uid aatntal f 

Thrntrlintt reitultii i>f my inquirj' amaxed me. I hud begun by 
-iiunioK (riBiulB in the nclentific world, as they were the most likely 
"• «t nwu to jhte Accumto answers concerning this faculty of visuai- 

'(vsaad InugiDatlua-lmagM at once, even when tbcy aru of the same 
Ti stiij miflit Iw npectcd u combine. All these differences are true of 
Tr.un . but maoy of liiem would be untrue of other penons. I quote 
'■^r^ w « lypv if ulaierTUloM wliicti siiy reader with suRlcfenl patience 
^ rapMt. T» ihem msy be added, u u universal propocitloo. that sfter- 
lM|i> MMB larger If we pmjpd ilii-m on a dislanl screen, and smaller If 
n pn)«t tbMB oa a near one. whilst no such change lakes place In mental 

52 P8YCR0L0GT, 

izing, to which novelists and poets continually allade, which has 
an abiding mark on the vocabularies of every language, and wl 
supplies the material out of which dreams and the well-known hall 
nations of sick people are built. 

'' To my astonishment, 1 found that t?ie great majority of the 
of science to whom I first applied protested that mental imagery 
unknown to them, and thoy looked on me as fanciful and fantasti 
supposing that the words • mental imagery ' really expressed wl 
believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more nc 
of its true nature than a color-blind man, who has not discerned 
defect, has of the nature of color. They had a mental deficienc 
which they were unaware, and naturally enough supposed that t 
who affirmed they possessed it were romancing. To illustrate 1 
mental attitude it will be sufficient to quote a few lines from the 1< 
of one of my correspondents, who writes : 

** * These questions presuppose assent to some sort of a propositioi 
garding the ** mind's eye," and the ** images" which it sees. . . . 
points to some initial fallacy. ... It is only by a figure of speech 
I can describe my recollection of a scene as a ** mental image " w 
lean *' see "with my ** mind's eye." ... I do not see it . . . anyi 
than a man sees the thousand lines of Sophocles which under 
pressure he is ready to repeat. The memory possesses it,' etc. 

** Much the same result followed inquiries made for me by a fr 
among members of the French Institute. 

*' On the other hand, when I spoke to persons whom I met in 
eral society, I found an entirely different disposition to prevail. Il 
men and a yet larger number of icomen, and many hoys and g 
declared that they habitnally saw mental imagery^ and that it 
perfectly distinct to them and full of color. The more I pressed 
crossed-questioued them, professing myself to be incredulous, then 
obvious was the truth of their first assertions. They desci 
their imagery in minute detail, and they spoke in a tone of snrprii 
my apparent hesitation in accepting what they said. I felt that I 
self should have spoken exactly as they did if I had been describii 
scene that lay before my eyes, in broad daylight, to a blind man 
persisted in doubting the reality of vision. Reassured by this haj 
experience, I recommenced to inquire among scientific men, and : 
found scattere<l instances of what 1 sought, though in by no meam 
same abundauce as elsewhere. I then circulated my questions i 
generally among my friends and through their hands, and obtaine< 
plies . . . from persons of both se.xes, and of various ages, and ir 
end from occasional corn»spondents in nearly every civilized counti 

** I have also received batches of answers from various educati 
establishments both in England and Americ^i, which were made i 
the masters had fully explained the meaning of the questions, and 
terested the boys in them. These have the merit of returns der 
from a general oensus, w]nch niy other data lack, because I cannot 

IMAOiyATlON. 53 

laMHol sui^wcM that tb« writ«rs ot tbo latlcr are a haphazard pro' 
|i«mi<4Uhmb to whom llicy were sent. Indeed I know of some who, 
terawtiiK »11 tmaspwiou of the power. naA of many others who, pos- 
mmaf it in loo fttint a degree to eoable them to expre:^ what their 

•Wnu tX alL Cntiaidirrultle statistical situilftrUy waa, however, ob- 
«Tiribn«t!«n ihn net« of returns furnished by Ihe scboolboys and 
A^ Mi)t br my ii«)utnite correspondeiils. and I ma.v add that they ac- 
tn^tn ihumpMl with the oral information I have elsewhere obtained. 
nenmtunBit) of replies from so many different sources which waa 
*«r fnxB tI>o ftrKt, the fact of their apparent trust wort hi neae being on 
Itc «lK)Ie BiDcb incmiaed by croas-examinalion (though 1 could give 
■w « t«o unuiiing instanem of break-down), and the evident effort 
Milria ^v» iWTTirate answem. have convinced me that it is a much 
■-'■^ nmlli-r llutn 1 had autidpated to obtain Iniatworthy ivplies to 
■ lualnsimi qinslinns. Many persnnn. especially women and intelli- 
: fkildn-n. liike pleaaure in intr<w|>eL'Hoii, and strive their very beat 
ipUu th^ir menial processes. I think that a delight in aolf-dissec- 
-I BOM be a Un>n;k' injrredient in the pleasure that many are said to 
iie IB OMfeiaitig Ibemselves to priests. 

" Htn. thm, itrr two rather notable results : the one is the proved 

. illij of oblalalng alaiiatical insight into the prooegses of other per- 

<j' mlwk. whatvTtraprJorf ofajectiou may have beeu made as to its 

f -MiWlUy ;mk1 the other is that scientiflc men, as a cUas. have feeble 

'.imofnsnkl reprcsenintitm. There is no doubt whatever on the 

"Tcrpoini, howMTcril nwy be accounted for. My own conclusion is 

!ji an orirr-nwiy perw^ptJon of sharp mental pictures is antagonistic 

' ''H'^MjiiirvTOfnl of habits of hi^'hly-generalixed and abatraet thought, 

- nTv when the slept* of riiuoning are carried on by words as 

• :- Mi'I that Ifthefaciillyuf seeing the pictures was ever poese«sed 

. kKu think hnni, it is very apt to be lost by disuse. The highest 

. .,', |ir--t>ably ihom in which it is not lost, but sut>ordinaIed, and 

-.]• I <r iiv> on ruiUiliIn oocaaions. 1 ara, however, bound to say 

:'ii r^iiuiDft fnenliy wems In bn repi acini so serviceably by other 

'■ if (-uDeefilion, chiefly. I believe, connected with the incipient 

—-1^ — iix<. not of the «ycbnlls oidy but of the nmsctes generally, Ihitt 

w« win tirrlart thenutlom tntirtly d^fMeiU in tlui power of feeing 

Mmtiif f/itturm '^ii nept/i/ieUia ffiee li/elike rlfucriptiotu of what they 

baiv Hvo. and can otherwise expreas themselves as if they were gifted 

''^h a tirid vianal imagiuation. Thfj/ am aim btmmt painten ftf iht 

^'tki)f Rogai AfO'teminanii* . . . 

' W an myielt a good drBugbtsnian, and have a very lively Interest tn 
turn, statua, arcbii«Liiire uud decoration, and a keen HeiiHlblllly to 
-:iEic rllcirU. But I am an extremely poor vtaunllxcr. and Had mywif 
' -a mnble to rcproiluce in my mind's eye plciures wblcb I have moat 
-■rilTyeaafiilnwl,— W, J] 

64 P6TCH0L00T. 

^* It is a mistoke to suppoae that sharp sight is accompanied by olea 
visnal memory. I have not a few instances in which the independeno 
of the two faculties is emphatically commented on ; and I have at leas 
one clear case where great interest in outlines and accurate appreoiatioi 
of straightness, squareness, and the like, is unaccompanied by thi 
power of visualizing. Neither does the faculty go with dreaming, 
have cases where it is powerful, and at the same time where dream 
are rare and faint or altogether absent. One friend tells me that hi 
dreams have not the hundredth part of the vigor of his waking fancies 

''The visualizing and the identifying powers are by no means nee 
essarily combined. A distinguished writer on metaphysical topics as 
sures me that he is exceptionally quick at recognizing a face that h^ 
has seen before, but that he cannot call up a mental image of any fae 
with clearness. 

*' Some persons have the power of combining in a single peroeptioi 
more than can be seen at any one moment by the two eyes. . . . 

'* I find that a few persons can, by what they often describe as ; 
kind of touch-sight, visualize at the same moment all round the imag 
of a solid body. Many can do so nearly, but not altogether round tha 
of a terrestrial globe. An eminent mineralogist assures me that he i 
able to imagine simultaneously all the sides of a crystal with which b 
is familiar. I may be allowed to quote a curious faculty of my own ii 
respect to this. It is exercised only oi^casionally and in dreams, o 
rather in nightmares, but under those circumstances I am perfectl; 
conscious of embracing an entire sphere in a single perception. It ap 
pears to lie within my mental eyeball, and to be viewed centripetal ly. 

*'This power of comprehension is practically attained in many case 
by indirect methods. It is a common feat to take in the whole snr 
roundings of an imagined room with such a rapid mental sweep as t 
leave some doubt whether it has not been viewed simultaneously. Som* 
persons have the habit of viewing objects as though they were parti; 
transparent : thus, if they so dispose a globe in their imagination as t 
see both its north and south poles at the same time, they will not b 
able to see its equatorial parts. They can also perceive all the rooms o 
an imaginary house by a single mental glance, the walls and floors bein) 
as if made of glass. A fourth class of |)ersons have the habit of recall 
ing scenes, not from the point of view whence they were observed, ba 
from a distance, and they visualize their own selves as actors on th 
mental stage. By one or other of these ways, the {wwerof seeing th 
whole of an object, and not merely one a8(H*ct of it, is possessed b; 
many persons. 

''Tbe place where the image appears to lie differs much. Most |>er 
sons see it in an indetlnablesort of way, others see it in front of the eye 
others at a distance i*orresponding to reality. There exists a powe 
which is rare naturally, but can, I bt»lieve, be act^uired without mucl 
difficulty, of pn>jecting a mental picture ui>on a pitH.*e of paper, and o 

iMAGiNA rioN. ns 

. Jiic 1' fitot thare, nu thai it oaii be outlined wilb a pencil. To tbia 

lBiiiin« usnally do not become strouger by dtvelliii|i; on tliero; the 
-■'. ulraLi (iimniotily tbt miwt vigoruuB, but this is not ulw^ya thecaM. 
-.itimrr. ibe inrntal riew of ii locality is insepambly connected witb 
■ iL- '■[ Its jMwitlon »A rei^ards ibe points of tbu c-umpau. real ur 
-.'inAr>. I bnvn rvcvived fnll nnil curinua descriptions from rery 
T-rriti -viurcM of Ihia fltroiig ^eogr^hical tendency, and in one or 
. idivN I hnvr r<!nsi>n to think it Hlliiv] lo a considerable faculty of 
."uni'htcal comprebeDsioD. 

-nirpuiivr uf TtMUHllunKiabijfbcriu the female sex than in the male. 
II-4 M wiBowhAt, but not much, higher in pubUc-schoot boys than in 
»n AflPT mamriiy i» reached, the fiiilher advance of age doen not 
-tn » din th*- facniiy. but nilhpr the reverse, judging from numerona 
• iA~n^n\i Ut thai effect; but advancing years are aometiroes accoin- 
.iE«l by a gtunring linbit of hard nlMtriiet thiaklng, and in the^ cnsea 
-i.'i( uuantunion niuong iboM' whom 1 bnve questioned — the faculty 
'la\*rd\\ bnnioien impninid. There is reason to believe Ihul it is very 
.'- 10 »"fw yomn^ children, who aocm to spend years of difficulty in 
-'iiiXusliiiiK bt-tttiirn tlie subjective and objcotive world. Language 
! tiatk-lnvnlDg i^-rtninly lend to dull it. 

TV viaualixing faculty la a natural gift, and, like all natural gifta, 
- 1 trivb-ncy tn Im iuhtirited. In tbia fiu:uUy the lendency to inheri- 

■ •> H eic«ptionally strong, aa I have abundant evidence to prove, 
"'lally in mjicrl to certain rather rare )>cculinrities. . . . which, 

'' tbry ciiat at All.aro usually found among two, three, or more 

Wmr* anil aUiera. jiarenta, ebildreti, uucles and aunts, and cftusina. 

Mnrr faroilin- diffr>r so mnch in respect to this gift, we may auppose 

r raMa wutild aLu) differ, and there enn be no doubt ibnt such is the 

.-■ I tiardty like tn refer to riviliznd nations, because their natural 

-'t«k an- too mncJi modiflnt by education to allow of their being 

, rMimaX inuiolT liand fashion. I muy. however, speiikof Ibo French, 

ipfitvr to ]>n»M^» the vianiilizing faculty in « high degreiv The 

■ iluu- alidily they show in prearranging ceremonials and /fls* of all 
:'U. anil Ihrir nniiiiuliliil gFuiua for tactics and sirateity, show that 

, tir able lu fon-we effccta with unusoal clonrness. Their ingenuity 
iiiurbnicBlcouirivanitw in an ailditional leatimony inthesHmcdiree- 
anil «> i* their aingnlar clearm-as nf itxpitwiion. Their phrase 
ipma-ruiu.' <ir ■ picture to youraelf.'seem» lo express their dominant 
k^ n( pOTn^tian. Our equivalent of - imai^ine ' is ambiguous. 

I tuvp inanT om^w of penons mentally reniiing off scores when 
piijiDf ih« plaiiofurie. or manuncript when they are making speeches. 
'iM K&leaman ban buudhI me that a certain hisilation In utterance 
(tell he baa ai ttmeit is dne to bis being plagned by the image of his 


manuscript speech with its original erasures and corrections. He can- 
not lay the ghost, and he puzzles in trying to decipher it. 

** Some few persons see mentally in print every word that is uttered; 
they attend to the visual equivalent and not to the sound of the words, 
and they read them off usually as from a long imaginary strip of paper, 
such as is unwound from telegraphic instruments." 

The reader will find further details in Mr. Galton's 
* Inquiries into Human Faculty,' pp. 83-114* I Lave 
myself for many years collected from each aaid all of my 
psychology-students descriptions of their own visual 
imagination ; and found (together with some curious idio- 
syncrasies) corroboration of all the variations which Mr. 
Galton reports. As examples, I subjoin extracts from two 
cases near the ends of the scale. The writers are first cous- 
ins, grandsons of a distinguished man of science. The one 
who is a good visualizer saj's : 

** This morning's breakfast-table is both dim and bright; it is dim if 
/ I try to think of it when my eyes are open upon any object; it is per- 

fectly clear and bright if I think of it with my eyes closed. — All the 
objects are clear at once, yet when I confine my attention to any one 
object it becomes far more distinct. — I have more power to recall color 
than any other one thing: if, for example, I were to recall a plate deco- 
rated with flowers I could reproduce in a drawing the exact tone, etc. 
The color of anything that was on the table is perfectly vivid. — There 
is very little limitation to the extent of my images: I can see all four 
sides of a room, I can see all four sides of two, three, four, even more 
rooms with such distinctness that if you should ask me what was in any 
particular place in any one, or ask me to count the chairs, etc., I could 
do it without the least hesitation. — The more I leam by heart the more 
chnirly do I see images of my pages. Even before I can recite the lines 
I see them so that I could give them very slowly word for word, but 
my mind is so occupied in looking at my printed image that I have no 
idea of what I am wiying, of the sense of it, etc. When I first found 
myself doing this 1 usimI to think it was merely because I knew the lines 
imperfectly; but I have quite convinced myself that I really do see an 
image. The strongest proof that such is really the fact is, I think, the 

**I can look down the mentally 8(»on page and see the words that 
commence all the linos, and from any one of these words I can continue 

* See also McCosh and OMboruc, Princeton Review, Jan. 1884. There 
are some good examples of high development of the Faculty in the London 
Spectator, Dec. 28. 1878, pp. 1681. 1684, Jan. 4, 11, 25, and March 18, 1879. 


1 fiuA this much ttanii^r tu do if llie words begin 
wui. J itiere are brmlu. Eminiple : 

6lantfnU . 
Tmu . - 
Ada. . 

Ctfnw. . 


COmnte . . 
(La FiititalneS. 


r Tisn&lizer nays : 


"l^f^mitj to fiinn meDtHl ininKea «eeuiii, from what I havt; studied 
•her peoiJtr'ii liuagos, to lie lUff-otivc, niiil somewhat peculwr. The 

■ •« t^ Ktiich 1 Mwm III rememlwr any particular eveni m uot by h 
% of diftinct iinngra, but a »orl af pAUurama. the faintest impres- 

■ o( which are ]>crc(^liblc througli b thick fog.^I cannot shut my 
hand gvt a dUllnut imaj^ of utiyonp. nlihough I used to be able to n 

K mgf>, atul tho faculty Msima to linve gnulunlly slipped away. 

t vivid drvanm, where the events appear liife the moBl real 

I Iroublt-d witli a dimiieui of sight whicli ciiuses ihi- 

r indistinct.— To come to the question of the brcaiifast- 

lotbltig dflluitp about it. Everything is vague. I ean- 

M Mf mkat I Mo>. 1 toulil not poaaibly count the chairs, but I happen 

>iiow that Ibecv am ten. I see nothing in detail.— Thuchief thing is ii 

.'»nl iaprrwinii that 1 canimt UtM exactly what I do sec. The color- 

t ia aboot ibe same, as far as I can recall it, only very much washed 

'I. Pertnpathi'unlyerjInrlcHU Dee at all distinctly is that of Ihetable- 

' (b, and I conlil pmbably sen the color of the wnll-paper if I could 

r whai color It was." 

A peraon wlione viaaHl imagiuatioii is tjtroug fiuds it 
Un] U» au<]or«tiiiid how tiioBt* wlia tire without the faculty 
nui tlunk at all. Some peiyplf. muioiAfefflt/ have no visual 
"•490 al all ii^rthy of the name,* and iusteud of seeing their 
■ ti-akfwit-tMlih', the_v tell yini thut they remember it or know 
^liil w«« cm it. Thifl kiiowiu;; &ud reniembering tiikfs 

* Tdif ilip following reiKirt from one of my students : " t iim unshlc 
<• Iwta Ib my mladV eye any rlsunl liki^iiesG of the table whatever. Alter 
May ubla. I rmtt only ge* u baxy ■iirfnce, with nothing on ft or sboiit it. 
Ion *cw no variety In color, and uu |Kwitive limilotionit in extent, while I 
rm^A av whai I w« well enniigli I0 detenulne Its t)u*itIuQ In respect to 
mj r>e. or lu vtwlnw II witli >my<iualily of rise. I sm In the Hnme ponillon 
•* Uiike mo*tl doff. I ruinnt M>c it in my mind's eye nt nil ; rind^o i-aniiot 
MI «lMli«r I alKmld have to run my <ye along It. if I iKil „f,: U." 


place undoubtedly by means of verbal images, as was ex-* 
plained already in Chapter IX, pp. 265-6. 

The study of Aphasia (see p. 54) has of late years show% 
how unexpectedly greai are the differefnces between individuals in 
respect of imagination. And at the same time the discrepan- 
cies between lesion and symptom in different cases of 
the disease have been largely cleared up. In some indi- 
viduals the habitual ' thought-stuff,' if one may so call it^ 
is visual ; in others it is auditory, articulatory, or motor ; 
in most, perhaps, it is evenlj- mixed. The same local cerebral 
injury must needs work different practical results in per- 
sons who differ in this way. In one it will throw a much- 
used brain-tract out of gear ; in the other it may affect an 
unimportant region. A particularlj' instructive case wa» 
published by Charcot in 1883.* The patient was 

Mr. X., a merchant, born in Vienna, highly educated, master of 
Grerman, Spanish, French, Greek, and Latin. Up to the beginning of 
the malady which took him to Professor Charcot, he read Homer at 
sight. He could, starting from any verse out of the first book of the 
Iliati, repeat the following verses without hesitating, by heart. Virgil 
and Horace were familiar. He also knew enough of modem Greek for 
business puq^ses. Up to within a year (from the time Charcot saw 
liim) he enjoyed an exceptional visual memory. He no sooner thought 
of persons or things, but features, forms, and colors arose with the 
same clearness, sharpness, and accuracy as if the objects stood before 
him. When he tried to recall a fact or a figure in his voluminous 
polyglot correspondence, the letters themselves appeared before him 
with their entire content, irregularities, erasures and all. At school he 
recited from a mentally seen page which he read off line by line and 
letter by letter. In making computations, he ran his mental eye down 
imaginary columns of figures, and performed in this way the most 
varied operations of arithmetic. He could never think of a passage in 
a play without the entire scene, stage, actors, and audience appearing^ 
to him. He had been a great traveller. Being a good draughtsman, 
he used to sketch views which pleased him; and his memory always 
brought back the entire landscaiK) exactly. If he thought of a conver- 
sation, a saying, an engagement, the place, the people, the entire scene 
rose before his mind. 

His auditory memory was always deficient, or at least secondary. 
He had no taste for music. 

* Progrds Medical, 21 juillet. 1 abridge from the German report ot 
the case in Wilbrand: Die SeeleDblindhoit (1887). 

lilAOlSATION. 5» 

A jtut aud ■ bitlf previous to exam i nation, After busincss-anxielies, 
na »f >1ii-)i. iqiiwtite, etc., he noticed suddenly one day au extraordi- 
r^i Lhiinirc in liimapK. After complete confusion, there oamo a violent 
(ocinut bccwtwu bib nld »ad his new state. Everything ubout bim 
niKNi -o new and foreign that at first he thought be must be going 
:.*! l\v WW ni^rvaua and irritable. Although he saw all thiugK ilis- 
tt, be- iuul i-uiini)y lost his memory for forms and colors. On ascer- 
1 [ii[>^ \h\*, tit- )>A'fime rcfusured as to his sanity. He soon diseiivcred 
Lj] hr could carry on Ilia aSaira by using his memory in an altogether 
if! iiiy, Hf Clin now describe clenrly tbe difference bciwoeu his two 

T-frtj litue be returns ri) A., from which place business often ciilU 
kim. be WHTins 1« himself an If enlcrin}; a strange city. He views the 
r. namenii.. bou»e#, and streets wilh the same surprise as if he saw 
■ ^ (iir tbr fint lime. Uraduidly. however, his memory returns, and 

cu>l* biniM-lt «t home agnin. When naked to describe the princi)>ul 

j,n- y\arv nf the town, hi' unawered. '* I know tlint it is there, bui it 
. rmi-miblo TO im.iginn il, and 1 can lell you nothing about it." He tins 
' niit»n \\:v p-irt of \. To-day hesainly tries to trace its principal 

illucs. Askod to dmw a minaret, lie tvflects, says it is a square 
' "r. ind draws, rudely, fonr lines, one for gronnd, one for lop, and 
' '.it udes. .Vskrd ti> druw nn nrcado. be says, " I remember [hat it 

tain* (wtDi-ctrrubir arches, and that two of them meeiing at an angle 
jik* » vault, but how it Imkit I am absninlely unable to imagim?." Tlie 
I ■■i(ll# n( a man which he drew by retjuest was a:* if drawn by n little 

1-1; and yet lie confnwil tliat he had bt-en helped tn draw it by took- 

„■ *i the bTsiaiidi-n. Similarly ho dr«w a sbai>eletia scribble fur a 

TI* can no wore rwnember his wife's find children's faces than lie 
IS iMM-mb^r the port of A. Even aft«r lielng with them gome timo 
tUvMvm anuonal to him. lie forgets his own face, and on oe spoke 
k' his Ima^ in a mirror, taking it for a stranger. He complains of his 
■» of rr«4lng for i:olotB. " Ify wife has black hair, ihis I know: but 
I eu DO tnnm recall iu color than 1 can her person and fonlures.'* 
Ttiia rUuol amnosia extends tn dating objects from bis childhood's 
j »an > i iatrmal mansion, ete., forgollen. 

Xd other disiiirbsnces but this lots of visual images. Now when he 
■vk* »o<t>ethinK lu his correspondence, he must rummage among the 
bttfn lik« other men, until he meets the [Hissage. !)*■ can recall only 
the Unrt fvw verses of the Iliad, and must o"^ to read Homer. Vii^l. 
obd Horacr. Flgura which he adds lie must now whisper to himself. 
B( tcaZiwa cle«rly that he must help his memory nut with auditory 
ta^a, which he iloes with effort. "Hie wordt and erpressions which 
kirtaaOs won now to rcho in hit ear, an all«gflhrr nocel aetuatioii /or 
U*. If be viohca to learn by heart anything, a aeries of phrases for 
uonftli!. he must raid thtni Kwral llnien aioutt, so as to Impress bia 
(■(. Wbeo later be repeals the thing in (jiicstion, the sensation of in- 


ward hearing which precedes articulation rises up in his mind. This 
feeling was formerly unknown to him. He speaks French fluently; but 
affirms that he can no longer think in French; but must get his French 
words by translating them from Spanish or Grerman, the languages of 
his childhood. He dreams no more in visual terms, but only in words, 
usually Spanish words. A certain degi-ee of verbal blindness affects 
him— he is troubled by the Greek alphabet, etc.* 

If this patient had possessed the auditory type of imag- 
ination from the start, it is evident that the injury, what- 
ever it was, to his centres for optical imagination, would 
have affected his practical life much less profoundly. 

** The auditory type,'^ says M. A. Binet,t ** appears to be rarer than 
the visual, Pei*sons of this type imagine what they think of in the 
language of sound. In order to remember a lesson they impress upon 
their mind, not the look of the page, but the sound of the words. 
They reason, as well as remember, by ear. In performing a mental ad- 
dition they repeat verbally the names of the figures, and add, as it 
were, the sounds, without any thought of the graphic signs. Imag- 
ination also takes the auditory form. *When I write a scene,' said 
Legouv^ to Scribe, * I hear ; but you see. In each phrase which I write, 
the voice of the personage who speaks strikes my ear. Vous^ qui Hes le 
4h4dtre nietfie, your actors walk, gesticulate before your eyes ; I am a 
-listener y you a spectator.' — * Nothing more true,' said Scribe ; ' do you 
know where I am when I write a piece ? In the middle of the parterre.* 
It is clear that the pure audile, seeking to develop only a single one of 
his faculties, may, like the pure visualizer, perform astounding feats 
of memory — Mozart, for example, noting from memory the Miserere of 
the Sistine Chapel after two hearings ; the deaf Beethoven, composing 
and inwardly rei)eating his enormous symphonies. On the other hand, 
the man of auditory type, like the visual, is exposed to serious dangers ; 
for if he lose his auditory images, he is without resource and breaks 
vdown completely. 

''It is possible that [)erHons with hallucinations of hearing, and in- 

* In a letter to Charcot this interesting pntient adds that his character 
also is changed . "I was formerly receptive, easily made enthusiastic, and 
possessed a rich fancy. Now I am (luict and cold, and fancy never carries 
my thoughts away. ... I am much less susceptible than formerly lo 
anger or sorrow. I lately lost my dearly -beloved mother; but felt far leas 
grief at the l>ereavement than if 1 had been able to see in my mind's eye 
her physiognomy and the phases of her suffering, and especially less than 
if 1 had been able to witness In imagination the outward effects of her un- 
timely loss upon thememl>er8 of the family." 

t Psychologic du Kalsonnemcnt (1886), p. 95. 



ili^iiiiuia afflirt«d nilh (he mania that they are victims of persecution, 
ut dl Utlotig to the auditory type ; and that the predominance oF a 
wuiD kind nf I ntafci nation may predispose to a certain order al hal- 
^ and pvrbapa oF deliriam. 

■■Tl» motor type remains— perhaps tlie moat interesting of all, 
i -^(rtalolT tbn one of which least is known. Persons who belong Ut 
' I'ljpF [U» molcurg. in French, moliles, aa Mr. Ualton proposes to 
^ ' (hem in EufclUh] amko use. in memory, reasoning, and all their 
-iillcrtaal oprniiions, of images derived from moveraeni, In order to 
^•fenUuMl this important point, it is enough to remember Ihal 'al> 
^ pemptwns. and in particular the important ones, those of sight 
-'.<! looch, mntain as Integral elements the movements of our eyes and 
:r,ta . and (bat. if movement is ever an essential factor in our really 
- nit «n ohjVt. i( mnst be an ecjualiy essential factor when we see the 
.^ ntj)w;t in Imagination ' (Ribotj,* For example, the complex im- 
-•suna nf a hall, which id there, in our hand, is the resultant of optical 
BpraaiMM of toncli. of muscular adjustments of the eye. of the move- 
mmu uf oar ISiigiT*. nnd of the muscular sensations which iheee yield. 
Tbni we inuucini' the ball. Ita idea must include the images of these 
■ iirntar u-tiMttiutis, just as it Inclndes those of the retinal and epidor- 
-ti mitntinDK They form so many motor images. If they were not 
<H>ff raeogDi^ted to exist, that is because oar knowledge oF the muscu- 
ir MiHv is TPlalively so recent. In older psychologies it never waa 
amlioopd, the number of senses being restricted to five. 

"Ttwrv are iMiriiciiu who rem lumber a drawing better when they have 
frJInvn] ita otitlinra with their linger. Lecoq de Bulsbaudran used this 
WBH In hia arlistli! teauhing, in order to accustom his pupils to draw 
Ina nnwiry. tie made them follow the outlines of figures with a 
fiwil held in the air, forcing them Ihu's Ut associate muscular with 
liwal BMfBiary. Oallon quotes a curious corroborative fact. Colonel 
Mooerioll uflen observed in North America young Indians who, visit- 
■f ueeaakNiaUy his quarters, interested themselves greatly in ih» 
npavtiifp which were shown them. One of lliein followsd with care 
•Mh Ibe pntnt of his knife the outline of a drawing in the Illustrated 
tMMkra Newa, saying that this was to enable him to carre it out the 
hUer ofl hia return home. In this case the motor images were to 

* [I an myaelf a very poor Tleuallxer. aod And that I can seldom call to 
■lid «nB a rfngle letter of the alphatrct In purely retinal tenns. I must 
km ih* totter by ruuiiog my mental eye over !te contour in order that 
At lmc« of it aball have any distiDCtaess at all. On questioning a large 
■■abtr of Otiter paople, mostly students, I find that pertups lialf of tbom 
f^i^ixn 00 micb dlMculIylo seeing letters mentally. .Mnny affirm 
lat Ihajr CIA •(« an entire word at once, especially » short oac like ' dog.' 
'ft M> Mtcb reeliog ot creating the letters successively by Iracing them 
I the ire.— W. J.] 

«2 P87CH0L00 T, 

reinforce the visual ones. The young savage was a fnotor* . . . Wheti 
one's motor images are destroyed, one loses one's remembrance of move- 
ments, and sometimes, more curiously still, one loses the power of exe* 
cuting them. Pathology gives us examples in motor aphasia, agraphia^ 
«tc. Take the case of agraphia. An educated man, knowing how to 
write, suddenly loses this power, as a result of cerebral injury. His 
hand and arm are in no way paralytic, yet he cannot write. Whence 
this loss of power ? He tells us himself : he no longer knows how. He 
has forgotten how to set about it to trace the letters, he has lost the 
memory of the movements to be executed, he has no longer the motor 
images which, when formerly he wrote, directed his hand. . . . Other 
patients, affected with word-blindness, resort to these motor images 
precisely to make amends for their other deficiency. . . . An individ- 
ual affected in this way cannot read letters which are placed before his 
«ye8, even although his sight be good enough for the purpose. This loss 
of the power of reading by sight may, at a certain time, be the only 
trouble the patient has. Individuals thus mutilated succeed in reading 
by an ingenious roundabout way which they often discover themselves : 
it is enough that they should trace the letters with their finger to under- 
stand their sense. What happens in such a case ? How can the hand 
supply the place of the eye? The motor image gives the key to the 
problem. If the patient can read, so to speak, with his fingers, it is 
because in tracing the letters he gives himself a certain number of mus- 
cular impressions which are those of writing. In one word, the patient 
reads by writing (Charcot): the feeling of the gp;^phic movements sug- 
gests the sense of what is being written as well as sight would.*' f 

The imagination of a blind-deaf mute like Laura Bridg- 
man must be confined entirely to tactile and motor material. 
AH blind persons must belong to the * tactile* and *niotSe* types of 
the French authors. When the young man whose cataracts 
were removed by Dr. Franz was shown different geometric 
figures, he said he " had not been able to form from them 
the idea of a square and a disk until he perceived a sensa- 
tion of what he saw in the points of his fingers, as if he 

really touched the objects." 4 

Professor Strieker of Vienna, who seems to have the 
motile form of imagination developed in unusual strength, 

* It is hardly netHlful to mjtlmt in moiiem primary education, in which 
the blackboanl is $o much uskhI, the ohiUlre n an* taught their letters, etc.* 
bv all pi>s»ible cbauQeh at onco, »ight, htrarlujT. acd movement. 

f See an interesting case of a »imilar wrl. rvported by Fkrgea, in l^Bn- 
cfphale. 7me Aunee, p. 545« 

t PhilotK^hical Transactions, \M\. \\ 65. 

I tamn 


given ft very curefnl nnalysis of liis own case iu a 
lie of monograpliH with wliicb all studeuts should be- 
htuiliur.* His recollections both of his owu ruove- 
mrntK anti of those of otber tMi]g» are accoin|)anied 
iii»ri»l»lT b_V liiatinct musfnlar feelings in those parts of 
k> UAy which would naturally b« used in effecting or in 
MUwinK thf movpmfnt. Iii thinking of a soldier niaroh- 
Oif, for pxaiu]il<!, it is iis if \w were helping the image to 
U b_v marehing himself in IiIk rear. And if he sup- 
ttiis Hvni pathetic feeling iu his own legs, and con- 
\\ie* all his »tt«ntit>u on the imagined soldier, the latter 
iUii>M. lut it were, paralyzed. In general his imagined 
ta, of whatnoever objects, seem paralyzed the 
Bt no feelings of movement either in his own eyes or 
own limbs lu-company them.f The tnovemeuts of 
kle Rp<>ei:ti play a predominant part iu hia mental 

k Af(«r toy experimental work I proceed lo il-i di-'ncriplion. 
I Nprulncit In Ihe drat instance onl,v words, wliich 1 tiHil 
failed with the perception of the various ilelaila of the ob< 
it Ibi? Iatl«r wiut going on. For Hpeech jihiya in all my 
C«o Important n pnrt that I ordinarily clothe phenomena in 
- :>!« •• fMt as 1 olMiervB thpin." J 

M"st |>erHon)4, on being aaked i*r what Kort of terma they 

< ••nU, will say ' in terms of hearing.' It is not until 

■■• iition is expressly drawn to the point that they 

.iriiiult to say whether auditory images or motor 

;:uH^''~ <'>>unecteif with the organs of articulation predomi- 

*»le. A good way of bringing tlie difficulty to cousciousness 

h that propoaed by Strieker : Partly open your mouth and 

'■'■'•■n inio^ue any woril with labials or dentals in it, such as 

imWik'," • toddle." Is your image under these conditions 

•Jottnct ? To moMt people the image is at first ' thick,' as 

t itound of the word would be if they tried to pronoauca 

Wlh thi» lij* parted. Many can never imagine the words 

I abvr dl« Spmchvontelluusen (1980), nnd Siudicn Dhor die 

felHrarfinfbi that by pnictfce he bus siiccoedcd Id maklo^- 
It vioariouaiy ' for hta leg-movements [□ Imagining 


! Bb wgg uogiTottt f II u iigf I 


clearly with the mouth open ; others succeed after a few 
preliminary trials. The experiment proves how dependent 
our verbal imagination is on actual feelings in lips, tongue, 
throat, larynx, etc. 

'* When we recall the impression of a word or sentence, if we do not 
speak it out, we feel the twitter of the organs just abont to oome to 
that point. The articulating parts— the larynx, the tongue, the lip6>* 
are all sensibly excited ; a suppressed articulation is in fact the mate^ 
rial cf our recollection, the intellectual manifestation, the idea of 

The open mouth in Strieker's experiment not only pre- 
vents actual articulation of the labials, but our feeling of 
its openness keeps us from imagining their articulation, 
just as a sensation of glaring light will keep us from 
strongly imagining darkness. In persons whose auditory 
imagination is weak, the articulatory image seems to con- 
stitute the whole material for verbal thought Professor 
Strieker says that in his own case no auditory image enters 
into the words of which he thinks. t Like most psycholo- 
gists, however, he makes of his personal peculiarities a rule, 
and says that verbal thinking is normally and univer- 
sally an exclusively motor representation. I certainly get 
auditory images, both of vowels and of consonants, in 
addition to the articulatory images or feelings on which 
this author lays such stress. And I find that numbers of 
my students, after repeating his experiments, come to this 
conclusion. There is at first a difficulty due to the open 
mouth. That, however, soon vanishes, as does also the 
difficulty of thinking of one vowel wliilst continuously 
sounding another. What probably remains true, however, 
is that most men have a less auditorv and a more articu- 
latory verbal imagination than they are apt to be aware ot 

* Bain : Sensi^s and Intellect, p. 889. 

t Stiulien aber Spmchvoretelhingen. 28, 81, etc. Cf. pp. 49-50. etc. 
Against Strieker, see Stmnpf. Ton|>8ychol., 155-162, and Revue Phi- 
U>8ophique. xx. 617. St»t^ aUo Paiilhan. Kev. Philoeophique, xvi. 406. 
Strieker repHoa to l^lulhan in vol. xviii. p. 685. P. retorts in vol. xix. 
p. 118. Strieker n«(H>rtH that out of UH) |H*rM)n8 questioned he found only 
ofie who had no filling in hia \\\mk when Hilently thinking the letters If ft 
P; and out of 60 only ttto who wriT eouMetous of no internal articuUtloB 
whilst reading (pp J^-60). 


Pm!.-wuir fitricltfir IiimHplf has acoustic imrtges, and can 
:::.>4:iiir tii» tt<iuuil8 of luiiaical mt»truiiieuUi, uuil tli» pectil- 
ur \a\rv of ft frieud. A statistical iDcjuiry nu a, lai^e ttcaU, 
into tlie Tariatioas of acoustic, tactile, and motor imagina- 
teui, would probably )it>ar l«ss fruit tliau Galtou's iuquiry 
□itn visual itnof^s. A (fw monographs 1>j i-oiupetent ob~ 
wiTPre, like Strieker, alnrnt their own peculiarities, wouM 
titf miith more valnable informatioii about the diversities 
'fiili i)rrTttiL' 

TowJi-imagtf are very strong m some people. The most 
■ ;iid kluch-images come when we oureelves barely escape 
' -ki injury, or when we see another injured. The place 

* I iblnk U mutt be adiniiiMl Uint soino pi^ople have qo vivid eubstau*- ] 
:.iT idM^ea la ang dcparlmeDI of llii-ir seiiBlbilllj. One o( my sIudeatB, 
u inleltifeMl juutli, lieDJedau pcriiriticioiisly that IberewasanyeAtnjiinhift 
BiajMaU wben he IhoQgbt, that 1 vns much perplexed by his due. Imy^ 
mU canalnly luiveiiotucliTWIdplayof oasccDt mofemeiilHririDolorlnisges 
M pMhaur Suteker dncribci*. When I seek to re|ireseiil arow of soldiera 
mrthlitg. all I cnWih la & view of Btationary legs Oral Id one phase of 
■wtBCnt Bwl Uiea Id anolber, and lhe«e views are extremely imperlpcl 
wl OHMBOiilary. Oc'Cksionally (o§pcc!ally wbeo I iry lo silmulaie my 
tB^iaatloa, a* hy repealing Victor Hugo's iloca about Itic regiment, 
" Lnir lata wt •! emrvct, mm larder nl eoirrlr. 
Qa'nBTTDttTolrimaliiaauK ae rcnnar st t'uutrlr.") 
I laoi l> ggt an InMantaocoiu glimpse of an actual movement, but it ts to 
dalMadri^nedim aiid uoeerlnio. All Ibese tmiiges nfcm at first as if 
poirij rrtlnal. t think. Uowirver. that rapid eyemovemcDls accompsny 
Ibtn. tbouKh tbrip latter ^Ive rtxe lo aueh alight feeliags that I buy are 
*laa* inpuBibte uf detection. Alifoliilcly an leg-movemeDla of my own 
•ntbtn; in fM-i. lo call «iich up arresU my Imn^imiion of ihe aoldlera. 
My optical Inu^areln gvneral verj' dim. dark, fugillva. and cootracted. 
b vtaiJd bw utictly tmpoKible to drait frum them, and yet I perfectly well 
dbllBfDid ooe from ibe other. My auditory images nrc cxceiwively iaade- 
qM« nfooiluctluii* of Ihdr origliinla. I liave >w imagea of taatc or smell. 
Tlwh liiia|Tiiallrii li fairly dlslbcl, but comee very Utile Into play with 
MrtebjMia ibnnglil of. Nelibcr teall ray thought verbalised: for I have 
*t^owj tdirmes of relation, m apt to lerminale In a nod of Ihe head or an 
"fHift of Ibe br««th an In a deflnlle word. On Ihewbole, vainie iniagea 
M ■Madma of movnoent Innide of my head towardn the vurious parrs of 
■VKafewblcb tbe t«rm»I am thinking of cither lie oraremumentarllysym- 
Mkd ta U» logMher wlib morenienii iit the breath through my pharynx 
m4 whoOm, fnrm a by no means InronBidembie part of my ttunight^ttiff. 
I taAc wfcetber my difficulty In gtrlng a clearer account is wholly a mni- 
Wof ikfitiar ^iwirvr of tnliMpeetiVfl attentloii, though that doubtless playf> 
IM pvL AnMXlon, (Wfcrft porj^uj, must always be Inferior In ptnportion 
H Ik* fMblenca of the IntcnaJ tmaget which are offered it to hold «d lo. 

06 P87CH0L06T, 

may then actually tingle with the imaginary sensation — 
perhaps not altogether imaginary, since goose-flesh, pal- 
ing or reddening, and other evidences of actual muscular 
contraction in the spot may result. 

*' An educated man," says a writer who must always be quoted when 
it is question of the powers of imagination,* *Uoldmeonee that on 
entering his house one day he received a shock from crushing the finger 
of one of his little children in the door. At the moment of his fright 
he felt a violent pain in the corresponding finger of his own body, 
and this pain abode with him three days/* 

The same author makes the following discrimination, 
which probably most men could verify : 

** On the skin I easily succeed in bringing out suggested sensations 
wherever I will. But because it is necessary to protract the mental ef- 
fort I can only awaken such sensations as are in their nature prolonged, 
as warmth, cold, pressure. Fleeting sensations, as those of a prick, a 
cut, a blow, etc., I am unable to call up, because I cannot imagine them 
ex abrupto with the requisite intensity. The sensations of the former 
order I can excite upon any part of the skin ; and they may become so 
lively that, whether I will or not, I have to pass my hand over the place 
just as if it were a real impression on the skin.'' \ 

Meyer's account of Ms ovm visual images is very interest- 
ing ; and with it we may close our survey of differences be- 
tween the normal powers of imagining in different indi- 

** With much practice,*^ he says, ** I have succeeded in making it 
possible for me to call up subjective visual sensations at will. I tried 
all my experiments by day or at night with closed eyes. At first it 
was very difficult. In the first experiments which succeeded the whole 
picture was luminous, the shadows being given in a somewhat less strong 
bluish light. In later experiments I saw the objects dark, with 
bright outlines, or rather I saw outline drawings of them, bright on a 
dark ground. I can compare these drawings less to chalk drawings on 
a blackboard than to drawings made with phosphorus on a dark wall 
at night, though the phosphorus would show luminous vapors which 
were absent from my lines. If I wished, for example, to see a face, 
without intending that of a particular person, I saw the outline of a 
profile against the dark background. When I tried to repeat an ex- 

* €^. Herm. Meyer, Untersuchungen ab. d. Physiol, d. Nerveof^uwi 
(1848), p. 288. For other cases see Tuke's Influence of Mind upon Body, 
chaps, n and vn. 

t M^er, op, eU. p. 288. 



pmBflil of ttu> elder Darwin I saw only the edges of the die as bright 
las aa * dark ground. Sometimes, however. I saw the die really white 
uA lU fldgcB black ; it was tbeu on a paler ground. I could soon at 
■til dump tMrtw Mn a wliilo die with black borders ou a light field, and 
itiatiilto with nbit« borders on a dark field ; and I con do this at any 
tman tMW. After king {iractii^e . . . those eiperlmpntB succeeded 
krcrr (till. 1 am now call before ray eyes almost any object which I 
fitir. a* a sabjf<CT|lve appearance, and this in its own natural color and 
nasiicutinii. I HOT them almost always on a more or Ies» light or dark, 
»j*tly du&lf changeablu groiini). Even known (aeee I can see quit« 
■Urp. wiib tbe true color uf hair and cheeks. It is odd that I sea 
!ii*r (mww nioslly in profile, whtireaa those described [in the previous 
MUwt| WMV all rnll-fac«. Here are some of the final results of these 

^^V*I> ria*Bt> ilmf after (he pjcfiiri« have arisen tbey vanish or change 

^^H^ otJiKt*. withoai my beiug able to prevent it. 

^^F">> Vbeo thecntnr dooK not inlcgrnlly belong lo the object, 1 cannot 

I ^n;> ooolrul tt. A fauf, e.g.. never seems to me blue, but always in 
lb oataral raltir: a ml doth, on the other hand, I can some times 
chaap to a Mae one. 

"S) 1 hamanmrFtimiMsncceeded inseoingpurecolors without objects; 
tbn tb» All (b« entire field of view. 

*' 4> I oflni fail to see objects which are not known to me, merefio- 
buu «i my fancy, and instead of them there will appear familiar ob- 
)m* af a «imilar .turt ; for instance, I once tried to gee a braas anord- 
Ul wttb a bratw guard, instead of which the more familiar picture of a 
apwr-ciurd aiipeared. 

"I) Voat of tlH«c ftnbjective appearances, especially when they were 
l*i|&t. left afltT'imagee behind them when the eyea were qnickly 
iqtEOfd daring their prenence. For example, I thought of a silver stir- 
n^ and after I had looked at it a while 1 opened my eyes and for a 
1n( whila aft«rwardB saw il« afterimage. 

"TbM* «xperimcnta succeeded best when 1 lay quietly on my back 
Md doMd Kj eyea. [ could bear no noise about me, as this kept the 
fUm fhm attaining tbn requisite intensity. The experimenta succeed 
*IA SK BOW wo easily that I am surprised they did not do so at first, 
■>d I tel H tbough thoy ought to succeed with everyone. The im- 
rnmii poliit in them is to get tbe image sufficiently intense by the ex- 
rtwln dtreetkm of tbe attention upon it. and by the removal of all 
^iitiubbig ImpTawttona." * 

Tie ntgative afler-imaga tc/nch svoceeded tipon Meyer'a 
mofimcUion uAen he opened his eyea are a higLly interest- 
IB^ Ikongh rare, phenoneaoD. So far aa I know there is 

68 P8TCH0L0Q Y. 

only one other published report of a similar experience.* It 
would seem that in such a case the neural process corre- 
sponding to the imagination must be the entire tract con- 
cerned in the actual sensation, even down as far as the 
retina. This leads to a new question to which we may 
now turn— of what is 


The commonly-receiyed idea is that it is only a milder 
degree of the same process which took place when the 
thing now imagined was sensibly perceived. Professor 
Bain writes: 

*' Since a sensation in the first instance diffuses nerve-currents 
through the interior of the brain outwards to the organs of expression 
and movement,— the persistence of that sensation, after the outward 
exciting cause is withdrawn, can be but a continuance of the same dif- 
fusive currents, perhaps less intense, but not otherwise different. The 
shock remaining in the ear and brain, after the sound of thunder, must 
pass through the same circles, and operate in the same way as during 
the actual sound. AVe can have no reason for believing that, in this 
self-sustaining condition, the impression changes its seat, or passes into 
some new circles that have the special property of retaining it. Every 
part actuateil after the shock must have been actuated by the shock, 
only more powerfully. With this single difference of intensity, the mode 
of existence of a sensation existing after the fact is essentially the same 
as its mode of existence during the fact. . . . Now if this be the case 
with impressions j)erf(isting when the cause has ceased, what view are 
wo to adopt concerning impressions reproduced by mental causes alone, 
or without tl)e aid of the original, as in ordinary recollection ? What 
is the manner of occupation of the brain with a resuscitated feeling of 
rt.»sistanc(\ a smell or a soun<l ? There is only one answer that seems 
admissable. T/ie reneu'eti feeh'ng oct^upies the very same parts, and in 
the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, nor in 
any othtr assignable manner. I imagine that if our present knowledge 
of the brain had Ikh'u pn»H*»nt to the earliest speculators, this is the only 

* That of Dr. Ch. VM in the Hivue PhiloRophique. xx. 864. Johannes 
MOUer's account of hypnagogic halluci nations floating before the eyes for 
a few moments after th(*tM* had lHH*n o|H*ned. seems to belong more to the 
category of R|X)ntan(»ou{« lialluclnHtionH {»vv his Physiology, London. 184S, 
p. 1894). It is impORiiibU* to tell whether the words in Wnndt's Vorle- 
simgen, i. 887. refer to a p4»rHonal exp4«Henoe of his own or not ; piobably 
not. 11 ta 9an» dire that an infortor viHnnHxc*r like myself can get no sudi 
after-images. Nor have I as yet succeeded in getting report of any from 
my students. 


I thst wodW hiivp opcuTTerf to Ihem. For where should a 
% be emboditwl, if Dot in ibe same orgaoB a« the feeling when 
It is only in thin wny that its identity enn be preserved ; a 
IMbig tUflsrmUy embodied would be a ditferent feeliog." * 

It in not plain from Profeasor Bain's text whether by 
li^ ' lUtrnp pnrtf^ ' he menns only the same parts inside the 
initi. or the same prripfiernl partn also, as those occupied by 
ti« original leelitig. The examples which he himself pro- 
oseds to f(ive are almost all ra&es of imagiuatioD of tnove- 
maU. in which the peripheral orgaus are indeed affected, 
for acttuU movementH of n weak sort are found to accom- 
pany the idea. This is what we should expect. All cur- 
rrats tend to mn forward in the brain and discbarge into 
the mnsi-'iilar system ; and the idea of a movement tends to 
do this with pecoliar facility. But the question remaiuB: 
Do ouTUtts ran backward, so that if the optical centres 
{tot example) are excited by ' association ' and a visual ob- 
^jfct is imagined, a current runs doivn to tlie retina- also, 
^■■d excitea that s\-mpathetically with the liigher tracts ? 
^K oth«r words, can peripheral sense-organs be excited from 
^^MMw, or otdy from vnthovi ? Are. they excited in tmagi- 
tatitm? FrofesHor Bain's instances are almost silent as to 
this point All he aaya is this : 

" V« might thititi nf ■ blow on the hand uutil the skin were actually 
ttriuied aad Inflained. Tlie alleotion very much directed to any part 
if tba bndy, >■> th*^ f(Tfitt tov, for instance, is npt to produce a dietinct 
trrUag ia the part, which wo sccnunt fur only by supposing a revived 
Mm'-cumnt to flow Iht^re. making a sort of false sensation, an influ- 
fDM from within mimicking the influences from withont in sensation 
fnpar. — (8m the wntiugs of Hr. Braid, of Hancheater, on Hypnotiani, 

^^M If I may judge from my own experience, all feelings of 
^^Bb sort are consecntive upon motor currents invading the 
^^Hh^^ producing contraction of the muscles there, the 
^^^^^^^Hrlioae coutractiou gives ' goose-flesh ' when it takes 
^^^^^^B- an extensive scale. 1 never get a feeli'ng in the 
^^^^^Whrewir strongly I imagine it, until some actual 

ekai^ in the condition of the skin itself has occurred. 

I^ troUt seeme to be that the cases where peripheral 


sense-organs are directly excited in consequence of imagi* 
nation are exceptional rarities, if they exist at alL In com* 
mon cases of imagination it toould seem more natural to suppose 
that the seat of the process is purely cerdyral, and thai the sense* 
organ is left out. Eeasons for such a conclusion would be 
briefly these : 

1) In imagination the starting-point of the process must 
be in the brain. Now we know that currents usually flow 
one way in the nervous system ; and for the peripheral sense- 
organs to be excited in these cases, the current would have 
to flow backward. 

2) There is between imagined objects and felt objects 
a difference of conscious quality which may be called al- 
most absolute. It is hardly possible to confound the live- 
liest image of fancy with the weakest real sensation. The 
felt object has a plastic reality and outwardness which the 
imagined object wholly lacks. Moreover, as Fechner says, 
in imagination the attention feels as if drawn backwards to 
the brain ; in sensation (even of after-images) it is directed 
forward towards the sense-organ.* The difference between 
the two processes feels like one of kind, and not like a mere 
* more ' or * less ' of the same.f If a sensation of sound 
were only a strong imagination, and an imagination a weak 
sensation, there ought to be a border-line of experience 
where we never could tell whether we were hearing a weak 
sound or imagining a strong one. In comparing a present 
sensation felt with a past one imagined, it will be remem- 
bered that we often judge the imagined one to have been the 
stronger (see above, p. 500, note). This is inexplicable if 
the imagination be simply a weaker excitement of the sen- 
sational process. 

To these reasons the following objections may be made : 
To 1) : The current demonstrably does flow backward 

♦ See above, Vol. II. p. 50, note. 

t V. Eandinsky (Kritische u. klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete der 
SinnestausGhungea (Berlin, 1885), p. 185 ff.) insists that in even the live- 
liest pseudo-hallucinations (see below. Chapter XX), which may be re- 
garded as the intensest possible results of the imaginative process, there 
is no outward objectivity perceived in the thing represented, and that a 
ffamer Abgrund separates these ' ideas ' from true hallucination and objec- 
tive perception. 

IXAdlXATlON. 71 

■?(nrB the optic nerve in Meyer's and Fere's negative after- 
iniig*'. Therefore it can flow backward ; therefore it tnay 
tarn backward in some, however slight, degree, in all imag- 

To 2): The difference alleged iBnotahsoIute,anil8eiisa- 
lioo and imagination nrr huid to discrlnunate where the 
■^siatinQ is tio weak aK to be just per('>'|>tihh>. At ni^ht 
h'jinng A very faint striking of the hour by a far-off clock, 
cor imagination reprodncea botli rhythm and sound, and it 
» o(U>n difficnlt to tell which was the last real stroke. So 
of a baby ciying in a distant part of the house, we are un- 
crrtain wh^^ther we still hear it, or only imagine the sound. 
Certain violin-players take advantage of this in diminuendo 
IfrmiuatioaB. Aftvr the pianissimo has been reached 
they cootinue to bow as if still playing, but are careful not 
lo toach the strings. The listener hears in imagination a 

* It McBM lo also flow bnckwHrds Id certafa Lypnoliv hHllticimilioiu. 
^q«>1 to a ' Sulii«cl ' in llit; tiypnollc Irancc Ibut a sbeut or paper has a 
Kd cn^ apon fi, tbeo pretend lo retiioTe Uie Imnglnary cross.whilst you 
Mil lb* Subject to look fixedly >t a dot upon the paper, and he will pres- 
aoljr tall yon that be imb a 'bluish-green 'crou. ThegemiioenesB of ibe 
m^ !■• tMCa doubled, bul Ihetv Bepms no good reason for rejecting M. 
■aa^aWMUil (UHagiirti8Uii'ADiin.i1. 188T, p. ISS). M. Biaet, following 
M, hrlnaui). aadoDIhe fallh of n cerlHliii-iperinieal, dl one time bvlieved, 
tl* optk»l bnln-oenlfvg and not Ibe reliaa to be the seat of ordinary nega- 
Iftr aflarlmaK**. The ctprrimenl is this: Look fixedly, with one eye 
•^■m, al a colon^ apot on a white background. Tiien close that eye and 
toik tudly with tbr tithtr eye at a plain surface. A negative Bflcr-image 
«ftke raloradipol will pmcnlly appear. (Psycbologiedu Raisonntment, 
MB. f. 4ft.| But Hr. Delalnrrc has proved {Americao Journal of Psy- 
rfcllngy. U. St9> thai tbia after-imBge Is due, not lo a higher cerebral pro- 
eim, bol III tbe tael that llie retinal process in the rioted eye aflecta 
OMcfaaaBtaa al certain moments, and that its object h then projected 
km iIm Said m*b by the eye which h open, M. Binei infomis me thai 
kt la ooaTMted by <lie proofs given by Mr. Delabarrc. 

fhf (acl mmaini. however, that the negative after-itna^es of Herr Meyer, 
H. Titi. and the hypnotic subjects, form an exception to nil that we know 
ef agmi-carrvutn. it they are due lo a refluent centrifugal current to tbe 
misa. ll may hr that they will hereafter be explained in some uiher way. 
MMDwhIlr we caji only write them down as a paradox. Slg, Sergi's theory 
IfeM tlirte L* aliKigt a refluent wave In perception hardly raeHtsseriouscon- 
MnMloD iP*ychologIe Pbyslologlfiue, pp, 99. 180). Sergi's theory baa 
ranatly bcco realllnned wlib almost incredible crudity by Lombrow and 
OtiolcB^i in the Revue Pbiloaophlque, xxix. 70 (Jan. 1890). 

72 P8TCH0L0OT. 

degree of sound fainter still than the preceding pianissima 

This phenomenon is not confined to hearing : 

'* If we slowly approach our finger to a surface of water, we often 
deceive ourselves about the moment in which the wetting occurs. The 
apprehensive patient believes himself to feel the knife of the snigeon 
whilst it is still at some distance." * 

Yisual perception supplies numberless instances in which 
the same sensation of vision is perceived as one object or 
another according to the interpretation of the mind. Many 
of these instances will come before us in the course of the 
next two chapters ; and in Chapter XIX similar illusions 
will be described in tlie other senses. Taken together, all 
these facts w^ould force us to admit that the svbjective 
differefnce bettveen imagined and /eU objects is less abscltde 
than has been daimed, and that the cortical processes which 
underlie imagination and sensation are not quite as discrete 
as one at first is tempted to suppose. That peripheral sen-' 
sory processes are ordinarily involved in imagination seems 
improbable; that they may sometimes be aroused from the cortex 
dotvntvards cannot^ however, be dogmaiicaUy denied. 

The imagination-process can then pass over into the sensa^ 
tion-process. In other words, genuine sensations can be 
centrally originated. When we come to study hallucina- 
tions in the chapter on Outer Perception, we shall see that 
this is by no means a thing of rare occurrence. At present, 
however, we must admit that normally the ttvo processes do 
NOT pass over into each other; and we must inquire why. 
One of two things must be the reason. Either 

1. Sensation-processes occupy a different locality from 
imagination-processes ; or 

2. Occupying the same locality, they have an intensity 
which under normal circumstances currents from other 
cortical regions are incapable of arousing, and to produce 
which currents from the periphery are required. 

It seems almost certain (after what was said in Chapter 
XL pp. 49-51) thai the imagination-process differs from the 
sensation-process by its intensity rather than by its looaUty. 
However it may be with lower animals, the assumption that 

♦ Lotze, Med. Psych p. 509. 

ntAGIIfATlOX- 73 

jiluatioiuJ and aeaBorisl <;«ntree ai-e locally distinct appears 
bi be Kopported b}' no faots drawn from the obserratioii of 
biBBB bfiiugii. After occipital deetrnctioa, tbe hemiaDop- 
au wliioh rfiMolts hi mau is seusorial blindnesa, not mere 
hw* of optitra] ideas. Were there coutrtiH for crude optical 
wa t i on below the rortes, the patients id these cases 
Tosld «till f«H»l lipht and darkne^ft. Since they do not pre- 
vrre uren tfaU iiupresaioii on the lost half of the field, we 
nnflt soppoMe (hut there are no centres for vision of any 
wtrl whnteTBr below tbe cortex, and that the corpora quadri- 
KBtninji and other iowor optical ganglia are organs for reflex 
Roiovetoent of eye-mnscles and not for conscious sights 
^■orM>Ter there are uo facts which oblige us to thiuk that, 
^BnttuB tbe occipital cortex, one part is connected with sen- 
■ktioti and another with mere ideation or imaginatinn. The 
p«tliol<i^paI eases asHiimed to prnre this Hre all better ex- 
plain*^ by dii*turbauceM of conduction between the optical 
Ukd other centres (see p. 50), lu bad cases of hemianopsia 
tke patient's images de]>art from him together with his sen- 
nhility to light They depart so completely that he does not 
mnti know what is the matter with iiim. To perceive that 
me iMbUnd to the ri^ht half of the field of view one must 
ka<n> an idea of that part of the fields possible existence. 
Bat tli(> d«fect iu thexe patients has to be revealed to them 
by the doctor, they tlieniselves only knowing that there is 
■ •nmethiug wrong ' with their eyes. What you have uo idea 
<A yoM cannot miss ; and their not definitely missing this 
fcreat ref{ion nnt of their sight seems due to the fact that their 
wry idea and memory of it is lost along with the sensation. 
A Mao blind of his eyeti merely, sees darbneaa. A man blind 
ol his Tumal brain-centres can no more see darknetis out of 
tbe partH of bis retina which are connected with the brain- 
Mob than he can see it out of the skin of his back. He 
anot se« at all in that part of the tteld ; and he cannot 
tliiiik of the light which be onght to Iw feeling tJxre, for tbe 
wy Dottnn of the existence of that particular ' there ' ie 
ntcmt of hi« mind.* 

' Sep Ml fntporlADt arllole by Bloet In Ibe Revuu PhilOBopblqiif!. xm. 
n imS'i ; aln Pntonr. lu Reviif MM. Ae In Suisse RomnDdc, 188B. No. 
' rtml in iIm- Nwimlnebu-lip* ('mintll'lnit. 1800. p 48. 

74 P8TCH0L0QT. 

Now if we admit that sensation and imagination are dn^ 
to the actiTity of the same centres in the cortex, we can see a 
Te,ry good teleological reason why thej should correspond 
to discrete kinds of process in these centres, and why the 
process which gives the sense that the object is really there 
ought normally to be arousable only by currents entering 
from the periphery and not by currents from the neighbor- 
ing cortical parts. We can see, in short, why the senscUiondl 
process ought to be discontinuous tmth aU normal ideational 
processes^ hotvever intense. For, as Dr. Miinsterberg justly 
observes : 

*' Were there not this peculiar arrangement we should not distingaisk 
reality and fantasy, our conduct would not be accommodated to the 
facts about us, but would be inappropriate and senseless, and we could 
not keep ourselves alive. . . . That our thoughts and memories should 
be copies of sensations with their intensity greatly reduced is thus a 
consequence deducible logically from the natural adaptation of the 
cerebiai mechanism to its environment'^ * 

Mechanically the discontinuity between the ideational 
and the sensational kinds of process must mean that when 
the greatest ideational intensity has been reached, an order 
of resistance presents itself which only a new order of force 
can break through. The current from the periphery is the 
new order of force required ; and what happens after the 
resistance is overcome is the sensational process. We may 
suppose that the latter consists in some new and more vio- 
lent sort of disintegration of the neural matter, which now 
explodes at a deeper level than at other times. 

Now how shall we conceive of the * resistance * which 
prevents this sort of disintegration from taking place, this 
sort of intensity in the process from being attained, so 
much of the time? It must be either an intrinsic resist- 
ance, some force of cohesion in the neural molecules them- 
selves ; or an extrinsic influence, due to other cortical cells. 
When we come to study the process of hallucination we 
shall see that both factors must be taken into account. 
There is a degree of inward molecular cohesion in our 
brain-cells which it probably takes a sudden inrush of 

♦Die Wnienshandhing (1888), pp. 129-40. 


desinictiTe energy to spring apari Incoming peripheral 
corrents possess this energy from the outset Currents 
from neighboring cortical regions might attain to it if they 
coald aecwnylaJte within the centre which we are supposed 
to be considering. But since during waking hours every 
centre communicates with others by association-paths, 
no snch accumulation can take place. The cortical cur- 
rents which run in run right out again, awakening the next 
ideas ; the level of tension in the cells does not rise to the 
kigher explosion-point ; and the latter must be gained by a 
Hidden current from the periphery or not at alL 



A PURE sensation we saw above, p. 7, to be an abetrao* 
tion never realized in adult life. Any quality of a thing 
which affects our sense-organs does also more than that : 
it arouses processes in the hemispheres which are dne to 
the organization of that organ by past experiences, and the 
result of which in consciousness are commonly described 
as ideas which the sensation suggests. The first of these 
ideas is that of the thing to which the sensible quality 
belongs. The consciousness of partuyidar material thing$ 
present to sense is nowadays called perception.* The con- 
sciousness of such things may be more or less complete ; 
it may be of the mere name of the thing and its other essen- 
tial attributes, or it may be of the thing's various remotei 
relations. It is impossible to draw any sharp line of dis- 
tinction between the barer and the richer consciousness, 
because the moment we get beyond the first crude sensa- 
tion all our consciousness is a matter of suggestion, and 
the various suggestions shade gradually into each other, 
being one and all products of the same psychologioal 
machinery of association. In the directer conscionsnesi 
fewer, in the remoter more, associative processes arc 
brought into play. 

* The word Perception, however, has been variously used. Forhistor 
ical notices, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, n. 96. For Hamil' 
ton perception is the consciousness of external objects ' (ib. d8). Spenoei 
defines it oddly enough as "a discerning of the relation or relatioDB b» 
tween 9UUe% cf con$eiousne$8 partly presentative and partly representatiTO ; 
which states of consciousness must be themselves known to Uie extent in- 
volved in the knowledge of their relations " (Psychol., § 855). 



Pmefttion thim differs from sengation by Oie conBci(msiies» C 
if /ttrtkar /acts tutsociated leith the object of the sensalion : 
- WlM«i I lift mjf <iyw from iho pajier on which I nrn wriring I sw 
'cbala «Dd ubk« and w«lbot my room, eaib of ila progwr shape 
•.li tf Om proper distaflce. I see, fnim my window, trees mid mpn<i- 
'<. >iKd hont!» And oiun, and distant hitls. 1 see each of lik {iroper 
'. of iU imipnr rnrm, aud at ita proper distance ; and ttipsu purticu- 
-*> *ptM*r aa immediate iaformatioos of the eye, as the colors which I 

- 'n memxm at tL Yrt pUiloftophy has aMtertained that we derive nolh- 
; rratn the pyr wliatover but seustttions of color. . . . How, tlien, is it 
>; mu mMitve iicciiral« information, by the eye, of size and shape and 
■uneiel Bv HMUicint ion merely. The colors upon a body are different, 

■ '-'-niinx tn it» figure, its shape, iiud its eixe. But the sensations of 
r and what we raay here, for brevity, call the sensaijoim of ex- 
'-i»ii, of fi|{uiT, ol disiancv, Iwvu been so of ten united, felt in cuu- 
i-^na. tliat the sensation of the color is msver experienced without 
oiMUg tho idn* nf the extension, the figure, the distance, in such inti- 
Maif BDtofi with it. that they not only oHonot be separated, but are ao- 
taaily snppriHwl tu bu seen. The sight, as it ia called, of figure, or dis- 
'•ioat, app ea ring aa it doee a simple sensatioD, b in reality a complex 
'lie tt oDoseiouaaeea— a sv<]neace in which the antecedent, a sensation 
'. i^ofar. »ad the ooneequent, a number of ideas, ure so closely com- 

- led by — oriatton that they appear not one idea, but one itensation." 

Tliia pafiflag(> from James Mill " gives a clear statement 
: III© iliictrine which Berkeley in his Theory of Vision 
••if for tile fir»t time an inttigral [lart of Paychology, 
Upriwiejr oompared onr viBiial sensations to the words of a 
liagMige, which are but signs or occasioDs for our iatel- 
iMti to pMW to wbut the xpeaker mean». As tlie suunda 
flUed Torda have no inwanl affinity with the ideas they 
riptff, BO neither have our visual sensatiouR, according to 
Bcckelaj, nay inwanl affinity with the things of whose 
pmsDoe th«y make us aware. Those thiugH are tavgiUes; 
tbiiri«al propflrtie», snch a« shape, size, mass, comustency, 
fOMtfaMs, reveal thomselves only to touch. But the visible 
■ps and th^ tajiKihle significat^s are by long custom so 
"aloaely twiatMl. blended, and incorporated together, and 
Iha prviadic^ ia so confirmed and riveted in onr thoughts 
\lj a loDff tr»ct of time, by the use of language, and want of 
niectioii," t that we think we see the whole object, tangible 
aad vifliblA Alike, in one aimple indivisible act. 

* Aiialyaia, 1. 1>7. 

tTlwoty of Vlsioii, 31, 


Senaationcd and reproductive brairir-prooesses combined^ then, 
are what give us the content of our perceptions. Every con' 
«rete particular material thing is a conflux of sensible 
qualities, with which we have become acquainted at vari- 
ous times. Some of these qualities, since they are more 
constant, interesting, or practically important, we regard as 
essential constituents of the thing. In a general way, such 
are the tangible shape, size, mass, etc. Other properties, 
being more fluctuating, we regard as more or less acciden- 
tal or inessential. We call the former qualities the reality^ 
the latter its appearances. Thus, I hear a sound, and say 
^ a horse-car ' ; but the sound is not the horse-car, it is 
•one of the horse-car's least important manifestations. The 
real horse-car is a feelable, or at most a feelable and visi- 
ble, thing which in my imagination the sound calls up. So 
when I get, as now, a brown eye-picture with lines not 
parallel, and with angles unlike, and call it my big solid 
rectangular walnut library-table, that picture is not the 
table. It is not even like the table as the table is for vision, 
when rightly seen. It is a distorted perspective view of three 
of the sides of what I mentally perceive (more or less) in its 
totality and undistorted shape. The back of the table, its 
square comers, its size, its heaviness, are features of which 
I am conscious when I look, almost as I am conscious of 
its name. The suggestion of the name is of course due to 
mere custom. But no less is that of the back, the size^ 
weight, squareness, etc. 

Nature, as Eeid says, is frugal in her operations, and 
will not be at the expense of a particular instinct to give 
us that knowledge which experience and habit will soon 
produce. Eeproduced sights and contacts tied together 
with the present sensation in the unity of a thing with a 
name, these are the complex objective stuff out of which 
my actually * perceived table is made. Infants must go 
through a long education of the eye and ear before thej 
can perceive the realities which adults perceive. Every 
perception is an acquired perception,* 

* The educative process is particularly obvious in the case of the ear, 
for all sudden sounds seem alarming to babies. The familiar noises of 

ras psscKPTioy of rmyas 79 

Penxption «Miy then hf definnl, iu Mr. Sully's words, as ~ 
thai proc«B8 bj which the mind 'Jj^ <^U 

•-jTrtetDODt* » aenMr-lm^TuBsiou bj an Hccompaniment or escort of re- / 

i] arouuim*. tlin wboie ugsrc^t^ at actual and revived aensatioiia 
li^ wiMified or "uitegransl' imo iho form of a percept, tlmt is, an 
(ffMcnUy immodUte appretieusioD or cogntiion of ati object oow 
fvacBt In A pwiicnlar locality or regioa of space." * 

£v«rj' raader'tt iniDd will supply abundaut examples of 
tba procvMH herw described ; aud to write them down would 
be therefore both amieeeasary and tedious. In the chapter 
40 HpncK- WH have already diucurtsed some of the more inter- 
oues ; for in oar perceptioua of shape and position it 
lUy lUfficQlt to decide how much of our sense of the ob- 
\» due l<) rejirodui'tiouH of past experience, aud how 
:h to th(f iintnediate seusations of the eye. I shall ac- 
;lr castiue myself in the rest of this chapter to cer- 
•dditioDal geueraiitieH coiiuected with the perceptive 

The fint point is relative to that ' solidification ' or ' in- 
tafftrnticjo,' whereof Mr. Sully speaks, of the present with 
tfae atMient aud merely represented sensations. Cerebrally 
taiwB, lliime wurdx mean uo more than this, that the pro> 
OBH utitMed ill the sense-organ has shot into various 
paths which habit has already organized iu the liemi- 
•{iWrM, and that instead of oar having the sort of con- 
•doiwMiAS which would be correlated with the simple seu- 
•orial prooesa, we hare that which is correlated with this 
Bote omnpiftz process. This, as it turns out, is the con- 
MtoumeMi of that more comples ' object,' the whole ' thing,' 
iMlutd of beiofi the consciousness of that wore simple 
'ibject, the few qnalities or attributes which actually im- 
pTMB imr ]>eripheral nervea This consciousness must have . ^ 

tlic unity which every 'section ' of our stream of thought '*'***^ 
rftuas KO long a" it* objective content does not sensibly /*^'**]r 

<iv sod tirrvi keep tlirm lii ronHlAnt tTcpidaliiiQ tintil »uch lime u tbey 
<'* etthcr lauTtnl Ibr object* which i^mlt them, or h>VD become blunted 
- ii«B Iff fneqninil expaicnM uf their innocuit)'. 
* QolttaBk, p. 153. 


change. More than this we cannot say ; we certainly 
ought not to say what usually is said by psychologists, and 
treat the perception as a sum of distinct psychic entities^ 
the present sensation namely, plvs a lot of images from the 
past, all * integrated ' together in a way impossible to de- 
scribe. The perception is one state of mind or nothing — as 
I have already so often said. 

In many cases it ^ easy to compare the psychic results 
of the sensational with those of the perceptive process. We 
then see a marked difference in the way in which the im- 
pressed portions of the object are felt, in consequence of 
being cognized along with the reproduced portion, in the 
higher state of mind. Their sensible quality changes un- 
der our very eye. Take the already -quoted catch, Paa de 
lieu Bh^ne qve nous : one may read this over and over again 
without recognizing the sounds to be identical with those 
of the words paddle your own canoe. As we seize the 
English meaning the sound itself appears to change. 
Yerbal sounds are usually perceived with their meaning at 
the moment of being heard. Sometimes, however, the 
associative irradiations are inhibited for a few moments- 
(the mind being preoccupied with other thoughts) whilst 
the words linger on the ear as mere echoes of acoustic sen- 
sation. Then, usually, their interpretation suddenly occurs^ 
But at that moment one may often surprise a change in th& 
xery feel of the w^ord. Our own language would sound 
ver}' different to us if we heard it without understanding,, 
as we hear a foreign tongue. Bises and falls of voice, odd 
sibilants and other consonants, would fall on our ear in a 
way of which we can now form no notion. Frenchmen say 
that English sounds to them like the gazouillement des oiseaux 
— an impression which it certainly makes on no native ear. 
Many of us English would describe the sound of Bussian 
in similar terms. All of us are conscious of the strong in- 
flections of voice and explosives and gutturals of German 
speech in a way in which no German can be conscious of 

This is probably the reason why, if we look at mk isolated 
printed word and repeat it long enough, it ends by assmniiig 
an entirely unnatural aspect Ijet the reader try thia with 


\is itonl nn tliis {mi)^. Hp will soon b^gin t« wonder if it 
■ill j-">«ibly W tlie word lie liiia Iweii asiiig all bis life with 
iii4i uiramBg. It Htarett nt him from the pnper like a glasH 
'If, with no HpeculatioD in it Its body is indeed there, but 
lU ■oal \n floil. It ij* ri'dnced, by this uew way of attending 
li> it. to its BeDsational nudity. We never before attended lo 
rtin thifi way, hut habitually got it clad with it» meaning 
th« momoDt we caught sight of it, and rapidly passed from 
it In the other words of the jihrnse. We apprehended it, 
IB short, with a cloud of asHociates, and thua perceiving it, 
■R f>!lt it i|uit^ otherwise than as we feel it now divested 
kod Klo^'^ 

Another well-known change is when we look at a land- 
»ni]»e with oiir head upside down. Perception is to a cer- 
uiu t'xttrat bntlled by this manoeuvre; gradations of dis- 
tance and other npace- determinations are made uncertain ; 
ih* tv prod active or associative processes, in short, decline ; 
aiwl. simaltaueously with their diminution, the colors grow 
richer aad more varied, and the coutrasts of light and shade 
BMirr Riftrked. The same thing occurs when we turn a 
uting bottom upward. We lose much of its meaning, 
mpeusate for the loss, we feel more fresldy the 
Ine of the mere tints and shadings, and become aware of 
Kk of purely fteusible harmony or balance which they 
Just so, if we lie on the floor and look up at 
I of a person talking behind us. His lower lip 
■ the hahitnal place of the upper one upon our 
T^tiiu, and tteemn animated by the most extraordinary and 
nQBatoral mobility, a mobility which now strikes ns be- 
•-AQM (thea^MfK-intivepTnceHses being disturbed by the un- 
wutomMl point of view) we get it as a naked sensation 
11"! not a« part of a familiar object perceived. 
^^ On a l»t*;r page other instances will meet us. For the 
^Elmmt thoHo are enongh to prove our point. Once more 
^^b find oantelves driven to admit that when qualities of an 
^^noet irapreaa our sense and we thereupon perceive the 
^^Rject, the senaation a8 aaeh of those qualities does not 


still exist inside of the perception and form a constituent 
thereof. The sensation is one thing and the pMoeption 
another, and neither can take place at the same time with 
the other, because their cerebral conditions are not tiie 
same. They may resemble each other, but in no respect are 
they identical states of mind. 


The chief cerebral conditions of perception are the paths 
of association irradiating from the sense-impression, which 
may have been already formed. If a certain sensation be 
strongly associated with the attributes of a certain thing, 
that thing is almost sure to be perceived when we get the 
sensation. Examples of such things would be familiar 
people, places, etc., which we recognize and name at a 
glance. But where the sensation is associcUed with more than 
one reality^ so that either of two discrepant sets of resid- 
ual properties may arise, the perception is doubtful and 
yacillating, and the most that can then be said of it is that it 
wiU be of a probable thing, of the thing which would most 
usually have given us that sensation. 

In these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that 
perception is rarely abortive ; some perception takes place. 
The two discrepant sets of associates do not neutralise each 
other or mix and make a blur. What we more commonly 
get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other 
in its completeness. In other words, all brain-prooe^es are 
such (w give rise to uhat ice may call figured consciousness. If 
paths are irradiated at all, they are irradiated in consistent 
systems, and occasion thoughts of definite objects, not mere 
hodge-podges of elements. Even where the brain's func- 
tions are half tlin>wn out of gear, as in aphasia or dropping 
asleep, this law of figured consciousness holds good. A 
}>erson who sudtlenly gets sleepy whilst reading aloud will 
read wrong; but instead of omitting a mere broth of sylla- 
bles, he will make such mistakes as to read ' supper-tUne * 
instead of * sovereign,' * i>verthi*ow ' instead of * opposite,' 
or indeed utter entirely imaginary phrases, composed of 
several definite words, instead of phrases of the book. So 
in aphasia : where the disease is mild the patient's mift- 



1 nsiii)^ entire wroDg words iuutead of right 
llj ia the graveat lesions does he become quite iB- 
These facta bIiow how subtle ia the asMociative 
fink ; how delicate yet how strong that eounectiuu among 
bnuu-psth* whiuh wakes any namber of them, ouc6 excited 
higether. thereafter tend to \4brate as a syatematic whole. A 
sidaII group of elements, ' (Ai*,' common to two systems, A 
umI B, tuny touch off A or B according as accident decides 
tbv next step (see Fig. 47). If it happen that a single point 
IcwUttg from ' this ' to B is momentarily a little more per- 
vioiu than any leading from ' this ' to A, then that little 
kdruitagiT wiU npset the equilibrium iu favor of the entire 
Cfslem B. The currents will sweep first through that point 


^^HAlkSDOe into all the paths of B, each increment of ad- 

^^^■Mlutkiiig A more and more impossible. The thoughts 

^^Bpfllbled with A and B, in such a case, will have objects 

I ^immt, though similar. The similarity will, however, 

r<iB«iKt in tM>me very limited feature if the ' this ' be small. 

Thtui the faintest aenmtiont will give rise (o the perception 

f d^hute things if only they resemke those tchich the things 

tin. In fact, a sensation must be strong and 

a order not to suggest an object and, if it is a non- 

AfMling, really to seem one. The aurie of epilepsy, 

t li^t, fiery \iBion, marings in the ears, the si;nsa- 

li electric currents give rise to when passed through 

thesd are uufigured because they are strong. 

ff»»kpr fe«<i|iitgs of the same sort would (jrobably suggest 

iibjwtn. Many years ago, after reading Maury's Ijook, Le 

S/'mmeil H li-* ft/oes, I began fur the hrat time to observe 

tlhna> ideas which faintly flit through the mind at all times, 

•onU, Tisiiins, ete>, dlscouuectetl with the main stream of 

ibooght. bat dis(!«ruible to au atteution on the watch for 


them. A horse's head, a coil of rope, an anchor, are, for 
example, ideas which have come to me unsolicited whilst I 
have been writing these latter lines. They can often be 
explained by subtle links of association, often not at all. 
But I have not a few times been surprised, after noting 
some such idea, to find, on shutting my eyes, an after- 
image left on the retina by some bright or dark object 
recently looked at, and which had evidently suggested 
the idea. * E\ddently,' I say, because the general shape^ 
size, and position of object thought-of and of after-image 
were the same, although the idea had details which the 
retinal image lacked. We shall probably never know just 
what part retinal after-images play in determining the train 
of our thoughts. Judging by my own experiences I should 
suspect it of being not insignificant^ 

*The more or less geometrically regular phantasms which are pro- 
duced by pressure od the eyeballs, congestion of the head, inhalation of 
ansBsthetics, etc., might again be cited to prove that faint and vague excite- 
ments of sense-organs are transformed into figured objects by the brain, 
only the facts are not quite clearly interpretable ; and the figuring may 
possibly be due to some retinal peculiarity, as yet unexplored. Beautiful 
patterns, which would do for wall-papers, succeed each other when the 
eyeballs are long pressed. Goethe's account of his own phantasm of a 
flower is well known. It came in the middle of his visual field whenever 
he closed his eyes and depressed bis head. " unfolding itself and develop- 
ing from its interior new flowers, formed of colored or sometimes green 
leaves, not natural but of fantastic forms, and symmetrical as the rosettes 
of sculptors," etc. (quoted in Mtlller's Physiology, Baly's tr., p. 1897). The 
fortification- and zigzag-patterns, which are well-known appearances in the 
field of view in certain functional disorders, have characteristics (steadiness^ 
coerciveness, blotting out of other objects) suggestive of a retinal origin — 
this is why the entire class of phenomena treated of in this note seem to me 
Btill doubtfully connected with the cerebral factor in perception of which 
the text trejits.— I copy from Taiue's book on Intelligence (vol. i. p. 61) 
the translation of an interesting observation by Prof. M. Lazarus, in which 
the same effect of an after-image is seen. Lazarus himself proposes the 
name of ' visionary illusions ' for such modifications of ideal pictures by 
peripheral stimulations (Lehre von den Sinncstfluschungen, 1867, p. 19). 
" I was on the Kaltbad terrace at Kigi, on a very clear afternoon, and 
attempting to make out the Waldbruder, a rock which stands out from 
the midst of the gigantic wall of mountains surrounding it, on whose sum- 
mits we see like a crown the glaciers of Titlis, Uri-Rothsdock, etc. 1 was 
looking alternately with the naked eye and with a spy-glass ; but could not 
distinguish it with the naked eye. For the space of six to ten minutes I 
had gazed steadfastly upon the mountains, whose color varied aooordiD|^ 


I now, (or brevitj-'s «ake, treat A and B in Fig. 47 
% if they Rtood for objects instead nf brain-processes. And 
It (artbermore snppose that A and B are, both of them, 
■ which mipht probably excite the sensation which I 
iUul 'lhi»,' bat that on the present occasion A and 
I the one which aotnally does so. If, then, on this 
D * f Am ' suggests A and not B, the result is a correct 
prroeptuM. Bat if, on the contrary, ' this ' suggests B and 
aol A, the result is a /nke perception, or, as it is technically 
«&lled. an Olumon. fiut the proceaa is the same, whether 
like perception be true or false. 

Id thrir *r<rcnil ■Ititudce or decltTJIies between violet, brown, Mid duk 
pnu, uid I hhd tatiguMl layeeU to no purpoBe, when 1 ceased looking 
ud luroMl aumj. At Ihal momcnl I saw before nie (I canool recollect 
abrtbci tMXj ryt» wrre shut or opeo) tbe figure of an nbscDt friend, like & 
««]■«. ... I naked m}-M.'lf al once bow 1 bad come lo think of mj absent 
ttlnid-~ln B few iFCorids I regained Ihe thread of my thougbls, which 
■f looking tor iLu Waldbrtiderbad interrupted, and readily found Ibul tbe 
UcB uf my friend bail by s very sioiple uecessity inlroduced llself among 
IMa. My rerollrctiiig him wns thus naturally accounted for.~Biit In 
•Mtiloa tn thin, he had appeared m a corpse. How was this 1—At this 
■DMUBt. wlMtheT through fatigue or in urder to think, I closed my eyes, 
wd tuuMi at ODCe the wbole Held of sight, over a considerable extent, 
unrird allb Ihe same corpse-like hue. a greeulsb yellow gray. I tbougbl 
■1 oart that I bad here the prindple o( Ihe desired explanation, and 
uvoipted hi recall lu mfmory Ihe fomis of other persons And, lo fact, 
tine lum* loo appCHred like corpses; standing or sitting, as I wished, nil 
lul s rorpae- like lint. The peisons whom I wished to see did not all ap* 
>v lo nwi u •ronible pliaotoms : and again, when my eyes were open. I 
'id giri ire ptiuilamB. or at all events only saw ibem faintly, of no deter- 
B'Md color. — 1 then ln(|ulred bow It was that phantoms of persons were 
■Strtrd by and coloreil like Ihe visual Held surrounding ihem, bow ibelr 
•oUlar* wrrr traced, and If their faces and clothes were of tbe same color, 
ht h WW Uicn loo laic, or perhaps tbe intluence of reflection and exami- 
utlon liad been lou powrrf ul. All grew suddenly pale, and tbe subjectlvs 
rkraoMMWin. wbicb mfgbl have lasted some minutes longer, luid dlsap 
nnd— It is plain that bereau Inward reminiscence, arising In accordance 
■lib llie laws of asKoclstlon. bad combined with an optical after Image. 
tW eienMtrr exritalion of the periphery of the optic nerve. 1 mean Ihe 
k«c.<«BllDU«<l pm-eding sensation of my eyes when contemplating the 
rafar o( tbe tnuuniain. bad Indirectly provoked a subjective and durabls 
■1 of ibe comptemeuairy color ; and my reminiscence, incor- 
fonllag Itwlt with ibis subjective sensation, became tbe corp»e*tlke pbui' 
Ida I have dncrlbed. " 

86 P8TCH0L0QT. 

Note that in every illusion what is false is what is in- 
ferred, not what is immediately given. The 'this,' if it 
were felt by itself alone, would be all right, it only becomes 
misleading by what it suggests. If it is a sensation of 
sight, it may suggest a tactile object, for example, which 
later tactile experiences prove to be not there. The so-celled 
^fallacy of the senses,' of which the ancient sceptics made so 
much account y is not fallacy of the senses proper , but rather of 
the inteUect, which interprets wrongly what the senses give.* 

So much premised, let us look a little closer at these 
illusions. They are due to two main causes. The wrong 
object is perceived either because 

1) Although not on this occasion the real cause, it is yet the 
habitucHy inveterate, or most probable cause of * this ; ' or because 

2) The mind is temporarily fuU of the thought of that object ^ 
and therefore ' this ' is peculiarly prone to suggest it at tki^ 

I will give briefly a number of examples under each 
head. The first head is the more important, because it 
includes a number of constant illusions to which all men 
are subject, and which can only be dispelled by much 

Illusions of the First Type, 

One of the oldest instances dates from Aristotle. Cross 

two fingers and roll a pea, pen- 
holder, or other small object be- 
tween them. It will seem double. 
Professor Croom Robertson has 
given the clearest analysis of this 
illusion. He observes that if 
Fio. 48. the object be brought into con- 

tact first with the forefinger and next with the second finger, 
the two contacts seem to come in at difierent points of space. 

• Cf. Th. Reid*a Intellectual Powers, essay n. chap, xxn, and A. Binet. 
in Mind, ix. 306. M. Binet points out the fact that what is fallaciously 
inferreii is always an object of some other sense than the ' this. ' ' Optical 
illusions ' are generally errors of touch and muscular sensibility, and the 
fallaciously perceived object and the experiences which correct it are both 
tactile in these cases. 


> fomftitger-tonch eeemti higher, tlioiigb the fiiig(>r is 
Jly lower; the 8ecoinl-6iiger-t»mi'h seems lower, though 
Qh* fingpf is i^nlly higher. " We perceive the contacts as 
doatiin bewaiiHe we refer them to two distinct parts of 
■p»cie." The tonoheil «iiles rtf the two tiugerB are normally 
not together ia space, and customarily never do touch one 
thing ; the nue thing which now touches them, therefore, 
■cems in two plaees, i.e. seems two things.* 

There is a whole batch of illusions which come frsm 
optical sensations interpreted by iis in accordance with our 
aMun] ntle, ftlthongli they are now ]iroduccd by an unuHual 
tibjppL The utrrmnci^pf is an exauipte. The e3'e8 see a 
fortore apiece, and the two pictures are a little disparate, 
iht? ane luwu by the right eye being a new of the object 
taken from a point slightly to the right of that from which 
the left eye's picture is taken. Pictures thrown on the two 
*y»* by solid fibjects present this identical disparity. 
Whmce we react on the sensation in onr usual way, and 
perceive a solid. If the pictures be exchanged we perceive 
* hollow mnuK! of the idtject, for a hollow mould would 
<»«l yint such disparate pictures as these. Wheatstoiie's 
instroment. the fmeiaimctype, allows ns to look at solid 
■ibjeirts and see with each eye the other eye's picture. We 
then perceive the solid ol»j©ct hollow, if if be nn ohjn-f irhirk 
nijU prrJuMtf lir fuiHoir, but not otherwise. A human face, 
r^ Dever appears hollow to the pseudoswope. In this 
bwgolarity of reaction nn different objects, some seem 
bollow, others not; the perceptive process is true to its 
law, which is nhmys (o rwirf on the sensation in a deter- 
■MAfe end Jt^^tred fashion if pmsible, <M>d in ns profxiiJe 
a fiuhiem ai the case. <ulmits. To couple faces and hollow 

■ TIW convirtm llliiilon is liard Ui briiig nbuiil. The polnla a aud t>. 
lartng kunuttlly In conUirt, niran >n us llic aiinic Bpacc, and licDce it mfgbt 
'- Mppoanl iLnl wlit'ti nimuluneoiislf loutlipd, ns by a p»ir of cnllipers. 
Tf AmM fe^l Imt vw olijui. whflsi ns % nuiiter of fact wo trcl Iwo, It 
•knald W niDArkrd Id eipiHonlioD ot IliU thnt an object placed lielweeu 
itMtato flofm lu their normal iiuc-nmed ixwition always awukeoslliescnbo 
rf tm» MKiarit. When Ihe fln^rm are jimmt togelhrr wc feel cm eijeet to 
W Iwlwvcn Ihon. Ami wlien Ihr nogcrgarc crowed, atKillielrcorreaponU- 
l*f poinu n anil b ■imiiltancoiisly preaned, we Ho get wimatliiDg lllfe iIm 
iIImIcm of rfoictriiM* — Ihnl is, we gut a vvry doulitf til doubU-nraa. 


uess violates all our habits of association. For the same 
reason it is very easy to make an intaglio cast of a face, or 
the painted inside of a pasteboard mask, look convex, in- 
stead of concave as they are. 

Our sense of the position of things with respect to our 
eye consists in suggestions of how we must move our hand 
to touch them. Certain places of the image on the retina, 
certain actively-produced positions of the eyeballs, are 
normally linked with the sense of every determinate posi- 
tion which an outer thing may come to occupy. Hence we 
perceive the usual position, even if the optical sensation be 
artificially brought from a different part of space. Prisms 
warp the light-rays in this waj', and throw upon the retina 
the image of an object situated, say, at spot a of space in the 
same manner in which (without the prisms) an object situ- 
ated at spot h would cast its image Accordingly we feel 
. for the object at b instead of a. If the prism be before one 
eye only we see the object at b with that eye, and in its 
right position a with the other — in other words, we see it 
double. If both eyes be armed with prisms with their angle 
towards the right, we pass our hand to the right of all objects 
when we try rapidly to touch them. And this illusory 
sense of their position lasts until a new association is fixed, 
when on removing the prisms a contrary illusion at first 
occurs. Passive or unintentional changes in the position 
of the eyeballs seem to be no more kept account of by the 
mind than prisms are ; so we spontaneously make no allow- 
ance for them in our perception of distance and movements. 
Press one of the eyeballs into a strained position with the 
£nger, and objects move and are translocated accordingly, 
just as when prisms are used. 

Curious illusions of movement in objects occur whenever 
the eyeballs move without our intending it. We shall learn 
in the following chapter that the original visual feeling of 
movement is produced by any image passing over the retina. 
Originally, however, this sensation is definitely referred 
neither to the object nor to the eyes. Such definite refer- 
ence grows up later, and obeys certain simple laws. We 
believe objects to move : 1) whenever we get the retinal 
movement-feeling, but think our eyes are still ; and 2) when- 


«T9r ws think tliat our eyes aiove, but fail to get the retinal 

BOTCment-feeling. We believe objt^ets tn be Btill, on the 

eoBtr»nr, 1) nrhenever we get the retinal movemeut-feeling, 

but tbiak our eyes are moving ; and 2) wlieuever we neither 

tkiak (lar oyes are moving, nor get tlie retinal niovement- 

ff«liii4^ Thus the perception of tbe object's state of motion 

or r«st depenciH on the notion we frame of our ouu eye's 

iaor»nit*ot. Now many sorts of stimulation make our eyes 

unn* without our knowing it If we look at a waterfall, 

n(»r, railroad train, or any body which continuously passea 

ia fmut of us in the same direction, it carries our eyes with 

it Thin movenieiit can be noticed in our eyes by a by- 

ftonder. If the object keep passing towards our left, our 

*yeft k(«p followiug whatever moving bit of it may have 

-Q){fat thnir ntteutiou at first, until that bit disappears 

in nnw. Then they jerk back to the right again, and 

-rii a Dew bit, which again they follow to the left, and so 

: ii>d«Ffiuitclr. This gives them an oscillating demeanor, 

■ ■» involontary rotations leftward alternating with rapid 

luntary jerks rightward. But the osciBali(ms continue for 

* »Ltle after tbe object has come to a standstill, or tbe 

•pa are carried to a new object, and this produces the illu- 

nn Ibat thiBf^B now move in the opposite direction. For 

*• ire unaware of the alow leftward automatic movements 

it <m «y«balls, and think that the retinal mnvement-seu- 

utiom thereby aronxedmust be due to a rightward motion 

*i Htf object seen; whilst the rapid Voluntary rightward 

BnTBBienta of our eyeballs we interpret as attempts to pur- 

4k and catt^h again those parts of the object which have 

iraa alipptuf; nvay to the left. 

Etaetly similar oscillations of the eyeballs are produced 
ia fWtiMMs, with exatly bimilar results. Giddiness is easi- 
-^t priNliined by whirling on our heels. It is a feeling of 
■ moreiueDt if our own head and body through apace, 
'^il t> DOW pretty well uuderstf^iod to be due to the irrita- 
Of'L of the Bemi-cireolar canals of the inner ear." When, 
* Porfclajr. Mach. and Brcuer are (he aulbors to whom we mainly owe 
Ar cxpfawalluQ al Uio feeling of vertigo. I bave found (American Jour- 
nl •( OtototQ-. Oct. 1883) Ihnt In deaf-mutuB (whose semi-circuUr cuiftla 
•* atbc anliibrjr iHirve* muii ofien be dlaorganized) there vety frequently 
OM* M MHttptlbtlltr Ui i^ddinriu ur whirling. 


after whirling, we stop, we seem to be spinning in the reven» 
direction for a few seconds, and then objects appear to con- 
tinue whirling in the same direction in which, a moment 
previous, our body actually whirled. The reason is that 
our eyes ruyrmaUy tend to maintain their field of view, K we 
suddenly turn our head leftwards it is hard to make the 
eyes follow. They roll in their orbits rightwards, by a 
sort of compensating inertia. Even though we fabelf 
think our head to be moving leftwards, this consequence 
occurs, and our eyes move rightwards — as may be observed 
in any one with vertigo after whirling. As these move- 
ments are unconscious, the retinal movement-feelings which 
they occasion are naturally referred to the objects seen. 
And the intermittent voluntary twitches of the eyes towarda 
the left, by which we ever and anon recover them from the 
extreme rightward positions to which the reflex movement 
brings them, simply confirm and intensify our impression 
of a leftward-whirling field of view : we seem to ourselves 
to be periodically pursuing and overtaking the objects in 
their leftward flight The whole phenomenon fades out 
after a few seconds. And it often ceases if we voluntarily 
fix our eyes upon a given point* 

Optical vertigo, as these illusions of objective movement 
are called, results sometimes from brain-trouble, intoxica- 
tions, paralysis, etc. A man will awaken with a weakness- 
of one of his eye-muscles. An intended orbital rotation 
will then not produce its expected result in the way of 
retinal movement-feeling — whence false perceptions, of 
which one of the most interesting cases will fall to be 
discussed in later chapters. 

There is an illusion of movement of the opposite sort^ 
with which every one is familiar at railway stations. Habit- 
ually, when we ourselves move forward, our entire field of 
view glides backward over our retina. When our move- 
ment is due to that of the windowed carriage, car, or boat 

* The invoUiDtaty continuance of the eye's motions is not the only cause- 
of the false perception in these caste. There is also a true negative after- 
image of the original retinal movement-sensations, as we shall see ia 
Chapter XX. 

roe PSBcsPTiON of rmjfoa. 


in whicli «o (tit. all HtatioDar^- olijects viniblo through the 
vindair giTB na a aenBation nf glitling in the opposite 
i]ir«ctiuii. Hewce, whenever we get tills sensation, of a 
ruilow with nil ohj^cts visible through it ninving in one 
directioD. we rt-act npon it in our i-ustomarj- way, and per- 
wivt a stationary field of view, over which the window, and 
•e (larselvex iuiude of it, are passing by a motion of our 
i^wu. CnDseqiiontly when another train comes alongside 
ol uors ib a Ktation, and fills tlie entire window, aud, after 
liUiidin^ still awhile, begins to glide away, we judge that it 
it .far train which is moving, and that the other train is still, 
If, boweTer, we ratcli a glimpse of any part of tlie station 
ttiroagh the windows, or between the cars, of the other train, 
ttii> illtution of onr own movement instantly disappears, and 
n perceive the other train to be the one in motion. Thia^ 
^un, is bat making the nsnal and probable inference from 
oar KCiiflalioD.* 

Ayjther iStuion dtte to movement is explained by Helm- 
Wtz. Most wajsi<le objects, houses, trees, etc., look small 
-thra MMU out of the windows of a swift train. TUis is be- 
^ue WB perceive them in the first instance unduly near. 
'lU:!*© perceive them unduly near because of their extra- 
Hliaarily rapid parallactic flight backwards. When we- 
'jonriTOH move forward all objects gUde backwards, a& 
lionaaul ; but the nearer they are, the more rapid is this 
iffiareat tmmtlooation. Relative rapidity of passage back- 
•vda is thus so familiarly associated with nearness that 
■tea we feel it we perceive nearness. But with a given 
BBj of r«tinnl image the nearer an object is, the Hmaller do 
tv jadge itti actual size to be. Hence in the train, the 
Euter we f(n, the nearer do the trees and houses seem, and 
th* tMnrer tJiey mteni. the smaller do they look.t 

Oiier fflnnoiM are due to the /filing of convergeruv beiufi; 
*TOBgly rotAr^treted. When we convei^e our eyeballs we 
r-rrtaTH an npprtximntlim of whatever thing we may be 
"king at Whatever things do approach whilst we look 

* W* nvtwr, HI &u w I koow, g«i tbe coaversc illusloD at & nllroad aUr 
Mm nd belkn Uw Mber Inln to move nliea it U ttni tl 

I BetmlwlU : Pbjmlol. Optlk. 860. 

92 P8TCH0L0GT. 

at them oblige us, so long as they are not very distant, to 
converge our eyes. Hence approach of the thing is the prob^ 
(Me objective fact when we feel our eyes converging. Now in 
most persons the internal recti muscles, to which converg- 
ence is due, are weaker than the others ; and the entirely 
passive position of the eyeballs, the position which they 
assume when covered and looking at nothing in particular, 
is either that of parallelism or of slight divergence. Make 
a person look with both eyes at some near object, and then 
screen the object from one of his eyes by a card or book. 
The chances are that you will see the eye thus screened 
turn just a little outwards. Remove the screen, and you 
will now see it turn in as it catches sight of the object again. 
The other eye meanwhile keeps as it was at first To most 
persons, accordingly, all objects seem to come nearer when, 
after looking at them with one eye, both eyes are used ; 
and they seem to recede during the opposite change. With 
persons whose external recti muscles are insufficient, the 
illusions may be of the contrary kind. 

The size of the retinal image is a fruitful source of illusions. 
Normally, the retinal image grows larger as the object draws 
near. But the sensation yielded by this enlargement is 
also given by any object which really grows in size with- 
out changing its distance. Enlargement of retinal image 
is therefore an ambiguous sign. An opera-glass enlarges 
the moon. But most persons will tell you that she looks 
smaller through it, only a great deal nearer and brighter. 
They read the enlargement as a sign of approach ; and the 
perception of approach makes them actually reverse the 
sensation which suggests it — by an exaggeration of our 
habitual custom of making allowance of the apparent en- 
largement of whatever object approaches us, and reducing 
it in imagination to its natural size. Similarly, in the theatre 
the glass brings the stage near, but hardly seems to mag- 
nify the people on it 

The well-known increased apparent size of the moon on the 
horizon is a result of association and probability. It is seen 
through vaporous air, and looks dimmer and duskier than 
when it rides on high ; and it is seen over fields, trees^ 


niH, anil the like, which hreuk up the iiiterven- 
9 and make u» the better realize the latter'^ extent. 
1^ causes make the moon seem mare distant from 
u vben it ia low ; and as its visual angle grows no less, we 
d(^m thai it mnitt be a. larger body, and we so perceive it. 
ItloiifcH particnlarlv euornionH when it comes up directly 
tiehioi) some well-knon-n large object, as a house or tree, 
•&taiit roaugh Ut subtend an angle no larger than that of 
tile mouD itfteU." 

TTie /tdi*g o/" accommodation also gives rise to false per- 

-^ptinos of size. Uflually we accommodate our eyes for an 

•-ct as it approaches ns. Usually under tliese cireum- 

' incMi the object throws a larger retinal image. But 

iLeving the object to remain the same, we make allowance 

; tbiM and treat the entire eye-feeling which we receive 

■ -ugnificant of nothing but approach. When we relax our 
-iiiamo<]AUon and at the same time the retinal image 

- TB fimaller, tlie probable oanse is always a rvuxding 
■■»cL The moment we put on convex glasses, however, 
-■- B4;e»niniodatiou relaxes, but the retinal image grows 
<r^ insteiu) of les& This is what would happen if our 
ij*«t, whilst receding, grew. Such a probable object we 
acairdingl; perreive, though with a certain vacillation as 
Id die receaaiou, for the growth in apparent size is also a 
pnbabU sign of approach, and is at moments interpreted 
■Mordi&gly. — Atropin paralyzes the muscles of accommo- 
dilkm. It is poMtible to get a dose which will weaken 
AeM moBcUa without laming them altogether. When a 
kxnro near object is then looked at we have to ii>ake the 
■•• TolnitbUT- strain to accommodate, as if it were a great 
4mI nearer ; bat as its retinal image is not enlarged in pro- 
portioo to this suggested approach, we deem that it mu»t 

■ UP grown smaller than usual. In consequence of this 
-'-all^i) mtcropstf, Aubert relates that he saw a man ap- 

: jfratly no larger than a photograph. But the small size 
ifUB made the man iteem farther off. The real distance 

• Ct Bvkelerl Tbeorjof VUion, gg 87-78 ; Helmboltz : Physiotogtache 
THk. pp. 6aO-l ; LedMlM In Reave Pbllowphique, xxvi. 49. 

di P8T0H0L0QT. 

was two or three feet, and he seemed agamst the wall of 
the room.* Of these vacillations we shall have to speak 
Again in the ensuing chapter, f 

Mrs..G. L. Franklin has recently described and explained 
with rare acuteness an illusion of which the most curious 
thing is that it was never noticed before. Take a single 
pair of crossed lines (Fig. 49), hold them in a horizontal plane 
before the eyes, and look along them, at such a 
distance that with the right eye shut, 1, and with 
the left eye shut, 2, looks like the projection of a 
vertical line. Look steadily now at the point of 
intersection of the lines with both eyes open, and 
you will see a third line sticking up like a pin 
through the paper at right angles to the plane of the 
Fio. 49. \^Q £rgt lines. The explanation of this illusion is 
very simple, but so circumstantial that I must refer for it to 
Mrs. Franklin's own account.]: Suffice it that images of the 
two lines fall on 'corresponding' rows of retinal points, 
and that the illusory vertical line is the only object capable 
of throwing such images. A variation of the experiment 
is this: 

<^ In Fig. 50 the lines are all drawn so as to pass through a oomimm 
point. With a little trouble one eye can be put into the positioaof this 
point — it is only necessary that the paper be held so that, with one eye 
shut, the other eye sees all the lines leaning neither to the right nor to 
the left. After a moment one can fancy the lines to be vertical stafb 
standing out of the plane of the paper. . . . This illusion [says Mrs. 
Franklin] I take to be of purely mental origin. When a line lies any- 
where in a plane passing through the apparent vertical meridian of one 
eye, and is looked at with that eye only. ... we have no very good 
means of knowing how it is directed in that plane. . . . Now of the^ 
lines in nature which lie anywhere within such a plane, by far the 

♦ Physiol. Optik, p. 602. 

f It seems likely that the strains in the recti muscles have something to 
do with the vacillating judgment in these atropin cases. The internal recti 
contract whenever we accommodate. They squint and produce doable 
vision when the innervation for accommodation is excessive. To see 
singly, when straining the atropinized accommodation, the contraction of 
our internal recti must be neutralized by a correspondingly excessive con- 
traction of the external recti. But this is a sign of Uie object's reoe88ioii» eta 

X American Journal of Psychology, l 101 ff. 

rits PsmjBPTios of things. 96 

^mtet BOiBber hn vertical Hoes. Hence we nre peculUrl; inclined to 
lUBk thmt m line which ve p«roeive to be in such a plane ia a vertical 
Uai. Bat to ■«• * lot of lioes m oooe, nil ready to throw their imAgM 

. always, the most probable 

tb* TvrtiaU meritliftn. is a thing that has hardly ever happened to 
mpt whm tbej all have been reitical lines. Hence when that 
w«lMT«a KtfU atroniieT tendency to think Iliat what we see 
Man OB b ft group of vsrtical linca." 

In other worilx. we see, i 

Th« foregoing may serve aa examples of the first tyjte 
•3I illniiioiui mentiuned on page 813. I could cite of course 
BMy oiboni. but it would be tedious to euuiueriite all the 
i^wnatnipMi aud zoctropes, dioramae, aud juggler' ii tricks 
.'ivbic-b tbey are embodied. In the chapter on Sensation 
''* uv that many illuxions commonly ranged under this 
ttfw an>, piiyi<iio]ogic-ttUy considered, of another sort al- 
lOiiether, and that asHociative processes, strictly so called, 
iiw nothing to do with their production. 

lUuaions of the Seamd Type. 
W« may now turn to illusions of the second of the two 
tyfMMdiwTriraiuatiMl on page 86. In this type we perceive a 
«rnuK object bv^cnu>wr oar mind is full of the thought of it 
•tthf tiun*. and any sensation which is iu the leant degree 
oau■^cl4■d with it touches off, as it were, a traiu already 
Ud, and gives U)« a to^uxe that the object is really before 
luk Bere is a familiar example ; 

"If a aportaman, whilti Miooting woodcock iu cover, Met, a bird 
abont tk» me aad oolor of ■ wgudoock get up and Hy through the foli- 


age, not having time to see more than that it is a bird of such a size 
and color, he immediately supplies by inference the other qualities of a 
woodcock, and is afterwards disgust^ to find that he has shot a thrush. 
I have done so myself, and could hardly believe that the thrush was the 
bird I had fired at, so complete was my mental supplement to my visual 

As with game, so with enemies, ghosts, and the like. 
Anyone waiting in a dark place and expecting or fearing 
strongly a certain object will interpret any abrupt sensa- 
tion to mean that object's presence. The boy playing ' I 
spy,' the criminal skulking from his pursuers, the supersti- 
tious person hurrying through the woods or past the church- 
yard at midnight, the man lost in the woods, the girl who 
tremulously has made an evening appointment with her 
swain, all are subject to illusions of sight and sound which 
make their hearts beat till they are dispelled. Twenfy 
times a day the lover, perambulating the streets with his 
preoccupied fancy, will think he perceives his idol's bonnet 
before him. 

The Proof-reader's lUtision. I remember one night in. 
Boston, whilst waiting for a * Mount Auburn ' car to bring 
me to Cambiidge, reading most distinctly that name upon 
the signboard of a car on which (as I afterwards learned) 
* North Avenue ' was painted. The illusion was so vivid 
that I could hardly believe my eyes had deceived me. All 
reading is more or less performed in this way. 

** Practised novel- or newspaper-readers could not possibly get on so 
fast if they had to see accurately every single letter of every word in 
order to perceive the words. More than half of the words come out of 
their mind, and hardly half from the printed page. Were this not so, 
did we perceive each letter by itself, typographic errors in well-knowu 
words would never be overlooked. Children, whose ideas ai*e not yet 
ready enough to perceive words at a glance, read them wrong if they 
are printed wrong, that is, right according to the way of printing. In 
a foreign language, although it may be printed with the same letters, 
we read by so much the more slowly as we do not understand, or are 
unable promptly to perceive the words. But we notice misprints all the 
more readily. For this reason Latin and Greek and, still better, 
Hebrew works are more correctly printed, because the proofs are better 
corrected, than iii German works. Of two friends of mine, one knew 
much Hebrew, the other little ; the latter, however, gave instmotion in 

* Romanes. Mental EvolutioD in Animals, d. 834 



* \a\ fymtutemra ; wnd whi-n he wtUed tho other tn help correcL 

«aa' exerdsfK It turned onl ihni he could And oul kII 8i>rls of 

b emn baiter thitii his friend, because the latter's perw ption of the 

B wiw too Bwifu" ' 

Tfftimtmy tn personat identity i> proverhinlly /nlffuyione for 

miUir reasons. A raan lias wjtiiesseil a rapid crime or 

Mciih'nt, anil carrieH away his mental image. Later ^le is 

eotJrtintffl by a jmaoner whom he forthwith perceives in 

llt« lijiht of that image, and recognizes or ' identifieB ' as a. 

nirjpfttit. although he may never have been near the 

Similarly at the so-catled 'materializing seanceH' 

^ich (raadnlent itiedinms give : in a dark room a man 

ts a (Mtize-robed fignre who in a whisper tellrt him she ia 

ill" spirit of his* Bister, mother, wife, or child, and falls upon 

\m neck. The darknesa, tlje previous forms, ami the es- 

p«>rtBticr have so tilled his mind with premonitory images 

llial it io no wonder he perceives what is suggested. These 

frawliilent 'stances* wonld furnish most precious docu- 

jt-nls to the psychology of perception, if they could only 

t» utJBfactorily inquired into, lu the hypuotie trance any 

■Ojef^tMl object is sensibly jierceived. In certain subjects 

Oi'tt happens more or less corapietety after waking from 

tbf trance. It would seem that under favorable conditions 

• MHuewhat similar susceptibility to suggestion may exist 

IB tvrtain p«n»otis who are not otherwise entranced at all. 

Tills snnrgestibility is greater in the lower senses than 
in the higher. A German observer writes : 

"We kn'iw (bat a wr-ak smell or laslo may be verj- diverseli inter- 
FM<*I by n«. and tiwt the same seusation will now be named as one 
thlniand The next moment m another. Suppose an agreeable smell of 
fc»*» In a room ; A visitor will notice il, seek lo reuogniie what it ia. 

'U, Luanu Das hcbn> d Seele. ii (18S7), p. 83. In Ihe ordlDary 
ktri»t •■! Hipetb hair Ihp worrfg wi- seem lo hear are nupplied onl of oiip 
"■tSn.3 A Uniruape with which we are perfeclly familiar is iiuder- 
""L rrcn whrn -jKihen la low tonoa ami far ofl. An iiDfamillar language 
a intDlriUjtible uadcr Ihvne ■.'ondltlona. If we do not gel a very good seal 
Mthrviifti tlieatre, we fall to follow Ihcdlntogiie: and what tcives Irotible 
<■ MM of US when ahmail In not only iLal Ihc iiallven epeak so tani. but 
■*« tbrf R|>cak au ttidtatln'.-lly and «o low. The verbal objects (or Inter- 
Pttag the aoundii by an not alcrl and rauly made In our minds, as they 
«» to our fWmlllar molher.iuugue. and do uol ulart up ai so faiut n cue. 


and at last perceive more and more distinctly that it is the perfume of 
roses — until after all he discovers a bouquet of violets. Then suddenly 
he recognizes the violet-smell, and wonders how he could possibly have 
hit upon the roses. --Just so it is with taste. Try some meat whose 
visible characteristics are disguised by the mode of cooking, and you 
will perhaps begin by taking it for venison, and end by being quite 
certai];^ that it is venison, until you are told that it is mutton ; where- 
upon you get distinctly the mutton flavor. — In this wise one may make 
a person taste or smell what one will, if one only makes sure that he 
shall conceive it beforehand as we wish, by saying to him : * Doesn^t 
that taste just like, etc.?' or 'Doesn't it smell just like, etc.?' One 
€an cheat whole companies in this way ; announce, for instance, at a 
meal, that the meat tastes 'high,' and almost every one who is not 
animated by a spirit of opposition will discover a flavor of putrescence 
which in reality is not there at all. 

** In the sense of feeling this phenomenon is less prominent, because 
we get BO close to the object that our sensation of it is never incomplete. 
8tilL examples may be adduced from this sense. On superficially feel- 
ing of a cloth, one may confidently declare it for velvet, whilst it is 
perhaps a long-haired cloth ; or a person may perhaps not be able to 
decide whether he has put on woolen or cotton stockings, and, trjing 
to ascertain this by the feeling on the skin of the feet, he may become 
aware that he gets the feeling of cotton or wool according as he thinks 
of the one or the other. When the feeling in our fingers is somewhat 
blunted by cold, we notice many such phenomena, being then more ex- 
posed to confound objects of touch with one another." ♦ 

High authorities have doubted this power of imagination 
to falsify present impressions of sense, t Yet it unquestion- 
ably exists. Within the past fortnight I have been annoyed 
by a smell, faint but unpleasant, in my librarj'. My annoy- 
ance began by an escape of gas from the furnace below 
stairs. This seemed to get lodged in my imagination as a 
sort of standard of perception; for, several days after the 
furnace had been rectified, I perceived the * same smell * 
again. It was traced this time to a new pair of India rubber 
shoes which had been brought in from the shop and laid on 
a table. It persisted in coming to me for several days» 
however, in spite of the fact that no other member of the 
family or visitor noticed anything unpleasant. My impres- 
sion during part of this time was one of uncertainty whether 

♦ G. H. Meyer, Untersuchungen, etc., pp. 242-3. 
f Helmholtz, P. O. 488. The question will soon come before us again 
in the chapter on the Perception of 8|>ace. 


B Eun<«ll WAS imiiginnty or re&l ; and at last it faded oul 
iviTiiiiL* mast 1)0 nble to give iostaoces like this from the 
iell-M>nM«. When w« bave paid tlie faithless pluuber for 
rvlfcdiug to ineud our drains, the intellect inhibits the 
■ (roui j)(*eei\iDg the same unaltered odor, until per- 
p BeTeral dajn go br. As regards the ventilation or 
j[ of rooms, we are apt to feel for some time as we 
k «• oaght to feeL If we believe the ventilator is shut, 
B feel the room close. On discovering it open, the oppres- 
tdou tlbmppeartj. 

An exireinv instimce is given in the following extract : 
• ■ A p»lwnt caUed nl my offite oiie day in a aUitu of great eicilpmcnt 
Cru« ibe oOocis of an ofFcneive odor in the bore«-car she Iiud foitie in, 
■nd which iJwi declared tiad probably emanalcd from some very sick 
pdMM hIm mosi liav« berii jiist carried in it. Therre could be no doubt 
ibat, MMBirUtiQK luul alTtuted her Beriuualy. Tor she was very paJe, with 
mMua. dilScalty in bruatliing, und otlier evidences of bodily and mental 
ilatiVBk 1 BUccovdM, ufl^-r Home difiicully and tinit>. in quieting her, 
ud kbe left, protcstmg thi>t Ihn smell wwt unlike Hiiy'liiog alie had ever 
lidorc csperiravMl and vain §ometiting dreadful. l.caving my oQlce 
tMM afUr, it K> hn{ipen«d tliat I found her at the street-corner, waiting 
braou-: w« Ibaa «i>UTed the oar together. 8he immediately called 
vf attofitiofitu Ihe Munu sickeiiingodor which she had experienced in 
Ike atker car, and Im^b to lie affected the same as before, when 1 
poiawd oat to berihatltmsnti-ll was simply thai which always emnnales 
(rwa (Im straw wiiicfa has been in stables. She quickly recognized it an 
ibcHkiae. when the nnpleaaant effects which arose while 6bc was possessed 
«ith anolber iienrftptiou of ilsclmracier at once passed away."* 

It i» the aame with touch. Everyone must have felt the 
wasiblr? qaolity cluuige under his hand, a» sudden contact 
with Bomething moist or hairj', in the dark, awoke a shock 
of dtMgUMt or fear which faded into calm recognition of »ome 
bniliAr object? Even so amall a thing as a crumb of po- 
tato on th» table-cloth, which we pick up, thinking it a 
cnuub of bread, feels horrible for a few moments t<j our 
fucy, aud different from what it is. 

Weight or muscular feeling is a sensation ; yet who has 

not heard thi* auea^dote of some one to h hom 8ir Humphry 

I Davy showed the metal sodium which he had just dis- 

[ tBDverMl? " BloHs me, how heavy it isl" said the man; 

• C. F T^luT. Semailoa and Fain. p. 87 (N. T., 1886). 


showing that his idea of what metals as a class ought to be 
had falsified the sensation he derived from a very light 

In the sense of hearing, similar mistakes abound. I 
have already mentioned the hallucinatory effect of mental 
images of very faint sounds, such as distant clock-strokes 
(above, p. 71). But even when stronger sensations of sound 
have been present, everyone must recall some experience 
in which they have altered their acoustic character as soon 
as the intellect referred them to a different source. The 
other day a friend was sitting in my room, when the clock, 
which has a rich low chime, began to strike. " Hollo ! '* said 
he, "hear that hand-organ in the garden," and was sur- 
prised at finding the real source of the sound. I had myself 
some years ago a very striking illusion of the sort. Sitting 
reading late one night, I suddenly heard a most formidable 
noise proceeding from the upper part of the house, which 
it seemed to fill. It ceased, and in a moment renewed it- 
self. I went into the hall to listen, but it came no more» 
Resuming my seat in the room, however, there it was again^ 
low, mighty, alarming, like a rising flood or the avani- 
courier of an awful gale. It came from all space. Quite 
startled, I again went into the hall, but it had already 
ceased once more. On returning a second time to the room> 
I discovered that it was nothing but the breathing of a little 
Scotch terrier which lay asleep on the floor. The note- 
worthy thing is that as soon as I recognized what it was, I 
was compelled to think it a different sound, and could not 
then hear it as I had heard it a moment before. 

In the anecdotes given by Delboeuf and Beid, this was 
probably also the case, though it is not so stated. Beid 

*' I remember that once lying abed, and having been put into a fright^ 
I beard my own heart beat; but I took it to be one knocking at the 
door, and arose and opened the door oftener than once, before I dis- 
covered that the sound was in my own breast.'' (Inquiry, chap. iv. 


Delboeuf s story is as follows : 

'* The illustrious P. J. van Beneden, senior, was walking one evening 
with a friend along a woody hill near Chaudfontaine. *Don*t you 


h^r.'uiil thii friend, 'tlie noiiie of a hunt on the mountninf M. van 
BrtinlcQ ll&ii>ns anil distinguislie« in fact the giving-tongueof the dog». 
1V_T lui«n soiuD time, expecting from one tnoment to uuother to ac« a 
■l'«r tiKind \yf; but the voice of the dogs seems neither to recede nor 
luirn.ucli. At last a (.■ountrymun couiifi by, and iliey aak biu who it is 
MM fJiQ b« taunting at this tate hour. But be, jioiiitiug to some puddles 
'I •iirT iioar their (oet. replica; ■ Yonder little niiitnals are what you 
irar ' And tlit-re there wen' in fact a number of toads of the species 
B.nbinator igiuta. . . . This bntrochian emits at the pairing season a 
HlTcrr or ralber crystalline note. . . . Sad and pure, it is a voice in 
aoatae tnemUing that of hounds giving chase." * 

The sense of siglit, as we have »eea id studying Space, 
w prvgnant witli UlaHionB of both the types con«idered. 
So seuiHi gives snch fluctuating impressious of the imuie 
object a» sigbt does. With no sense sre we so apt to treat 
tii4^ M'umtiouH immediately given as mere signs ; with none 
i* tb<! iDvooution from memory of a thiiig, and the couse- 
qoeot perceptiou of the latter, so immediate. The 'thiug' 
vhinb we perceive always resembles, as we have seen, the 
ebJMSi of w>me absent sensation, usually another optical 
Affiiro which iu our mind has come to be the standai-d of 
reality; and it ia this incessant reductiou of our optical 
obj«K)ts fa> more ' real ' forms which has led some authors 
into tbe mistake of thinking that the sensations which 
first spiprehand them are ortgiually and uatively of no 

Of Accidental and occasional illusions of sight many 
amaaog eiatnples might be given. Two will suf&ce. One 
i* a reniiuittceuce of my own. I was Ij'iiig in my berth in 
• xtoftUK^^r Itntetiiug to the sailors holystone the deck oat- 
ide ; when, oo turning my eyes to the window, I perceived 
' Ti perfect distinctness that the chief-engineer of the ves- 
I hiwl entered my state-room, and was standing looking 
"i the window at the men at work upon the guards. 
1 &t his intrasion, and also at his iuteutuess and 

^B de la Lot pBychopbjBltiue (I888t, p. 61. 
KTolkinaiin's eiaay ' Ueber Ursprttngljche* und Erwor- 
JtilBIChauuugCD.' on p. 189 of hia UuIemichuagL-n Im 

•■ wmt vyJki tod Chapter xni of Hcring's couirlbulioD to Hur- 

'• Ilaodbuch der Physlologie, vol. tii. 

102 P87CH0L00T, 

immobility, I remained watcLiug him and wondering how 
long he would stand thus. At last I spoke ; but getting no 
reply, sat up in my berth, and then saw that what I had 
taken for the engineer was my own cap and coat hanging 
on a peg beside the window. The illusion was complete ; 
the engineer was a peculiar-looking man ; and I saw him 
unmistakably ; but after the illusion had vanished I found 
it hard voluntarily to make the cap and coat look like him 
at all. 

The following story, which I owe to my friend ProL 
Hyatt, is of a probably not uncommon class : 

** During the winter of 1858, while in Venice, I had the somewhat 
peculiar illusion which you request me to relate. I remember the cir- 
cumstances very accurately because I have often repeat^ the story, 
and have made an effort to keep all the attendant circumstances clear 
of exaggeration. I was traveUing with my mother, and we had taken 
rooms at a hotel which had been located in an old palace. The room 
in which I went to bed was large and lofty. The moon was shining 
brightly, and I remember standing before a draped window, thinking 
of the romantic nature of the surroundings, remnants of old stories of 
knights and ladies, and the possibility that even in that room itself 
love-scenes and sanguinary tragedies might have taken place. The- 
night was so lovely that many of the people were strolling through the 
narrow lanes or so-called streets, singing as they went, and I laid awake 
for some time listening to these patrols of serenaders, and of course 
finally fell asleep. I became aware that some one was leaning over me 
closely, and that my own breathing was being interfered with; a decided 
feeling of an unwelcome presence of some sort awakened me. As I 
opened my eyes I saw, as distinctly as I ever saw any living person, a 
draped head about a foot or eighteen inches to the right, and just above 
my bed. The horror which took possession of my young fancy was^ 
beyond anything 1 have ever experienced. The head was covered by a 
long black veil which floated out into the moonlight, the face itself was 
pale and beautiful, and the lower part swathed in the white band com- 
monly worn by the nuns of Catholic orders. My hair seemed to lise 
up, and a profuse perspiration attested the genuineness of the terror 
which I felt. For a time I lay in this way, and then gradually gaining 
more command over my superstitious terrors, concluded to try to grap- 
ple with the apparition. It remained perfectly distinct until 1 reached 
at it sharply with my hand, and then disappeared, to return again, 
however, as soon as I sank back into the pillow. The second or third 
grasp which I made at the head was not followed by a reappearance, 
and I then saw that the ghost was not a real presence, but depended 
upon the position of my head. If I moved my eyes either to the left or 



ntiou occapied by in; bend wbeD I awakened. Ihe 
y returning to about the same position. I could 
b nearly the game intensity as at llrst, 1 presently 
r by thne experiments that the illusion arose from the 
■^rrx ti the ima;;^ nation, aided by the actnal flgure made by a visual 
■rruan of th« moonbeams shining through the laco curtains of the win- 
i ■ [/ I bad giTen way to the first terror of the situation and cov- 
■--J np my bead, I should probably have believed in the reality of the 
i-puntwin, einw I hnvc not by the 8iixhl«i4l word, so far as 1 know, e»- 
Uprmtml llie vividness of my feelings." 


Enoaijit \\»n uow beeti said to prove the geuerul law of 
[vrcwption, whicli is this, that whihi. part of what toe per- 
'rive romm through our senaeafrom the object before us, another 
part (auiI it may b<> the larger part) always covies (in Laza- 
nw'« phroMo) out (fimr otm hrtui. 

At bottom this is only oup i-ase (and that the simplest 
<mm) of the ^neral fact that our nerva-ceutrea are au organ 
(or rt!«otii)((oii sfnue-impressioos, aad that our IiemispUeres, 
b p«rticiilar, arc given ns in order that records of our private 
put ftXfterieuce may co-operate in the reaction. Of course 
«eU a geaeral ivay of stating the fact is vagiie ; and all those 
»bo (oUow the vurreat theory of idean will be prompt to 
llirov this ragaeness at it as a reproach. Their way o^ de- 
tcrihing the process goes much more into detail. I^e sen- 
Mtioti, tbny say, awakens 'images ' of other sensations asso- 
ciated with it ID the past. These images ' fuse,' or are ' com- 
bined ' by the ^;o with the preHPut sensation into a new 
pnMlnct, the ((ercept, etc.. etc. Something so indistinguish- 
able from thiH in practical outi^ome is what really occurs, 
tbal one may aeem faatidioas in objecting to such a state- 
■rat, opnciaUy if have no rival theory of the elementary 
prn owMpM to propose. And yet, it tliin notion of images 
risiiiK '""1 flocking and fusing be mythological <and we have 
all aloo^ H» coniutlerecl it), why shouhl we entertain it unless 
B >n h MW<lly as a mere figure of speech V As such, of course, 
it t> eonventent and welcome to pass. But if we try to put 
u exart meaning iuto it, all we find is that the brain reacta 
bypathfl whiuh previoas experiences have worn, and makes 
n oraally perceive the probable thing, i.p., the thing by 


which on previous occasions the reaction was most frequent* 
ly aroused. 

But we can, I think, without danger of being too 
speculative, be a little more exact than this, and conceive 
of a physiological reason why the felt quality of an object 
changes when, instead of being apprehended in a mere sen- 
sation, the object is perceived as a thing. All consciousness 
seems to depend on a certain slowness of the process in the 
cortical cells. The rapider currents are, the less feeling 
they seem to awaken. If a region A, then, be so connected 
with another region B that every current which enters A 
immediately drains off into B, we shall not be very strongly 
conscious of the sort of object that A can make us feel. 
If B, on the contrary, has no such copious channel of dis- 
charge, the excitement will linger there longer ere it diffuses 
itself elsewhere, and our consciousness of the sort of ob- 
ject that B makes us feel ^dll be strong. Carrying this to 
an ideal maximum, we may say that if A offer no resistance 
to the transmission forward of the current, and if the cur- 
rent terminate in B, then, no matter what causes may initiate 
the current, we shall get no consciousness of the object 
peculiar to A, but on the contrary a vivid sensation of the 
object peculiar to B. And this will be true though at other 
times the connection between A and B might lie less open, 
and every current then entering A might give us a strong con- 
sciousness of A's peculiar object. In other words, just in 
proportion as associations are habitual, will the qualities of 
the suggested thing tend to substitute themselves in con- 
sciousness for those of the thing immediately there; or, 
more briefly, just in proportion as an experience is probabk 
win it tend to be dii^ectly fdt. In all such experiences the 
paths lie wide open from the cells first affected to those 
concerned with the suggested ideas. A circular after-image 
on the receding wall or ceiling is actually 8een as an ellipse, 
a square after-image of a cross there is seen as slant-legged, 
etc., because only in the process correlated with the vision 
of the latter figures do the inward currents find a pause 
(see the next chapter). 

We must remember this when, in dealing with the eye, 
we come to point out the erroneousness of the principle laid 


down by Reid anil Eelmlioltz that true seneatioDS cai) 
Bererbe changed by ttip HUggestionn of experience. 

A certain illasion of which I have not yet spoken affords 
u itilditionAl iliustratioD of this. IVhen ice uiTI to execute a 
■o or ww tf and the movemertt for some reason does not occur, 
mhn tie aftuation of the pnrt'a not moving is a strong one, vk 
•It aft to ft^ an if the movetnent had actvaVy taken place. 
Tim w«iiM habitually to he the (;ase in aniP6thp»in of the 
nonng psrtft. Close the patient'^ eyes, hold hin antesthetic 
ira ftUl, and tell him to rni^e his hand to his head; mid 
wlwn he opens his eyes he will be astonished to find that 
th- iDOTT'inent Imx not tiiken place. All reports of antesthetic 
rfcse* seem to mention this illusion. Hteniberg who wrote on 
ttr snbject in 1885," lays it down an a law that the intention 
til movn i>i the samn thing as the fueling of the motion. We 
•hall latf-r kcp that this is false (Chapter XXV): bat it 
certainly may tiggeiil the feeling of the motion with hallu- 
itory intensity'. Sternberg gives the following experi- 
it. which I find sncoeed» with at least half of those who 
Rpst yonr palm on the edge of the table with yonr 
f(irefin)ter hanging over in a irasition of extreme flexion, 
ud then exert your will to Hex it still more. The position 
o( the other tingerx makes this impossible, and yet if we do 
noi look to see the finger, we think we feel it move. Hp 
qni^itcM from Exner a similar experiment witli the jaws ; Put 
aomt> hard rtiblMT or other unindentable obstacle between 


a Xbm ProcenllDgs of Ihc JUneriou) Soctety for Payrhlcal Research, pp. 
I luiTB tried U) accciiml for «ome of the variatloos in tbja coosciouf- 
Ovl at 110 peraoiu wbom I found to feel llieir lost fool, sonie did au 
" Ellbcr ilii<y ouly teeX it occasloniilly. r>r only wbea U pniiia 
IWm, or ftnljr when Uiry try to move il; or Ihry only fefl il wbcn they 
' thtsk B giMd deal about tt ' und make rd eSon 1o conjure <1 Dp, When 
ihrj 'ffow ImttrollTe,' the feeling ' flie« bark ' or ' jumpg tmrk.' lo lbs 
•tuap. Erery degree of ronscioiuneca. from complete and peraiHneat bsl- 
larlnatfaxi down in Kometbliig hanlly dlnliiigulsbitlilp from ordinHry fancy, 
M«u rcpfcaenled in the (ense of ttie mUting extreniily wfalcb theM 
patii!St> lay Ihey hate. Indeed I have seldom Keen ii more plausible lot of 
«Tfde«re for the vleir that Imagluatiou nnil Hpiisallon are but differences of 
HrldnoB lu ad ideutlral jird-iwi ihtia Uiese confeulonfi, Uking them atbo- 
iHhvr, amtsln. Many p<t lien tt wy they can hardly lell whether tbv 
hrf or tMcy Uw Ihnb- ' 

106 P8TCH0L00T. 

your back teeth and bite hard : you think you feel the Jatr 
move and the front teeth approach each other, though in 
the nature of things no movement can occur.* — The visu- 
al suggestion of the path traversed by the finger-tip as the 
locus of the movement-feeling in the joint, which we dis- 
cussed on page 41, is another example of this semi-hallu- 
cinatory power of the suggested thing. Amputated people, 
as we have learned, still feel their lost feet, etc. This is a 
necessary consequence of the law of specific energies, for if 
the central region correlated with the foot give rise to any 
feeling at all it must give rise to the feeling of a foot.t But 
the curious thing is that many of these patients can wUl the 
foot to move, and when they have done so, distinctly /e^I the 
movement to occur. They can, to use their own language, 
* work ' or * wiggle ' their lost toes. X 

Now in all these various cases we are dealing with data 
which in normal life are inseparably joined. Of all possi- 
ble experiences, it is hard to imagine any pair more uni- 
formly and incessantly coupled than the volition to move^ 
on the one hand, and the feeling of the changed position of 
the parts, on the other. From the earliest ancestors of ours 
which had feet, down to the present day, the movement of 
the feet must always have accompanied the will to move 
them ; and here, if anywhere, habit's consequences ought 
to be found.^ The process of the willing ought, then, to pour 
into the process of feeling the command effected, and ought 
to awaken that feeling in a maximal degree provided no 
other positively contradictory sensation come in at the same 
time. In most of us, when the will fails of its effect there 
is a contradictory sensation. We discern a resistance or 
the unchanged position of the limb. But neither in ansBS- 
thesia nor in amputation can there be any contradictory 
sensation in the foot to correct us ; so imagination has all 
the force of fact. 

* Pflttger's Archiv. xxzvn. 1. 
t Not all patients have this additional illusion. 

X I ought to say that in almo$t all cases the volition is followed h$ 
actual contraction of muscles in the ttump. 

TUJ£ PUHcjePTiotr OF I'myaa. luT 


In Germany since Herbart's time Psychology lias always 
W a ^^«l deal to say about a process called Apperception* 
Tkf inrnming ideas or sensations are said to be 'apper- 
ffjted ' br • roaasea ' of ideas already in the mind. It is plain 
ihal the process we have l>een describing as perception is, 
tl this mtc, BD apperceptive process. So are all reco^i- 
tim, chwfiing, and naming ; and passing bejoud these sim- 
plMtntggeRtionH, all farther thoughts about our percepts are 
■ p |»rc«ptive processes as well. I have myself not used the 
word apperception because it has carried very diifereut mean- 
'-..^ in the history of philosophy,! and 'psychic reaction,' 
ctorp rotation,' 'conception,' ' assimilatiou,' 'elaboration,' 
■' ■tmplr ' thonght,' are perfect synonyms for its Herbartian 
UMiuag, widely token. It is, moreover, hardly worth while 
lo prrtfud to analyze the so-caUed apperceptive perform- 
■ncr« beyond the first or perceptive stage, because their varia- 
tioaaand degrees are literally innumerable. ' Apperceptiou ' 
i* a uuno for the sum-total of the effects of what we Itave 
■tadied as aosocifltiou ; and it is obvious that the things 
vbicb a given experience will suggest to a man depend oa 
what Mr. Lewes calls his entire psychostatical conditions, 
kia OAbire and stock of ideas, or, in other words, his charac- 
tar, hAhitH, memory, education, previous experience, and 
■nDoitanr mootL We gain no insight into what really oc- 
om eittter io the mind or in the brain by calling all these 
tlUBga tlM ' apperceiving mass,' though of course this may 
vpon oecsaion be convenient. On the whole I am inclined 
to dnak Mr. Lewes'H term of ' assimilation ' the meet fruit- 
fal ooA T8t afied.t 

ProfMWor H. Steinthal has analyzed apperceptive pro- 
nnes with a wjrt of detail which is simply burdensome.^ 


• CI. Herbart. Piydiol «1», WisBonscliift, g 125, 

fOnaparvtbr hlrtortral r«*tew« by K. Laage: Ueber Apperception 
(n«^. I87»i. pp IS-M; \ij guude Id Wuodl's Pbtlosophiscbe StuHico. i. 
Ur. mi ty lUrty lo VUnvljTtcb. t. vtIrb Phil., x. 347 B. 

iProblMM. vol I- p. liva. 

fSMbli EtaJeluug In di« pBycfaoUigle u. 8pr»chwtn«nscbaf( (1881^ 

108 P8T0H0L0G7, 

His introdnction of the matter may, howeYer, be quoted. 
He begins with an anecdote from a comic paper. 

*Mn the compartment of a railway-carriage six persons unknown to 
each other sit in lively conversation. It becomes a matter of regret tiial 
one of the company must alight at the next station. One of the othen 
«ays that he of all things prefers such a meeting with entirely unknown 
persons, and that on such occasions he is accustomed neither to ask who 
or what his companions may be nor to tell who or what he is. Another 
thereupon says that he will undertake to decide this question, if they 
each and all will answer him an entirely disconnected question. Thq^ 
began. He drew five leaves from his note-book, wrote a question on 
each, and gave one to each of his companions with the request that he 
write the answer below. When the leaves were returned to him, he 
turned, after reading them, without hesitation to the others, and said to 
the first, * You are a man of science'; to the second, ' Yon are a sol- 
dier'; to the third, * You are a philologer'; to the fourth, ' Yon aie a 
journalist'; to the fifth, 'You are a farmer.' All admitted that he 
was right, whereupon he got out and left the five behind. Each 
wished to know what question the others had received; and behold, he 
had given the same question to each. It ran thus : 

'* *• What being destroys what it has itself brought forth f 

*^To this the naturalist had answered, 'vital force*; the scridier, 
^war'; the philologist, 'Kronos'; the publicist, 'revolution'; the 
farmer, ' a boar \ This anecdote, methinks, if not true, is at least 
splendidly well invented. Its narrator makes the journalist go on to 
say : * Therein consists the joke. Each one answers the first thing that 
occurs to him,* and that is whatever is most newly related to his pur- 
suit in life. Every question is a hole-drilling experiment, and the an- 
swer is an opening through which one sees into our interiors.' ... So 
do we all. We are all able to recognize the clergyman, the soldier, the 
scholar, the business man, not only by the cut of their garments and 
the nttitude of their body, but by what they say and how they express 
it. We guess the place in life of men by the interest which they show 
and the way in which they show it, by the objects of which they q)eak, 
by the point of view from which they regard things, judge them, conoeive 
them, in short by their mode of apperceiving. . . . 

"Every man has one group of ideas which relate to his own person 
and interests, and another which is connected with society. Each has 
his group of ideas about plants, religion, law, art, etc., and more 
especially about the rose, epic poetry, sermons, free trade, and the like. 
Thus the mental content of every individual, even of the uneducated 

* One of my colleaguoa, asking himself the question after reading the 
anecdote, tells me that he replic<1 ' Harvard College/ the faculty of that bo^jr 
having voted, a few days previously, to keep back the degrees of memben 
of the graduating class who might be disorderly on claas-day night. W. J. 


ad 4( dUMrvn, cooMst* of massps or circles of knowledge nf wtiich 
within Boioe larger cirflc, alongside of othere similarly in- 
l, Mul of which rswh indudes smaller circles within itself. . . . 
1W pmKfitioQ of ti ihing like a Ijorae . . . U a process betwi^iii the 
1 btinM'* pktun: tieforu our eyes, un the one liaud, and thosi' fnsi'd 
loTM and ideas of all the horses wtt have i;vL'r seeti, on 
> other; . . . K procces hetnecD tno fact<irs or nomenljt, of wliieb 
•' *n»t«4l beforri tbo process and nos an old possession of the mind 
'-J" (nmpof ideiis, cir concept, namely), whilst the other In but just 
;m^t«() tn the mind, and la the immediately snpervening factor (the 
■s«»-iiBprv!niott). The former apperceives the latter; the latter ia 
ifpcnniTrd bj the former. Out of ibeir combination an apperoeption- 
vp^hm ui«A: the knowledge of the perceived being as a horse. The 
■irfisr factor ia relatively to tbi? later one oclivuand a ptiori ; thesuper- 
^tnK fadnr in |iven. a piMteriori, passive. . . , We mny then defino 
'. . frfiorfitirin OS th« roovemf^ut of two masses of consciousness (Vorst«l- 
iF.QMMMrni against each oiher so as to produce a cognition. 
" Titr a priori factor we isalled active, the a posteriori factor passive, 
l«t thlt I* only relatively true. . . . Although the a priori moment 
— i».».tj «how« itsiiir to be the more powerfnl, apperception- processes 
can perfvctly weft occur In which the new observation transforms or en- 
nehea ttwi appenwivlng group of ideas. A child who hitherto has seen 
Mer bat foar-oortiemd tables ^perceivc^ a round one as a table; but 
lyilii* tbF atiparcetving masB ('table') is enriched. To his previous 
kamladp ot tabln comes this new feature that they need not be four- 
t bat may be round. In the hiatory of science it has happened 
t wimn discovery, at the same lime Ihat it was apper- 
I. La. broagtal into connection with the systeni <>f our knowled);e, 
d tbe whole nyst«m. In principle, however, we must maintain 
that, aKhoogh «ithor factor is both active and passive, the a /iriorj factor 
a alB«t always the more active of the two." * 

This Account of Hteintlial's briugtt out very clearly the 
£frraice lifiiMen our pnyckultxjiail concepftons and wktU are 
nSMamce^a in logic In logic a concept is uniilterable ; but 
wbat are popularly callod our ' conceptious of tbiugs ' alter 
lijr being nsed. The nim of ' Science ' is to attain concep- 
tioaB BO adoqaato and exact that we shall never need to 
dtMngiB tliem. There ia au everlasting struggle in every 
uid betwoen the tendency tu keep uuchanged, and the 
teadency to renovate, its ideas. Our education in a cease- 
leM c»mpromise between the conservative and the pro- 
s factors. Every new experience must be disposed 


of under some old head. The great point is to find the head 
which has to be least altered to take it in. Certain Polyne- 
sian natives, seeing horses for the first time, called tiiem 
pigs, that being the nearest head. My child of two played 
for a week with the first orange that was given him, calUng 
it a 'ball.' He called the first whole eggs he saw 'potatoes,* 
having been accustomed to see his ' eggs ' broken into a 
glass, and his potatoes without the skin. A folding pocket- 
corkscrew he unhesitatingly called * bad-scissors.' Hardly 
any one of us can make new heads easily when fresh expe- 
riences come. Most of us grow more and more enslaved to 
the stock conceptions with which we have once become 
familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating impres- 
sions in any but the old ways. Old-f ogj'ism, in short, is the 
inevitable terminus to which life sweeps us on. Objects 
which violate our established habits of ' apperception ' are 
simply not taken account of at all ; or, if on some occasion 
we are forced by dint of argument to admit their existence, 
twenty-four hours later the admission is as if it were not, 
and every trace of the unassimilable trufch has vanished 
from our thought. Genius, in truth, means little more than 
the faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual way. 

On the other hand, nothing is more congenial, from 
babyhood to the end of life, than to be able to assimilate 
the new to the old, to meet each threatening violator or 
burster of our well-known series of concepts, as it comes 
in, see through its uuwontedness, and ticket it off as an old 
friend in disguise. This victorious assimilation of the new 
is in fact the type of all intellectual pleasure. The lust for 
it is curiosity. The relation of the new to the old, before 
the assimilation is performed, is wonder. We feel neither 
curiosity nor wonder concerning things so far beyond us 
that we have no concepts to refer them to or standards by 
which to measure them.* The Fuegians, in Darwin's voy- 

* The great maxim in pedagogy is to knit every new piece of knowl- 
edge on to a pre-existing curiosity — i.e., to assimilate its matter in some 
way to what is already known. Hence the advantage of ** comparing all 
that is far off and foreign to something that is near home, of making the 
unknown plain by the example of the known, and of connecting all the 
instruction with the personal experience of the pupil. ... If the teacher It 


ip, wondered at the Hmall Imath, but tnok tlifl big ship aa 

n'raatttT of »-ouir«»'.' Onl_v wlia( we partlr kuuw iilreitdj 

i::«imii» 08 with n (Ifnin* to know more. The m{>re elabii- 

il« bfxtilt> [abricR, Ihc vuRtnr wnrks in metal, tn mrmt of 

- an* like the air. tlip wat^T, and the ground, ahtinlute ex- 

-i-ucett which awakeD no ideas. It i» a matter of roiirse 

it Ml cugraviDg or a copper-plate inscription shonhl poB- 

- -■. that degree of beautj. But if we are shown a pen- 

•Inwiiiij; i>f equal perfection, our personal aympathy with 

Ux- diftiniltj' of the task makes us imniediatelj wonder at 

tin* akilL The old lady admiring the Ac-ad eiiiioian'si picture, 

«ajB tri him : " Aiid itt it really all done hy luinii '/" 


A widcly-Hpread opinion ( which lias been held by such 
iBflD an Schopenhauer, Hjwncer, Hartniauu, AVundt, Helni- 
bottK, and lately iutere»tingly pleaded for by M. Binet*) 
will have it that perception nhould be caBed a nwt of reasoning 
tfrratitm, tatrrr ur l^a nwrmttdotialy and automnticiiUy pe.r- 
/vrmed. The qnextion aeeina at tirst a verltal one, depend- 
ing t>n how bromUy the term reaaoning is to be taken. If, 
pverr titni* a present sign suggesta an absent reality to our 
aind. we make an inference ; and if every time we make an 
iiifi)reti(M< wu reiMMjn ; then perception is indubitably reason- 
iDK. Only one ttees no room in it for any uucouscious part. 
Both aflsociatea, the present sign and the contiguous things 
wbicb it HUggeats, are above-board, and no intermediary 

• apWa Um ill>t>tK« of ikctiin rrom tbe eurlb. let liim nsk . . . ' If any- 
oa* thne ia ibr luo Bred off a cannoD Mrsigbt at yon, whal should j'ou 
AtT ' Oet out of thi' way ' would lie llie answer. ' No Deed of tbal,' 
Iki iscfeermlfUl ri'ply 'You may qui el !y go lo sleep fn your room, 
wd grt up aKBln. you may wait till yntir coDtlrmaiion-day, you may Irara 
aa^^ Hid rmw M old M I am,— lAcn only will llie caniiou-liall lu' get- 
Itasnear (4™ you may Jump lu oDe sidv! Sue, so great aa iliat isUieeua'a 
IWaner!'" (K. Lniiee. Unber Apperception. I67D. p. TS— n c^hamilng 
IkNCh tm>nx lliilr work , 

" A SrtioponliaucT, HiO* voni GruDile. ehap. iv H. Spencer, Ptrycliol,. 
uwt rr. rliapi. ix. X- K. v. Uirimaiin, Ptiil. of Ihe t'nconiicious lU), 
■%iL Tit, V11I. W. Wuadl. Deltrllge, pji 422 D.; Vorlesiingen. iv, xm. 
U. Uslmbulu. Eiiyalal Opllk. pp. 4iiO, 447. A. Blnel, Psycliol. du Hol- 
^■mbbM. dwf>>.m. r Wuodt and Hotmboltz bave more receally 
* — mlirl • SMmbcme. vol l p. 108 nolv 

112 P8YCH0L0QT, 

ideas are required. Most of those who have upheld the 
thesis in question have, however, made a more complex 
supposition. What they have meant is that perception is 
a mediate inference, and that the middle term is unconscious. 
When the sensation which I have called * this ' (p. 83, supra) 
is felt, they think that some process like the following runs 
through the mind : 

'This' is M; 
but M is A ; 
therefore ' this ' is A.* 

Now there seem no good grounds for supposing this 
additional wheelwork in the mind. The classification of 
' this ' as M is itself an act of perception, and should, if all 
perception were inference, require a still earlier syllogism for 
its performance, and so backwards in infinitum. The only 
extrication from this coil would be to represent the process 
in altered guise, thus : 

'This' is like those; 
Those are A ; 
Therefore * this ' is A. 

The major premise here involves no association by conti- 
guity, no naming of those as M, but only a suggestion of 
unnamed similar images, a recall of analogous past sensa- 
tions with which the characters that make up A were habit- 
ually conjoined. But here again, what grounds of fact are 
there for admitting this recall ? We are quite unconscious 
of any such images of the past And the conception of all 
the forms of association as resultants of the elementary fact 
of habit-worn paths in the brain makes such images entirely 
superfluous for explaining the phenomena in point. Since 
the brain-process of ' this,' the sign of A, has repeatedly 
been aroused in company with the process of the full object 
A, direct paths of irradiation from the one to the other must 
be already established. And although roundabout paths 
may also be possible, as from ' this ' to ' those,' and then 

* When not all M, but only some M, in A, when in other words, M \b 
^undistributed ' the conclusion is liable to error. Illusions would thus be 
logical faUaeies, if true perceptions were valid syllogisms. Hiey would 
draw false conclusions from undistributed middle terms. 

Ttm pmicsprioN of tjiinus. 113 

imm 'tboMt ' to ' A' (paths which would lead to pmctioally 
tlir sune couclniiioD ati the struigbter ones), yet there \» no 
\:ri-fuii\ whatever [or asaamiug them tu be tTHversed now, 
• ■ppi'tkli^ HiiK-e appeuraDces poiut the other way. lu 
'^i/inY reasotiiug, such paths are doubtlems traversed, in 
;-rrrptiou they are iti all probability closetL So far, then, 
'nui peri:«ptioD being a sjiefies of reasoning properly so 
died, both itand reasoning are <'0'ordinate varietieMof that 
l-^fwr sort of process known psychologically as the asso- 
\»d(in of ideas, and physiologically as the law of habit in 
ijt- brain. To caU perception vnconscious reanoning is fhm 
■'■krra HMlmo meta^utr, or n poeilively mialeaiiivg cmf union 
■<fvn tiro dl^t^renl thingn. 

One more point and we may leave the subject of Per- 

■ Win. Homillon thought that he had discovered a 

it iatP ' which bad been whuUy <ivtirlooked by psycholo- 

i, and wliicb, 'simple nnd universal,' is this: "Knowl- 

_ I and Feeling, — Perception and Sensation, though al- 

tfti ocwxistent, are always in the inverse ratio of eaeh 

Hamilton wrote as if perceptiim and sensation 

> two coexistent elements entering into a single state 

loDMcio 11811688. Hpeucer refines upon him by (contending 

ttber are two mutnally exelnsive slates of coustious- 

I, not two elements of a single state. If sensation be 

»ii,aii berth Uamiltou and Spencer mainly take it in this 

stem, to mean the feeling of pUtmurf. '>r pain, there is 

■doabt that the Iaw, however expressed, ia true ; and that 

I tuitid which is strongly conscious of the pleasantness or 

i of an experience is ipto /iwlo less fitted to 

d analyze its outward cause.* Apart from pleas- 

, however, the law seems but a corollary of the 

• the more concentrated a state of consciousness is, 

Fnare vivid it is. Wlien feeling a color, or listeuing to 

B per at, we get it more intensely, notice it better, tbjui 

|leu we are aware of it merely as one among many other 

WTti»s of H t4>tal object. The more diffused cerebral 

it of the perceptive state is proliably incompatible 

114 P8YCH0L0QT. 

with quite as strong an excitement of separate parts as 
the sensational state comports. So we come back here to 
oul* own earlier discrimination between the perceptive and 
the sensational processes, and to the examples which we 
gave on pp. 80, 81.* 


Between normal perception and illusion we have seen 
that there is no break, the processhemg identically the same 
in both. The last illusions we considered might fairly be 
called hallucinations. We must now consider the false 
perceptions more commonly called by that name.t In or- 

* Here is auother good example, taken from Helmholtz's Optics, p. 435: 
"Tiie sight of a man walkiug is a familiar spectacle to us. We perceive 
it as a couuected whole, and at most notice the most striking of its pecu- 
liarities. Stroug attention is required, aud a special choice of the point of 
view, in order to feel the perpendicular and lateral oscillations of such a 
walking figure. We must choose fitting points or lines in the background 
with which to compare the positions of its hend. But if a distant walking 
man be looked at through an astronomical telescope (which inverts the 
object), what a singular hopping and rocking appearance he presents I No 
difficulty now in seeing the body's oscillations, and many other details of 
the gait. . . . But, on the other hand, its total character, whether light or 
clumsy, dignitied or graceful, is harder to perceive than in the upright po- 

f Illusions and hallucinations must both be distinguished from delusion. 
A delusion is a false opinion about a matter of fact, which need not neces- 
sarily involve, though it often docs involve, false perceptions of sensible 
things. We may, for example, have religious delusions, medical delusions, 
delusions about our own imjx)rtance, about other peoples' characters, etc., 
(id Libitum. The delusions of the insane are apt to affect certain typical 
forms, often very hard to explain. But in many cases they are certainly 
theories which the patients invent to account for their abnormal bodily 
sensations. In other cases they are due to hallucinations of hearing and of 
sight. Dr. Clouston (Clinical Lectures on Mental Disease, lecture in ad 
Jin.) gives the following special delusions as having been found in about 
a hundred melancholy fenuile patients who were afflicted in this way. 
There were delusions of 

geneml persecution; being destitute: 

general suspicion; being followed by the police; 

being ])oisou(Hi; being very wicked; 

being killed : imix'uding death ; 

being conspired against; impending calamity; 

being defrauded; the soul being lost; 

being preached against in church; having no stomach; 

being pregnant; having no inside; 



-.1'. j'^irlAnct> bAllneinstion in held to differ from illusion in 

" ''iil->t there is an object really there in illusion, in Au/^h- 

u'-rr i# wo olfjtvliw stimvhi^ at. aU. V>'e shall presently 

:liis Htipposed absence of objective stimulus in hal- 

<ti U H mistake, and that ha lluoiiiittiou a are oft^u ^ 

,1 'j^rrmrt of the perception process, in whioh the secon- * 

1 ifv LT^bral reaction is out of all normal proi>ortion to the 

.'nphmil Titiaiulus which occasious tlie acti\'ity. Hallu- 

■ nations nsnally appear JibrupUj and have the character of 

- itij; forced upon the subject. But they posseaa various 

■i-m'rt— ■ <if apparent ohjfcttvUy. One mistake in limine must 

' t;n»rtU'il against. They are often talked of as meatal 

"'•i-fa projected outwards by miHtake. But where an hall u- 

• ludtion iK complete, it is much more than a meutal image. 

j^m k'dlucinaiion »« a vlrirtly sfnsuliondl/orm of consciomness, 

•4 (fnid anrf (rue a smtafion as if ffwre uvre a real object there. 

TW object hapjiens not to be there, that is all. 

The mildi-r decrees of hallucination have boen desig- 
ut«<l as piewi»-haUiwinafion«. Pseudo-hallucinations and 
liallai-inatiouB have been sharjily distinguiNhed from each 

trnwiag a boae In the Uiroat; 
lartaf lott mucb maoey; 

ite *• « 111 DOl recoTer: 
IM Ai 1* Id be murrtored; 
iMtto h to be ttullcd aUru; 
Am *• b la tM> ftmrred: 

Am Ik* hMd b tarerrd f ram Uie 

ikiiiAdmi law bnTubg: 
IW n«n1m lafco placit uound; 
1M k li wfiiDg to lukc food; 
Wie in bell; 

W*f lt«p«a) uf the dtvtt; 
k^ jaM—iJ of tbo dsvll; 
kifaf MBuniUcd ui napudon- 


having iirllhcr Rlomncti aor tuaio*; 

being covered wUU vurmlu; 

leltera twiog wrltteu ubout her; 

property tivtiig stolCD; 

hor children Mag killed: 

baviDg cotnmtttHi Ihrfl; 

the logs being made of glus; 

having horns on the hPHd; 


hnvitig cuniniltlcil murder; 

tnr uf being hHnged ; 

being called name* by peraotu; 

lielng «cled on by splrlte: 

Uie body Itelng IrenEformedi 

iDsecta coming from the body; 

rape being practised on ber; 

b«vlag a venereal dlseaae; 

being a fish. 

being dead; 

having coDimllled 'aulcldo of the MHil.' 

116 P8YCH0L00T, 

other only within a few years. Dr. Kandinsly writes of 
their difference as follows : 

*^ In carelessly questioning a patient we may confound his pseudo- 
hallucinatory perceptions with hallucinations. But to the unoonfosed 
consciousness of the patient himself, even though he be imbecile, the 
identification of the two phenomena is impossible, at least in the sphere 
of vision. At the moment of having a pseudo-hallucination of sight, 
the patient feels himself iu an entirely different relation to this subjec- 
tive sensible appearance, from that in which he finds himself whilst 
subject to a true visual hallucination. The latter is reality itself ; the 
former, on the contrary, remains always a subjective phenomenon 
which the individual commonly regards either as sent to him as a sign 
of God's grace, or as artificially induced by his secret persecutors . . . 
If he knows by his own expei%ence what a genuine hallucination is, it is 
quite impossible for him to mistake the pseudo-hallucination for it. . . . 
A concrete example will make the difference clear : 

**Dr. N. L. . . . heard one day suddenly amongst the voices of his 
persecutors (^coming from a hollow space in the midst of the waiP)a 
rather loud voice impressively saying to him ; * Change your national 
allegiance.' Understanding this to mean that his only hope consisted 
in ceasing to be subject to the Czar of Russia, he reflected a moment 
what allegiance would be better, and resolved to become an English sub- 
ject. At the same moment he saw a pseudo-hallucinatory lion of 
natural size, which appeared and quickly laid its fore-paws on Ym 
shoulders. He had a lively feeling of these paws as a tolerably painful 
local pressure (complete hallucination of touch). Then the same voice 
from the wall said : ' Now you have a lion— now you will rule/ where- 
upon the patient recollected that the lion was the national emblem of 
England. The lion appeared to L. very distinct and vivid, but he never- 
theless remained conscious, as he afterwards expressed it, that he saw the 
animal, not with his bodily but with his mental eyes. (After his re- 
covery he called analogous apparitions by the name of ' expressive-plastic 
ideas.') Accordingly he felt no terror, even though he felt the contact of 
the claws. . . . Had the lion been a complete hallucination, the patient, 
as he himself remarked after recovery, would have felt great fear, and 
very likely screamed or taken to flight. Had it been a simple image of 
the fancy he would not have connected it with the voices, of whose ob- 
jective reality he was at the time quite convinced."* 

From ordinary images of memory and fancy, pseudo- 
hallucinations differ in being much more vivid, minute, de- 

* V. Eandinsky : Eritische u. Klinische Bctrachtungen im Gebiete d. 
Slnnest&uschuDgen (1885), p. 42. 



faifed, stewlr, abrupt, nml spoiitaueoiiB, in the sense that 
al! fuling of onr on-o activity in producing them i» lacking. 
Xh. Kitadiusky bad a patient who, after taking opium or 
t<<httich, hiwl abandnnt pseudo-hallucinations uud hallu- 
I'^atiotiH. As bH alao had strong; visualizing power and 
- 1« an e<)acat«>d physician, the three sorts of plienomena 
i;ld Iw wwily compared. Although projected outwards 
-lullr not further than the limit of dlstiiictest vision, a 
;,..t or so) the pneudo- hallucinations lacketl the chamtier of 
eijtctive rtiilUy which the hallucinatious possessed, bat, 
nnlike the pictures of imagination, it was almost inipossihle 
|i) prtxluoe them at will. Must of the ' voices ' which people 
Le*r (^whether they (five rise to delusions or not) are psendo- 
iAlla^inntions. They are described as 'inner' voices, al- 
tboogb their character is entirely unlike the inner speech 
of the Kubjfct with Iiimaelf. I know two persons who hear 
neb inoer voices making unforeseen remarks whenever they 
fmw qoiet and listen for them. They are a ver)- common 
incid^Dt of delusional insanity, and at last grow into viWd 
ballaciiiations. The latter are comparatively frequent oc- 
ctLrreiwws in sporatlic form ; and certain individuals are 
&klfle ia have them often. From the results of the 'Census 
o( Hall oci nations,' which was begun by Edmund Guruey, it 
Trmild appear that, roughly speaking, one person at least 
in f»ety ton i» likely to have had a vind hallucination at 
t>oin« tiue in bis life.* The following cases from healthy 
peopli! will give un idea of what these hallucinations are : 

■' Wtmi a girl of eighte^^n. I wuk one evening engaged in a very 
fBinfol (IbKuwion with an elderly person. Uy distress was so great 
Umi I look up 8 thick ivory knittiog-needlo that was lying on tho man- 
trJiwceof lh<r parlor iind broku it inlosmull pieces ati I tnlkod. lii the 
iBikiur ibe >]i«rn<!sioii 1 wa« very wishful to know the opinion of a 
Un<ba wiUi wliom I had an nnusually close relationship, I turned 
f^oA and MW him sitting at the fnrtber side of n centre-lable, with his 
irsi (elded (an numnal poeiliou with liim), bul, to tny dismny. I pcr- 

*Sw PrDCfndldg* of Soc. for V»ych. Rc»oarch, J>oo. 18811. pp. 7, 183. 
1W lauraallonal Cangrcat for EKperinieDl&l PBycbolugj' has now charge 
tf Ite CeoMW, and ihe preerot writer is it* agent for America. 


ceived from the sarcastic expression of his mouth that he was not in 
sympathy with me, was not * taking my side/ as I should then liave 
expressed it. The surprise cooled me, and the discussion was dropped. 
**Some minutes after, having occasion to speak to my brother, I 
turned towards him, but he was gone. I inquired when he left the 
room, and was told that he had not beeu in it, which I did not believe, 
thinking that he had come in for a minute and had gone out without 
being noticed. About an hour and a half afterwards he appeared, and 
convinced me, with some trouble, that he had never been near the 
house that evening. He is still alive and well.'^ 

Here is another case : 

**One night in March 1873 or '74, I cannot recollect which year» 
I was attending on the sick-bed of my mother. About eight o'clock in 
the evening I went into the dining room to fix a cup of tea, and on turn- 
ing from the sideboard t^ the table, on the other side of the table before 
the fire, which was burning brightly, as was also the gas, I saw standing 
with his hand clasped to his side in true military fashion a soldier of 
about thirty years of age, with dark, piercing eyes looking directly into 
mine. He wore a small cap with standing feat her ; his costume was 
also of a soldierly style. He did not strike me as being a spirit, ghost, 
or anything uncanny, only a living man ; but after gazing for fully a 
minute I realized that it was nothing of earth, for he neither moved 
his eyes nor his body, and in looking closely I could see the fire beyond. 
I was of course startled, and yet did not run out of the room. I felt 
stunned. I walked out rapidly, however, and turning to the servant 
in the hall asked her if she saw anything. She said not. I went into 
my mother's room and remained talking for about an hour, but never 
mentioned the above subject for fear of exciting her, and finally forgot 
it altogether, returning to the dining-room, still in forgetfulness of 
what had occurred, but repeating, as above, the turning from sideboard 
to table in act of preparing more tea. I looked casually towards the 
fire, and there I saw the soldier again. This time I was entirely alarmed, 
and fled from the room in haste. I called to my father, but when he 
came he saw nothing." 

Sometimes more than one sense is affected. The fol- 
lowing is a case : 

** In response to your request to write out my experience of Oct. 30,. 
1886, I will inflict on you a letter. 

**0n the day above mentioned, Oct. 30, 1886, I was in , 

where I was teaching. I had performed my regular routine work for 
the day, and was sitting in my room working out trigonometrical for- 

run mucni'Tias uf rsiiyus. 


tt.«>. I wHcxpoRiing Rvf ry day to hcnr of Ihcconfiiiemont of my wife, 
■nrt iHlDraUy my tbi>ughl« fnr some time had been more or leas with 

un. Sbe wnn. !>>■ the way, in B , some fifty miles from mn. 

" At tb* lime, however, ueitheraheuorthoeipectedevunt WRsinmy 
mini : ■• I Biu4, 1 was working out trigouometricol fDrniiilu^ and t hnd 
'•vn working on irigonomelry the eiiliro evening. About eli'vcu 
vick, MS I ABt tliera buried in sines, tiisinee, tangents, eolnn^udi. 
■- 4Dt», and «»i«TMil8. I felt very dialinctly upon my left shouldsr a 
>i-li. nml n 8lti;lii shnke, hs if stiuielMicly hikd tried to attruel my ai- 
. ii'-n b» otht-r mntna nn<l hiKl fnilerf. Without rising I Inniwl my 
.' uL. autl ibrffK )*etween uieamllhe door mood my wife, dreased exiietly 
1' I U»l 1.1W brr, Mimn Itvv weeks Ijefnre., As I turned she satd : ' U 
I. It liiil« Hvnnan : he has come.' Something more was i«aJd. but tliiii 
i> ilir unly ■mlPiK-i- I eiui rec«ll. To makt* sure thnt 1 wus not aiileep 
*od drraminii. 1 n>w rmm the chatr, pinched myself and walked toward 
It B^rv. wtaieb dlsaiipeared Immediately ns 1 rose. I can give no in- 
f ■ctnation ■• to l\\v. length »f time oecnpicd by Ibis qilsodd, but I know 
1 «aa awake, iu my usual good health. Tho touch waa I'ery distinol, 
ilie figum wan absoliiiely per(e«(, stood about llireo feet from Ihe door. 
■ iiich «a* dmrd, and had not been ujieiied during llie evening. The 
■.■gnd of the voice was nnmistakable, and 1 should have recognized it as 
my vttrx Toioe i^ven if I bad not turned and had nut neen ibe Hgura 
ai all. Th» tnno una conversational, gust as if she would have said 
tbe MBw wonla had she l>eeii actually standing there. 

" In nmnt tn mvKelf, 1 would Hay, aa I have ali'andy intimated. 1 was 
In nr naaal gmxt health : I had not boen sick before, nor was I after 
tlw> u)--cnm-n<H-, not eft nmcli as a headache having afHicletl me. 

"SlKinly after the experience above dnscrihed, I retired fnr the night 

and. aa I iMUally do. tiv\A quietly until morning. I did not speculate 

tanieaUrly about the iilrange appiiaratiee of the night before, and 

tlMMfl) I tbou^l of It some, I did not tell anylxtdy. The following 

Buniiaj) I rnM', not cuniiciiius of having dreamed anything, but I waa 

nrr ftrmly impressed with the idea that there wan something for me at 

ibp ii4«(raph 'Office. I tried to throw off the im[ir<«ainu, for so far as I 

Itttew tber* was no reason for it. Having nothing to do, I went out for 

a walk ; aod In liel|) lhn)W iifT the impreaaion above noted. 1 walked 

»*»y from ihe telegraph -office. A* I proeeeilcd, however, the impriai- 

MMD tipi-aBie a eon ri el ion, and I aeiually turned about and went to the 

^^MfJ pUcr I had resolved not to visit, the telegraph -ofHee. The lirst 

^Hmkh I «aw on arriving at aald office via, the telegraph -operator, who 

^^^■Rlt on Innns of intimacy with me, remarked : ' Hello, jiapa, I've got 

^^Fiklegrnm for you.' The telegram announced the birth of a hoy, 

wigliinf nine pounds, and that all were doing well. Now. then. Ihave 

on tbcury at all ahont the events nnrrat<-<l above ; I never had any such 

riprrimiv before nominee; 1 am no believer in spiriiuali-m. am not in 

I soiMtntilioua, know very little about ' though t-trunsfereni.'e,' 


* unconscious cerebration,' etc., etc., but I am a1)8olutely certain about 
what I have tried to relate. 

*' In regard to the remark which I heard, * It is a little Herman/ etc., 
I would add that we had previously decided to call the child, if a boy. 
Herman — my own name, by the way."* 

The hallucination sometimes carries a change of the 
general consciousness with it, so as to appear more like a 
sudden lapse into a dream. The following case was given 
me by a man of 43, who had never anything resembling it 
before : 

** While sitting at my desk this a. m. reading a circular of the lioyal 
Legion a very curious thing hapi>ened to me, such as I have never ex- 
perienced. It was perfwtly real, so real that it took some minutes to 
recover from. It seems to me like a dii-ect intromission into some other 
world. I never had anything approaching it l)efore save when dn*ani- 
ing at night. I was wide awake, of course. But this was the feeling. 1 
had only just sat down and become interest(Ki in the circular, when I 
seemed to lose myself for a minute and then found myself in the top 
story of a high building very white and shining and clean, witli a 
noble window immediately at the right of where I sat. Through this 
window I looked out upon a marvellous reach of landscape entirely new. 
I never had before such a sense of intlnity in nature, such superb 
stretches of light and color jind cleanness. 1 know that for the space 
of three minutt'S I was entirely lost, for when 1 b<*gan to come to, so to 
speak,— sitting in that other world, I debated for three or four minuteA 
more as to which was dream' and which was reality. Sitting there I got 
a faint sense of C' — [the town in which the writer was], away off 
and dim at first. Tlien I remember thinking ' Why, I used to live in 

C . . . ; |>erhaps I am going back.' Slowly C did come back, and 

1 found myself at my desk again. For a few minutes the process of 
determining where 1 was wjis very funny. But the whole experience 
was perfectly delightful, there was such a sense of brilliancy and 
clearness and lightness al)out it. 1 suppose it lasted in all about seven 
minutes or ten minutes.'* 

The hallucinations of fever-delirium are a mixture of 
pseudo-hallucination, true hallucination, and illusion. 
Those of opium, hasheesh, and belladonna resemble them 

*This case is of the class which Mr. Myers terms 'veridical.' In ji 
subsequent letter the writer informs me that his vision occurred some five 
hours before the child w:is born. 

run I'KRcsi'Tiox of TlllXtlS 121 

■ diis respect. Tlie fullowiug vivid ucconut of a fit of 
kubeesb-delinnm baa been giveQ me by a frieud : 

" I «M Kftdtng a aewHpMpor, iiud the Indication uf the approaching 
4dinum ■■•• an inabililj to keep my mind Used oii tLu DarratJve. Di- 
wUi I by down npon a aofa Ihere appealed before my eyes several 
aMiofbiinvi hands, wliich oflcillated forn moment, revolved and then 
rhMHtil ta apnnas. Tlin Raiiiu niutiuns were re|>eated. the objects chang- 
Hf to wboefa. tin soldiers, larap-posts, hroniDs, and connMrss other 
rfMnlitiea. This ttogi' lusted about t«ii miiiuit-R, and during that 
:^vi H saTi- lo say thai I saw at leiut a ibtiuaaud different objects. 
'.'v vliirlins imagea did not appear like ibe realilieit of life, but had 
.' '-banrUrr of thp sucontlnr}' images seen in tlie eye after lookiug at 
'-' bngbily-ltlaniinated object. A mere suggestion from the person 
' I VM with me in Iht- room was sufficient to call up an image of the 
■ifo^grMtA. while without suggtstion there appeared nil the com- 
. '. nbfMij of life and many unriMl monHtixisitieH. which it is abao- 
ia:^j isipoMible lo describe, and which seemed to be creations of the 

' The rfaarai^ler o( the symptoms changed rapidly. A sort of wave 
imsnl to pMi over me, and 1 became awure of the fact that my pulse 
«M beaanf r^idly. I look out my watch, and by exercising consider- 
ate «ill-po«er managed to time the heart-beats, 183 to the minute, 

■ I eoald fed eacli palaatinn through my whole system, and a curi- 
«» twiteUag oommeiiced, whieh no effort of the mind could stop. 

-^ T1m» w«rtt moniMits of apparent lucidity, when it eeemed as if I 
««U tm tritliin myself, and watch the pumping of my heart. A 
■imigv fou* oaioe over me. a oerlainty that I should never recover from 
i>* HTrri* of thn opiate, which was as quickly followed by a feclitig of 
traai uiter*«i id the experiment, a certainty that the experience was 
«rr TMiM nutvl and exciting that 1 had ever been through. 

Uy mind was In nn exceedingly impressionable state. Anyplace 
iigbt of or luggmted appeared with all the distinctness of the reality, 
.'.naxbt of the Giant's Causeway in StalTa. and iustanlly 1 Riood 
' iilii \iiit portals of Fingal's Cave, Great basaltic columns rose on all 
;-•. wliilr hup- witv™ rolled through the chasm and broke in silenca 
■ ^1 iIhi ri-cky shoh'. Hnddenly Ihere was a roar and blast of sound, 
'1 ibv •ton) ' lahmaral ' wan echoing up the cave. At the enunciatioti 
1 till* rvtHHtkable vmnl the great columns of basalt changed inlowbirl- 
iiic rlolluB pins and 1 Iaiigho«l aloud at the absurdity. 

" l\ may htw stali! that the word ' Ishmaral ' sei>mcd to haunt uy 
Mhrr liallDiH nations, fur I remember that I heiml it frequently ther«- 
diit I 1 urjit enjoyed a Mirl of me tern psychosis. Any animal or 
i>tB( ittal I thought of eould Iv uiade the being which held my mind. 
llbHclii ut • fox. and iiisiantly I was transformed into that animal, I 
ai«U dMindly feel myself a fox, could sec my long can and busbj 


tail, and by a sort of introvision felt that my complete anatomy was 
that of a fox. Suddenly the point of vision changed. My eyes seemed 
to be located at the back of my mouth ; I looked out between the parted 
lips, saw the two rows of pointed teeth, and, closing my mouth with a 
snap, saw — nothing. 

'^ I was next transformed into a bombshell, felt my size, weight, and 
thickness, and experienced the sensation of being shot up out of a giant 
mortar, lookinii: down upon the earth, bursting and falling back in a 
shower of iron fragments. 

** Into countless other objects was I transformed, many of them so 
absurd that 1 am unable to conceive what suggested them. For ex- 
ample, I was a little china doll, deep down in a bottle of olive oil, next 
moment a stick of twisted candy, then a skeleton inclosed in a whirl- 
ing coffin, and so on o^ infinitum. 

'* Towards the end of the delirium the whirling images appeared 
again, and I was haunted by a singular creation of the brain, which re- 
appeared ever}' few moments. It was an image of a double-faced doll^ 
with a cylindrical body running down to a point like a peg-top. 

'' It was always the same, having a sort of crown on its head, and 
painted in two colors, green and brown, on a background of blue. The 
expression of the Janus-like profiles was always the same, as were the 
adornments of the body. After recovering from the eflfecta of the 
drug I could not picture to myself exactly how this singular monstros- 
ity appeared, but in subsequent experiences I was always visited by 
this phantom, and always recognized every detail of its composition. 
It was like visiting some long-forgotten spot and seeing some sight that 
had faded from the memory, but which appeared perfectly familiar as 
soon as looked upon. 

'* The effects of the drug lasted about an hour and a half, leaving 
me a trifle tipsy and dizzy ; but after a ten-hour sleep I was myself 
again, save for a slight inability to keep my mind fixed on any piece of 
work for any length of time, which remained with me during most of 
the next day.^' 


Examples of these singular perversions of perception 
might be multiplied indefinitely, but I have no more space. 
Let us turn to the question of what the physiological pro- 
cess may be to which they are due. It must, of course^ 
consist of an excitement from within of those centres which 
are active in normal perception, identical in kind and de* 
gree with that which real external objects are usually 
needed to induce. The particular process which cur- 



rents from the senfie-organs arouse would seem uiuler 
»unn>I rircnmstanceH to \>v. aroutiable iu no other way. On 
:. 7'J S. above, we fiaw that tlie ueuti'es aioused by iocom- 
:_); peripbeml t-uireuts are probably identical witb the 
nUfn naetl in mere imagination ; and that the vividness 
u[ till* M-DsAtional kind of conaoiousnesH is probably cor- 
nliit«d with a discrete degree of inteitsUy in the process 
tbertfin aroased. Heferring the reader back to that pas- 
nge and to what was more lately said on p. 103 S., I now 
fRM:v«Ml to complete my theory of the perceptive process 
bj an analysis of what may most probably be believed to 
' e pla*« in hallncinatioii strictly so called. 
VTg have seen (p. lo) that the free discharge of cells 
each other through associative ])aths is a Ubely reason 
bby tlio maximum intensity of function is not reached 
vlien the cells are excited by their neighbors in the cortex. 
I the Olid of Chapter XXV we shall return to this coucep- 
nd whilst making it still more precise, use it for ex- 
iiinin! certain phenomena connected with the will. The 
■ i>i that the leakage forward along these paths is too 
t^t^iid for the inner tension in any centre to accumulate to 
tbe tnftximal oxplosiou-poiut, unless the exciting currents 
are greati^r than those which the various portions of the 
nirles supply to each other. Currents from the periphery 
an (a« it iteeuis) the only currents whose energy can vau- 
qniah tli« sapra-idcational resistance (so to call it) of the 
celL^ and cause the jjeculiarly intense sort of disintegra- 
tioD with which the sensational quality is linked. If, Itoir- 
rcrr, the Uaka^ foncard imre to stop, the tension inside cer- 
tain cells might reach the explosion-point, even though the 
tJifluenc^ which excited them came only from neighboring 
eorttcal parts. Let an empty pail with a leak in its bottom, 
Hfpf^ np against a support so that if it ever became full 
t water it would upset, represent the resting condition of 
) oentrti for a certain sort of feeling. Let water poured 
3 it st&nd fur the currents which are its natural stimulus ; 
16 hole in its bottom will, of course, represent the 
' by which it transmits its excitement to other asso. 
] c«Uk. Now let two other \essels have the function 

124 P8YCH0L00T. 

of suppl}dng it with water. One of these vessels stands 
for the neighboring cortical cells, and can pour in hardly 
any more water than goes out by the leak. The pail conse- 
sequently never upsets in consequence of the supply from 
this source. A current of water passes through it and does 
work elsewhere, but in the pail itself nothing but what 
stands for ideational activity is aroused. The other vessel, 
however, stands for the peripheral sense-organs, and sup- 
plies a stream of water so copious that the pail promptly 
tills up in spite of the leak, and presently upsets ; in other 
words, sensational activity is aroused. But it is obvious that 
if the leak were plugged, the slower stream of supply 
would also end by upsetting the pail. 

To apply this to the brain and to thought, if we take a 
series of processes ABODE, associated together in that 
order, and suppose that the current through them is very 
fluent, there will be little intensity anywhere until, perhaps, 
a pause occurs at E. But the moment the current is blocked 
anywhere, say between C and D, the process in C must 
grow more intense, and might even be conceived to explode 
«o as to produce a sensation in the mind instead of an idea. 

It would seem that some hallucinations are best to be 
explained in this way. We have in fact a regular series of 
facts which can all be formulated under the single law tha,tthe 
substantive strength of a state of consciottsness bears an inverse 
proportion to its suggestiveness. It is the halting-places of 
our thought which are occupied with distinct imagery. 
Most of the words we utter have no time to awaken images 
at all ; they simply awaken the following words. But when 
the sentence stops, an image dwells for awhile before the 
mental eye (see Vol. I. p. 243). Again, whenever the asso- 
ciative processes are reduced and impeded by the approach 
of unconsciousness, as in falling asleep, or growing faint, or 
becoming narcotized, we find a concomitant increase in the 
intensity of whatever partial consciousness may survive. In 
some people what M. Maury has called * hypnagogic ' hal- 
lucinations * are the regular concomitant of the process of 

♦ Le Sommeil et les Rfives (1865), chaps, m, iv. 


Ub&H lUtWp. Trains of faces, landsc&pes, etc., pass before 
(be menlBl eye, first as faacie», tbeo an pseudo-LaUucJua- 
Ims, fituilT as foU-fledged h&lluematious formiug dreamu. 
Uvsr^ard utMotriatioii-patha as paths of drainage, tlien the 
dratttng off of one after another of them aBthe encroaching 
cerebral paratysU advancen ought to act like the plugging 
1)1 UiA bole iu th<^ I>ottom of the pail, and make the activity 
■•w iDtenSe ill those systems of cells that retain any 
iHiritr at a!L The level rises because the currents are 
: <: dnUoed away, until at laet the full sensational explosion 
.t occur. 

The uanal esplanatiou of hypnagogic hallucinations is 
iiilhfV arti ideas deprived of their ordinary reductivee. In 
'iino]oHc«nce. sensations being extinct, the mind, it issaid, 
itira baTiug uo stronger things to compare its ideas with, 
Moibe^ to these the fnlneiis of reality. At ordinary times 
ih* objects of our imagination aie reduced to the afatits of 
abjective tacts by the ever-present contrast of our sensa- 
tious with them. Eliminate the sensations, however, this 
Ti-w 8up|)uses, and the ' images ' are forthwith ' projected ' 
into the outer world and appear as realities, XhuH is the 
illtwion of dreams also explained. This, indeed, after a 
UnhioD gives an account of the facts.* And yet it certainly 
fail* to explain the extraordinary vivacity and completeness 
of 9o many of our dreain-fautasms. The process of ' imagin- 
ing' inuitt (in these cases at least t)t)e not merely relatively, 
Imt absolutely and in itself more intense than at other 
tJniM. The fact is, it is not a process of imagining, but a 
guitUDe ■eoBational process ; and the theory iu question is 
^^^■refore falMo is far as that point is concerned. 
^^■Dr. HnghlinKs Jackson's explanation of the epileptic 
^^Mar« is acknowledged to be masterly. It involves 

•Tl«h MuoTj ot incompleie recUficatlon of ihe Inner images by their 
mmI nduetivw I* moat brilllBiitly stated by M. ThIqc in liiH woik on 
laidlixnM. booti "■ cJup. i. 

(Not, of itonne. In mil caM8,bec«UMlhecel1«reinBiiiing Active are tliem- 
•rJm « ibr way u> be overpowered by tbe gencial (unknown) caodllton w 
■leep U due. 

126 P8YCU0L0QT. 

principles exactly like those which I am bringing forward 
here. The ' loss of consciousness ' in epilepsy is due to the 
most highly organized brain-processes being exhausted 
and thrown out of gear. The less organized (more instinc- 
tive) processes, ordinarily inhibited by the others, are then 
exalted, so that we get as a mere consequence of relief from 
the inhibition, the meaningless or maniacal action which 
HO often follows the attack. * 

Similarly the subavUus tendinorum or jerking of the 
muscles which so often startles us when we are on the point 

* For a full account of Jackson's theories, see bis ' Croonian Lectures ' 
published in the Brit. Med. Jouin. for 1884. Cf. also bis remarks in the 
Discussion of Dr. Mercier's paper on Inhibition in ' Brain/ xi. 861. 

The loss of vivacity in the images in the process of waking, as well as 
the gain of it in falling asleep, are both well described by M. Taine, who 
writes (on Intelligence, i. 50. 58) that often in the daytime, when fatigued 
and seated in a chair, it is sufficient for him to close one eye with a hand- 
kerchief, when, " by degrees, the sight of the other eye becomes vague, 
and it closes. All external sensations are gradually effaced, or cease, at all 
events, to be remarked ; the internal images, on the other hand, feeble and 
rapid during the state of complete wakefulness, become intense, distinct, 
colored, steady, and lasting : there is a sort of ecstasy, accompanied by a 
feeling of expansion and of comfort. Warned by frequent experience, I 
know that sleep is coming on, and that I must not disturb the rising 
vision ; I remain passive, and in a few minutes it is complete. Architecture, 
landscapes, moving tigures, pass slowly by, and sometimes remain, w^ith 
incomparable clearness of form and fulness of being ; sleep comes on, and 
I know no more of the real world I am in. Many times, like M. Maur}% 
I have caused myself to be gently roused at different moments of this state, 
and have thus been able to mark its characters. — The intense image which 
seems an external object is but a more forcible contiDuation of the feeble 
image which an instant before I recognized as internal ; some scrap of a 
forest, some house*, some person which I vaguely imagined on closing my 
eyes, has in a minute become present to me with full bodily details, so as to 
change into a complete hallucination. Then, waking up on a hand touch- 
ing me, I feel the figure decay, lose color, and evaporate : what had ap- 
peared a substance is reduced to a shadow. . . . In such a case, I have often 
seen, for a passing moment, the image grow pale, waste away, and evapo- 
rate ; sometimes, on opening the eyes, a fragment of landscape or the skirt 
of a dress appears still to float over the fire-irons or on the black hearth." 
This persistence of dream -objects for a few moments after the eyes are 
opened seems to be no extremely rare experience. Many cases of it have 
been rcjiortod to me directly. Compare Mailer's Physiology, Baly's tr., 
p. 945. 

TllK PKRCSPriON OF Till Nl IS. 127 

-l faJtug aiUeep, mav be interpreted an due to the rise (in 
-rbuB lower motor centres) of tlie ordinary ' tonic ' tension 
I ' thi! vxplotnon-point, when the inhibition t^oinmonlj ex- 
. :v<\ ity the higher centres falls too snddeniv away. 

< l,i<- ]Hnuiible condition of hallucination then atands 

(It i, whatet'er other conditions there maybe. When 

■' . i.ct/ pnlts of (iJisociation betnven a centre and other centres 

' t/irtiim Old f/ <;«(r, any itctivlly which may exist in the 

•<-•' mtrr trmis to increase f'n intensify untU finally the point 

• ■I ftr rraehed al which the last inimrd resistance is overcome, 
I ihr ndt i*en»iiliona! process explodes* Thus it will happen 
.: (■,Hii-cs nf au amount of activity in brain-cells which 

lid or<liuarily result in a weak consciousness may pro- 

1- .- 3 y^TY strong consciousuesH when the overflow of these 

'■.U !■ ittoppeil by the torpor of the rest of the brain. A 

jLt peripheral irritation, then, if it reaches the centres of 

[i-<iauiineHs at all during sleep, will give rise to the dream 

' : A violent Hen^atiou. All the books about dreaming are 

.11 of aoecdoteH which illustrate this. For example, M. 

'I .ury'a nose and lips are tickled with a feather while he 

■ !>». He dreams he is being tortured by having a pitch- 

I'ter applied to bis face, torn off, lacerating the skin of 

'f- and lipiL DeMcartes, on being bitten by a flea, dreams 

: Iwing run through by a sword. A friend tells me, as I 

. lie lliiK, of his hair changing its position in his forehead 

-t a" he "dozed off* in his chair a few day» since. In- 

ittlv ln' <lr*-nnied that some one had struck him a blow. 

iiiijl'— cjui be quoted ad libitum, but these are enough, t 

* I wytbr 'Donnal 'patlis. because lialliicinalinns arc nol lanxupKllbtc 
wfc* tmmr |wih* of ■•■odiiiloii being left. iSonic liyptioiic patlviiru «ilt 
*Msaly bsfr baJludnaiitma of objccliiaiiggcsled In llieui, but will nmpliry 
Ibcn aad ta out tlie lilualinn. But Uip patlm hi-re t^iii i.'xceialve)]' nnr- 
raw. md the ivIlecilaDa wbidi ouglil lu make iIif ballui^inBtloD Incn-diblp 
4> aM uecur lo Uie «ubJ«ct'B uilutl. in gvntrrnl. Itic unrrowi^r a tniiD of 
'Hum' la, Uw vtrldrr the conAclouiueK i« of pncb. Under ordinary < ir- 
F^wilMUia, tbt mxin bnin probnbl)- play* a pnri hi dmlaiag nny ceotre 
*ldift B*f b« IdMllooally acllve. Whra Xhr drsluagc la redurcd In nuy 
*>T k prafaaUy nuktn the airlive procc«« aiorr tntcuHC. 

t M. A. Maury glrex a tiuniber op. ril. pp. laO-H. 


We seem herewith to have au explauatiou for a certaiu 
number of hallucinations. Whenever the normal forxcard 
irradiation of intra-cortical excitement through association-paths 
is checked, any accidental spontaneous activity or any peripheral 
stimulation {Jiotvever inadequate at other times) by which a brain- 
centre may be visited, sets up a process offvH sensational inten- 
sity therein. 

In the hallucinations artificially produced in hypnotic 
subjects, some degree of peripheral excitement seems usu- 
ally to be required. The brain is asleep as far as its own 
spontaneous thinking goes, and the words of the ' magneti- 
zer * then awaken a cortical process which drafts off into 
itself any currents of a related sort which may come in 
from the periphery, resulting in a vivid objective percep- 
tion of the suggested thing. Thus, point to a dot on a 
sheet of paper, and call it * General Grant's photograph,* 
and your subject will see a photograph of the General 
there instead of the dot. The dot gives objectivity to the 
appearance, and the suggested notion of the General gives 
it form. Then magnify the dot by a lens ; double it by a 
prism or by nudging the eyeball ; reflect it in a mirror ; 
turn it upside down ; or wipe it out ; and the subject will 
tell you that the * photograph ' has been enlarged, doubled, 
reflected, turned about, or made to disappear. In M. Binet's 
language, * the dot is the outward point de repere which is 
needed to give objectivity to your suggestion, and without 
which the latter will only produce a conception in the 
subject's mind.t M. Binet has shown that such a periphe- 

* M. Binet's highly important experiments, which were first published 
in vol. XVII of the Revue Philosophique (1884), are also given in full in 
chapter ix of his and Fcre'H work on ' Animal Magnetism ' in the Inter- 
national Scientific SericH. Where there is no dot on the paper, nor any 
other visible mark, the subject's judgment about the * portrait ' would 
seem to be guided by what he sees happening to the entire sheet. 

t It is a difllcult thing to distinguish in a hypnotic patient between a 
genuine sensorial hallucination of something suggested and a conception 
of it merely, coupled with belief that it is there. I have been surprised at the 
vagueness with which such subjects will often trace upon blank paper the 
outlines of the pictures which they say they ' see ' thereupon. On the other 


•^fM»t lit! rtpirf is need in an euormoufl uumber, not only 
.' iiTpaotic liftllaoinatioiis, but of haUucinatious of the 
mute. These latter are oft«n unUaieral ; that is, tlie patient 
ham tlie voices always on one aide nf liim, or sees the 
tfut onl; when a certain one of his eyes is open. In 
mwT of these caaes it has been distinctly proved that a 
. rliid irritfttioii iu the internal ear, or an opacity in tba 
.:iuont of the eye, was the starting point of the current 
-bkli thf" patient's diseased acoustic or optical centres 
(i'>tii*^ with their jwculiar products in the way of ideas. 
IMlweitmiians productxi in this Vtiy are 'ILLUSIONS'; and M. 
Bi»tf» theory, thai all haUvcivaiions must start in the periphery, 
mag fce ailed an ailempl to reduce haliucinaiion and iUveion to 
(■f piftioloffict'l type, the type, namely, to which normal per- 
rfpbon belongs. In every case, according to M, Biuet, 
•li«tltor of perception, of hallucination, or of illusion, we 
gfit the (teuitatioDal %'ividne8s by means of a current from 
the peripheral nerves. It may be a mere trace of a cur- 
n^nt But that trace is enough to kindle the maximal or 
Kspra-ideatioual process so that the object perceiTed will 
hare the character of externality. Wliat the nature of the 
eb}»oi shjdl be will depend wholly on the particular sys- 
tsa of pstfas in which the process is kindled. Fart of the 
Aing in all cases comes from the sense-organ, the rest is 
{■nu«hed by the mind. But we cannot by inirospection 
ib«ltt>(niiMh between these parts ; and our only formula for 
tbv rttsnlt is that the brain has reacted, on the impression m 
Um> aormol way. Just so in the dreams which we have 
eoaad«red, and iu the hallucinations of which M. Binet 
IcIIk, we can only say that the brain has reacted in an abnor- 
10*1 way. 

Jt Binet'a theory accounta indeetl/or a vtjdtitude of oaasa, 
^ trrtaitJjf not for idL The prism does not always double 

kad, fov wni hmi lh«m my tbst tiiny Gad uo dlSercoce bclwecn a retil 
hmwr wUeb you ^ow theni aud no imftginarj Howcr wbicb you tell 
[bt« li bB^« It. Whea told UibI odi^ k imagiDary and that they must 
fkk oat tW real one. Uiey eomeiimeH say Ibe cbotce la ImpimGiblc, and 
■Mtew tbcj point to ibe ImagUiKry ikiwer. 

130 P8TCH0L0GT. 

the false appearance,* nor does the latter always disappear 
when the eyes are closed. Dr. Hack Tuke t gives several 
examples in sane people of well-exteriorized hallucinations 
which did not respond to Binet's tests ; and Mr. Eklmond 
Gumey % gives a number of reasons why intensity in a cor- 
tical process may be expected to result from local patho- 
logical activity just as much as its peculiar nature doe& 
For Binet, an abnormally or exclusively active part of the 
cortex gives the nature of 'what shall appear, whilst a pe- 
ripheral sense-organ alone can give the intensity sufficient to 
make it appear projected into real space. But since this 
intensity is after all but a matter of degree, one does not see 
why, under rare conditions, the degree in question might 
not be attained by inner causes exclusively. In that case 
we should have certain hallucinations centrally initiated 
alongside of the peripherally initiated hallucinations, which 
are the only sort that M. Binet*s theory allows. It seems 
probable on the whde, therefore, thai centrally initiated haUu' 
cinations can eocist. How often they do exist is another ques- 
tion. The existence of hallucinations which affect more 
than one sense is an argument for central initiation. For 
grant that the thing seen may have its starting point in the 
outer world, the voice which it is heard to utter must be 
due to an influence from the visual region, i.e. must be of 
central origin. 

Sporadic cases of hallucination, visiting people only 
once in a lifetime (which seem to be by far the most fre- 
quent type), are on any theorj' hard to understand in detaiL 
They are often extraordinarily complete ; and the fact that 
many of them are reported as veridical, that is, as coincid- 
ing with real events, such as accidents, deaths, etc., of the 
persons seen, is an additional complication of the phe- 
nomenon. The first really scientific studv of hallucination 

* Only the other day, in three hypnotized girls. I failed to double 
hallucination with a prism. Of course it may not have been a fully 
developed hallucination. 

t Brain, xi. 441. 

t Mind. X. 161, 316 ; and Phantasms of the Living (1886), i. 47(M8a 


fa all Hi powdble bearingH, on the haais of a large mass of 

ia|iirin] mmterinl, vrs begnn bj Mr. EduuiKl Giiruey and 

ii eootiaaed br other members of the Society for F»y- 

dricml Besearch ; suil the * Census ' is now being a]iplied 

towTvra] vouiitrioH uuder the aimjiicea of the luteruiitiouul 

Gdii|{t«« of Experiueutal I'sychology. It is to be hoped 

tbl oat of thes« combined labors sometliing solid will 

nrataally RTow. The facts shade off into the phenomena 

if BOtor aotomatisni, tranoe, etc.; and nothing but a wide 

mpuvtiTe stnily ran give really instructive results.* 

7^ pari played by the peripheral aenae-organ in halluciuu- 

(ioD is juftt ad olwctire lui we found it in the case of imagiua- 

tioB. The thiugti 8e>eD often seem opaque and hide the 

fc^^kgroniid npon which they are projected. It does unt 

loUoir (miD tin*, however, that the retina is actually in- 

tnlved to the visioiL A contrary' process going on in the 

ncnal ceotrea wuold prevent the retinal impressiim made 

by th« out«r realiti«« from being felt, and this would iu 

I torms be equivalent to the hiding of them by the 
fignre. The negative aft«r-imiiges of mental 

a tvportad by Meyor and Fer^, und the negative after- 

II of hypnotic hallucinations reported by Binet and 
<rtbatB ao (ar conatitnte the only evidence there is for the 
Rtina being involved. Bat until these after-images are 
ctplaioed in ftomp nthf^r way we must admit the possibititr 
«f a oeotrifngal current from the optical centres don-nwards 
hlo tlie peripheral organ of sight, paradoxical as the course 
vl meli a enrrent may appear. 

* FEBCSFTION-'niC]:.* 

rUr lime which the perceptive process oocujnea boa been 
iH|Ured into by varioaa eiiierimenters. Some call it per- 
c»p(ioa-tiint>, Kome choice-time, Home discrimination -time. 
Tbt resnlta have been already given in Chapter XIII (vol. 
I, p. 633 It), to which the reader is consequently referred. 

* la Hr. Ourany'* work. JuM died, a Tojr Urp onaitMr of VBrldUaJ 
■MM am erkkaltr dfanuMd. 


Dr. Bomanes gives an interestmg yariaiion of thesd 
time-measurements. He fonnd * 

'^ an astonishing difference between different individuals with respect 
to the rate at which they are able to read. Of oonrse reading implies 
enormously intricate processes of perception both of the sensuous aud 
of the intellectual order ; but if we choose for these observations per- 
sons who have been accustomed to read much, we may consider that 
they are all very much on a par with req^ect to the amount of practice 
which they have had, so that the differences in their rates of reading 
may fairly be attributed to real differences in their rates of forming 
complex perceptions in rapid succession, and not to any merely aod- 
dental differences arising from greater or less facility acquired by 
special practice. 

^* My experiments consisted in marking a brief printed paragraph in 
a book which had never been read by any of the persons to whom it 
was to be presented. The paragraph, which contained simple state- 
ments of simple facts, was marked on the margin with penciL The 
book was then placed before the reader open, the page, however, being 
covered with a sheet of paper. Having pointed out to the reader upon 
this sheet of paper what part of the underlying page the marked para- 
graph occupied, I suddenly removed the sheet of paper with one hand, 
while I started a chronograph with the other. Twenty seconds being 
allowed for reading the paragraph (ten lines octavo), as soon as the 
time was up I again suddenly placed the sheet of pi4)er over the printed 
page, passed the book on to the next reader, and repeated the experi- 
ment as before. Meanwhile, the first reader, the moment after the 
book had been removed, wrote down all that he or she could remember 
having read. And so on with all the other readers. 

''Now the results of a number of experiments conducted on this 
method were to show, as I have said, astonishing differences in the 
maximum rate of reading which is possible to different individuals, all 
of whom have been accustomed to extensive reading. That is to say, 
the difference may amount to 4 to 1 ; or, otherwise stated, in a given 
time one individual may be able to read four times as much as another. 
Moreover, it appeared that there was no relationship between slowness 
of reading and power of assimilation ; on the contrary, when all the 
efforts are directed to assimilating as much as possible in a given time, 
the rapid readers (as shown by their written notes) usually give a bet- 
ter account of the portions of the paragraph which have been com- 
passed by the slow readers than the latter are able to give ; and the 
most rapid reader I have found is also the best at assimilating. 1 
should further say that there is no relationship between rapidity of 
perception as thus tested and intellectual acti\ity as tested by the gen- 
eral results of intellectual work ; for 1 have tried the experiment with 

* Mental Evolution iu Animals, p. 136. 


ftfcfil bigfalj dlstiDguished men in science and literature, most of 
wlMn I foond to be slow readers.*^ * 

*UUrmimr€. The best treatment of perception with which I am ac- 

^oiioted it that in Mr. James Sully's book on ' Illusions ' in the Interna- 

tiosti Sdentific Series. On hallucinations the literature is large. Gurney. 

Cisdinsky (as ahready cited), and some articles by Kraepelin in the 

Vierteljahischrift fttr Wissenschaftliche Philoeophie. vol. v (1881), are 

tk iDost sjTstematic studies recently made. All works on Insanity treat 

oT them. Dr . W. W. Ireland's works. ' The Blot upon the Brain ' (1886) and 

'TWougb the iTory Gate ' (1800) have much information on the subject. 

Gmcy gives pretty complete references to older literature. The most 

lapoitant thing on the subject from the point of view of theory Is the 

irticle by Mr. Myers on the Demon of Socrates in the Proceedings of the 

fiodecy for Psychical Research for 1889, p. 522. 



In the sensations of hearing^ touchy sights and pain we are 
accustomed to distinguish from among the other dements the 
dement of vduminousness. We call the reyerberations of a 
thunderstorm more yoluminous than the squeaking of a 
slate-pencil ; the entrance into a warm bath giyes our skin 
a more massiye feeling than the prick of a pin; a little 
neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, seems less ex- 
tensiye than the heayy soreness of a boil or the yast discom- 
fort of a colic or a lumbago ; and a solitary star looks smaller 
than the noonday sky. In the sensation of dizziness or 
subjectiye motion, which recent inyestigation has proyed 
to be connected with stimulation of the semi-circular canals 
of the ear, the spatial character is very prominent Whether 
the ' muscular sense ' directly yields us knowledge of space 
is still a matter of litigation among psychologist. Whilst 
some go so far as to ascribe our entire cognition of exten- 
sion to its exclusive aid, others deny to it all extensive 
quality whatever. Under these circumstances we shall do 
better to adjourn its consideration ; admitting, however, that 
it seems at first sight as if we felt something decidedly 
more voluminous when we contract our thigh-muscles than 
when we twitch an evelid or some small muscle in the face. 
It seems, moreover, as if this difference lay in the feeling 
of the thigh-muscles themselves. 

In the sensations of smell and taste this element of 
varying vastness seems less prominent but not altogether 
absent Some tastes and smells appear less extensive than 
complex flavors, like that of roast meat or plum puddings 
on the one hand, or heavy odors like miisk or tuberose, on 

"* Hoprintod. witli coii'^iilorHble revision, fn>m * Mind * for 1887. 




(bK i)Ui«r. Tlie fiiitliot nkitrp given to Uie acitl clAsa woultl 
ciD !'• fthow that to Uie (K>pulur iiiiuil tLere i» sometluDg 
■.iiB'W aqJ, bs it were, Btreukr, in the impreasioQ tbej 
:.iU. ■■ibt-r Aurora juid odora Iwiu^ Iiigger and rounder. 

Ti).- M-iMAlioiiit liftrived from tlife iuward orgiius are also 
datiortlr mnra or lens vulumiuoua. Kepletion aud enipti- 
Wim, aaJhc^tina, palpitation, lieadache, are examplea of 
lUa, uiU eertaiul^' not Iei«s ttpatiHl in the consciousness vb 
haw o( oar gvncrsl bodil}' couditinu in unusea, fever, hearj 
dtomiaeaa, and fati|;iie. Our entire cubic content neemB 
llcB woaibiT mauifetit to iih as such, and feels much larger 
iXjui any hx-al pulMition, pressnri^, or diacomfort. Skin 
-.•i rrtinu are, howeTer, thu orKans in which the ep&ce- 
if-ioeut playtt the inoHt active part. Xot ouly does the 
uutumol VHAtiicH« yielded by the retina surpass that 1,'ielded 
he any "ther ergon, bnt th" iutrif.iwy with which our ntten- 
bon cao tinlKUnde this vastneHS nud perc«ire it to be com- 
puted of loMM-r jtortions siniuItaneooBly coexisting along- 
ttd«> of iMurh wthiT is without a parallel elsewhere.* The 
^ir ipv^a a firvater va»tiiess than the skin, but is consider- 
ably leaa able to HalHlJride itf 

JVio»r mfjint thffiiit in that thin eleinenl, dt'acemibU m each 

mery »mmilum, Ikmiijh more ilfvelnptil m some than in 

is /V (tn'ytmif sensittion of space, out of which all the 

ksowliMige about space that we afterwards come to 

i* woven by processes of discriniiiiatioii, assocititinQ, 

nelo^tioti. 'Extensity,' as Mr. James Ward calls it^ J 


* fn>l. Ja*IR>w bad founit Ib^l InvsrUbly wf l^ml lo vrutepiittinitlt ibl 1 
laiiiial Af oar ikln wblrlt may be ilimulated tiy oimlnct wlUi bu object 
*h«B w» riprra* It In lerin* of vUria! tipar-c: lliai l». wbrn ukinl lo mark 
m lafer Uw r.nrni of sklti ftJTeclcil. *f alHityg ilnw ll much too ■mall. 
1W Aowatlul tlueityr KcM ■» much Rpac«'to«llti|; from the iimalkr llii« m 
tW (kia gK* fniui itm Urfvr one. Cf. Jwtron : Mlud. rr, 549-T; Atnerl- 
Mf Pfcycliolggy, Itl, M. 

« auuniU Ibv gram- onts mxm ihv ii»«t MlptinlTc. Blmnpf 
B fur thb. I) MaodalloD wiih Uggvi c%tm»; 3) wider 
<f tb« luud anil bwly wlicn grave noleB arc auug; S) audi- 
Wtj •! a gnatrr illttancv, Itv thinks HiAt IbMC llim rfasoni illspcDM lu 
^nm mtfpaditt ■» ImmaneDt «iirn*iiy In ibc miamiioa n( xiuDd ■« »uch. 
W U* ranaiki la ibc Toi>|Myrho)nrl(-, t 907-211. 

i Eacrrlotwdla BrlUumln. tili EtJIilun. irilcte r«]rchology , pp. 4«. 08. 

136 P8TCH0L00T. 

on this view, becomes an element in each sensation just as 
intensity is. The latter every one will admit to be a dis- 
tinguishable though not separable ingredient of the sensible 
quality. In like manner extensity, being an entirely pecul- 
iar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of itself, 
and inseparable in actual experience from some sensational 
quality which it must accompany, can itself receive no 
other name than that of sejisaiional element. 

It must now be noted that the vastnesa hitherto spoken of 
is as great in one direction as in another. Its dimensions are 
so vague that in it there is no question as yet of surface 
as opposed to depth ; ' volume ' being the best short name 
for the sensation in question. Sensations (/ different orders 
are rovgUy comparable^ inter «e, with respect to their volumes. 
This shows that the spatial quality in each is identical 
wherever found, for different qualitative elements, e.g. 
warmth and odor, are incommensurate. Persons bom 
blind are reported surprised at the largeness with which 
objects appear to them when their sight is restored. Franz 
says of his patient cured of cataract : " He saw everything 
much larger than he had supposed from the idea obtained 
by his sense of touch. Moving, and especially living, 
objects appeared very large." * Loud sounds have a cer- 
tain enormousness of feeling. It is impossible to conceive 
of the explosion of a cannon as filling a small space. In 
general, sounds seem to occupy all the room between us 
and their source ; and in the case of certain ones, the 
cricket's song, the whistling of the wind, the roaring of the 
surf, or a distant railway train, to have no definite start- 
ing point. 

In the sphere of Wsion we have facts of the same order. 
'Glowing' bodies, as Hering says, give us a perception 
"which seems roomy (raumhaff) in comparison with that 
of strictly surface color. A glowing iron looks luminous 
through and through, and so does a flame." t A luminous 
fog, a band of sunshine, affect us in the same way. As 
Hering urges : 

* Philosopbicjil Traiisiiotions (1841). 

f Hermaiurs Hamib d. Physiol.. M. in. 1. S. 575. 


"Wt mtmt dtetitiguUlt momi/ from aiiporficiAl, ns well as distinctly 

bniiiWiBetly faeundBtl. MnaatiorDt. Thii^dark which with closed o^es 

immm Mort oim i», for example, n nMimy sensation. We do not see 

1 tki •arfiwv llk«< « mUl In front of us, but a space tilled with dark- 

MK iod ««*n wbuii we succe«Ml in aeeing this darkness as teriuinal«d 

^■hbck vail lli«t« Htill ivtnnina i» fmnt of this trail the dark Apace, 

1b«^ ibins luti>i>«iu when we find ournelves with open ej'es in an 

^■JWrl; dark rocim. Tliiit snnMtion of ditrkni^ss in ulso va;;iiely 

hAilKl. An examplf of a distinctly bounddd roomy senanlion is itiat 

^*ckarand voliirtMl fluid «t«n InHKla^: t|jo yellow of the win(^ is 

Ml iwi on)}' on the bounding surfncv of the glass; the yellow sensa- 

IM fU* the wIhJ(> (nlerior of the glass. By day the »o-csl)od empty 

tfKt bHimrn tw and nbj<«l8 anm nppears vt^ry different from whAt it 

khj bI^L The Increasing darknens scttlm not only upon the thiti^ 

tal aba to«wf » u sod the IbitiKs. so ks at last lo cover them eoin- 

flMljr «Dd SQ lb» space itlono. If 1 look into a dark box 1 And it/!Ual 

■iA djufeneM*. and tbis la se«n not merely as the dark-colored sides or 

>ilU t)l ibr lux. A ahady comer in an otherwise well-lighted room is 

.. ■•! « darkneaa whirh is not only on the walls and lloor but between 

' nk ra tbr spaw they include. Every sensation is there where 1 ex- 

;--niK« tl. and if I have it at once at every point of a certain roomy 

t^c*, it i* tbeo a volumtuouM sensation. A cube of transparent green 

(Ibm ftvw B* a spatial eotuiation ; an opniiue cube painted green, on 

■be «Miinu7, only •ensatloDs of surface. " * 

TT^ere arr crriain qvasi-mator sensations in f Ae hfnd when 
VB chADgc the direction of tlie ntt^^uUou, wIiicL equnlly seem 
lo iomKe three dimenttious. If n'ith closed eyes we think 
of tbe ttip of the lioose and then of the cellar, of the diHtauce 
b front «f ua ftiid then of that behiud ns, of space far to the 
r^^t mod then far to the left, we liave something far stronger 
tliMi An idea, — an actual feeling, namely. &s if something in 
tW head uovmI into another direction. Fechuer was, I 
betiera, the first to pnbUHli any remarks on these feelings. 
He VTltcw m» fnlloWH : 

" WlwB wc traRHfrr thp atlMition from objects of one sense to those 
M tmdb/9 wt liave an iDdescribable feetlug (though at the same time 
m* (■^nrtJy dp|«rmitiaic and rppniducibln at plensurej uf altered dinv- 
tloo. Of dlffrrenily If^cnlixed tension tSitannuiij/t. Wo ftwl ■ mrain for- 
ward In Ike eya*. one directed Hidi-ways in the ears. inereasinK with 
ikt i h^if of our atttmlion. snd chntitpni; acciinling ns w« look at nn 
t^ttt srvfally. or listen to somi'thine aiipnilvi<ly ; wherefore we K)>enk 
at itrmtming Oi* allenlion- The difference in mont plainly full when 

• - 

-..—-- ~ ■ 7" — " - -"-—". -■- ixzii •IT. Tiii? f *^' jce local- 

--..:: J -" - - ■ ,.: .. ^ _• -.i^r f"_!'1 I - :::»?!n**iKie when 
. — . r"-'" . -.r-j — ■-" ■ -■■- *-..■ r.-.'L "i.r? t.iiiuiir^u* feeling 

- - -^ 'f ---"■" :-. ^':.. - 1 •::i.T— =" :• -^.:!«i' br;-i:Tion to 

--■ _- --.. -r .1'-^ - — r- .- :=~ru:i r» :■>»- t t firwards, 

:. ..:*- . . -- T — -: ..- ^. — -jr..:- -."r_-iiit- >^-" ' : i-r b^jid f ree 
-- ?r. ■-..... .- -— .- :.:f --•-_:. - ::■- r " r'^ : r ii-rt Tbe feel- 

::^ IT-.: -t -:.*- - t- z. ..- -.:'•-:... •^i=^-'-n.ia". li»i s*»^m« nuher 

- •..-,.• ^■— :*- :: -.: ' r ::■- :-«. v :.. _ Mtr : run. llif. If I wish, 

- • -:...r. "- ..1 . ■...-- ." ■-•"'•:. " v.l ins^ :»e-f:cv me with 

- Ill- — . : ■ .» -..:;-: ... t--~^^:: - i - -i " ii : r^kria. ret rather 

I*. J.- .►- ^> : : L . -T -— i: ■-- : — -i:i^ "^l:::! F^ecLiier de- 
-•:'_".•— i_'- -1 ". i-"* -■ :^-rLriTr-. - ji^ucj^^rj *r-:iJ-<ircTilar 
'ji-i.i- •^i.-.ii 1.-. "■ _ j.--?^ ui-:- ^i"??-!-' ::z-'r""rT iiir most 
it-^i*:!"- :•-: "-"-"1- - :_.iJi:^ :-z. :_rr*:"z»;c . iZid vhen, as 
!i-:-. *_:- _Li^-- 1.'- 1 " :-7:-:--r*L !-• ikiri*: t Iaoe- in the 
-i--ri.t_ T -.L '--" • -; " i "--T^- ^"-^^^^ ^Tsioe located 

:.•-::•-• XI V .. _-: -..i _l.: ••;■ a.":..' : -i-.T-rfi '-^ncTion of 

.;■- — :: ■■ -.i.' : : :. - -~ ' - i : "f-^-z" •\~\±z.v~'.'Z :f *-■= .-rxisic seal of 
..^^ ■■--. - -. ""::' i~- ■ ■ ■•! ■ ■" : ^: * :• —'•*"•: "i^:'! s-;. *t:ua'. move- 
" '-.'.' • ■ - ■ • — : .1 ■ I • : • : — .' r Tit.*' :: Mr r. ":• •i.rc I *~ LaniiTcon- 
i. ■ ..- »- . ^- "— : J- : -■ •••1 T "«?:■. _ •Vjiirr ^C'^* onto de- 

.. ■ - 7.-"- I- ■--•_; -is ■_ c 1 "Jit iiicr^r: sesse-organa 

..-• i - « :-■-'. ."• -. -^iiTX 'i-ftf^ ri7iou« organs 

— .. :■•--: :--:>'•:•- i. ':•- :!>* «: :f mujcles which 

1 -^T .-.-- M-- -^ .L ^ lix' inr'i.'-s'Ar muscTiiar con- 
-. ■ ----■::-: : : :': T^rr. '^ neoi'.'. soznexhing is 
».-. ■■ . 1 J - .-_."-■-:-■ J "f ■?* n-e a 'i«:ded answer ; 

-. . . ■ .-:•■-. • :• i -■:^-." : :' '-.-*''.- ii :iir inside of the 

:• . ■' - . -■ ■-■•_.•_: i ■ r : "i • : .- "-^T scalp, wi;U % pressure 
'- .. . . L-.. .-. -r.: -z: --: ■-■r:rti> caused hy a con- 

'-i.- -...-.-• ■ " -: '. : 7- ? : rz: -:i-.* Very ^ell with the 

^,. -- ^ }.' -;---■'. y :' r- :•••'* '-i^^h^h men. In a 

f -. - .... I .:.-•• -..* J 1" -■-■'.-•■« af'tr continuous 

•/.._••... i . • . : - « , : s: : . :he muscles of the 

i.-.. ... IN." ■--: vl i fv!r'y n:orbi«l degree of 

i^:.- .--..- -7 1 ■-.■.. : < il -.—. -ItT Psychuphysik, il. 


lo U»p skin itseU there ia a vague form of projection 
ialn tlif third ilimenfiton to which Heriug has called att«D- 

"Boat UtMt felt only agniiut the outaueous surface, bat when com* 
d tbnagh tlic nir nmy nppcw rxtending more or less out from 
( Into the third (iimeaslon of BUTrouiiiling space. . . . We 
a the ilork the p\H--v of u radinnt hotly by moving the 
ImJ Id aiKl rn>, and ail^ndini; to the flnctuation of our fneling of 
nrvtk. The feelintt Itself, however, is DOl prujecled fnlly into the 
im ai which wr lucaliu- the hot body, but always mnains in the 
:'«feboftiocd of the hand." 

Th» intMridr of ouv'k moatli-cnvitr feels larger when ex- 
plored bj* the toD(j!ae than when Inolced at. The crater of a 
iuwlT-«xtraet4>d tooth, and the movements of a 1on»e tooth 
IS iu »>tM:krt, fet'l (juite nionHtrons. A midge bnzzing 
t^ainiit the drum of the ear will often seem as big as a but- 
terllT. The apatial aensibilitT of the tympanic membrane 
ham hitherto been rerr little studied, though the subject 
will wll r<*p«y much trouble. If we approiu')) it by iutro- 
dttoing into the outer «ar some small object like the tip of 
a tt>11ed-ap tiasne-paper lamplighter, we are surprised at 
th» largo nuliatiug aensatiou which its presence gives us, 
uti at the sens>< of clearness nml opeiiness which cornea 
wh«B it ia remcived. It la immaterial to inquire whether 
tW fair-reacfaing Menaation here I>e due to actual irradiatiou 
opoB iliatant nerves or not We are considering now, not 
tte objective oanaea of the spatial feeling, but its subjective 
ranetien, and the experiment shows that the same objeci 
gj*v« nore of it to the inner than to the outer cuticle of 
the iMir. The preaanre of the air in the tympanic canty 
■poa the membrane gives an aHtonishingly large seiisatioo. 
W« eaa increaae the pressure by lioMittg our Dustrils and 
rlnung irtir month and forcing air through our Eustachian 
■.<i\m» by an o»pimt*«rr effort ; nnil we can diminish it by 
' iihvr inapiring »r swallowing under the same oonditiona of 
kVMed montli and nose. In either case wc get a large round 
tridimenaional setisatiiin inside of the head, which seems 
■a if it mnst come from the alTucUou of au organ much 
luK»r than the ^mpanic membrane, whose surface hardly 
da that of ooe'a little>finger-uail. 


The trmpanic membrane is forthermore able to render 
sensible differences in the pressure of the external atmos- 
phere, too slight to be felt either as noise or in this more 
Tiolent way. If the reader will sit with closed eyes and let 
a friend approximate some solid object, like a large book, 
noiselessly to his face, he will immediately become aware 
of the object's presence and position — likewise of its de- 
parture. A friend of the writer, making the experiment 
for the first time, discriminated unhesitatingly between the 
three degrees of solidity of a board, a lattice-frame, and a 
sieye, held close to his ear. Xow as this sensation is neyer 
used by ordinary persons as a means of perception, we may 
fairly assume that its felt quality, in those whose attention 
is called to it for the first time, belongs to it qua sensation, 
and owes nothing to educational suggestions. But this felt 
quality is most distinctiy and unmistakably one of yague 
spatial yastness in three dimensions — quite as much so as 
is the felt quality of the retinal sensation when we lie on 
our back and fill the entire field of yision with the empty 
blue sky. When an object is brought near the ear we im- 
mediately feel shut in, contracted; when the object is 
remoyed, we suddenly feel as if a transparency, clearness, 
openness, had been made outside of us. And the feeling 
will, by any one who will take the pains to obsenre it, be 
acknowledged to inyolye the third dimension in a yague, 
unmeasured state.* 

The reader will haye noticed, in this enumeration of 
facts, that vctuminousness of the feeling seems to bear very little 
relation to the size of the organ that yields it. The ear and 
eye are comparatively minute organs, yet they giye us feel- 
ings of great volume. The same lack of exact proportion 
between size of feeling and size of organ affected obtains 
within the limits of particular sensory organs. An object 
appears smaller ou the lateral portions of the retina than it 
does on the fovea, as may be easily verified by holding the 

* That the sensation in question is one of tactile rather than of acoustic 
sensibility would seem proved by the fact that a medical friend of the 
writer, both of whose membran^r iympani are quite normal, but one of 
•whose ears is almost totally deaf, feels the presence and withdrawal of ob- 
jects as well at one ear as at the other. 



IM (imtiofters pnnillp] luid a coaple of uicheu apart, and 

tatwferrin^c the ^azc of one eye from oiip to the otlier. 

Hm \Le fittg<T wot liirectlv looked at will appeur tosLrink, 

uij this whatever l>e the direction of the liugerii. Ou the 

li'Qgnn » cmmb, or the calibre of a small tube, appears 

'ari^i-r than Ix'tweeu the iingera. If two poiiite kept equi- 

LiUnt |blnnt«-d coidpasa- or sciBsora- points, for example) 

r drawn acroso the tikiii so aa really to describe a pair of 

ftirullel liQ<^^ the lines will appear further apart in Home 

•[■lU than in others. If, for example, we draw them hori- 

iintnlly across the fare, so that the moiitli falls between 

t^riu, the person ex[)erimented ujk>q will feel as il thej 

Iv^-tui Xa> diverge near the month and to include it in a well 

sukjkcd ellipse. lu like 

keep the compass- 

Pra. M <aner Wrbrr). 

Ill one or two centimetres apart> and draw them down 
Utnmxva over the wrist aud palm, tiually tliawing one 
g ooo finger, the other along ita neighbor, the appear- 
**w>e will be th«t of a Mngle line, noon breaking into two, 
' r.ich become more »-idely separated below the wrist, to 
utrart af{mib in the palm, and tinally diverge rapidly 
.lin towardit the Anger-tlpit. The dotted lines in Figs. 
1 luid *>*i represent the true path of the compass-poiut» ; 
'■''•■ full Iixi»a their apparent path. 

Tht^ name length of akin, moreover, will convey a mora 
niMuate wimatiun aeeonliug to the manner of Ktimnlation- 
If lite eilge <(f n card Ik- prt«stted ligainst the skin, the dis- 
kaee between its extremities will seem shorter than that be- 
t>Mii two Mimpaaa-tips touching the name terminal pointa.* 

* The tUa M«tii> lo obey a diSerrat law from lUe ej-t- hm. If * given 
■wmI uio In actMl. Ilni by a tcrin of poiolB, anil ooit by ibe iwo 



In the eye, iotenBity of oerTe-stimalatioD seems to in- 
crease the volume of the feeling as well 
as its brilliaDcy. If we raise and lower 
the gas altenistely, the whole room and 
all the objects in it seem alternately to 
enlarge and contract If we cover half 
a page of small print with a gray glass, the 
print seen throngh the glass appears 
decidedly smaller than that seen oatside 
of it, and the darker the glass the greater 
the difference. When a circumscribed 
opacity in front of the retina keeps off 
part of the light from the portion which 
it covers, objects projected on that 
portion may seem but half as large as 
when their image falls oatside of it* 
The inverse effect seems produced by 
certain drugs and antesthetics. Mor- 
phine, atropine, daturine, and cold blunt 
the sensibility of the skin, so that dis- 
tances apon it seem less. Haschish pro- 
duces strange perversions of the general 
sensibility. Under its inflaeuce one's 
body may seem either enormously en- 
larged or strangely contracted. Some^ 
times a single member will alter its 
proportion to the rest ; or one's back, 
for instance, will appear entirely absent, 
as if one were hollow behind. Objects 
if»r*webe t. Comparatively near will recede to a vast 
distance, a n\\nH street assume to the 
immeasurable perspective. Ether and chloroform 

e points, witb thetntpirtil between them uneicit«d,tbia Interval will 
Beera coDBidt'rablj Icbs lu Ihi; bpcoiuI ibsc Ibtm ll xeemed In the first. In 
the akin llie uuexdteit (iiicrval fcL'ts iho lurger. The reader may easily 
verify the fncls In this cnae by taking a vlslriiig-cnrd, cutting ooe edge of 
It into a aaw-tooih pattern, and from the op|>o8iie edge cutting out all but 
the two corners, and iheu conipariug (he feeUngaarotuedby the twaedgM 
when held agnlust Ibc akiu. 

'Classen, Physiologie des Geslchiasiuues, p. 114 ; see also A. RleU.Der 
FlilloBopbiKbe Kritlcismiu, ii. p. 149. 

Ttis PKRCBPTioy OF 81'ACE. u:^ 

"losinosllj- pnwluce not wlioltr dissimilar reHnUs. PAuam, 
-.ii' Ciercuou pliyaiolngist, relates that wlmu, us a hay, he 
was «tlierixe«] fur nonralgia, tlie objects iii the room grew 
MtrauelT Hmall and distant, before his held of vision dnrk- 
kdmI over au«l tlif> roaring in his enra began. H<> hIso men- 
tinQs that ■ fritMid of his in church, stniggling in vuiu to 
kp«p kwake, saw the preacher grow smaller and smaller 
and more and more distant. I myself on one occasion 
obaervcd the same recession of objects during the begiu- 
aioit of chloroformization. In various cerebral diseases 
w find analogonii dislurbanceH. 

Cm* wr lunrign the jthyfiiJogidjl romlHions irhich miike Ihf 
■-iitaUtiryjmutibir.largewiiiit.if one gensntiim vary so much/rom 
■il €j^ nnnihrr? Only imperfectlj. One factor in the re- 
^t undoubtedly if the number of nerve-terminations 
nmalbuiCoaBlT excited by the outward ligeut that awalceus 
tli« twtwation. When many skiu-nerves are warmed, or 
■Mncb n>tinal snrfnc« illiiminKted, oar fMing is Ini^r than 
«hen a lesser nerrons surface is excited. The single sen- 
*atii>n yielded by two compass-points, although it seems 
ample, i» y«t felt to be much htjq^r and blunter than that 
yielded by one. The touch of a single point may always 
b* recognized by its quality of sharpness. This page looks 
Ba«:h aroaller to the reader if he closes one eye than if both 
ey^ Kra open. So does th« moon, which latter fact shows 
that tbe phenomeuon hao nothing Uj do with parallax. 
The celebrated boy coached for the cataract by Cheselden 
■hi>«ght, after Uis tirst eye wa« operated, "all things he saw 
-itietnely largir," but being couched of his second eye, 
•kid ** that objects at (irnt appeared large to this eye, but 
iwit an luige as they did at HrHt to the other ; and looking 
apiia the asiB)'' object with both i\veH, he thought it looked 
aho«it twice as large a» with the tirst couched eye only, bat 
»">( double, that we can anyways discover," 

The grt'At'T cxtt'nsiveueas that the feeling of certain 
parte of the same surface has over other parts, and that 
■MM nnler of surface has over another ('retina orer akin, for 
nuDple), may also to a certain extent lie esplaim^d by the 
operstioD of the same factor. It is an anatomical fact that 
the tB'wt spatially sensitive surfaces (retina, tougui', finger- 


tips, etc. > are supplied by nerve-tnmks of unusual thick- 
ness, which must supply to every unit of surface-area an 
unusually large number of terminal fibres. But the varia- 
tious of felt extension obey probably only a very rough law 
of numerical proportion to the number of fibres. A sound 
is not twice as voluminous to two ears as to one ; and the 
above-cited variations of feeling, when the same surface is 
excited under different conditions, show that the feeling is 
a resultant of several factors of which the anatomical one 
is only the principaL Many ingenious hypotheses have ' 
been brought forward to assign the co-operating factors 
where different conditions give conflicting amounts of felt 
space. Later we shall analyze some of these cases in de- 
tail, but it must be confessed here in advance that many of 
them resist analysis altogether. * 

* It is worth while at this point to call attention with some emphasis to 
the fact that, though the anatomical condition of the feeling retembUi the 
feeling itself, such resemblance cannot be taken by our understanding to 
explain tohy the feeling should be just what it is. We hear it untiringly 
reiterated by materialists and spiritualists alike that we can see no possible 
inward reason why a certain brain-process should produce the feeling of 
redness and another of anger : the one process is no more red than the 
other is angry, and the coupling of process and feeling is, as far as our 
understanding goes, a juxtaposition pure and simple. But in the matter of 
spatial feeling, where the retinal patch that produces a triangle in the mind 
is itself a triangle, etc., it looks at first sight as if the sensation might be a 
direct cognition of its own neural condition. Were this true, however, our 
sensation should be one of multitude rather than of continuous extent ; for 
the condition is number of optical nerve-termini, and even this is only a 
remote condition and not an immediate condition. The immediate condi- 
tion of the feeling is not the process in the retina, but the process in the 
brain; and the process in the brain may, for aught we know, be as unlike 
a triangle, — nay, it probably is so, — as it is unlike redness or rage. It is 
simply a eaincidence ihhi in the case of space one of the organic conditions, 
viz., the triangle impressed on the skin or the retina, should lead to a rep- 
resentation in the mind of the subject observed similar to that which it 
produces in the psychological observer. In no other kind of case is the 
coincidence found. Even should we admit that we cognize triangles in 
space because of our immediate cognition of the triangular shape of our 
excited group of nerve-tips, the matter would hardly be more transparent, 
for the mystery would still remain, why are we so much better cognizant 
of triangles on our finger-tips than on the nerve-tips of our back, on our 
eye than on our ear, and on any of these parts than in our brain ? Thos. 
Brown very rightly rejects the notion of explaining the shape of the space 
perceived by the shape of the 'nervous expansion affected.' **If thif 



So hr, all we lisve established or sought to estnbUah is 

fke exialeoce of tlie vogue form or quale of spatiulity as uu 

tuepATsble eleraeot botuid up with the other peculiaritii 

■ :' each and everj oni* of our Neusatiou8, The numerous 

:«m{)lc>i w«? bnve adduced of the variatioua of tbiu esteniiive 

^-mi'iit bavt* only beeti meant to make t-leur it8 strictly 

•f-a<>atiotial character. la very few of them will the reiuler 

liavi- bf^n able to explain the variation by aii added iut«l- 

Wtaal «'li!meiit, hucH as the HU^gestiou of a recollected ex- 

perieacc In ahuottt all it haa aeemed to be the immediate 

pBTchir ^'ffect of a i>eculiar sort of uerve-process excited; 

and all the DirrTvproceases in question agree in yielding 

VluU apace they do %-ield, to the mind, in the abape of a 

ICnpk^ tJ»taI vaMtu<>i<a, iu which, primtttvely at least, no <yrdi~r 

^iffarU or of giJtUvwions ri<iKUH. 

Let no one be aarpriaed at thia notion of a apace without 
order. There may l>e a apace without order just aa there 
■ukT be an imlcr without apace.* And the primitive percefi- 
tions of apace are certainly of an unordered kini The 
offder which Uie npacea first perceived potentially include 
before being dimtiiictly apprehended by the mind, be 
into tboHe apaces by a rather complicated set of iu- 
tnal acta. The primordial largenessea which the sen- 
LB yield must bi^ nuii/iured atut xuMwidnl by conacioaa- 
aod added ^)gether, before they can form by their 
>TsUt«na what we know aa the real Space of the objective 
voiid. In thenr- operations, imagiuatiou, association, at- 
t^ntina, and selection play u decisive part; and although 
iter Dowb«r« add any new material to the space-data of 
vnM>, tbiHT ao ahnffle and manipulate the^e data and hide 





•hould havH MiiikM incliea and LkII iDcbca, unil 
<<Sn«Botber fiirau, recti! Ihtmr anil curvltliirar. of rni|(tiiji.'v aud luuiicl." 

* MiwlnU loacK, r.f,. harr an nrdcr ot iiualily lodepeodi-ul cither of 
■Mr ifMrt>' iir tlme-onlrr, Miult Kim» from Lbe tlmu-ordifr of llii: DohM 
vpatitog tbrir quality' ottlfr In genonl, It a &c iltfg h ij k, etc. slaod 
IvM *ma|vn>«iil ot tMlInc* Id tlie urdir of ib«lr 'lualliy, tbey ma}- •»■ 
l^aaMMf tfmot onim or llnw-ottlw, a* <l t/a h g. otr., aod illll llir "rilrr 
If fwtlh^ wDI nawla flzid and unchangfd. 


present ones behind imagined ones that it is no wonder if 
some authors have gone so far as to think that the sense- 
data have no spatial worth at all, and that the intellect, 
since it makes the subdivisions, also gives the spatial 
quality to them out of resources of its own. 

As for ourselves, having found that all our sensations 
(however as yet unconnected and undiscriminated) are of 
extensive objects, our next problem is : How do we arrange 
these at first chaotically given spaces into the one regtdar and 
orderly ' world of space ' which we now know ? 

To begin with, there is no reason to suppose that the 
seTeral sense-spaces of which a sentient creature may 
become conscious, each filled with its own peculiar content, 
should tend, simplv because they are many, to enter into 
any definite spatial' intercourse with each other, or Ue in 
any particular order of positions. Even in ourselves we 
can recognize this. Ditferent feelings may coexist in us 
without assuming any particular spatial order. The sound 
of the brook near which I write, the odor of the cedars, the 
comfort with which my breakfast has filled me, and my in- 
terest in this paragraph, all lie distinct in my consciousness, 
but in no sense outside or alongside of each other. Their 
spaces are interfused and at most fill the same vaguely ob- 
jective world. Even where the qualities are far less dis- 
parate, we may have something similar. If we take our 
subjective and corporeal sensations alone, there are moments 
when, as we lie or sit motionless, we find it very diflicult to 
feel distinctly the length of our back or the direction of our 
feet from our shoulders. By a strong eflfort we can succeed 
in dispersing our attention impartially over our whole per- 
son, and then we feel the real shape of our body in a sort 
of unitary way. But in general a few parts are strongly 
emphasized to consciousness and the rest sink out of notice ; 
and it is then remarkable how vague and ambiguous our 
perception of their relative order of location is. Obviously, 
for the orderly arrangement of a multitude of sense-spaces 
in consciousness, something more than their mere separate 
existence is required. Wliat is this further condition? 

If a number of sensible extents are to be perceived alongside 

iktittf^ c«nT»vtly tiie form of one's IkmIv by imre fueling 0\a£t4, i 
in«»4 from tli4> fact that it is rorr hnrd to fcpl its totality as i^ /"/M^ 
^ iiQtt at all. The troablp in similar to that of thiuking 

rns PKncKPTioK of spack 147 

(^Mel other mirf I'li li^m't^- i>nii^ Hiry mwt npptnr as parts in 
a NMtrr anuihir rrtml trhtch can mtrr Ihr inlml simply and alt 
I think it wil! )>e seen that th^ dimculty of esti' 

for- V, 

■ tr4i<aiid bAckwanlM itimtiltAuoouslj. Wheu eouscious of ^ 

.r b"Kd «v tcDil t'> Ki^iw iinvoosoious of otir feet, and there 

t. r-. thus an ©lemeut of time-succeHsion into oar percep- 

: iiirM^lTPH which traDsforniH the latter froni an net of 

t'l nu*- of onnHtnictioti. This element of con- 

M --i w prenent in a ^till hif;lier degree, and rrarries 

- ,ni.' •oDM^nenceti, when we deal with objeotiTe 

. u''" "' t'l b«* griwpfd liy » fiiugle look. The relft- 

titr- jH'XiitioDK of the shojiH in m town, !M>parated by many 

[>iM Mtre<>lH, have to be thus coDntmeted from data ap- 

iltnl ill HUt.-4-eaBioD, and the retiult in a greater or less 

deK r i' g "( vHgiieni->sa. 

Tbal It HentiatioD be diacriminat«l as a part from ont of a j 
Urp^r rnTeloping spM'e is theu the conditio sine qtui turn of its t 
batoK Bfipn-heDdud in a delinite spatial order. The problem 
(ifordfriugnurfeelini^iti ttpace is then, in the fimt instance, 
a ppoblom of ditwrimination, but not of discrimination pure 
and Buaple: (or then not only coexistent si^fhte but coex- 
tslanl aootidH would oecefiaarily assume sarh order, which 
ther DOloriotutly do mit. Whatever is dincrimiuated will 
appear as a small space within n lar^^r space, it is true, but 
t^ i» but the very mdimeat of order. For the location of 
it within that sfnace to become precise, other oonditions stUl 
' JitrtKapcirrene; and tbt> best way to study what they are 
'Jl h» to paa»e for a little and tituilytr what th^ ej!pn»sio» 
•pttial order ' mraiu. 

SpAtial order is an abstract term. The concrete i>ercep- 
:. n* which it corem are 6guie a.. <iirectioiiH, positjons, mag - 
■.tadea, and dislaoces. To sip^jle out uny ou•^ of thi^se 
*fcif bftm a totft] Tastuess is partially t«i iiitrodnce order 
■to the TBOtneaa. To sabdiWde the vastness into a multt- 
twl* of tbew tliingt is to apprehend it in a (!oni]dete]y 
irdvrly way. Now what ar* Uifse thiugn st^verally? To 




begin with, no one can for an instant hesitate to say that 
some of them are qualities of sensation, just as the total 
vastness is in which they lie. Take figure : a square, a 
circle, and a triangle appear in the first instance to the eye 
simply as three difl'erent kinds of impressions, each so pecul- 
iar thkt we should recognize it if it were to return. When 
Nunnely's patient had his cataracts removed, and a cube and 
a sphere were presented to his notice, he could at once 
perceive a difference in their shapes ; and though he could 
not say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw 
they were not of the same figure. So of lines: if we can 
notice lines at all in our field of vision, it is inconceivable 
that a vertical one should not affect us differently from an 
horizontal one, and should not be recognized as affecting us 
similarly when presented again, although we might not yet 
know the name * vertical,' or any of its connotations, beyond 
this peculiar affection of our sensibility. So of angles : an 
obtuse one affects our feeling immediately in a different way 
from an acute one. Distance-apart, too, is a simple sensa- 
tion — the sensation of a line joining the two distant points : 
lengthen the line, you alter the feeling and with it the 
distance feli 

But with distance and direction we pass to the category 
of space-re/afiow5, and are immediately confronted by an 
opinion whicli makes of all relations something toio ccdo 
different from all facts of feeling or imagination whatsoever. 
A relation, f(^r the Platonizing school in psychology, is an 
energy of pure thought, and, as such, is quite incommen- 
surable with the data of sensibility between which it may 
be perceived to obtain. 

We may consequeutly imagine a disciple of this school 
to say to us at this point: "Suppose you have made a sep- 
arate specific sensation of each line and each angle, what 
boots it? You have still the order of directions and of 
distances to acrount for; you have still the relative magni- 
tudes ot all these felt figures to state ; you have their re- 
spective positions to define before you can be said to have 
brought order into yi^ur space. And not one of these de- 


teraunatioBs can b« effected except throngli an act of r&- 

Utis^ thought, »o that your nttempt to give an account of 

•T'AOQ id t«riiiH of pur« seusiliility breaks dowu almost at 

' •• vtfjy oatwt. Poeitum, for example, cau never be a sen- 

idoa, for it baa notbing intriimic about it; it can only 

••litaio bettcfnt « spot, line, or other figure and extnineMia 

m-ardatatts, and can never be au element of the aeusible 

datum, the Uue or the Hpot, in itself. Let ua then confess 

HlhAt Thtitigbt aloiin can unlock the riddle of space, uud 

^H^U Thought ir) an adorable but unfathomable mystery." 

^^ Huch n Rii'tbod of dealing with the problem has the 

Berit of shortnesH, Letns, however, be in uo sncb harry, 

bat tM^ whf th4>r we cannot get a little deeper by patieuUy 

cotuddxriug what these space-relations are. 

• RglatioD " is a very slippery word. It has so many 

diSf r«ut concrete meanings that the use of it as an abstract ^'-J^-" 

aniviTMal may easily iutrodiice bewilderment into our / 

th'-ugbt. We mast therefore be careful to avoid ambiguity 

■. nakiug sare, wherever we have to employ it, what its 

• CUH* toHauiug is in that particular sphere of application. 

U prw»rntWB have to do with space-relations, and no others, 

^1-.^ 'relations' are feelings of an entirely different order 

•m the terms thoy relate. The relation of similarity, e.g., 

m»y equally obbuu bt'tween jasmine and tuberose, or be- 

^^m«o Mr. BrowTiing'fl verses and Mr. Story's ; it is itself 

H^ftberodnmns uor poetical, and those may well be pardoned 

■Vfco hav* deniw! t« it all sensational content whatever. 

Bal just aa, in the field of quantity', the relation between 

Iwo Dumbers is another number, so in the Jifid of spa^e the j 

niittirmi' are fad* of Ihe. mimf order with tfw fitcls (furij rtiate. 

If Ikar Initer be palchri in /Ac cirrie if vi/ntm, thr former 

arr ixrtain olhrr fnlchen betioeen them. When we s])eak of 

\k*- nrlatlou of directioQ of two |Kiiuts toward each other, 

«• mtMiQ simply thn iwusution of tb<^ line that joins the two 

(••iota together. The line ia (fw rrhitivH ; feel it and you 

I tbe relation, nee it and you see the relation; nor can 

1 koy conceivable way think the latter except by im- 

~ » former (bowevur vaguely), or describe or indi- 

ine except by poiutiug to the other. And the 

i«nt yon have imagined the line, the relation stands 

150 rsrcHOLOor. 

before jou in all its completenesSy with nothing further to 
be done. Just so the relation of direction between two lines 
is identical with the peculiar sensation of shape of the 
space enclosed between them. This is commonly called 
an angular relation. 

If these relations are sensations, no less so are the rela- 
ijJtX'$-*^ tions of position. The rdation of position between the top and 
bottom points of a vertical line is that line^ and nothing else. 
The relations of position between a point and a horizontal 
line below it are potentially numerous. There is one more 
important than the rest, called its distance. This is the 
sensation, ideal or actual, of a perpendicular drawn from the 
point to the line.* Two lines, one from each extremity of 
the horizontal to the point, give us a pecuUar sensation of 
triangularity. This feeling may be said to constitute the 
Uxms of all the relations of position of the elements in ques* 
tion. Rightness and leftness^ upness and dotvnness, are again 
pure sensations differing specifically from each other, and 
generically from everything else. Like all sensations, they 
can only be indicated, not described. If we take a cube and 
label one side top, another bottom^ a third /ron/, and a fourth 
back, there remains no form of words by which we can de- 
scribe to another person which of the remaining sides is right 
and which left. We can only point and say here is right 
and there is left, just as we should say this is red and that 
blue. Of two points seen beside each other at all, one is 
always affected by one of these feelings, and the other by 
the opposite; the same is true of the extremities of any 

* The whole science of geometry may be said to owe its being to the 
exorbitant interest which the human mind takes in linea. We cut space 
up in every direction in order to manufacture them. 

f Kant was, 1 believe, the tirst to call attention to this last order of facts. 
After pointing out that two opposite spherical triangles, two gloves of a 
pair, two spirals wound in contrary directions, have identical inward de- 
terminations, that is, have their parts defined with relation to eaek tether by 
the same law, and so must be conceived as identical, he showed that the im- 
possibility of their mutual superposition obliges us to assign to each figure 
of a symmetrical pair a peculiar difference of its own which can only con* 
sist in an outward determination or relation of its parts, no longer to each 
other, but to the whole of an objectively outlying space with its points of the 
«x>mpa88 given absolutely. This incxmceivable difference is perceived only 



s it a]ip(>iirH iiKliibitultle tbnt nil spiice-relatioiis ex- . 

«e of luafi^itaile are Dothiug more or less tliaii pnro ^^ y^ 
] objeeto. But magnihaif appears U> outstep tbis ^*-t*jiC 
Kiphere. We have relatious of inticbDesu and little- m^jJ*^* 
reen ttueH. Dumlierti, inteDsities, aud qualities, a»/rtiA«^. 
1 •■ Kpiu-t-*. It ix impossible, then, that Bucb relatious j 

kbtmld (ortQ ■ particular kiod of Bimply spatial feeling. "fu^oM 
Tbu W0 must adrait : tbe relation of quantity is generic ^Q 
uul iieoDK iu manT rategorieu of consciousness, whilst the 
ether relations we Iiave nmsidered are s[>ecific and occur 
in space alone. When our attention passes from a shorter 
Us* l"> n lobgfr, from a smaller spot t<> a larger, from a 
(<^f(hler light ti> a stronger, from a paler blue to a richer, 
from a march tone to a galop, the transitioQ is accompanied 
in Uw a^i-uthtttic field of consciousness by a peculiar feeling >« 
of differemv which is what we call the sensation of morr, — t. 
more length, more expanse, inore light, more blue, more 
Bnticm. This transitional sensation of more must be iden- 
tical with itself under all these dilTerent oc^companimeuts, 
KT we abould uot give it the same name in every case. We 
fr^t it whet) we pass from a short vertical line to a long 
hxrurtntal one, from a small square t^i a large circle, as 
w»ll as when we pass between those tignres whose shai>es 
an* rnngrnon*. But when the slia[K<s are congruous our 
nia»i-iiiuaness of the relation is a good deal more distinct, 
ft&d it ixmoAt diatinct of all when, in the exercise of our 
aiialytio atl4»ntiou, we notice, first, a pfirt, and then the 
••^ir, of a titter Uue or ahajMi. Then the moit of the whole 
Aftoallr aticks oat, aa a separate piece of apace, and is ho 
Furttuttti'd. The same exact sensation of it is given when 
*i- are able to siipef^iose one line or figure on another. This 
utdi«]M' usable condition of exact measurement of the morr 
ba« ]<^I aome U* think tliat the feeling itself arose in erery 
eaae from origtual flxperieucoi of anperpoaition. This i> 

ha relatfanti to r1|bt and left. wUltb U a matter of tninir<]lal« 

la thwK bul wunl* {tttU/iM tinmiUalbar anf Aruehauang gtht 

I IS) K>ai eipnMM all ibsi we bavi- nicaut by aiwakbiK 

■I l*fl. 

utriatlc litlal 

IhM eoabwM* In Dgnre*. Kclailun 

m wrong, bowevu, to 
■vniial lo tliu DJiUUuico of 


shift -HUTirs. it "iLt 'mfi\ 

mrtfO^ 'hrm ^enr t# * j 

vittL ais» p*HiefI V. it^3if:a2$crAfiE^ aie r^iarft^os of ite paitB» 
or rh^j siaj b«r iiLgiil r«!^i3rpaeirBtfii^»fw> i^f obimc aot rettlhr 
drawTL Bat fzL -rraifrr ■::&£!«* tziiHr •Hicaiice infio the mmd is 
«CTi7-4li^a.t V. ^ !n«:r<r ietailt^i ^^abaircisiirii. t^TeniziBjee. and 

diK^Air/^A •% 'rr>nL*r'*';i*7i#?*)* •'^.wftihtisot^ tk^n^ tie eniire jwoieM 
Ay w:»^A 'rie /»^i** fr^.m. .nr jint r»iiy%f fetHmg ^ a idol 
fMw//«JW ^-0 a rfj^/nihtyn rf rht* r»Mi^7i#f*? in detoA. Tke more 
nnm^roa-- tLe ^^h^ii-rL^iriLSAr^- tke more elaboimte and per- 
fect vlk c»>gmiti'>ii ?.»r*r:-m-r:^ Bat nuksmach as all the sub- 
diri.'sioii- are tL^mrvrives "iec-satioiLs, and eTen the feeling 
of * more or • les.-* ' Ls. wh«rnr not it^^elf a figure, at le^st a 
H^ji't^tiou of traniiition between two sensations of figure, 
it follox-, for aii^ht we can a;? vet see to the contranr, 
t^iat oU Hj/f/iinl krtfnrlH^Qe (^ M>n^it\onaI at boitomi, and that, 
a^ the HeriMatioii.H lie u^eth^r in the anitr of eonscionsness, 
jjo new material element whatever comes to them from a 
MUpra-H'jnHible .sonrce.* 

• In th'f 'rye*! of many it will have seemed strange to cmU a rdfttion a 
int!Tti line, anri a line a mere AemiatioD. We may easily learn a great deal 
(fffwit hxiy relation, wiy tliat between two points: we may divide the line 
v/hirti JoiriA tlie«w', rinrl dUtingiiifih it. and classify it. and find out Um rela- 

r PimcicPTioy of si'ack- 1S3 

Tif hrin^ing o/" muhlivutlonH to oiuictoimnfM .' This, fkfi 
■ oar mext topic Tliej may be brought to coDsciousDeaa 
nder three aftpectfi is respect of tlit^ir Irxyiiity, in respect 
«( Ui«ir nv^ in rf««pect of their shape. 

TV Mtantng of Localttatton. 

Coi^/ninff-ovrsttves to the problem of localitif for the pres- 
ot, let tu begiii with the ainiple case of a sensitive surface, 
mlj two {jointa of which reeeive stiiiiulatinu fniin without 
Hnw, first, are th«»e two poiuts felt as aloD};.-4ide of each 
other with an interval of Hpace between them? We must 
be oMucioni) of two thin^ for thi» : of the ilualitj of the ex- 
cited points, ami of the extenstveDess of the anexcited 
JMlUTaL The JnalJtj alone, although n uecessart', in not a 
nfident cootlitiou of the spatial separatiou. We may, 
(nr uurtaoc**, tliaceru two soundH in the same place, sweet 
•ad aoor in tlif mvme lemouade, warm and eold, round and 
ticut«d contact in the same place on the skin, etc.* lu all 
dacriminatiou the recognition of the dnality of two feelings 
bf Ihf mind Ik the easier the more »trou^ly the feelingH are 


Mom hjr inwiag or rt^reM'iitlciG: now Hum. and so on. Bui all ihis 
hnbif lixluury^M nmight l<> do wllli our ae^uaintana with Ibc rplHlloQ 
IkrU, la lliflnl iuifoMnn Snc»^ln?il. tlie relalino u thr lint and nathlng 
mnK It would tndt*tl he fair to call H wmctbini; Ii^sar nnd in fact H U 
•HT t)i tui(l«ti(*nil how inoct of u« etinit to f«i.'l a« if ilie Wue were a mucli 
f^mf ibbiR Ibui Ihv rrUtlon, The line in liroad or narrow. Iiliie or red, 
-. ulv liy ifab olr|»ct or hf thai alternately, in the ooune nt our experience; 
i> ibrrvforv indc|)rndent of any un<r of theae accidenU; and *o, froro 
' "tnc it an Du one of nifh •etuible ijiialltfM, we ma; end by Ihlaking of 
-: MM>niMlilii( which r%iiiiot hedrOnt^l Fut-cpi a* ihe nr-i^tlon nf all mD' 
Ate qMlll7 whati-nr. anil whlrU need* to be put into ihii srnwtlnna by a 

I act of ' rvlaltoft Ihoiigbt. ' 

m why we p^ lo feel aa it a tpace- halation must be Hinie- 

r Ihan the mere fivlltif; of a llnf or an^lc is Iliai between two 

re ran potvnlldllr make any niimlxT of Ilni** and angiea. or tlnd, 
ta ankiNir imrrnaca. vnillculj' niimerou* rrbilinno- The sense of tliii Inricfl- 
■h* palfllaHty cieavn to out wordi when we speak In a gcnonil may of 

of placv.' and mialtwd* u> iiilo auppiMini; thai tint cren any 
oa* of itaarm can b» eiliauallTsly oiinaMl by a itogle angli 

* TOi otlaa happcna wbm tbc warm and raid points, or ibc round and 
k are appllnl li> Ibe akin wilhin the limtta of a aingli ~ 


eontnifited in qualttr. fi our two txaktd poimte avaken 
identieml qualifies of mmamtkm^ tit&w Huist^ pofixce, a j^Kir 
to the mind is one : and, not fJTfltinprifihfwl mt all, ther are, 
^/ortierK not Lo«!aIiaed apart. Spots &>ar outiiiietm dis- 
tant on tke back ha^e no qualitative contrast at all, and fuse 
into a sngie ^nsafiiHi. Points leas Aan diree thoosandths 
of a TniTlimetPe apart awakui on die retina sensations so 
contrasted diat we appreiiend diem immediatelj as twa 
^w diese nnlxkenesses wkicli arise so sJowIj when we pass 
from one point to anodier in the back, so mnch &ster on 
the tongne and finger-tips^ bat with snch inconceirable 
rapidrtv on the retcELK what are thej? Can we discover 
anjdiing abont their intrxnisc natore? 

The most natural and lEnmediate anawerto make is thai 
they are nnlikeness of place pnre and ample. In the words 
of a German phT^ologist^*^ to whom psrchophTsics owes 

^h: " 

*' Tbe aeD;3arioiisare Crom. the ocxtaec (mm mrmktnim) kxaiiied. . . . 
Et»t isenss&rioa as socii is from the Terj begiimiii^ affected with the 
spatial qoalitj. 50 chat this qoalitr is nochinf like an external attribote 
comiiur to the aeosanon from a hicher fMohj. but mast be regarded as 
something uiuiuizieiitly nstsuiixuc in the aenaatioa itself.** 

And jet the moment we redect on this ^iswer an insu- 
perable logical diffiooltr seems to present itselL No single 
fMole of sensation can. bj itself, amoont to a consciousness 
of poisitiom^ Suppose no feeling but that of a single point 
ever to be awakened. Could that possibly be the feeling 
of any special trAcrmc^ or tierrmes^ ^ Certainly not. Only 
urktn o MiPTomd point is felt to arise cam the Mrwt ome acquire 
n deierminntion cf «p. dtyum^ rigkt or lefty and these deiermina-- 
tiortJi ore nil rtlatic^ to that p^coml point. Each point, so far as 
it is placed, is then only by virtue of what it is not^ namely, 
by virtue of another point. This is as much as to say thai 
p^-^^sition has nothing intrinsic about it ; and that, although a 
feeling of absolute bigness may, a feeling cf place cannot^ 
pftssMy form on immanent element in any single isolated sensa^ 
lion. The very writer we have quoted has given heed to 
this objection, for he continues vp. 335 1 by saying that the 

* Vierordt, Gnindriss der Physiologie, 5te Auflage (1877), pp. 8M, 496. 



wmlioDB thoH oripnalH- localized "are only bo tn them' 
h'm, but not in the ropreseutatiuu of cuoitciousness, which 
R Dot yet preaeiit . . . ThPT are, iu the tirut instaoce, ds- 
nidof all natiuU relntioDs with each other." But such a 
hiiiliHiin tif tht! wtDsstioD 'in itself ' wonUI seem to meaii 
aodini; more thau the tiuHceptibilit}' or potrnluiitly of being 
iGriincUy kx.-aliz^'it wheu the time oanie and other conilitiotii^ 
bKWM folfillud. Cau we uuw discover aujthiug about such 
M W Mp tibility in itnelf before it ha» borue its ulterior fruits 
h llw developed coasciouHness ? 

'Lnatl SiffHs.' 

Til begin with, everr seoHation of the skin and every vis- 

Rnl tteutuitioD neemii Ui derive fmoi its tojKigraphic tteat 

I pKuliar nhade o[ feeling, which it would not have iu 

ux'llirr place. Anil this feeling per «c seems quite another 

tiinji troni the iwrceptioa of the place. Says Wiindt * : 

U«Uh lh« naK«r we tuuch Qret the ohc«k am) tbon tlit^ palm, 

Unir pn-viiwl}' the uimi- )>r<iafiurD, the seniuitiiin shows twit- 

WdHutdin|[idutincll; markixi dlffprencoln (he I wo cases. Similarly, 

«« wKnpafv thv palm with the bnuk of the hand, (hr nape i>r Ui» 

wt «ith Us antcTinr snrfaox, tho bmiwl with the back ; in sliori. any 

njdMaat paruuf ilu> itkiu wilheucbvther. Aud moreover, ma Muilf 

^Btffc, by ailKaitint)- utMvrving, that spota even tolembly elose 

NpAwdUbtr in nvpoot o( Ihe quality of their tceliag. IT we poos 

(na 4NM point of tmr cutaneous surfaiw Ui aniither, we Hnd n perrectly 

mdaal aud miBtlnaotiB nlirraiion in onr feoliiig. notwithstanding th» 

<AjcGtlf« natutv of the eoniaet ban n'inained the aanie. Eieu the um- 

■Uona nt oom>[nttdinK p<>intM oti npiMMite side* of the bod;, thougb 

•Mtar.antiiMidMiUt^. If. (or Inalanee, we touch first the bu'k ofoiia 

kaad and then of the olhtir, we irmark n quolltnlivn iiiilikmii«» vf 

•naatkHi. It must not he thought that Huch diflerencos are mere mat- 

lam of hBafittatlon, aud that we faki- thi- Mi-iiiMtluiis to Ur dlfTtrent 

knasM «■ R-pmw«l mtoii of them looiirM-lvi-s ns nceupyiiiK a itiffnrent 

fiM«. VHb wiRMent ■hurtwniug of t)ie allention, we may. eouAnlng 

•anriVM te lb* quality of ihe ferlinK" alnne, pntirely alntmet frtioi 

Iter kMftUiy, and yd nutiw Itu* dilTereiieM i|ulle an markedly." 

f r 

•VariMoagen QIl Mm»eh.-n u. Tliier«ee1e rLeiptlic.lMSK i '■■14 8«o 
•Ik> IjhM^ PhynMoflcal Psychology, pp. SVS-V. and company lb* account 
by 0. SlaaWy IlaJI <Hliid. i. ATI) of Ibr ncnaillon* producoii liy niuriuc 
kklHH potel lifbtlyoTBT Ibc aUn. FutaU of eultfng pain. i|MlvcHnf. 
[, wUrilag, ttokUng, icralcblng. and aiOcclerailoD. aluroatcd wfib 


Whether these local contrasts shade into each other 
with absolutely continnons gradations, we cannot saj. But 
we km>w (^continues Wnudt) that 

'' they cluiu^. ^%'ben we pass from one point of the skin to its neigh- 
bor, with very different degrees of rapidity. On delicately-feeling 
(Hirtts ustHl principally for toaching. snob as the finger-tips, the dif- 
fereuitt of sens^atiou between two closely approximate points is already 
HtrouK^y pronounced : whilst in parts of lesser delicacy, as the arm, the 
biick» tht> legs> the disparities of sensation are observable only between 

'Ihe internal organs^ too, have their specific qualia of sen- 
Mation. An indammation of the kidney is difiierent from 
i>U0 ot the liver ; pains in joints and mnscnlar insertions 
ai*^ diHtiuguissJieii Pain in the dental nerves is whollj 
uuliko the (udu of a bom. But very important and curious 
aiiuilai'ities prevail throughout these differences. Internal 
|HUUs« ^%1kh!^ s^t^at we cannot see, and have no means of 
kuv^\^ iug uule«iis!^ the character of the pain itself reveal it, 
ai'u foil uvWfv they belong. Diseases of the stomach, 
kiiluo\ » liver^ rectum, prostate, etc,, of the bones, of the 
biaitu aiul ils membranes^ are referred to their proper posi- 
ti\uu Norv^wj^^us des>cribe the length of the nerve. Such 
KK'alittaUvuisi an ihvxfie of vertical, frontal, or occipital head- 
aoho <4 iulracranial origin force us to conclude that parts 
^hu ti ikiv uoighK>r^ whether inner or outer, may possess 
U\ luoiv \ u (iu> v^f thai fact a common peculiarity of feeling, 
tk iv'n^vcl ui N^hich their sensations agree, and which serves 
IV* ik U'kiui v^f thoiv prv^ximity. These local colorings are, 
iu\Mov»\oi« H\v hIivu^ thai we cognize them as the same, 
Uux'Uf^tu'Ut .^U oouliasis of sensible quality in the accom- 
^Niiunv^ (vuvptioiu OoKl and heat are wide as the poles 
^.'iuiuUm , \ot it iMth fall on the cheek, there mixes with 
tUout .vMuv'iUiu^ (hc4l makes ihem in fAa/ rrspnf identical ; 
iu li V s V v'ut»»M iNv tst\ vlesjxite the identity of cold with itself 
vs lii ix \t I t\^v4UsU \^hou >^e get it fir^t on the palm and then 
*«u lU.* I Uv^^K* ^v^uo vUfier^^uvv vx>mes* which keeps the two 

^ \ V I . ' , . ^ ; 1 4 ■ oj o ■ \ ^1 :4iui ^vIk> >iN^\>^k*** vV€si:»k>os of these facts we know 
k \ ^'«i \ii\. «'>^i Ui^^v -.tuV iKwi CKH h<^ Nf di9CQ»ML Two principftl 
»a'l" '» '*^xv Nn'^ 'u\v»Jk\\t i\k tV ofcw *>f the rHiaa. Wiiiidt(Men- 



DOW let as reTert to tho (jn^ry propotinded a 

Hot «n«» : CVwi /A'we rfi/f>rpTMww nf mere g unlity in f'etding, 

^wy'wf airvrdiw; to locality yet iuiving ench Hfneibly nwi in- 

tr^Mmfltf anrl by itarif nothtntf to do tritk position, constitute 

•ir 'rvterplibtiitiea ' we mentioned, the conditions of being per' 

nnti in /tnmtion, nf thr loctiUtiefi to tfhich they Mojitf? The 

Miolmn* nil a row of hoQseH, the initial letters of a set of 

^■rA*. hnv<t no intrinsic kiiisUii* with points nf space, and 

■ '.].■■}- ur« the conditions of our knowledpe of where any 

,-■ 1- m the row, or any word in the dictionary. Can the 

j.:ii-iti..iis of fettling in question bo taj^s or labels of this 

imii nhich in no wiite originally reveal tliu poaition of the 

Ki«>t to which they are attached, but gnide its to it by what 

Berkeley wonhl call a ' cnntomary tie ' ? Many nnthors hare 

uili««itatin({Iy n-plied in the affirmative ; Lotze, who in his 

Uedizinttiche pHycliologie* first described the sensations in 

this way. dpsi^^uating them, thns conceived, as local-signs. 

TVi* term baa obtained wide currency in Germany, and in 

tpnilnnif 1^ the ' uval-hion thfjik v' herenfter, I shfiU nhcnys ^j 

■f*m the theory tchtch denies thut /here cnn lie in a sensation any 

^■•inent t^ndual localily, of inherent tpatial order, any tone as 


1. 314)c«IIMftitPDtioi] loibocIiAtigMofcoliii-itriuibUily 

' II b tbr rrtln* ill>>|iUjl «» Uic linitgc of Ihc rolored obJiM:! pnsitca from tlia 

-« to tbr [trripbcr;. The mlor niters and iK'i'oinH dwkM-, uid the 

in^ l» tDurr ni|>lil In rentklti dInictlnDii lluin In olbrr». This alUrailon 

.-»*«T»1. howfTpr, U one of wblch, atturh. wo art wholly ■incouM'iowi. 

W-' iLr >ky u bright blue all over, the mudilluiiloDB uf the blur scnsik- 

iitcriiTcicd by us, mil w UUTtreuccH In llie objectlre ivlor, but 

• In iu Irtcality Uue (MeillzluUrhc P«.T('ho1«g1<>. 833. 8SS). oo 

ml. hu pointed oiil the prcullar trndcory which «»ch parilcii- 

r I iirrvliiia ba* to rail torlh thai ronvemcnl of thi- eyeball which 

w.V. mrTT lb« Image of Ibc exciting object from the pviot In question to 

Ikc/bMM. WiUi «Kh Hpitnilc tendency to inuvemenl laa wlib ench actual 

■<i|iwi«Mtl we tnay nippow n (K'CnlUr modtHcalion of wnidblllly to b« 

«SM>0kMd. Till* iDodlflmilon would conxtltule the peciitiiu- local tlncFing 

•f lb* tmafi- bycarhpoini. flee alao 8iilly> PnyrholoKy. pp. 118-121. 

hof B. Brdman baa quite lately (ViertelJalimcbHrt f. win. Plili. x. 

IH'V>deiitMl Ibe exiatrnf.'e of all erldence for oiieb immanent qtialia of 

ln4tBf cfaanclerizlnx mch Ineallty, Acute as his rematttii arp. tliey <|iiile 

hU to rmiTlnM' me. On the akin llip ^atui nn evident 1 tlimijd My 

Thpt*. M on ibe nctioft, they arc leu *o tKrIea uid Auerhacb), thla may 

*»ll be ■ tDcre dU&cuhy uf (UacrimliMtiun Dot yel educated to ttw 

* im, p an. 


it were which cries to us immediately and without further 
Ado, ' I am Aere,' or * I am there,' 

If, as may well be the case, we by this time find our- 
selves tempted to accept the Local-sign theory in a general 
way, we have to clear up several farther matters. If a sign 
is to lead us to the thing it means, we must have some other 
source of knowledge of that thing. Either the thing has 
been given in a previous experience of which the sign also 
formed part — they are associated ; or it is what Beid calls a 
< natural ' sign, that is, a feeling which, the first time it 
enters the mind, evokes from the native powers thereof a 
cognition of the thing that hitherto had lain dormant In 
both cases, however, the sign is one thing, and the thing 
another. In the instance that now concerns us, the sign is 
■a quality offeding and the thing is a position. Now we have 
seen that the position of a point is not only revealed, but 
created, by the existence of other points to which it stands 
in determinate relations. If the sign can by any machinery 
which it sets in motion evoke a consciousness either of the other 
points, or of the rdaiionSy or of both^ it vxytdd seem tofnlfl Us 
function, and reveal to us the position we seek. 

But such a machinery is already familiar to us. It is 
neither more nor less than the law of habit in the nervous 
system. When any point of the sensitive surf^»ce has been 
frequently excited simultaneously with, or immediately 
before or after, other points, and afterwards comes to be 
excited alone, there will be a tendency for its perceptive 
nerve-centre to irradiate into the nerve-centres of the other 
points. Subjectively considered, this is the same as if we 
said that the peculiar feding of the first point suggests the 
feeling of the entire region with whose stimulation its ovm ex- 
citement has been hxibitually associated. 

Take the case of the stomach. When the epigastrium 
is heavily pressed, when certain muscles contract, etc., the 
stomach is squeezed, and its peculiar local sign awakes in 
consciousness simultaneously with the local signs of the 
other squeezed parts. There is also a sensation of total 
vastness aroused by the combined irritation, and somewhere 
in this the stomach-feeling seems to lie. Suppose that 
later a pain arises in the stomach from some non-mechani- 


It will l>t> tio^eil by tlie gitstric Inoal si^, aud 
t urTi>-ceutri> )i>u]jportiiig tins latl^-r feeling will excite 
t Mlpportiug tbe (Icnaal and miiHcuUr fet>liu(0 
■MsUtetl witli it wl]«u liie fxciteineiit wan 
Vkom the eomliinatioD the same peculiar 
I irfti igain ariKe. lu a wonl, ' Hnmettiiug' iu tUe 
«biiiM)i-tM>i)ftaUi>n ' rf^miuds' us of a ti>tal siiace, nf wliicb 
\br diaphragmatic aiid epigastric nensatinos alao fonu a 
[Art, or, to exprcHs it more briefly still, saggeata the Qcigh- 
Uifbood of thV'M5 lattt^r organs.* 

Bevert to the caao of two excitvd points on a surface with 
utumHt^Hl Hpace between them. The general reault of 
jjMinnn C'upfricMco has bw^u that when either point wan 
iapmseal bv an ontward object, the same object also 
iMrbed the in[in]<>diatelr neiglilxtring parts. Each point, 
kfrtber wiUt \u Un-nl sign, i» thn» Hswiciated with a circle 
tj nrronnding jtoiuts, the associHtioii fading iu strength as 
tk* circle growa larger. Each will re\-ive its own circle ; 
*il when Vtth are escit*"*! togetlier, the strongeitt renval 
«lll he tlint duo to th« citnibirmi irrndiatinij. Now the tract 
juinitiij tht Itro ncritfd points lA the only part coniniou to the 
liu circles. And the feelings of thi» whole traiTt will there- 
ti-n awaken with counderable vividness in the imagination 
vlwn it>4 extremities are touched by an outward irritant. 
Tlip tiiiml reM-ives with the impresaion of the two distinct 
pn«nt> the vague itlea of a line. The twouesH of the points 
tome^ from the contrast of their local signs : the line comes 
!n>ui thf aHMK-iatioDa into which experience baa wrought 
ifarw lattfr. If iKi i<leal line ariaes we have duality witb- 
<ffit ««niw of interval ; if the line be excited a<^tuallv rather 

* Xajbr lb« liicallxallnn <rf inincmibil pain U lUelf duo lo niich uw- 
iktlBB an Ub nl Um] tigut wlih rarh olher. rstber Ihan to their qiiallu- 
tttv riMllwIty Id orlgliboring part' (•uprn. p. 19); thmigh tt b cunci-iTDbtc 
m*iim kiiil Hlinllaril}' Itwlf ibuuliJ bora b>vc oue hhiI tb« Mme 
It wp mil'liUM- lli« tPiiMjry nrrvm From llino- pAns of ibr 
h aa; (lalrh nf nkln In irrmlnnlp In th« unmc nennnrfal hraln- 
« fnim (br t-kia iiu-1f. am! If ibi? rxHu-mcot nf any one Obn 
■t throu^ Ihe wb<ilp uf Hut tract, the fM-ltngndf all Abtvt 
!^ woiiM pnwimahly Imtb barr a *lmlliir InlrinKlr i|U*lllj. 
bae toad Mrb ta arnniip Ihr olbrr. Hinm tlie wunr nprvn- 
M* Mit>t>liea tkr akiii and ibe parti beneMb, tlie anatuttiloal 
1* BMhldg inipiubablu. 

160 P8YCH0L0QT. 

than ideally, we have the interval given with its ends, in 
the form of a single extended object felt E. H. Weber, in 
the famous article in which he laid the foundations of all 
our accurate knowledge of these subjects, laid it down as 
the logical requisite for the perception of ttoo separated points^ 
that the mind should, along tvith its consciousness of them, be- 
come axvare of an unexcited interval as such, I have only tried 
to show how the known laivs of experience may cause this requi- 
site to he fulfilled. Of course, if the local signs of the entire 
region oflFer but little qualitative contrast inter se, the line 
suggested will be but dimly defined or discriminated in 
length or direction from other possible lines in its neighbor- 
hood. This is what happens in the back, where conscious- 
ness can sunder two spots, whilst only vaguely apprehend- 
ing their distance and direction apart 

The relation of position 6f the two points is the sug- 
gested interval or line. Turn now to the simplest case, 
that of a single excited spot. How can it suggest its position ? 
Not by recalling any particular line unless experience have 
constantly been in the habit of marking or tracing some one 
line from it towards some one neighboring point Now 
on the back, belly, viscera, etc., no such tracing habitually 
occurs. The consequence is that the only suggestion is 
that of the whole neighboring circle ; i.e., the spot simply 
recalls the general region in which it happens to lie. By a pro- 
cess of successive construction, it is quite true that we can 
also get the feeling of distance between the spot and some 
other particular spot. Attention, by reinforcing the local 
sign of one part of the circle, can awaken a new circle 
round this part, and so de proche en proche we may slide our 
feeling down from our cheek, say, to our foot But when 
we first touched our cheek we had no consciousness of the 
foot at all.* In the extremities, the lips, the tongue and 
other mobile parts, the case is different We there have 
an instinctive tendency, when a part of lesser discriminative 

* Unless, indeed, the foot happen to be spontaneously tingling or some- 
thing of the sort at the moment. The whole surface of the body is always 
in a state of semi* conscious Irritation which needs only the emphasis of 
attention, or of some accidental inward irritation, to become strong at any 

rus PEUvsrnos of space. 


~ :.<ilulity U tiiUL-lied, to movft thn member bo that tlie 
Peking object glides nluug it to tbe \ihw*> wbere sensi- 
liiT u gronteat li ft ImkI)- toui-hua D«r haud we move the 
iwi oT«r it till th« fiiiger-tijiH are able to explore iL If 
I" Milo iif our foot t^^iu-lies auythiiiK "'^ l>riii^ it towards 
I- toHB, and so forth. There thus arise Hues of habitual 
•■•"a^ from all ]K>iDtM of a meml>er t^) itH sensitive tip. 
v.* are the lint's nitwt readily recalled when aur point 
.■ ti-nched, aud tlieir recall is identical with the coQBcioUH- 
m^ iif Uie iliiitauce of the touched poiut from the ' tip.' I 
ikink uirono miiHt be aware wheu he touches a poiut of 
hi* hand or wrial that it Ui the relation to the finger-tips of 
■iiich be IB uBuallv most coQBciotia PointB im the fore- 
«ra sattg^t <<ith«r tin- finger-tips or the ellxiw (the latter 
hcJMg a )ipot of greater senaibility*). In the foot it is the 
Vm, sad hO on. A point oan onlj l>e cogniEed in its rela- 
tMu to lb« <intin> IkmIv at once by awakening a viatud 
'\stfjt u( the wbote b<Kly. Such awakening is even more 
l-TiniuJy tliau the previouBly considered casea a matter of 
.TV MHociatiou. 

Tkia leada ualo the eye. On the retina the fovea and the 
.low Kpdt ahiint it form a focns of exquisite sensibility, 

- lAnb which nrurr impresBion falling on an outlj'ing por- 
.. (if the field ift moved by an instinctive action of the 
-.^Irj. of tho wyeball. Few jwrsons, until their attention 

- ti\v*\ (') the fact, are aware how almost imi>088ible it is 
if*p a coQspicuoas visible object in the margin of the 

■ !ii of view . The moment volitic)n is relaxed we find that 
liiout oar knowing it oar eyes have turned so as to bring 
'.-■ tkf i-t-ntre. This ja why most persona are nuable to 

■ jr ihe eyes steailily converged upon a {toint in space with 
liiinic in it The objects agaiust the walls of the room 

'llltinwilut Ibe iBtlile of ili« tora arm, though lu illDcrimliiaiivo 
Mrtfiiif la .(fun \<em ihan ibai of Ibe ouUMr. u«u»lly rUc* vctj- |in>aif- 
■wllp lato ratndmuooa when ibc LUIer is loucbHl. lU mllutir Konf- 
Ulirtoraatoci bapMtd ili«l don. We fii)i>r Biruking it frum tbe«a- 
H«r M ifaa flnor lurfacc aniuuil ike uiuar aide uiurc iLaa ta lb* ro*«n« 
Aaska. Proeatlot moTrnwuu give itoe U> i-tiiitaciA Id ibU order, and 
•■■ fwqilfllj Indulcnl tu wbcn lli« back o( Ibc foTC-arm fnls an ot>JMt 

162 P8TCH0L0QT, 

invincibly attract the fovese to themselves. If we contem* 
plate a blank wall or sheet of paper, we always observe in 
a moment that we are directly looking at some speck npon it 
which, unnoticed at first, ended by 'catching our eye.' Thus 
whenever an image falling on the point P of the retina excites 
attention^ it more habitually moves from that point towards the 
fovea than in any one other direction. The line traced thus by 
the image is not always a straight line. When the direction 
of the point from the fovea is neither vertical nor horizon- 
tal but oblique, the line traced is often a curve, with its con- 
cavity directed upwards if the direction is upwards, down- 
wards if the direction is downwards. This may be verified 
by anyone who will take the trouble to make a simple ex- 
periment with a luminous body like a candle-flame in a dark 
enclosure, or a star. Gazing first at some point remote 
from the source of light, let the eye be suddenly turned full 
upon the latter. The luminous image will necessarily fall 
in succession upon a continuous series of points, reaching 
from the one first affected to the fovea. But by virtue of 
the slowness with which retinal excitements die away, the 
entire series of points will for an instant be \isible as an 
after-image, displapng the above peculiarity of form ac- 
cording to its situation.^ These radiating lines are neither 
regular nor invariable in the same person, nor, probably, 
equally curved in different individuals. We are incessant- 
ly drawing them between the fovea and every point of the 
field of view. Objects remain in their peripheral indistinct- 
ness only so long as they are unnoticed. The moment we 
attend to them they grow distinct through one of these mo- 
tions — which leads to the idea prevalent among uninstructed 
persons that we see distinctly all parts of the field of view 
at once. TTie result of this incessant tracing of radii is that 
whenever a local sign P is awakened by a spot of light falling 
upon it, it recalls forthivith, even though the eyeball be unmoved, 
the local signs of all the other points lohich lie bettceen P and 
the fovea. It recalls them in imaginary form, just as the 
normal reflex movement would recall them in vivid form ; 
and with their recall is given a consciousness more or less 

* These facts were tirst noticed by Wiuidt: see his Beitrdge, p. 140, dOfl. 
See also Lamansky, PflQger's Archiv, xi. 418. 


Unl of th» whole litio ou whioh they lie. lu other words, 
a^ ny of Ii{;ht can fall ou uny retinnl sput without the lo- 
cal iigii of that Hpot revealing to us, by reailliiif^ the line 
nt i)a nHxtt hahitual atutoriat«s, its direction and distance 
fnin the centre of the tield. The fovea atrts tiiuB as tli« 
«()pB rrf a KTst^tn of polar co-ordinates, in relatioD to which 
ruk uid »very retinal point has through an inceaaantlv-re- 
fMtod process of a)i»ociatiou it» ili»tance and direction de- 
tmnined. AVere /' alone illumined and all the rest of tlie 
i^Mdark we HhonM hHII, even with motionlese eyes, know 
tlwther /* lay high or low, right or left, through the ideal 
different from nil other streaks, which P alone 
9 INiwer of awakemng.* 

>■ liven t<1*ln "ailing, bill our courae begins ui be m lorlu- 
irnO iDli> nilnulcT <lDtBiI tbnt I wtll Irvnl of the more pre- 
HJoo of IhfkIIi; In s long nol«. WLcu PrerallB un ideal Hue 
■ fmrra (hv line b fell in III entirely and but Titgnely -. wliilsi 
«*a|ipa*cil In bra xlngloniarof KrtiiiU light, OnmUout iii strong 
Tba gmund vt the ilisllnctlun between P and tbe 
^M Ham wUdi II l«rmiDai» in manifotl— i' being vivid wbilF Ike line !■ 
lUH: Vm akf AtrnU P held Iht piirUcvlar poriUon U doa, at titt end t^ Vie 
>'•< nMUr UUm unywAfffw fUt—fir saiftpU, in it$ middttf Tbal umm» 
•«dMBf M>l klall inanlteal. 
Tackar ny out UmnghU about IbU lallrr inystery. let ua lake thn ruw 
' ta MSoal Uor nf llgbl, none of wh<Mc put* jii Ideal. Tho feeling; of 
'f 3tm h pKiduml. on we know, whm « multitude of rotliial paints are 
'i-Md Uigmirr, racli uf wbkli irArn isreiled teparalely vuuld give rUe to 
-^ id Ikn (w-tlti^ i-alla] toc^al ilgiiH. Eac-h of thi-se algni Is Ifae fMlIng of 
1 MaB «t«ev. Kmiii thrlr sltniillaniuus arousal we nii^bl well tuppow a 
fitMBf "f laf*^ *pac« I» rrkull. Bui wby in ll iiecAaiary ttiat in Ihli 
Wpf i^aehniMiMB Ibu ilgii a *bouId appear always al one end of Ibc line, 
• Klteolber. and m in Utemiddli-! For tbmigh tbe line boa uiilUr>* 
■Mak at li^bt. It« Mirerai rotutliuent polnta can nerertbelua brtak out 
(mm Ii. mmI became alive, «acta for ilaclf, uDder ibe bvlecllve eye of atun* 

Tbc uiMTltkal reader, giving Ills ilral •-arcli-s* ):lanmtiUip«ib]rct. will 
mf Ita ibrtv ia an myrirry In liiii, and tlial - of roiinw ' local slgnii mil*! 
i«f«r •loapAde of earb Mher. eacb In tu own place:— there 1* no otb«r 
«•; pOMlblc Dul tbe more plilluiiopbie Mudenl, wbuse biiilnnw It Is lo 
^■vm dUHmliln i|iilte u iiiui-li as lo got ri<l of tlieni. will reflect ibal ll 
Is saacvlrahl' thai tbe pantal factors mlBhl fiiw Into b iargtrr space, and 
JH Ml larb lie locatnl vllbln It any more than a voice is loealtd In a 
ttena. n> will wood«r bow. sf ler i-nmblning Into tbe line, the ]>olot* 
«M \meamu wvmUy allre agalo : the arparale pufla of ■ ' dreae ' no louger 
•ftolha aar aflcr Ihajr iter* taatA Into a c«rulD pitch of souDd. Ho will 
mal %hm taat lk« whm. ■liar looklac at tblng* with oae aye ckwed. «• 

164 P8TCH0L0GT. 

^^J And with this we can close the first great division of 
oar subject We have shown that, within the range of 

double, by openiDg the other eye, the number of retinal points affected, 
the new retinal sensations do not as a rule appear alongnde of the 
old ones and additional to them, but merely make the old ones seem 
larger and nearer. Why should the affection of new points on the mdm 
retina have so different a result ? In fact, he will see no sort of logical 
connection between (1) the original separate local signs, (2) the line as a 
unit, (3) the line with the points discriminated in it, and (4) the Yarious> 
nerye-processes which subserve all these different things. He will suspect 
our local sign of being a very slippery and ambiguous sort of creature. 
Podtionless at first, it no sooner appears in the midst of a gang of compan- 
ions than it is found maintaining the strictest position of its own, and as- 
signing place to each of its associates. How is this possible ? Must we 
accept what we rejected a while ago as absurd, and admit the points each 
to have position in $et Or must we suspect that our whole construction 
has been fallacious, and that we have tried to conjure up, out of association, 
qualities which the associates never contained? 

There is no doubt a real difiSculty here; and the shortest way of dealing 
with it would be to confess it insoluble and ultimate. Even if position be 
not an intrinsic character of any one of those sensations we have called 
local signs, we must still admit that there is mmiething about every one of 
them that stands for the potentiality of position, and is the ground why the 
local sign , when it gets placed at all, gets placed here rather than there. If thia 
* something ' be interpreted as a physiological something, as a mere nerve- 
process, it is easy to say in a blank way that when it is excited alone, it is- 
an * ultimate fact ' (1) that a positionless spot will appear; that when it is 
excited together with other similar processes, but wiihout [the process of 
discriminative attention, it is another 'ultimate fact ' (2) that a unitary line 
will come; and that the final ' ultimate fact ' (8) is that, when the nerve- 
process is excited in combination with that other process which subserves- 
the feeling of attention, what results will be the line with the local sign 
inside of it determined to a particular place. Thus we should escape the 
responsibility of explaining, by falling back on the everlasting inscruta- 
bility of the psycho-neural nexus. The moment we call the ground of lo- 
calization physiological, we need only point out how, in those cases in 
which localization occurs, the physiological process difera from those in 
which it does not, to have done all we can possibly do in the matter. This 
would be unexceptionable logic, and with it we might let the matter drop, 
satisfied that there was do self-contradiction in it, but only the universal 
psychological puzzle of how a new mode of consciousness emerges when- 
ever a fundamentally new mode of nervous action occurs. 

But, blameless as such tactics would logically be on our part, let us see 
whether we cannot push our theoretic insight a little farther. It seems to 
me we can. We cannot, it is true, give a reason why the line we feel when 
process (2) awakens should have its own peculiar shape; nor can we explain 
the essence of the process of discriminative attention. But we can see 
why, if the brute facts be admitted that a line may have one of its parts 
singled out by attention at all, and that that part may appear in relation to 


*TM7 Beose, experience takes tti initio the spatial form. We 
lure also sliowu that in the cases of the retina aod skin 

viti pmU »X all, Ibe rclktIoD must be I'n 1A« ^^m iIm^/, — for Ibr line rud 
tWtwUate tbc Da tj things BUpponed U> be in coDSciousDeEa. And we can 
fimWnniire wggwl a rauuo why pnitg sppeariu^ thus ill relulbn lo ekcii 
• Hat alitiulil fall Into an immultible onlt^r, ftud «ach wjlhin ibal 
* krF|) iu chanx-ierlitic place. 

" k kil of Mii-li loorU signs all liHVe any tjuality wlitcb evenly augments 
[jtiw p— IniM uni' IU llic other, ne can arrange Uiem tn nn ideal serlul 
jj^lkwhldi any uii« lociU aifm must lie below ihooe with mure, above 
I, of lh« iiualily in ({ueHtiiin. It inu)>t ilivicle (lie series into 
IdIom tndced It have a maximum or mlnliiiiim of Ibe (quality, 
r begina or emls it. 
1 M Uc*l acrleiof locul signH in Ibe miuil is. however, not yvl iden- 
■inlvllh ihe feelin); of a Hue In Bpace. Touch a dozen |>oinls on Ibe eltin 
maoriMy, aiid there «ctrm* no neeeuenry ressoD why the uolioD of a ileti- 
tXt lint aboulil i-mrrge, even tliough we be strongly awure of a gradation 
a' qoalilj unutig tho touches. We nuiy of eoumi: Nyniiiollratly arrange 
Um Ib a line lu our Ihuught. but we can always distinguish between a 
Uv ifabollcklly thought and a line directly felt. 

8>U Bolv now the ixruliarily of the nerve -piwessea of all (hew local 
i^u; tbnugh they may give no line when excited siicressively, when cx- 
(iiid tigtthrr Ibry ilu give the actual sensation of a liuo in space. The 
nat nf them !■ the neurftl process of that line; the sum of their feelings 
)• iW lecllDf of that line: and if we beg:iD to single out parlicular t<oinls 
!na tb* lltte. and notice them by their rank, it is impossible to see bow 
n»nuik caa appmr except M an actual tlied space-position sensibly felt 
■••blii>f the total line. Tbe scale iiaelf appearing as a line, riiak in It 
■Ml appotr a* a dplinite pan of the line. If the seven notes of an octave, 
•bcB haard together, appeared lu the sense of hearing us an outspread 
Hmn^ suUMil— wblcb it Is neediest lo say they do not— why then no one 
Mfeoold b«dlarrltnlnal(>d wlilioul being localized, according to its plich. 
•> tbe lis*. oUher aa one of Its extremities nr as some part between. 

Bui not alooc ibc gradation of iheir iiuallty arranges ilic local-sign 
'•*!^Cs (a a scalf. Our nwnnnoUt arraujce them also In a IiW-scale. 
Wbaaam a nlmuliu passe* from |x>int a of the skin or retina to point/, 
li nnbOM til* local-algn feelings In the perfn'tly deBnlte lime-ordcr abfdef. 
kOBMil ndU/uniil nb have tiecn successively aroused. Tbefcclingc 
MMrtlBM b preccdnl by ah. siimetiineit followed by ba. according to the 
■oMnant's dlnctlon: the result of It all beitig tlint wc never feel ollber a, 
«.•«/, willMWl there clinging to il faint revertwratlon* of the various ttnie- 
w4m «f traoBliiuD In whieb. IhrouglKiut post ua|>erlenc«. It has bc«a 
irmiiil To the local algn '■ there clings thellnge or lone, the penumbra 
•rfilafC, of t^ tran*ltlon hnl To/, tor there cling iiiille dllTiTcnt tones. 
OmvwIibIi tbr principle (hat u f<>rllngmay be tiiified by Ibe repnidiirtive 
■—■.hitwu I IS of an hahiiual imnslllan. even when the transition Is not 
■ada.asd It Mvnis entirely natural to admit that, If tie transition lie habit- 
■sl^ fai Use order nbalrf, and If <i, f. and/ bo felt H'pnraiely nt all. <i will 
kMt with an •«*rnlUl«<iWtn«i, /with an essential hilKun.naAWtmt will 

I'M PSYrm}L09r T 


■ I. ••«{•• I J I 

•« ' •• 

at&^ntioiL inti^ -^fHimble psrtBw whu^k sre altio spAces^ and 

into n^iatinii» between die parts* dieiie b^zig :seiLfibIe spaces 
&Xi. Fiirtiieniii'ire. we ^eeiL ' m a &x>t-iioCe> thai differ- 
ent parta, once •iLacrizmnated. iiet:«HH}anIy &II mfeo a deter- 
minate order, both hj reason or •ie&iite ;£nkiat£ona in their 
qTxalizj. iknd bv reaii«:>n of die ±xi^i order t^f time-sacces- 
<kion in whieii mijvements aroa:ie them. Bat in all thi^ 
nothing hae be«Hi ^iaid of the ci/mparatrre meaawmmefd of 
one :4enart:>Le ^pat^e- total agaJTi?^ am^dier. or of the war 
in whieh^ bv '^rnnmrng oar tifrers ffiople sen^ble space* 
experiences ttjgether, we end bj '^omstroetin^ what we re- 
gard as^ the unitary, conttnaoo^* ami inixnite objeetiTe Space 
of the real world. To thb^ mi^re diffieolt inqairj we next 

The problem breaks into two sabordinate problems . 

1 1 • Hour U the tHidiei^on omd meag^rrmaU €f the wevertd 
mmJioriaf 9jin€^ aymptetd^ t^j^^ed? and 

'2 How do their nf(i»tal 'MMiti^m rnui fturion and reduction 
to the Jinm^ ^nh, in. a wo-nJ^ hjic d*je:» their ^yntkegit^ occHr? 

I think that^ as in the inTesdgation josl finished, we 
found onrselTes able t*3 get aloo^ withoat inToking anj data 
but tho!^ thukt pore sensibility on the one hand, and the 
ordinary intellectxial powers of diseruninadon and recoUee- 

f&ll between. Thas rhotie pKTchoIo^jist;^ *^ ho sec little store br locml signs^ 
and grest store bj moTements :n expI:iiniEix space-perception, would haTc 
a perfectlj dednite nme-«^rr!er. due to motioo. br whidi to accouot for 
'.b<ir definite order of pi3$:tioc« rbit appears when sensitiTe spots are excited 
all at once. Withou% however, the preltniin&rT admisaioo of the *alti- 
DiAte fact ' that this coUec'.ive e\<.-:*t^men: <hal: feel like a time and notbiDg- 
else, it can never b^ expl-tineii «hv 'Lhe new order should needs be an 
order of pointion*. and n«>c i>f merely idetil «erial rank. We shall hereafter 
have any amount of opp«>rtutiity :o obiserve bow thoroughgoing is the par- 
ticipation of motion in a!! our sp»r::il men^arements. WhAher the local 
signs have their respective qualities evenly irraduated or m»t. the feelings 
of transition must be set down a> amons the ren? enntm in localization. 
But the gradation of the local <!gns is hardly to be doubted: so we may be- 
lieve ourselve? really to posses* two ^ets of reasons for localizing any point 
we may bap[^<-n to distiugruish from out the midst of any line or any larger 


a <ui the other, wore able to yield ; so here we shall 
riK-rgp fmm onr more tfotu]>licHted quest with the convic- 
■.rin thnl &11 thv fHcts iMiii lie tu^vunnted for ou the supposi- 
Via thjit uii other luviits] forc(>s have Iraeu Ht work save 
ilui«- wf (iml everj-where else in psycholoj^T : seDsibility, 
uiini'U. ktr Ut4> (l&t» ; nnd discrimiuatioii, iisHociAtioa, 
ai-mort, uid choice for the rear run gem puts and <^oiDbi]ia- 
biiiu *hiob they andergo. 

1. TV iyn/fliviiiofi nf the Oriffitta] Sttts^-npocea, 
Hmr are spatial suhdi\'i9iou8 brought to (^ousciousness ? I 
- ulhur wordsi, How does spatial discriminatiou occur? 
Ij>' (wDPral itiibjo>ct of discrimitiatiou hau been treated in 
' in-noaH chapt«r. Here we ueed uuly intjuire what are 
' «>iiditi<inH that make spatial discrimiuRtion so much 
'--Tiu wighi tlinn in t4)ach, aud in touch than in hearing, f 
■1*11. or tiMt«<. 

rv _jSr»* grrat timdifion is, thtit differevt points o/" the 

■ •''Ur •A*i// differ in llie tjuality of fkeir iiiintanetit sensihiUiy, 

ii is that <f»ch ithall iMxry its special Iocttl-ni}^ii. If the 

iiu ff-lt eTorywhere i*xactly alike, a foot-bath could be dis- 

':ik'ni>ih(i>] fmut a total immemon, as lieing smaller, but 

>>-r dintinf^JHhed (roui a wet face. The loi-nl-sigus are 

h*)ieosslile : two points which have th^ Hatne local-sign 

li always be felt as the name point. We do not jud^^e 

"lu (wii anlxtiw we liavc discerned their Kensatious to be 

: -F-r^Dt* Grniit«d none but honiof^Hiieuus irritants, that 

'L'»n would then distingnish the greatest multiplicity of 

riUnt*— wouKl count moat stars or com pass -points, or 

r pani the siec of two wet surfaces — whose local 

waft the least even. A skin whotw sensibility 

Ljiiilly off from a focus, like the apei of a boil, 

'■■■tt(>r than a homogeneous iutegumeut for Kpati&l 

The retiuji, with its exquisitely sensitive fovea, 

I ■L-nliarit)-. and undoubtedly owes to it a great part 

: Hvviir nilln«i<i>bU|iii?. Eh-pl. IIWO. luwr a»1)My« we jiidge 

lIRrmii •* aooii iw Ihelr iieiiiuillitiii dlStr enough for unto 

a.rm uiiiia1lUilvrl;-dl<Iercm wlien wurmivply cxL'iUHl. Tlila 

'< ntk-iit trui:. Slcin-ieiMttluiu. diUvrept tmnuich I" W iKw-'riniln&ted 

- -o iiLiiBin. mair Mill fiwe IocbIIj If extluxl Uotli at oaev. 


of the mimitenef^ widi wliicli we are able co sabdiride the 
total b^nieHH of the lienaatioa it yielthk Oa it» periphery 
the local ilitferencea do not ^hade off very rapidly, and we 
can connt there fewer siibdiyi»ion& 

Bnt thesf Axirrf diffemiHxs of fifiing, m hyng as tit WHffmx 
is wntxcU^Hi frf)ni unkhtiNt, are oimtMft nnO. I eanot feel them 
by a pore mental act of attention anient^ they belong to qoite 
distinct parts of the b<xiy, as the nose and the Up, the finger- 
tip and the ear ; their contrast needs the reinforcement of 
outward excitement to be feltL In the spatial machness of 
a colic— or, to call it by the more spacioas-i94:>iinding rema- 
eidar, of a ' bellyache ' — one can with difficulty distinguish 
the north-east from the south-west comer, but can do so 
much more easily if, by pressing one^s finger against the 
former region, one is able to make the pain there more in- 

The local diffefmeeji require then «in ndventitioug jviim- 
iifm, mgperimimxd ttpm thtm^ to awaben the atteniwm. After 
the attention has once been awakened in this way, it may 
continue to be conscious of the unaided difference ; just as 
a sail on the horizon may be to*:> faint for us to notice until 
someone's linger, placed against the spot, has pointed it out 
to us, but may then remain visible after the finger has been 
withdrawn. But all this is true only on condition that 
separate points of the surface may be exdwtweiy stimulated. 
If the whole surface at once be excited from without, and 
homogeneously, as, for example, by immersing the body in 
salt water, hycaA ilisorimination is not furthered. The local- 
signs, it Ls true, all awaken at once ; but in such multitude 
that no one of them, i^-ith its specific quality, stands out in 
contrast with the resL If, however, a single extremity be 
immersed, the contrast between the wet and dry parts is 
strong, and, at the surface of the water especially, the local- 
signs attract the attention, gi^"ing the feeling of a ring sur- 
rounding the member. Similarly, two or three wet spots 
separateil bv dry s|>ots, or two or three hard points against 
the skin, will help to break up our ctiusciousness of the 
latter's bigness. In cases of this sort, where points re- 
ceiving an identical kind of excitement are, nevertheless, 
felt to \ye locally distinct, and the objective irritants are also 


Avnltiple, — e.g., comimss-poiuts oii f«kiu or starn on 
\ ordituiry explanation ih no doubt just, ami we 
t Uie oatwan) i-nuKCs bo be multiple betinuse we linve 
ilvrrDH] tho liical feeliii^^s of their seusatious to be dif- 

f'opnHtj/ far piirliti/ utitiiuintion it Ihus the second cotuii- 
ivn fitnjring liiiTrimmdion. A sensitive snrface which has to 
\yr fidted in nil Itu partn at once can yield notbiug but a 
f^nvfif aadividrd larifeDess. This appears to )>e the cane 
lilL tti<> olfactory, and toall iuleutuaud purposes with the 
^T'UInr^', surfaceji. Of many tawles and flavors, even sim- 
liluimusly presented, fai;h uffectn the totality of its re- 
»j*ctire orf^BO, each ap]>earB with the whole Tastuess given 
K that organ, and appears interpenetrated by the rest* 

'll tnaj, however, he m<<1 tliat cvrn In llit tongue there Is a detenuloi- 
Ihtiit Uticr Ikvors lo Uir bock and of ai^lilsiotlie front edge of the organ. 
l|laHk««iM! uttrci. its sidw and Trout, antl a lute like llial of alum 
UfaH haelr. hj^ It* ktyptli' cUfCt on the portion of mucoiiB membrane, 
■U ll iBUBedlBiel}^ louchtw. more »liBrply Ihan roasi pork, tor f xample, 
MUtfbnulUMall pvu alike, llieiiork. tlierefore. ia8te« more npacioiu 
ttMtlw alum or Ihc pepper. In the none, loo, certain smeilB, of which 
i«(fB nay ba lakt^n ai Ihe type, M'cni lc» upallally extended than heavy, 
•'ImuIdc odora. like miuk. Tlic naaun of Ibis nppcara lo b« lliat the 
''ram tahlUl LntpEralion by Iheir ahurpnem. whllBl the latter ar« drawn 
ku lb* luDf*. anil tbu* sicliv an obJeviiTely larger Riirface. The aserip- 
'■*n nf beffbl and depth lo certain note* st^m* due. not to any loialilatloo 
A lit tnunila. but to Ihe fact that a fecHng of vibration in Ihe chest and 
iiMoa 1b ike ^uDct accompaniei Ihu nlngiug of a has* note, whilst, when 
't (taf blgti. tlitr palatine mucoui membrane ladrawu upon by IhemUM'Ica 
' -Jffe nuv* Ibr laryni. and awakeiiH a feeling in ilie loof of tliu mouth. 

1W ooly real objocllon l« the law of partial glinuilatlnn laid down In 
■t lot ta one (hat mlKhl Iw drawn from the organ of hisrlng: for. ac- 
C to iBodrm Ibeorin. llic eoehlm may have Its wpurate uerrv* termini 
'j ndieil by M>und> of differing pitch, and yet the aouoda aeem 
ill to nil ■ oonmiiu fiwce. and nut neceaaarily to Ih- arranged nloogaide of 
«aek e(b(T &l m<»l the high note In feh an u thinner, brlgliter Htreak 
apiHI ■ darker hnrkgrouud. In nn article on Space, published in tbc 
taanil wf Bjwyulallve I'hiloaopby forJauuary. tSTS, 1 ventured loauggeM 
" / the auditory nrrve termini might be "excited all at once by 
liulaay pllrh, a* the whole retina woulil lie by every luminous point 
ne wan- no dioptrlr appnraluii affixed." And 1 added : " Nolwitlh 
t tbc brilliant eonjeclura uf the last tv* yean which aaaign dlffer- 
aalanNMtlc cnd-orgaoi lodlSrrunt mte« of alr-wnve. we ai« Mill grtvlly 
Ik (k* darii aboui the nihject ; and I. for my pan. would mnrli more con. 
UMtly rpfect a (henry nf bearing which rfolaled the prlneiplii ndranccil In 


I should have been willing some years ago to name with* 
out hesitation a third condition of discrimination — saying it 
would be most developed in that organ which is susceptible 
of the most various qualities of feeling. The retina is un- 
questionably such an organ. The colors and shades it 
perceives are infinitely more numerous than the diversities 
of skin -sensation. And it can feel at once white and black, 
whilst the ear can in nowise so feel sound and silence. But 
the late researches of Donaldson, Blix, and Goldscheider, * 
on specific points for heat, cold, pressure, and pain in the 
skin ; the older ones of Gzermak (repeated later by Klug 
in Ludwig's laboratory), showing that a hot and a cold 
compass-point are no more easily discriminated as two than 
two of equal temperature ; and some unpublished experi- 
ments of my own — all disincline me to make much of this 
condition now.t There is, however, one quality of sensa- 

tbis article tban give up those principles for the sake of any liypothesia 
hitherto published about either organs of Corti or basilar mem braDe.'^ 
Professor Rutherford's theory of hearing, advanced at the meeting of the 
British Association for 1886, already furnishes an alternative view which 
would make hearing present no exception to the space-theoxy I defend, 
and which, whether destined to be proved true or false, ought, at any rate, 
to make us feel that the Helmholtzian theory is probably not the last word 
in the physiology of hearing. Stepano, ff . . (Hermann und Schwalbe's Jahres- 
bericht, xv. 404, Literature 1886) reports a case in which more than the 
upper half of one cochlea was lost without any such deafness to deep notea 
on that side as Helmholtz's theory would require. 

♦ Donaldson, in Mind, x. 899, 577; Goldsclieider. in Archiv f. (Anat. u.) 
Physiologic ; Blix, in Zeitschrift fQr Biologic. A good resume may be 
found in Ladd's Physiol. Psychology, part ii. chap. iv. §§ 21-88. 

f I tried on nine or ten people, making numerous observations on each. 
what difference it made in the discrimination of two points to have them. 
alike or unlike. The points chosen were (1) two large needle-heads, (2> 
two screw-heads, and (8) a needle-head and a screw. head. The distance 
of the screw-heads was measured from their centres. I found that when 
the points gave divei-sc qualities of feeling (as in 3), this facilitated the 
discrimination, but much less strongly than I expected. The difference, 
in fact, would often not be perceptible twenty times running When, 
however, one of the points was endowed with a rotary movement, the 
other remaining .still, the doubleness of the points became much more evi- 
dent than before. To observe this I took an ordinary pair of compasses with 
one point blunt, and the movable leg replaced by a metallic rod which could, 
at any moment, be made to rotate in nitn by a dentist's drilling-machine, to 
which it was attached. The compass had then its points applied to the skin 
at such a distance apart as to be felt as one impression. Suddenly rotating 
the drill -apparatus then almost always made them seem as two. 


: n wlticfa ut jjartioularly exciting, aud that is ihB feeling 
/ motion Pifi" any of our sur/aceJi. The erectiou of this 
laui A fwiwrnt^ (■h^meutary quftlity of seuaibility ia one of 
till' Bio«t recent of jtsyvhological achievementH, and is 
•iTtliT of tletaioiog us a while at this point. 

llie Senmlion of Mofian over Surfaoea. 
Thtffiiing ^ motion has generally been aatstimed by 
I L>^)l(^rL»tM t*) be impossible uutil the puttitious of (erminua 

^•"Utd terminM ad quern ai-e severally cognized, and tbe 
-i>;>«fSTe occupancies of these pouitions by the uiuviug 
i--lj ue percoivcii to be separated by a distimrt interval of 
iiiie.* As a matter of fart, however, we ooguize only the 

rvRknTeot mutious in this way. likieing the baud of a 

ifk at XII wid afU-rwanla ut VI, we judge that it haa 
- "smi throngh the interval. Seeing the sun now in the 

:^l and again in the weet, I infer it to have passed over 
' ' head, Uut wo can only tn/Vr that which we iiJready 
.-Mricftlly know in !«oine wore direct faHhion, and it is ex- ^x,^Xiui 

• rinwotsUy certain that we have the feeling of motion ^ , 
ji^ui w aa a direct and ttimple wtmaiioti. Ozermak long ago 

■ Jiled oat til'* difference between seeing the motion of the 

-<<iM)-huid of u watch, when we look directly at it, and 
-liiast^ the fact of ita having altered its ]K)sitinn when ws 
faimrgaut «i»ou some other point of the dial-plate. In 
tlu &nit cAMe we have a specific quality of sensation which 
i«*liMtit in the second. If the reader will find a portion 
ut kta akin — the arm, for exam]de — where a pair of oom- 
|M»-fKMBti4 an inch apart are fott us one impression, and if 
kewill then trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot 
nUi k pencil-|M>int, he will be distinctly aware of the point's 
Bntion and vaguely aware of the direction of the motion, 
TWprc«ptiou of the motiuu horit is certainly not derived 
fiwn k pre-existing knowledge that itH starting and ending 
(NUti are neparate [Kwitiona in apace, because positions in 
■•ce Ira times wider apart fail to be discriminated as such 

K*7U» la only aDolbcr iiunipU of whnl 1 call ■ Ihe psfcholopisl'i tai- 
r'— IliiiiklnfElliBl tbe mind lie in iiliiil;iiig miulDec^nafirilj'bceoDicioua 
fttobjfct afUr tli« fubkiD in wbicli ihe pxychnloglAt liimwU ia con- 


when exeiteii bv the diTider^ It is the same with the 
retina^ Oiie':4 fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions 
cannot be connted — that is xo :^t, the fire retinal tracts 
which they occupy are not (iistinctlT apprehended by the 
mind as five :^parate portions in space — and yet the slight- 
est movement of the fingers is most Tiridly perceived as 
movement and nothing else. It is thus certain that onr 
sense of movement, being do much more delicate than onr 
sense of positb^n, cannot possibly be derived from it. A 
curioua oh^frr^jtum by Emer * ctompletes the proof that move- 
ment is a primitive form of sensibility, by showing it to be 
mnch more delicate than oar sense of snceession in time. 
This very able physiologist caosed two electric sparks to 
appear in rapid snceession, one beside the other. The 
observer had to state whether the right-hand one or the 
left-hand one appeared first. When the interval was re- 
duced to as short a time as 0.014 ' the discrimination of 
temporal order in the sparks became impossible. Bnt 
Exner fonnd that if the sparks were brought so close to- 
gether in space that their irradiation-circles overlapped, the 
eye then felt their flashing as if it were the motion of a 
single spark from the point occupied by the first to the 
point occupied by the second, and the time-interval might 
then be made as small as 0.015" before the mind began to 
be in doubt as to whether the apparent motion started 
from the right or from the left On the skin similar ex- 
periments $?ave similar results. 

flerordf, at almost the same fimfy^ called atttention to cer- 
tain persistent niit^nonSy amongst ickick are these: If another 
person gently trace a line across our wrist or finger, the 
latter beinj? stationarv, it will feel to us as if the mem- 
her were moving in the opposite direction to the tracing 
jx>int. If, on the contrary, we move our limb across a fixed 
point, it will be seen as if the point were moving as well 
If the reader will touch his forehead with his forefinger 
kept motionless, and then rotate the head so that the skin 
of the forehead passes beneath the finger's tip, he will have 

m^^^^ ' — — ' ■ 

♦Sitzb. der. k. Akad. Wien. Bd. lxxu.. Abth. 8(1875). 
t Zcilschrift fttr Biologie. xii. 226 ( 1876). 



u irr^suittble sPD&Ation nl tLe latter being itself in motion 
i» Uip o|)]M)iiite direction to the head. So in aliduc-ting the 
teecntfromcAoli other; unme may move and the rest be still 
ftiil, tiat tlif Htill oUpB will (eel an if they were actively sep- 
intinj; from the rest. TheHe illnsions. aoiordinR t^i Vierordt, 
*!>■ nirvivAlii of a primitive form of perceptiou, when '*^ 
miiti.'ii wiw* felt mt siioh, but ascribed to the whole content /!*—-• 
'( cnnscioattnnss, and not yet <liHtin^Qi»htMl as lielongiu^ es- 
■lutiTely tr. nne .if itn parts. When our perception is fully 
l-t^l.ipfii we go beyond the meri* relative motion of thing 
<»il iinxind, ATid cait aseribe nbsolnte inntinn ti> one of these 
''m]K>tiBntfl if onr total 'ibject. and abanlntt* rest t<> another. 
Whi>Q, in vtaioD for example, the whole background moves 
i'««U)T. wn think that it is ourselves nr our eyes which 
•u- moving ; and any ohjeet in the foreground which may 
If relatively to the background is judged by uh to be 
■;;li Bill primitively thif. discrimination cannot be per- 
'■ :Iv mjule. The sensation of the motion spreads over all 
\t -f M-c and inf'>cts it. Any relative motion of object 
.'■. r--\:i,:\ Itoth makes the object seem to move, and makes 
- '''1 'uruelvef in motion. Even now when our whole ob- 
rt mov<^ we still get giddy ; and we still see an apparent 
^ :4ioti of ihe entire field of view, whenever we suddenly 
-rt flor head and eyet or shake them quickly to and fro. 
IHtktBg liar eyeballs gives the same illusion. We knowia 
tlltbepf nwet) what really happens, bnt the conditions are 
mwiul. «■> onr primitive sensation i>ersi»ts unchecked. So 

■ l'w« wh»n clouds float by the moon. We know the moon 

■ 'till; bot we sft it move even faster than the clouds, it 
-' i-a when we t*li)wly move onr eyes the primitive sensation 1 
[^Jvista under the victorious conception. If we notice |' 
^im\y the esi>erience, we find that any object towards 
*hicli we look appears moring t^i meet our eye. 

Bat the most valuable contribution to the subject is 
tl» F*P*'^ **' ^- ^ Schneider,* who takes up the matter 
■D^ogieAlly, and shows by examples from every branch of 
tlu> uumal kingdom that movement is the qnati^ by which <^ 
uinals most easily attract each other's attention. The in- 

• VlMi»l)alinclj for win. Phlloa , n. 877. 

174 P8YCH0L0OT, 

stinct of ' shamming death ' is no shamming of death at all, 
bnt rather a paralysis through fear, which saves the insect, 
crustacean, or other creature from being noticed at all by his 

\J enemy. Tt is parallelled in the human race by the breath- 
holding stillness of the boy playing * I spy,' to whom the 
seeker is near ; and its obverse side is shown in our invol- 
untary waving of arms, jumping up and down, and so forth, 
when we wish to attract someone's attention at a distance. 
^ Creatures ' stalking ' their prey and creatures hiding from 
their pursuers alike show how immobility diminishes con- 
spicuity. In the woods, if we are quiet, the squirrels and 
birds will actually touch us. Flies will light on stuffed 

^ birds and stationary frogs.* On the other hand, the tre- 
mendous shock of feeling the thing we are sitting on begin 
to move, the exaggerated start it gives us to have an insect 
unexpectedly pass over our skin, or a cat noiselessly come 
and snuffle about our hand, the excessive reflex effects of 
tickling, etc., show how exciting the sensation of motion is 
per 8€, A kitten cannot help pursuing a moving ball. Im- 
pressions too faint to be cognized at all are immediately 
felt if they move. A fly sitting is unnoticed, — we feel it the 
moment it crawls. A shadow may be too faint to be per- 
ceived. As soon as it moves, however, we see it. Schneider 
found that a shadow, with distinct outline, and directlv fix- 
ated, could still be perceived when moving, although its 
objective sti*ength might be but half as great as that of a 
stationary shadow so faint as just to disappear. With a 
blurred shadow in indirect vision the difference in favor 
of motion was much greater — namely, 13.3 : 40.7. If we 
hold a finger between our closed eyelid and the sunshine 
we shall not notice its presence. The moment we move it 
to and fro, however, we discern it. Such visual perception 
as this reproduces the conditions of sight among the 
radiates, t 

* Exner tries to show that the structure of the faceted eye of articulates 
adapts it for perceiving motions almost exclusively. 

f Schneider tries to explain why a sensory surface is so much more ex- 
cited when its impression moves. It has long since heen noticed how much 
more acute is discrimination of successive than of simultaneous diiferences. 
But in the case of a moving impression, say on the retina, we have a aum- 



!l bss now been said to show that i'l the eiiucaiion 

riminalion the motifma of imprfssioiig ucrotta »en- 

t mv*l h'Vt been the principal ugent in breaking 

ajM]itr ctinsviounnrss of the aiirfaces Juto n cnusvinnBtiesB 

<>!tkeir parte. Etpd to-day the iiiaiB fiim-tifin of the pe- 

^_4nikr'r«l re^ioiut of our retina is that of Hentinels, which, 

^^■■fDlifunHiif lifflit move over them, cry ' Who goes thei'e V 

^^bdi-all the fovea to the spoL Most parts of the skin do 

^^Bt (M>rform tlie itanie office for the tiiiger-ttpa Of course 

^^Hjfer-tipH and fovea leave M>n»' power nf direct perception 

^^B BiarKtiial retina imd skiu respectively. But it in worthy 

HBf itiite that such perception is best developed on the skin of 

tlif- most movable partn (the labors nt Viernrdt and his 

yayiii' liuvr well ahuwu thibt) ; and that iu the hiiud, whose 

•iin iti exceptionally discrimiuativp, it seeuii> U' have become 

«>tlin>iigli the inveterate habit which most of them possess 

'■I twitching and moving it ander whatever object may 

l-'icli them. !«i an ti. become better aequainted with the con- 

f< rmnlion of the same. Cxermak was the 6rst to notice this. 

Umm\ lie oasilr verified. Of ronrse wovnnml of surface 

k.tiSrrK^ftrl ini/m- ptirpn«rji (^ stimulnthn) etjiiii'tilmt to movt- 

<trn! 1/ ot'jrci ovrr aiufuce. In exploring the uhapes and 

of both •urts of dlflervace ; wliere(>f Ilie iinliinil ellecl muit be 10 

prrfrrt iliMzrilnlDMJoo •<{ nl 


^{•ft-band ligun let tlir (lurk tpul B most, for example, from 
Al ibeoiiiaft there bifar tliiiiiluneuuiconiraBt uf blackand 
Wli«n tbt motion lia» ixx-unvd w Dial Ibe ngbi-hanil 
fd, tli« wRio rontnuil n-mnios, the tilftck uid the wbjlo 
Mijivrt phce*. But In addition to It ilicrc U a doubln me- 
inul nr-i ill K. wlikh. a uiomenl ago wLlIc, basnow become 
>nd 111 U. whlcb. a moment a^co black, hsB dow become 
t makr orb ilni.'le twIInK "' coDlnul = I (a luppoiltlon tar 
■"(•vnrBblr tu ibritalr ut nst). the *um of roDttastalnibecaiieof niollOD 
*iU t> I, M affalnal 1 Id tbr atati- of ml. TImi la, our atlemloD will be 
•alM by a trrblr fnrrr bi ilii' <llirerencc of color, provldt^ tbo cutor bo- 
;in to DM«c~(('f nIhj l-lcl<ohl. i'bytlulo(^be Oi>tIscbe Nollzen. 3l9 

If. Wiener SlUUDpibprlcblf. ISKt.i ' 


sizes of things by either eye or skin the movements of these 
organs are incessant and unrestrainable. Every such move- 
ment draws the points and lines of the object across the 
surface, imprints them a hundred times more sharply, 
and drives them home to the attention. The immense part 
thus played by movements in our perceptive activity is held 
by many psychologists* to prove that the muscles are them- 
selves the space-percei^dng organ. Not surface-sensibility, 
but ' the muscular sense,' is for these writers the origiiial 
and only revealer of objective extension. But they have 
all failed to notice with what peculiar intensity muscular 
contractions call surface-sensibilities into play, and that the 
mere discrimination of impressions (quite apart from any 
question of measuring the space between them) largely 
depends on the mobility of the surface upon which they 

*Bn>wu, Bain. J. S. Mill, and in a modified nutDner Wundt, Helmholtz, 
8uUy. f U\ 

f M. Oh. Dunan. in bis forcibly written essay * TEspace Vistiel et 
rKaimt^t^ 'l^lctile' in tbe Revue Pbilosopbique for 1888, endeavora to prove 
that Hiirfat^'s alone give no perception of extent, by citing the way in 
whU*li thv bliiui go to work to gain an idea of an object's shape. If surfaces 
\v«Mv tho (H'lx'ipicnt organ, he says, ** both the seeing and the blind ought 
hi gnlu an vxact idm of the size land shape) of an object by merely laying 
Ihrlr huiui tiat u)H)n it (provided of course that it were smaller than the 
hniul), aiul this iKHmuse of their direct appreciation of the amount of tactile 
auvfaoo HtTtH'ttHi, aud with no recourse to the muscular sense. . . . But the 
ftM'l U I hut a (HTsi>n born blind never proceeds in this way to measure ob- 
jintlvo Hurfaa's. The only means which he has of getting at the size of a 
Uuly U that of running his finger along the lines by which it is tmunded. 
Ktu- luNtuuoo. if you put into the hands of one tmm blind a book whose 
diuuiUMioUM uir unknown to him. he will begin by resting it against his 
iAwMiX iH» UH to hold it lutrizontal ; then, bringing his two hands together at 
tlio uilddio of tlio tnlire opp<it>ite to the one against his body, he will draw 
llu'ui HHUudoi till thoy reach the ends of the edge in question : and then, 
\\\\\\ iioi till tht'u. will ho be able to say what the length of the object is " 
K\\\\. wv. p. t48K 1 think that anyone who will try to appreciate the size 
uiid hliH|M« of an objtvt by simply * layiug his hand flat upon it ' will find 
that \\\ss ^l(^lil olmtado is that he feeU the eontour$ so imperfectly. The 
uuiuu^ul. howovrr, the hands move, the contours are emphatically and dis- 
I iiu't l> i\\\. A II iH^n^ption of shape and size is perception of contours, and 
Ihsi of all tluMH' u\tist Ih' made $harp. Motion does this ; and the Impulse 
to muvti tutr or>?at\s In |H»rcev>tion is primarily due to the craTing which we 
fi'vl to gvt \tur H\i I face sensations sharp. When it comes to the naming and 


1 7%c Meiuuremaii of the sejiae-spacfs <ujiiinst tncK otMr, 

Wbst precedes is all we can say id auuwei' to the problem 
of ^iKriminstioti. Turn iiow to that of lueiiiiureiiieut of the 
HiereJ dpaces ai^alnat eacL other, thai Iwiiig the first step 
iioar cuiuitructiuf; out ot ourdiverseBpace-exiierieuces the 
tx Kpnce wn buUeve iu as that of the real world. 

The fint thiai^ that »eeiU!^ eviileut ia that we have no 
ivktdidile power of comparing t<;>gether with any accuracy 
tU i^it«utH rovealed by diB'erent seuuatiouti. Our nioutU- 
f»ntr fpi.'U indeed t<j itself smaller, and to the touj^iie 
U^'cr. than it feeU to the tiu^er or eye, our tympauio 
Dtinhnute feels larger than our fiuger-tip, our lips feel 
lirger than a Hurfacu equal to them ou our thi^h. So much 
(T'lnpariitoD ia iinmediat<:> ; but it is vague ; and for anything 
'Uft ve uiust reaort to other help. 

Tkg great atfrni in wwi/xirt'wy /Ac extent f fit hy one aenaory 
-.r/'W tcitk that frothy an(A)ier,ia titperpoailiim — iritperjKMfUion 

'Mt tur/aex upon another, aiitl aupofosition of one outer 
^iij ipmi many sur/aorji. Thus areexact equivalencies and 
' uunon measureH introduced, and the w ay prepared lor 
Btmerical rKHuIlH. 

Conld we not superpose one part of our ekin upon an- 
fllfcer, or dob object on both parta, we should hardly suc- 
maJ m cominfi; to that knowledge of our own form which 
npoMraa. The original differences of bigness of onr dlf- 
Imiit parts would remain vaguely operative, and we should 
Ut« no certainty om to how much lip was equivalent to so 
■nek forabfviul, how much finger U> no mnch back. 

Bat with the power of exploring one part of the surfatie 
b? nolber wo get a direct |>erception of cutaneous equiva- 
Ittma. TIte priniitive dilTereuceH of biguei^a are over- 
pivsntd when we feel by au immediate sensation that a 
*ertwu length of thigh surface is in contact with the entire 
{aim Juul fiu^ra. And when a motion of the opposite Bnger- 
t>|a draws a line firnt along this tutme length of thigh and 

ig or ntijpnta Id l«ms nf Hime mmmon nlsadaitt we Bbsll lee prM- 
OU; h0« owTmieDU belp alsu , but do more la Uiis case than ibe oUier 
^ th? belp, tocauM Ibe quality of fXUniBloo lUelf U oonlributed by Um 


then along the whole of the hand in qnestion, we get a new 
manner of measurement, less direct but confirming the 
equivalencies established by the first. In these ways, by 
superpositions of parts and by tracing lines on different 
parts by identical morements, a person deprived of sight 
can soon learn to reduce all the dimensions of his body to a 
homogeneous scale. By applying the same methods to 
objects of his own size or smaller, he can with equal ease 
make himself acquainted with their extension stated in 
terms deriTed from his own bulk, palms, feet, cubits, spans, 
paces, fathoms ^armspreads i, etc In these reductions it is 
to be noticed that tchen the resident sensations cf largeness 
ef two opposed surfaces conflict^ one of the sensations is chosen 
as the true standard and the other treated as illusory. Thus 
an empty tooth-socket is believed to be really smaller than 
the finger-tip which it wiU not admit, although it msLjfed 
larger ; and in general it may be said that the hand, as the 
almost exclusive organ of palpation, gives its own magnitude 
to the other parts, instead of having its size determined by 
them. In general, it is, as Fechner says, the extent felt by 
the more sensitive part to which the other extents are re- 

But even though exploration of one surface by another 
were impossible, we could always measure our various 
surfaces against each other by applying the same extended 
object first to one and then to another. We should of 
course have tlie alternative of supposing that the object 
itself waxed and waued as it glided from one place to 
another ^cf. alx>ve, p. 141 >; but the principle of simplifying 
as much as ^K>ssible our world would soon drive us out of 
that assumption into the easier one that objects as a rule 

* Fpchner describes i PsTcboph\*sik. i. 1S2 a * method of equivaleoU' 
for measuring the seusibiliiy of the skin Two compttnes are used, one on 
the pan A. another on the part R of the surface Tlie points on B must 
be adjusted so that their distance apart appears equaJ to that between the 
points on A With the place A constant, the second pair of points must be 
varied a i?reat dttil for evvrv chauge in the place B though for the same A 
and B the relation ot the two (.^mipasses is remarkably constant, and con- 
tmues unaltered for months pn.>vided but few experiments are made oo 
each day If. hov^erer. we practise daily their differenoe grows lem, in 
•ccordance with the law gircu in the text 

TUB PBRCtCPTlOy OF 81'AfS 179 

sizes, and that most of our fienaationa are 

1 by arrors for which a ooustftnt allowance mast be 


Id the retina there itt no reason to Htippose that the 

liii'iifHiM-A of two iinpres»ion8 (liuen or blotches) falling on 

iiffpn^nl rcffinnH are primitively felt to stand in any exact 

lirifjiil nitio. It IK nnlj when the impressions come from 

•Ji' mmr nlijffA that we judge their fay.^<i to be the same. 

^uil thU, tiKi, oiiIt when the relation of the object to the 

■■■ is bclirvoii to l>e on the whole unchanged. When the 

I ■■'ct by moving cbangcx its relations to the eye the sensa- 

Lj .-iiiie.l by its image even on the same retinal region 

rri. - -ict fluctimtiug that we end by ascribing no abeolnte 

;-in alintever to the retinal space-feeling which at any 

nuimi'iH we may receiTe. So complete does this overlook- 

luttiil n-tinal maguitatle become that it is next to impossi- 

. bl« t» otmpare tlie visaa) magnitudes of objects at different 

L^fatucea witbont making the experiment of superposition. 

^^Bcanoot nay beforehand bow much of a distant house or 

^^M oar finger will co\er. The various answers to the 

^Tntiliar qaestiou, How lai>;e is the moon ? — answers which 

t»fT fniro a cartwheel to a wafer — illustrate this most 

■HtiBgly. The hardest part of the training of a young 

|l|thtsmsn is bis learning to feel directly the retinal (i.e. 
^tirely aemuble) magnitudes which the different objects 
be field of vit^w subtend. To do this he lunst recover 
U Baakin rails the 'innocence of the eye' — that is, a 
I of childish perception of stains of color merely as 
h, without eonaciouxnesB of what tliey mean. 
, With the rest of us this innocence is lost, (hit </ «W fht 

final magnUvdrs o/" each known object tve hnvf erifctrd one as 
1^ ttkL OIK' lo think of, and degraded aS the others to serve as 
it* fi^ns. ThiH ' rtml ' magnitude is determined by lesthetio 
ud practical interests. It is that which we get when the 
objent in at the distance most propitiouH for exact visual 
£ierimhtation of itM dvtails. This is the distance at which 
>* bold anjrthing we are examining. Farther than this ne 
*e it too small, nearer too large. And the larger and the 
*Bnl)sr feeling vani^ in the act of suggesting this ime, 
tlusroKira iinptirtant mmnirtr/. A>i I look along the dining- 


table I overlook the fact that the farther plates and glasses 
fed so much smaller than my own, for I know that they are 
all equal in size ; and the feeling of them, which is a present 
sensation, is eclipsed in the glare of the knowledge, which 
is a merely imagined one. 

If the inconsistencies of sight-spaces inter se can thus be 
reduced, of course there can be no difficulty in equating 
sight-spaces with spaces given to touch. In this equation 
it is probably the touch-feeling which prevails as real and 
the sight which serves as sign — a reduction made necessary 
not only by the far greater constancy of felt over sc^n 
magnitudes, but by the greater practical interest which the 
sense of touch possesses for our lives. As a rule, things 
only benefit or harm us by coming into direct contact with 
our skin : sight is only a sort of anticipatory touch ; the 
latter is, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, the 'mother-tongue of 
thought,' and the handmaid's idiom must be translated 
into the lauguage of the mistress before it can speak clearly 
to tlie mind.* 

Later on we shall see that the feelings excited in the 
joints when a limb moves are used as signs of the path 
traversed by the extremity. But of this more anon. As 
for the equatiug of sound-, smell-, and taste-volumes with 
those yielded by the more discriminative senses, they are 
too vague to need any remark. It may be observed of 
pain, however, that its size has to be reduced to that of the 
normal tactile size of the organ which is its seat. A finger 
with a felon on it, and the pulses of the arteries therein, both 
'feel ' larger than we believe they really 'are.' 

* Prof. Jiustrnw ^ivcs as tlie result of bis experiments this general 
conclusioi) (Am. Jotirnnl of Psychology, in. 58): "The space-perceptions 
of di^()mratc scusok ure themselves dinparate, and whatever harmony 
there is amongst them we are warranted iu regarding as the result 
of e.xperience. The spacial notions of one deprived of the sense of sight 
and reduced to the use of the other space-senses must indeed he different 
from our own." But he continues: "The existence of the striking 
disparities between our visual and our other space- perceptions without 
confusing us. and, indeed, without usually being noticed, can only be 
explaiueii by the tendency to interpret all dimensions into their ^ittial 
equitiiUnts,** But this author gives no reasons for saying * visual ' rather 
than ' tactile ;* and I must continue to think that probabilities point the 
other way so far as what we call real magnitudes are concerned. 




1 will have l>een noticed in tlie account giveu that 
■ (wo aftuioriril sparr-itnpreeeiofS, bellfvni to cotne/rom the 
wthftH, differ, then THE ONE MOST ISTEKEBTING, practically 

r MfMtnciify, t8 JtTDOED TO HE THE TBCE ONE. This IdW of 

;Lt«rMt holds throiiglioat— tboQgh » periiiauetit inter^t, 
ikf tluU of touch, may resist a Htroug but tleeting nop lik^ 
itt of puu, tM iu the case just giveu of the feinu. 

3, The Sumvuition of the Sfvse-itpaces. 

Now for the next step in our construction of real apac« : 
flwr oir (Ae vnrioiut neiiae-apaces 'tildfd together into a 
"Molidattti and tinifary confinunm? For they are, in man 
»t kll erettta, incoherent at the tttart 

Here again the Brst fact that appears i» thut primitive/y 
■yr »jncr-fj-ji^fnt-rit J'nrm a rhnoJi, out of whkh nv fuiv iifl 
•*me%fi>itr/omUy/itr cxfricnlhg than. Ohjects of riifferni 
"•uf-oryatu, nrperimced together, do not iv the Jirat inaftmce 
'ffar m'/A^t ituiide ttr alongside or far outside of ench fiiher, 
•iier gpatioUi/ cvtUinvoiui nor diacontintiotui, in any definite 
*n» of these tronU. The same thing is almost as truR of 
' t'j»irtft felt l>_v different parts of the same organ before 
liw-ritninntion has doum its liuished work. The most we 
rau «T in that all onr space-experiences together form an 
•A^'r* tnlat and that this objedive total is vast. 

E*«tii MOW tliK apai-e inside our mouth, which is so inti- 
tuldy known sod accarately measured by its inhabitant 
tint tongue, can hardly be said to have its internal direc- 
tknu atiil dimensions known iu any exact relation to those 
'^tlw> largvr world oufaiide. It forms almost a little world 
''' itwlf. Again, when the dentist excavates a small canity 
- "lie of itur teeth, we feel the hard point of his instrument 
"raping, in distinctly differing diret^tions, a surface which 
MPiDA to our seDsibility vaguely larger than the Nubsetjnent 
■•e (if the mirror tells ds it ■ really ' is. And though the 
■Urvctiitus nf the serapiug differ «o completely inter #f, not 
•■tte of them can be identiSed with the particular direction 
ia the outer world Ui which it corresponds. The space of 
Ihe t(K>th-sensiMHty is thus really n little world by itself, 
vhich can only l>ecome congruent with the outer space- 

182 P8TCH0L0QT. 

world by farther experiences which ghall alter its bnlk, 
identify its directions, fuse its margins, and finally imbed it 
as a definite part within a definite whole. And even though 
every joint's rotations should be felt to vary inter «e as so 
many differences of direction in a common room ; even 
though the same were true of diverse tracings on the skin, 
and of diverse tracings on the retina respectively, it would 
still not follow that feeUngs of direction, on these different 
surfaces, are intuitive!}' comparable among each other, or 
with the other directions yielded by the feelings of the 
semi-circular canals. It would not follow that we should 
immediately judge the relations of them all to each other 
in one space-world. 

If with the arms in an unnatural attitude we ' feel ' 
things, we are perplexed about their shape, size, and 
position. Let the reader lie on his back with his arms 
stretched above his head, and it will astonish him to find 
how ill able he is to recognize the geometrical relations of 
objects placed within reach of his hands. But the geomet- 
rical relations here spoken of are nothing but identities 
recognized between the directions and sizes perceived in 
this way and those perceived in the more usual ways. 
The two ways do not fit each other intuitively. 

How lax the connection between the system of visual and 
the system of tactile directions is in man, appears from the 
facility vdih which microscopists learn to reverse the move- 
ments of their hand in manipulating things on the stage of 
the instrument. To move the slide to the seen left they 
must draw it to the/rf< right But in a very few days the 
habit becomes a second nature. So in tying our cravat, 
shaviug before a mirror, etc., the right and left sides are 
inverted, and the directions of our hand movements are the 
opposite of what they seem. Yet this never annoys us. 
Only when by accident we trj- to tie the cravat of another 
person do we learn that there are two ways of combining 
sight and touch perceptions. Let any one try for the first 
time to write or draw while looking at the image of his 
hand and paper in a mirror, and he will be utterly bewil- 
dered. But a very short training will teach him to undo 
in this respect the associations of his previous lifetime. 



Pr»]a« kIiow Uiis in an oren more atriking way. If the 
ty*^ I)« armed with Hpectacles coataiuing slightly prismatio 
f\u»tt irith tlieir bas^H turned, for example, towards the 
ri^ht. rTirry object looked at will be apparently trane located 
fc' ihe left ; and thp hand put forth to grasp nay nufli nljject 
vvill mftke the iniHtake of paH^iiig beyond it on t)ie left side. 
Ulnu Uiaii tin li<iiirof practice in wearing such Hpectacleft 
ifin< the judgiueut so that no more mistakes are made, 
h tact the Qew-formed asaociations are already so strong, 
it when the prisma are first laid aside again the opposite 
Bit w i-omniitted, the habits of a lifetime violated, and 
to kuti ouw passed to the right of every object which it 

utij tuavh. 

\ TW primitiTe chaos thus subsists to a great degree 
1) life so far as our immediate sensibility goes. We 
MuRt ybHous objecta and their bignesses, together or in 
nnanoD ; but so Koon as it is it question of the order and 
ttUtiou of many of them at once our ijituitive apprehension 
nukiiw to the very end most vague nud iuuomplete. 
Vkikt w« are attending to one, or at most to two or three 
lAjwto, all the others lapee, and the most we feel of them ia 
till thfTY Atill linger on the outskirts and uan be caught 
toin by liiming in a certain way. Nevertheless tkroughoiU 
"H lAii om/uwion ire amivitte ofn ut>r}d Hprnid out I'n a pffr/edly 
/arf umJ ord^y fashion, and ii-e Mieve tVi i7^ existence, Tfte 
fWuM u ; How i/o (Aw (Tww«y/(On and tkw Mir/ (trisf ? Uoitt 
W oAooti nmoothrd and straightened out ? 

f lUnly by two operations : Some of the es{)erieuces ara 
* 1 to exist oat- and alongside of eucb other, and 
kspprehended to interpeuetrnte each other, and 
^tke aarae room. In this way what was incoherent 
Mjve endti by being coherent and detiniti^tly related ; 
wh H hard to trace the priucip]e.s, by which the mind is 
' ' d in tbifl arrangement of its i>erceptions, in detail. 
■ !■ th e first itltu'e, following the great iut*>llectual law of 
Lwn aimplify, unify, and identify as much as we 
Whatever aeniiiUe d'Un can he attemled to together 
tther. Their srverrd extmts stem one fxletU. The 
mtt wkSrh earh nppnirs i& hrid t>. fir I kr sir me m'th the pliKt 


at which the others appear. They becoine, in shorty so many 
properties of one and the same real thino. This is the first 
and great commandment, the fundamental 'act* bj which 
our world gets spatially arranged. 

In this coalescence in a * thing,' one of the coalescing 
sensations is held to be the thing, the other sensations ate 
taken for its more or less accidental properties, or modes of 
appearance.* The sensation chosen to be the thing essen- 
tially is the most constant and practically important of the 
lot ; most often it is hardness or weight. But the hardness 
or weight is never without tactile bulk ; and as we can 
always see something in our hand when we feel something 
there, we equate the bulk felt with the bulk seen, and thence- 
forward this common bulk is also apt to figure as of the 
essence of the 'thing.' Frequently a shape so figures, 
sometimes a temperature, a taste, etc. ; but for the most part 
temperature, smell, sound, color, or whatever other phenom- 
ena may vividly impress us simultaneously with the bulk 
felt or seen, figure among the accidents. Smell and sound 
impress us, it is true, when we neither see nor touch the 
thing ; but they are strongest when we see or touch, so we 
locate the source of these properties within the touched or 
seen space, whilst the properties themselves we regard as 
overflowing in a weakened form into the spaces filled by 
other things. In all this, it imU be observed, the sense-data 
whose spaces coalesce info one are yielded by different sense- 
organs. Such data have no tendency to displace each othei 
from consciousness, but can be attended to together all at 
once. Often indeed they vary concomitantly and reach a 
maximum together. We may be sure, therefore, that the 
general rule of our mind is to locate IN each other all sensa- 
tions which are associated in simultaneous experience, and 
do not interfere with each other's perception. t 

* Cf. Lipps on 'Coinplicaliou,' Gruudtatsachen, etc., p. 579. 

f YeDtriloquisra shows this very prettily. The veDtriloquist talks with 
out moviDg his lips, and at the same time draws our attention to a doll, f 
box, or some other object. We forthwith locate the voice within thii 
object. On the stage an actor ignorant of music sometimes has to sing, 
or play on the guitar or violin. He goes through the motion* before oui 
eyes, whilst in the orchestra or elsewhere the music is performed. Bu* 
because as we listen we see the actor, it is almost impossible not to hear th< 
music as if coming from where he sits or stands. 



I imprfasiom <m the mmf setm^-organ do iuterfere 
ll other'd perceptiou, aud cauuot well be attended 
Hcucf «*■ do not I/Kate them in earh other's spaces, 
i«( nrnnw/r ihmi in n iteritd order af exteriority, pfick alongside 
'/ tit ral, in a spaa- larger Ihnn that trkich any one aensutiim 
^flifi. Tliig Iftri^er space, Imwever, Ir aii objeiit of c;oacep- 
HfM rather tliaii nf diriM't iuttiitioti, uud lienrs all tb« iiiiirks 
"I Wing ctiDHtrocted pieceineHl by tbe uiiiiiL The bliud 
lull fom« it out of tactile, lui-omotor, uud auditory esperi- 
rvtn, Um MeinK tnuti out of visual nues almost excluitivelj'. 
.Ki Uie ristml coastraction ia the easiest to uuderstand, 
^ hi u mmiuder that tirat 

^^L ILimrj an^\e nsual seusatiou nr ' field nf new ' is 
^^BMi To f^t a new field of view for our object tbe old 
^^^Miprt (UHa]>ppiu-. But tbe disap|>earaiice may be oulv 
^^PfiC Xet tbv tirHt fieb] nf view be A B 0. If we earry 
^^VwiMBitian to tbe limit C, it cetii^es to be tbe lituit, and 
^Miunea tbe c*utrp of the field, and beyond it appear freHh 
P«rti where Uierf were uoiie before :* ABC cbuuges, in 
, Ihiirt, U> C 1> E. But nltbouKli the parts A B are Io«t to 
|^t,ye( their iuiafie abides in tbe memory ; and if we think 
ir ftiat I'lijeet A B (J as having existed or as ittill existiuft 
til, we must think of it oh it was ori^nally presented, 
■Daly, a« spread out from C in one direction just as C U K 
1 nut iu another. A B aud D E can never coalesce 
•- pbu-v t»" they could were tbey olijects of ditTereut 
I) becBUtie tbey can never be jierceived at ouce : ve 
tt luae one t» see the other. 8o (the letters standing 
' thin(p*'t we )(et t»> ctmceive of tbe auccesaive tiebU 
a uflfT tbe nnnloxy of the several tlUnRS which we 
<»iTB in a aiuftle field. Tbey must W out- and along- 
f KAoh uthnr, and we ennreive that their juxtaposed 
H niuttt make a latt^er apace. A B C -|- C D E must, 
burt, be imagined to esiat in the fonn of A B C D E or 
' 1 at all 
! eiui Qsnally recover anything lost from atgbt by 
g cnir attention and our eyes back !n its direction ; and 

186 P8TCH0L0GT. 

through these constant changes every field of seen things 
comes at last to be thought of as always having a fringe 
of other things possible to be seen spreading in all directions 
round about it. Meanwhile the movements concomitantly 
vfiili which the various fields alternate are also felt and re- 
membered ; and gradually (through association) this and 
that movement come in our thought to suggest this or that 
extent of fresh objects introduced. GraduaUy, too, since 
the objects vary indefinitely in kind, we abstract from 
their several natures and think separately of their mere 
extents, of which extents the various movements remain as 
the only constant introducers and associates. More and 
more, therefore, do we think of movement and seen extent 
as mutuaUy involving each other, until at last (with Bain 
and J. S. Mill) we may get to regard them as synonymous, 
and say, " What is the meanina of the tvord extent^ unless it 
be possible movement?"* We forget in this conclusion 
that (whatever intrinsic extensiveness the movements may 
appear endowed with), that seen spreadoutness which is 
the pattern of the abstract extensiveness which we imagine 
came to us. originally from the retinal sensation. 

The muscular sensations of the eyeball signify this sort 
of \asible spreadoutness, just as this ^'isible spreadoutness 
may come in later experience to signify the * real ' bulks, 
distances, lengths and breadths known to touch and loco- 
motion, t To the very end, however, in us seeing men, 
the quality, the nature, the sort of thing tee mean by exten- 
siveness, would seem to be the sort of feeling which our re- 
tinal stimulations bring. 

In one deprived of sight the principles by which the 
notion of real space is constructed are the same. Skin- 
feelings take in liim the place of retinal feelings in giving 

* See, e.g., Bain's Senses and Intellect, pp. 366-7, 371. 

f When, for example, a baby looks at its own moving band, it seei 
one object at the same time that it feels another. Both interest iti 
attention, and it locates them together. But the felt object's size is the 
more constant size, just as the felt object is, on the whole, the more in- 
teresting and important object ; and so the retinal sensations become re- 
garded as its signs and have their 'real space- val ues ' interpreted in 
tangible terms. 



tk* qaality of lat^^ral spreadoutuesu, as our ntteutioii passes 
IruiD OD9 esteut of UieiD to nunther, Hwakeued by aii object 
; along. Usually the moving object is our Laiul ; 
A(<<elio({H u[ niovemeut in our joints iuvariabh' accoui- 
hf Ui« feelinfpt in tlie akiu. But the feeling of the skiu 
[Vlutt thr> bliui] man nii-mm by hiw skin ; no the aize of the 
D-f«eUnKS standH a» the absolutf' or real size, and the 
K of the joint-feeliuRs becomes a sign of these. Suppoae, 
■ examplo, a blind baby with (to make the descriptioQ 
l«r)a b]i»t«r ou hi» toe, exploring bis leg with his 
[pT-tip and feeling a jtain ahoot up sharply the iuKtant 
B Mister is touched. The experiment gives him four 
len'nt kimU of KOiiaatioD — two of them protracted, twa 
Idea. The first pair are the movement-feeling in the 
I of the upper Hub, and the movement-feeling ou 
I akin of the leg and foot These, attended t<> together, 
thnir eiLt^ntw identified as one objective apace — 
t baad move*! through the »uime space in which the 
gliea. The ttecond pair of nbjecta are the pain iu the 
"iter, and the peculiar feeling the blister gives to tho 
Their Bpaceft also fuse ; and aa each marks the end 
movement-Herien (arm moved, leg stroked^ 
WDt-Kpaves are rmpluitietiRy identilied with each 
I thid end. Were there otlier small bliutera dia- 
I down tbe leg, there would be a number of thene 
poiuta ; the niovemeut-siiaces w<iuld be ideu- 
i, not only uh totals, but point for point. * 

*TW incDhcnmra of Ihu diflerenl piimordUl letiw.'- spare* inter m 
b otun nwde ■ pnlext Tot ilcoylDg lo Ibe primitive bodily frclinici <uty 
^ukllualJty Ki all, Nutblug Is cotnniuDur tlitiii li- >i«tr ilHilil -. "BoblM 
t*" ariclDally do i«pttUa] [XTcrpUoD ; fur wheo n boby'n loo arbra lie does 
*H|dK> IbFpala In Ibe tor. IIi' inakrc Dnilrflnllr iDovi'meuUiir ileftnra, 
••daay br rftccinalcil wllboul Mog beld." Tbi'ffBClsnrv true cnutigU ; 
^ lb InlrrprelBllon U >ll wruug. Wlint ruBlly boppeua is Ib>l the ba.' 
'■• mlfL*et kb' tor' in Ike t"'" ■' ''"' '>*-' kuuWK niitbiDg of ht« ' luv ' 
]•• He bM not MWoiled lo li m a vUimI ubjoci : be hu not bandied H I 
■ttUtfiaitm; nor bavo lu normal organic HrnBatloni or conlacla yitJ 
^nmt InicrnilDg i-nou^b Ui b« diKtimlnatvd from the whole g 
firiinfot Xhc l>JO\.ot vrtnitl tits leg tu wbich it bclooga. In abc 
^ !• bHiIict a metiibor of tbi' Inbe'i optical Bpac«. of bU haud-n 
VM*, nor aa Indcpmdeni iiiRmb«r of bl« l«g-aad-fool fpacc. I 
Mly BO mental eiUIpoi^c ya hitbu tbl« lltltrpaln-opacc. What wonder. 


Just so with spaces beyond the body's limits. Continu- 
ing the joint-feeling beyond the toe, the baby hits another 
object, which he can still think of when he brings his hand 
back to its blister again. That object at the end of that 
joint-feeling means a new place for him, and the more such 
objects multiply in his experience the wider does the space 
of his concpption grow. If, wandering through the woods 
to-day by a new path, I find myself suddenly in a glade 
which affects my senses exactly as did another I reached 
last week at the end of a different walk, I believe the two 
identical affections to present the same persisting glade, 
and infer that I have attained it by two differing roads. 
The spaces walked over grow congruent by their extremi- 
ties ; though apart from the common sensation which those 
extremities give me, I should be under no necessity of con- 
necting one walk with another at all. The case in no whit 
differs when shorter movements are concerned. If, moving 
first one arm and then another, the blind child gets the 
same kind of sensation upon the hand, and gets it again 
as often as he repeats either process, he judges that he has 
touched the same object by both motions, and concludes 
that the motions terminate in a common place. From place 
to place marked in this way he moves, and adding the 
places moved through, one to another, he builds up his no- 
tion of the extent of the outer world. The seeing man's 
process is identical ; only his units, which may be succes- 
sive bird's-eye views, are much larger than in the case of 
the blind. 

then, if the pain seem a little space-world all by itself? But let the pain 
once associate itself with these other space-worlds, and its space will be- 
come pari of their space. Let the baby feel the nurse stroking the 
limb and awakening the pain every time her finger passes towards the 
toe ; let him look on and sec her finger on the toe every time the pain 
shoots up : let him handle his foot himself and get the pain whenever 
the toe comes into his fingers or his mouth ; let moving the leg exacerbate 
the pain,— and all is changed. The space of the pain becomes identified 
with that part of each of the other spaces which gets felt when it 
awakens ; and by their identity with it these parts are identified Mrith each 
other, and grow systematically connected as members of a larger extensive 

Ttdingi of Movement in Jointit. 

t linTe IfovQ l«i1 U) H}>eak of feelings which arise in 
j-iiiiU. A& tbeue feutinf^H Lave h^»u too uiucli neglected in 
F-t (-li>'l'>Ky iiitliertti, iu eutericg now somewhat uituiitely 
mbi Ibt'ir Mtiidy 1 shall proliiibl^' at the same time froHhen 
_l)ir interest of the rentier, wliidi iiD<ler the rather dry ab> 
mH of the prenoiiu page» may presumably have 

Jffbe e, by Miuply flexing my right forefinger ou its luetu- 

I trace with it« tip an inch on the palm of my }-,,/ , 
]■ luy feeling of the nize of the inch purely and -vA. 
ling in tlie skin of the palm, or have tlie nius- %Zv*.- 
oontr»ctiouH of the right hand and forearm auythiug ,44.m,c4 
<to with it ? In the preceding pages I have eontitautly 
' spatial aeusihility to be an affair uf Murfaces. At 
ktartitig. the t-nusiilf ration of the ' muscular seuHe ' aa 
-tn^^aMurer was poHtponed to a later stage, i^lauy 
of whom the foremost was Thomas Brown, in his 
Nm OM thr i'hilonophy of thr Huiiian itivJ, and of whom 
kte»t iti no lesM a Psychologist than Prof. DellxBuf,* 
that th<» couHciousuess of active musi^olur motion, 
of its own amount, is the fonii et origo of all spatial 
niment. It would seem to follow, if this theory' were 
that two ek in- fvtr lings, one of u large patch, one of a 
possess their difference of spatiuUty, not as an 
lie element, but solely by virtne of the fact that the 
got ittt points aiuxeasivelg excited, demauils 
niOMcalar contraction than the small one does. Fixed 
kdons witli the several smountsot muscularcontrac- 
rM|iiirtttl in this partjcular experience would thus ex- 

I'^aiqaol In Scmoitioiift vlmetlM Mint ellfR eiendueRT' In Revu« 

M. IT. 1ST — A* Ihe T'laofa of IbU rliRplcr are being rnTTvcIed, 

« lh« third ' H«ft ' of HOiuterlierg's Bcitrlge lur EiprrimrntelleD 

. Id whkh IliU viKOrouii /oud^ pnyi'liologUt TcnQirtu* ilf I 

d him afli-r ki hwiy n tilHiice > nioro rBillrnlly lliitii rvcr ilii- iloc- 

Klkat anacalM «>nMiloi) piopcr 1* our one mcaui uf iiirnauTing axlcn- 

l/Bshla to ivopea Ui« ilbcuwUni bete, 1 un lu duty bound to call 

~ ■ of Um reuler to U«rr M. '■ «i>rk. 

190 P8YCH0L0QT. 

plain the apparent sizes of the skin-patches, which sizes 
would consequently not be primitiYe data but derivative re- 

It seems to me thai no evidence of the muscular measure- 
merits in question exists; but that all the facts may be ex- 
plained by surface-sensibility, provided we take that of the 
joint-surfaces also into account. 

The most striking argument, and the most obvious one, 
which an upholder of the muscular theory is likely to pro- 
duce is undoubtedly this fact : if, with closed eyes, we trace 
figures in the air with the extended forefinger (the motions 
may occur from the metacarpal-, the wrist-, the elbow-, or 
the shoulder-joint indifferently), what we are conscious of in 
each case, and indeed most acutely conscious of, is the 
geometric path described by the fiuger-hj:>. Its angles, its 
subdivisions, are all as distinctly felt as if seen by the eye ; 
and yet the suriace of the finger-tip receives no impression 
at alL* But with each variation of the figure, the muscular 
contractions vary, and so do the feelings which these yield. 
Are not these latter the sensible data that make us aware of 
the lengths and directions we discern in the traced line ? 

Should we be tempted to object to this supposition of 
the advocate of perception by muscular feelings, that we 
have learned the spatial significance of these feelings by 
reiterated experiences of seeing what figure is drawn when 
each special muscular grouping is felt, so that in the last 
resort the muscular space feelings would be derived from 
retinal-surface feelings, our opponent might immediately' 
hush us by pointing to the fact that in persons bom blind 
the phenomenon in question is even more perfect than in 

If we suggest that the blind may have originally traced 
the figures on the cutaneous surface of cheek, thigh, or palm, 
and may now remember the specific figure which each pres- 
ent movement formerly caused the skin-surface to per- 
ceive, he may reply that the delicacy of the motor percep- 

* Even if the figure be drawn on a board instead of in the air, the yari- 
ttdons of contact on the finger's surface will be much simpler than the pe- 
culiarities of the traced figure itself. 



far exceeds thiit of mont of t)i« cntftneoiis surfaces ; 

in fact, we can feel a figare traced oalj in its dilTereu- 

lo ajw ak, — a figure n'tiicli we merely start to trace by 

Ip.a fignre whicli, trace<l in the same way on onr 

by the baud of aiiother, ia almofit if not wholly 

' ible. 

The champion of the mnacnlar sense seems likely to lie ^u-t^. 
tnamphaot until iiy tnvohe ihe articular oartUa^es, a» in- ^^u^ 
J anrtacei* whfwe sensibility is calle<l in plwj' by every q^jSi,, 
Tement wo make, however delicate the latter may be. 
Tn e»tab!ii4h the part they play in our f^eometriziDg, it 
I review a few facts. It Las long been known 
J medical prnctiti oners that, iu patients with ciitaueoiis 
» of a limb, whose mnscleB also are inseusible to 
■ thrill of the faradic current, a very accurate of the 
which the limb may be Hexed or extended by the 
I of another may be preserved-* Ou the other hand, 
k may have thJH seu»e of movement impaired wlieu the tuc- 
ItMnubitity is well preserved. That the pretende<l feeliuj; 
I ontf^int; innervation can play in these cases no part, is 
nionH from the fact that the movements by which the 
^■<^liADKes its position are pamsive ones, imprinted ou it 
f thp experimenting physician, The writ.-rti who have 
lf;ht a rationale of the matter have consequently been 
D by way of excluniou to assume the articular sarfacoa 
I W the aeat of the perception in question, -f 

Tkit Ih^ joint-MarJw^M tire tmutitivf appears evident from 
H fkct that in inflammation they liecome the seat of excrn- 
pains, and from the perception by everyone who 
'ifh wt-ighb* or presses against resistance, that every iu- 
fruw of the force opposing him betrays itself to his con- 
rantun^iui principally by the starting-out of new feelings 
irUuB incrcatM- of old ones, in or about the joints. If the 
■imrtore and mtxie of mutual application of two articular 
■ntftoea he taken into account, it will appear that, granting 
tiwmr&cuH to Ar mUHitive, uo more favorable meehauical 

■8(* for czatnpio DudtoDnc. Elcrlrlwilon lnc»llB£e, pp. 737. 770. Ley. 

I. Vl«ihcn»-« Arelik. Bd. Il-vu. |I8W). 

JILf., EulenlitirK. I<ebrb. <t. NcnrciikniikheUeii (Berllu), ISTH, i. 8 

192 * P8TCH0L0OT. 

conditions could be possible for the delicate calling of the 
sensibility into play than are realized in the minutely grad- 
uated rotations and firmly resisted variations of pressure 
Involved in every act of extension or flexion. Nevertheless 
it is a great pity that we have as yet no direct testimony, 
no expressions from patients with healthy joints accident- 
ally laid open, of the impressions they experience when the 
cartilage is pressed or rubbed. 

The first approach to direct evidence, so far as I know, 
is contained in the paper of Lewinski,* publibhed in 1879. 
This observer had a patient the inner half of whose leg 
was anaesthetic. When this patient stood up, he had a 
curious illusion about the position of his limb, which dis- 
appeared the moment he lay down again : he thought him- 
self knock'hneed. If, as Lewinski says, we assume the inner 
half of the joint to share the insensibility of the corre- 
sponding part of the skin, then he ought to feel, when the 
joint-surfaces pressed against each other in the act of 
standing, the outer half of the joint most strongly. But 
this is the feeling he would also get whenever it was by any 
chance sought to force his leg into a knock-kneed attitude. 
Lewinski was led by this case to examine the feet of cer- 
tain ataxic patients with imperfect sense of position. He 
found in every instance that when the toes were flexed and 
draum upon at the same time (the joint-surfaces drawn 
asunder) all sense of the amount of flexion disappeared. 
On the contraiy, when he pressed a toe m, whilst flexing it, 
the patient's appreciation of the amount of flexion was 
much improved, evidently because the artificial increase of 
articular pressure made up for the pathological insensibil- 
ity of the parts. 

Since Lewinski's paper an important experimental re- 
search by A. Goldscheider t has appeared, which completely 
establishes our point This patient observer caused his 
fingers, arms, and legs to be passively rotated upon their 
various joints in a mechanical apparatus which registered 
both the velocity of movement impressed and the amount 

* • Ueber den Kraftsinn,' Virchow's Archiv. Bd. Lxxvii. 184. 
t Archiv f. (Aoat. u) Physiologic (1889), pp. 369, 540. 


^nttatiou. No HctivH tuiis<.'ulai- coutraL-tiou took 

Atninimal feltiiiuonntsof rotation were in all canes 

Hmall. Iwing much Irrh than a HiDfi^le aQgulai' df- 

i:m>iii&ll tlie jointH except those of the tiugeru. 8iich (lis- 

pSao-imMitK us thew.thc aiitlior Baya (p. 4y0j,caij banlly be 

lUtnclmi by the t've. The poiut of applicatiou of the foice 

»hirli rotated the limb ina<le mi ttiffereiice in the result. 

EL-1«tiimH rotiml the bip-joint, for example, were its deli- 

.^irlj fi'lt wbvn thu U'n was hiiii^ by the heel as when it 

-A-bn&K ^y the thit^h whilst the iiioveuieutH were per- 

"ii*d Aoa'Atheaia of the skin produced byinductiou-cur- 

• -WeImi tiAi] no diittnrbiiiK effect lui the perception, nor 

il tlu> rariouH tle^rueH of pressnre of the moviuK force 

[•>D the shin affect it. It became, in fact, all tliii more 

i-tiK'i in proportion aa the concomitaut presHure-feelin^ 

•'r> -rlimiiinlt>>l by artificial aruvathenia. When the joints 

llt-m«.-l5eH. however, were made artificially ampathetic tbe 

■•■nvjiti' >n of the movement grew obtuse and the angular 

tAtiniM bad to be much initreaeed before they were [ler- 

ptibl*. All thette facta pro^e acciirdiiig U> Heir Gold- 

■ ' -!<f"r. that t}if jmnt aur/acat and these <ttoiw are the Htitrt- 3^*"*^^ 

■ /-''ni .1/ tht imfnnuiitmJt In/ which the vtnvemrafu of our / 'y(t "^ 

■ 1 Tt nrr immfdialfiff prrcrivnf. 

A[i[ilvtnf( thin reault, which aeemH iuvoluerable, t<> tbe 

™»- 'i( tile tracing! fiuHf r-lip, we woe that our perception of 

l)ir latter gives no counteunuce bi the theory of tbe niuei- 

't\u MUMe. fVe intiubitaUtf locaJixr the Jiwfer-iip itt the «wc- 

■■■'nr piititl* t)f Us piith htf tnetiitaof the wn»nlif»ut which ur 

iir from oar jointt. Bat if this is so, it may be aaked, 

■■ lj; do we feel the figure to bo traced, not within tbe joint 

ilwU, bat ill HDcli ou altogether different place? And why 

In *n feel it mo much larger than it really is? 

1 will Miawer tbeae t|nestionM by aakiug another : Why 
ik> w** more onr jointa at all? Surely to gain HonuHhiug 
aoR vmlnalilr than the insipid joint-feelings theinselves. 
Awl these more intorentiDg feelingts are in the main pro- 
■Inml npon the •t-i'n of the nionng part, or of some other 
part over which it ]MUMe»t, or upon the eye. With niove- 
■ of the fingera we vxplore the uoutiguratiou of all real 
I with which we have to deal, our own bodvas weltan 


foreign things. Nothing that interests us is located in the 
joint ; everything that interests iis either is some part of 
our skin, or is something that we see as we handle it. The 
cutaneously felt and the seen extents come thus to figure 
as the important things for us to concern ourselves with. 
Every time the joint moves, even though we neither see, 
nor feel cutaneously, the reminiscence of skin-events and 
sights which formerly coincided with that extent of move- 
ment, ideally awaken as the movement's import, and the 
mind drops the present sign to attend to the import alone. 
The joint-sensation itself, as such, does not disappear in 
the process. A little attention easily detects it, with all 
its line peculiarities, hidden beneath its vaster suggestions ; 
so that really the mind has two space-perceptions before 
it, congruent in form but different in scale and place, either 
of which exclusively it may notice, or both at once, — the 
joint-space which iifeds and the real space which it means. 
The joint-spaces serve so admirably as signs because of 
their capacity for parallel variation to all the peculiarities 
of external motion. There is not a direction in the real 
world nor a ratio of distance which cannot be matched bv 
some direction or extent of joint-rotation. Joint-feelings, 
like all feelings, are roomy. Specific ones are contrasted 
inter se as different directions are contrasted within the 
same extent. If I exteud my arm straight out at the 
shoulder, the rotation of the shoulder- joint will give me one 
feeling of movement ; if then I sweep the arm forward, the 
same joint will give me another feeling of movement. 
Both these movements are felt to happen in space, and 
differ in specific quality. Why shall not the specificness 
of the quality just consist in the feeling of a peculiar direc- 
tion ? * Why may not the several joint-feelings be so many 
perceptions of movement in so many different directions ? 
That we cannot explain why they should is no presumption 
that they do not, for we never can explain why any sense- 
organ should awaken the sensation it does. 

♦ Direction in its * first intention,' of course ; direction with which so 
far we merely become acquainted, and about which we know nothing save 
perhaps its diflfercnce from another direction a moment ago experienced In 

tli«» oamA WAV ! 

the same way ! 


Bat if the joint-feeUnfrs are directiouu and exteDts, 

-uili&g ill reUtJOQ to each other, the task of associatiou iu 

utorprating their import iu eve- or skiu'tcrius is a good deal 

■iapUfie<L Let the movement he, of a certain joint, derive 

iti aboolnle spure-valne from the L-titaueoim feeling it is 

klvm capable of eugendering ; theu the longer movement 

tM of the itauKi joint will be judged to have a greater 

if«re-vatae, oven though it may never have wholly merged 

•tUi a Hkiu -experience. So of differences of direction : uo 

«wli joiul-tliffereuce = »o much skin -difference ; therefore, 

mnrr jomtdiffereuce = more Bkin-difference. In fact, the 

f-<J-/teli«g aiit excellently serve «« a map on n reduced scale, oj 

r^ily which the imiujimilion can iiienti/y at its pleasure 

i'i ikis or that newtiNr extenmon simullaneawily Intotim tn 

■•» ofVr M«y. 

Alit^it the joiitt-foeling iu itself acquires an emotional 
ii!<-ffirt, — which happeua whenever the joint is inflamed 
udpuoful, — the secondary suggestions fail to arise, and 
tbe DMiTemeal in ffilt where it is, and in its intrinsic scale of 

The localization of the joiut-feeling in a space simulta- 

' o«Iy ktinwu otlierwise (i-e, Ut eye or skin), is what is 

uiaionly callnd the extraditum or rccevlric projection of the 

■■ii»g. Iu the preceding chapter I said agood deal on this 

jt'^^ct ; l«it we miwt now see a little mor^i closely jnst what 

>;ip«iii8 iu thin inxtancv of it. The content of the joint- 

'-"-li&g, tn begin with, Is an object, aud is in itself a place. 

Fitrit to be plarKl,Htiy in Ihedboic, the eiUtw as seen or haa- 

dW nuMt ulreaity have became another object for the mind, 

' I Imtv Mid Iianliy Kuylhlng nlHXii assiictnlinnK oiih Tlminl ipaor fn 
Ht larcjakag kocount. bccAiiH' 1 wIiIifU Iu ivprcscui a pr»cc«H wbji^h the 
tHMlMd Um mvIdk tama miglit n|iiatly elwre. It ia U> Ur ootk't-d Ituil 
tkr^KC •ti((«iit«l 111 tbr l^^llgllIaIiolJ wlif^n tti« Jolul luovei). &n<l pro- 
jmai ID Ibr ilUlBDce of Itir I1n;;cr-lip. ih not rcprrwDlcd wt »ay tpieifit 
Ala-tMCt- WlwllliRNvlnirnuia Imagines laaviiiblcpnlh; wtint Ibi' blind 
KM tB^fiMM li rnllier > ^Dcrlc ituBgv, »□ abatrnction from nutoy skin- 
frnta okiiw luckl (Ifina lisvr neutralized each oth«r, luii) Ictt uotbtng btit 
iMr flonnoa TwiUir« Iwhlad. Wc nban iic« m wu go on ibiil ibl* genetic 
UaCnetloB of BpMCe-inftgiiitudv from Ibu vntioua lo<»l pccultKritics of feci- 
l*(«1ittli aeeampaiiled tt wbrn it woa for the Ont time fi^ll. uccura un • 
"«ikkntble ■»!« in Uic BCqulrcd pent^ptionii of lillnil tu> wdl tu of w«lDg 

196 P8YCH0L0QT, 

and with its place as thus known, the place which the joint- 
feeling fills must coalesce. That the latter should be felt 
* in the elbow ' is therefore a * projection ' of it into the place 
of another object as much as its being felt in the finger-tip 
or at the end of a cane can be. But when we say * projec- 
tion ' we generally have in our mind the notion of a there as 
contrasted with a here. What is the here when we say that the 
joint- feeling is there ? The * here ' seems to be the spot 
which the mind has chosen for its own post of observation, 
usually some place within the head, but sometimes iftdthin 
the throat or breast — not a rigorously fixed spot, but a 
region from any portion of which it may send forth its vari- 
ous acts of attention. Extradition from either of these- 
regions is the common law under which we perceive the 
whereabouts of the north star, of our own voice, of the con- 
tact of our teeth with each other, of the tip of our finger^ 
of the point of our cane on the ground, or of a movement 
in our elbow-joint. 

But /or the distance betiveen the * here ' and the * there ' to be 
fdty the entire intervening space must be itsdf an object of per- 
ception. The consciousness of this intervening space is the 
sine qud non of the joint-feeling's projection to the farther 
end of it. When it is filled by our own bodily tissues (as 
where the projection only goes as far as the elbow or fin- 
ger-tip) we are sensible of its extent alike by our eye, by 
our exploring movements, and by the resident sensations 
which fill its length. When it reaches beyond the limits 
of our body, the resident sensations are lacking, but limbs 
and hand and eye suffice to make it known. Let me, for 
example, locate a feeling of motion coming from my elbow- 
joint in the point of my cane a yard beyond my hand. 
Either I see this yard as I flourish the cane, and the seen 
end of it then absorbs my sensation just as my seen elbow 
might absorb it, or I am blind and imagine the cane as an 
object continuing my arm, either because I have explored 
both arm and cane with the other hand, or because I have 
pressed them both along my body and leg. If I project my 
joint- feeling farther still, it is by a conception rather than a 
distinct imagination of the space. I think: * farther,' 'thrice 
as far,' etc.; and thus get a symbolic image of a distant 


)>«[li lit wliirh I point* But tlie ' nljHorption ' of the joiut- 
!re[in([ l>v tli>^ tliKtaut spot, iu whatever terms tlie Intt^r 
m» be Appre)iPU<le(l, ix never anj'thiug hut that eoHles- 
•ni* iiiti> one 'tkiiift' already spokeu of on page 184, of 
■*li»(rT»Tr (iiffen'iit nenitiHe objects interest our attention at 

2. Feeliiu/i </ Musctdur Vnnti-nclion. 

KMcl<^rH ver»pd in psychological litenitnre will hai-e 

-.-W, in oar acconnt thus far, the usual iuvocatiou of 

till- mn-tculor nense,' This word is used with extreme 

iipiii-ncxx Ii> cover all resident sensations, whether of 

■nboa or poHitinn, in our raeralwrs, am) even to designate 

th' tap|iotted feeling of efferent discharge from the brain. 

W» iball later Hee good reason to deny the existence of the 

htttr («eliDg. We have tMTonnteil for the bett4T [lart at least 

«f tbe resident feelings of motion in limbs by the sensibility 

ti\Lr ft rtirn I ar surfaces. The skin and ligaments also must 

n- fvelingn awakeuei) as they are strettihed or squeezed 

:i tIeuoEt or extension. And I am inclined to think that 

''^ tmtnlunu tif our contracitv0 miistiea ifiemnelves prnbnhly play 

V nuJI » pnri in building up our ex<ict hwu^fd4jf of spar^ ns 

f^ydntot'tfwtaliona which tw poenfUH. Tlie muscles, indeed, 

]>iay an nll-importaiit part, but it is through the remote 

•ffrvt nf their con tractions ou other seDsitive parts, not 

lkr»D)(b their own rei«ident sensations being aroused. In 

(itlier wordu, mnjicvlar contraniion is only ivdirectiy trtsiru- 

mnl'i, im yiving m apiicr-pemjttions, by its effvcla on xutfaceg. 

la akin and retina it produces a motion of the stimulus 

the aarface ; in joiuta it produces a motion of the 

Dpitti uach other — such motion being by far the 

r^e t44l ralBrECtncnt nf a lyntcm of w-Rutlonii b}- Itic mluil h noUi- 
Viiioa U full of It : nnd in tbe manual nru, where k 
M |Ma B tool larger Ihaii Ibu one he ia acuiaUiniLfl In ntid tuw sud- 
all lilt niovFiii«iii* Ui li* acale. or wbcre be turn in execui* 
irvt o( nuiTcuuiiita In nii unnntiirat ]io>lIinii nf ImmIj'; whot? ii 
i^frt macu an instrumcDi wlib iiniuuAlly limad or nnrrow krys: 
i»aaMahBalo&ll«rlli«»lir of bla bADilwriUng— weaeeliow (intniptly 
■> Mind nmltlplUa ooro tor all. m ll wrre. Ibe wbole Mrlea of lu u|h.-i»- 
ONa hjr a cotMUuil tacior. and httt not to iraiibic ilwK atler ihat wltb fui- 

Itet •i|w4«uMI nf lliu iIclalN 

198 P8TCH0L00T. 

most delicate maimer of exciting the surfaces in question. 
One is tempted to doubt whether the muscular sensibility 
as such plays even a subordinate part as sign of these 
more immediately geometrical perceptions which are so 
uniformly associated with it as effects of the contraction 
objectively \'iewed. 

For this opinion many reasons can be assigned. First, 
it seems a priori improbable that such organs as muscles 
should give us feelings whose variations bear any exact 
proportion to the spaces traversed when they contract 
As G. E. Miiller says,* their sensorj' nerves must be excited 
either chemically or by mechanical compression whilst the 
contractions last, and in neither case can the excitement be 
proportionate to the position into which the limb is thrown. 
The chemical state of the muscle depends on the previous 
work more than on the actually present contraction ; and 
the internal pressure of it depends on the resistance offered 
more than on the shortening attained. The intrinsic mus- 
cidar sensations are Jikdy therefore to he merely those of massive 
strain or fatigue, and to carry no accurate discrimination tcith 
d^^i^ I ' them of lengths of path moved through. 

Empirically we find this probability confirmed by many 
facts. The judicious A. W. Yolkman observes t that : 

** Muscular feeling gives tolerably fine evidence as to the existence 
of movement, but hardly any direct information about its extent or 
direction. We are not aware that the contractions of a supinator 
longus have a wider range than those of a supinator brevis; and that 
the fibres of a bipenniform muscle contract in opposite directions is a fact 
of which the muscular feeling itself gives not the slightest intimation. 
Muscle- feeling belongs to that class of general sensations which tell us 
of our inner states, but not of outer relations ; it does not belong among 
the space-perceiving .senses." 

E. H. AVeber in his article Tastsinn called attention 
to the fact that muscular movements as large and strong 
as those of the diaphragm go on continually without our 
perceiWng them as motion. 

G. H. Lewes makes the same remark. When we think 
of our muscular sensations as movements in space, it is. 

* PtlOger's Archiv, xlv. 65. 

t Untersuchungen im Gebiote der Optik, Leipzig (1868), p. 188. 


bvnose we \i%\« iiigraiued with them io our imaginatiou a 
mnmnent od a Miirfnce siiDaltaQec)u»ly felt 

■TbiB nbMwTor wcbrenthc there is a (mntntctimi of llie niiiHclcs 
' 'he riU fti)cl Ibe iliaptiragin. Kinco wo an the ohe«l exiinnding. we 
. ui« It M ■ Dovompnt nnd cnn only think of it as biii!|i. But (he (lin- 
>r>^ iImK U not »eon. and consequently by no one who i» nut pliysi- 
'qiotll; ralighlpDcd on Ihi.- point is this diaphragm ihougtat of in 
^I'lTBMiL Nay, «Tun wlien toid b; n pliysiologist that the dinpbragm 
^'iro u. («cb brrMhing, r^vcry otiti wlio liaa not seen it moving down- 
•id pkturea it as an upward movement, because the chest moves 

A j)eniotui] experience of my own seems strongly to cor- 
' 1>"nil« ttiis view. For years I have been familiar, ilmioK 
: •' Kct of ^aptiig, with u large, rotmil, smooth sensation in 
'' - rf^on of the Ihrout, a Hecsation oharacterifitic nl gap- 
'.,; um! nothing el»o, but which, although I liail oft«<ii 

- odered about it, never suggested to my raiiid the nintiou 
I iuvthibg. Tin- roadfr probably knows from his uwn 

l^riruptr oxaetly what feeling I mean. It was not till one 

■yj stodents told me, that I learned its objective caiiHe. 

'' wt! look int<> the mirror while gaping, we seo that at the 

'itwnt w« have thiit feeling the hanging palate riws by 

" - (Vintraction of its intrinsic musules. The contraction 

'lieM" muHclea and the compression of the [lalatine luu- 

:■> Kii'mbrane »rv what occasion the feeling; and I was 

hnrt oMtoniahed that, coming from so small an organ, 

Miild api>ear oo voluminous. Now the curious jioint ix 

I— tiiat iio soouor hati 1 learned by the eye its objective 

i.'i-Hignificuuce, than I found myself enabled mentally to 

-■' it on a movement upwards of a body in the situation of 

I- uvula. When I now have it, my fancy Injtftn it, so to 

■j-ai, with the image of the rising uvula; and it nhaorfm 

■<.•■ imai;e easily and naturally. In a word, a luuscular 

T:tra«>tiou gave me » sensation whereof I was unable dur- 

^ forty years to interpret a motor meaning, of which two 

iiji-*H of the eye made me permaiieiitly the master. To my 

.rid no further protjf in ueethnl of the fact that musculiur 

i.tracti<in, merely as such, need nut be perceived dirtHrtly 

- ") ranch motion through space. 

300 P8YtU0L0QY, 

Take again the contractions of the muscles which make 
the eyeball rotate. The feeling of these is supposed b\ 
many writers to play the chief part in our perceptions ol 
extent The space seen between two things means, accord 
ing to these authors, nothing but the amount of contractioi 
which is needed to carry the fovea from the first thing to th< 
second. But close the eyes and note the contractions ii 
themselves (even when coupled as they still are with ihi 
delicate surface sensations of the eyeball rolling under th< 
lids), and we are surprised at finding how vague their space 
import appears. Shut the eyes and roll them, and you cai 
with no approach to accuracy tell the outer object whicl 
shall first be seen when you open them again.* Moreover, i 
our eye-muscle-contractions had much to do with gi^ang u 
our sense of seen extent, we ought to have a natural illusioi 
of which we find no trace. Since the feeling in the muscle: 
grows disproportionately intense as the eyeball is rollec 
into an extreme eccentric position, all places on the extreme 
margin of the field of view ought to appear farther fron 
the centre than they really are, for the fovea cannot get tc 
them without an amount of this feeling altogether in excess 
of the amount of actual rotation, t When we turn to th( 

* Yolkmann. op. cit. p. 189. Compare also what Hering says of the in 
ability in his own case to make after-images seem to move when he roll 
his closed eyes in their sockets ; aud of the insigDifibance of his feelings o 
convergence for the sense of distance (Beitrftgc zur Physiologie, 1861-2 
pp. 31, 141). Uelmholtz also allows to the muscles of convergence a verj 
feeble share in producing our sense of the third dimension (PbysiologisclK 
Optik, 649-59). 

t Compiire Lipps. Psychologische Studien (1885). p. 18. and the othei 
arguments given on pp. 12 to 27. The most plausible reasons far contrac 
tions of the eyeball -muscles being admitted as original contributors to thi 
perception of extent, are those of Wuudt, Physiologische Psychologic, ii 
96-100. They are drawn from certain constant errors in our estimate o: 
lines and angles ; which, however, are susceptible, all of them, of differen 
interpretations (see some of them further on). — Just as my MS. goe: 
to the printer, Herr Mtlnsterberg's Beitrilge zur ex|)eriraentellen Psy 
chologie, Heft 2, conies into my hands with experiments on the measure 
ment of space recorded in it, which, in the author's view, prove the feeling 
of muscular strain to be a principal factor in our vision of extent. As 
Mtlnsterberg worked three hours a day for a year and a half at comparing 
the length of lines, seen with his eyes in different positions ; and as he care 
fully averaged and * i>ercented * 20.000 oljsi'rvations. his conclusion must b< 
ilsteneil to with great re8|>ect. Briefly it is this, that " our judgments ot 


mQ<cl«'K (>{ the \Kniy tit liir){e ^e 6ud tlie same vagueueKa. 
(■■ildwheider found that the miiiiniftl perceived rotatiou iif 

■ I' <i-|h<m| iid » roni|uuiiH>n f>f ilic Inicniilty of tliefccliugHoF movement 

• L. <r, iii>r m nur eyi-lMll-muscIn m wu gliitiec over ilie JUlnnFe, and 

• 111 (.1- niih iLe leimUoua of llglit" ip H2(. The facia upon wliieh 

iiir i-'ii'luu Ih Imtvd Hi-0 rrrlftiu couglmit Frrcir" whicb MniJGtiTl>frg 

l»iul vninjlDg OS ttic BtHDiUnl or given iDlvrval wns to tbe riglit or ibe 
kn vt ihe iDtL-ml ki ht marked oB as ujiiul io it, or na it was iHiove or 
Wkiw IL. ur iUmmI in noine more i-oiiipUoilt^il rpl&tloii ntlll He Kduiili llint 
kcdaaoiMplKiD all lli« orrors la dviHll, iiud ilmiwe "alaud iMfTore results 
■iirb KviB (urpri*lng and uol Ui be uDruvelluil, tKicaiue we riintiot nunlfXe 
Ik tletncDto which cnlvr fiito ihc [-umplex ecuuiiIod whli:li we receive." 
B<nb«liMendaubl wii«l«v('r of lb« grnurnl fact " Uiat llm nKivenicDIiof 
llw •'5'n uil tbe wiue of Ibi-ir poailioD wlicn Hxed Bxert so decisive an 
tol]'iru<v oil our eMiuialo of the HpaceH tmvu. thai tlui i-rrurB uiunol puwi- 
tiii l<-vi[iinlnctl Uy anything el«e tbau Ilie nioveineiil'fceliugR and their 
n|'"ilurliaii> In tbe inemoi;" (pp. IflS. 167). It is prtniiniptuoua to doubt 

• mm a upiaton wbca ytm haven't bnil h<)t cxprricnoi' ; and yet IhiTc are ■ 

KiMlwr oIpuinlawhicLt luakt.- mi' fc«l likt? BUBpeodiDg judgmtnl In r<^giini 

■■flrrrll.'a tUctim. llefuuiiil. tori:;iiuiiplv. acoiialHiil teudvncy to undvr- 

Mtaui* EalrrvaU lying lo llio riglit. aud Io ovrrealimnlc intervals lying 

I'Mbc Irft. He lugrnlouily explains tbisns a roiull of tUu babit of rvad- 

'■'I, olikk mlo* U8 IO tniivc our cyt-s easily along siraiglit lines from left 

' rt^-hl. whenaa in looking from right to left wu move theni in curved 

un antHi the page. As wb meamra tnletnaU lu itrtiigbt Hum. It costa 

kirv nuiriihir rHort IO measure from Hglil to left than Ibr otber way, 

Mil aa Inlcrval liing Io the left iie«ms Io us conaetiuenlly longer than It 

nmBf y. Now 1 liavi- been a reailer for more years than lltrr MQnsler- 

Wy. akil jcl wilti me tlierc iaa strongly pronounced error Ibe otber way. 

b b iha right wanl-lylng Interval whicb lo mo m«uis louger ilinn it really 

la Motcovct. llerr M. weam concave s|>r4'iacles, and looked Ibmiigb thorn 

«U Ua tmdjifnl. May it uoi be that eomi.- of Ihe errors were due to di»- 

knloa of tbo nllniil image, as tbe eye looked do longer Ibrough Ibe centre 

bM ikitMigti ibp margin of ilie g]ate1 In abort, with all tbo presumptions 

wMiA i>* b>r* anin against muncular coDlractlon being dednlloly felt aa 

k^lh, I lliink thai there may Ix' cxplanalloDH of Hrrr M.'s rcaulls whicb 

lM»« ncapTtI «Ti-u lila aagacity ; and I call for a suspension of Judgment 

«Mil Uiey ilnll liBve lie^n ooullrmed by other otwerveni. 1 ilo not myself 

4a«fei ilMl our feeling; of t««n extent may be altera by concomitant mua- 

calar f««titic*' !■> tiiaptcr XVU (pp. S4-M) we mw many examples of 

tteDiir alletaAions. inirrferenrca with, or cxaltationi of, Ihc seJiHiry effect 

W HOC ncrre prucos liy anntlu'r. I do not «cit why curreula from tbe 

mmtitm or ryrlhla. coming In at Ihe same time with a retinal imiireasioD. 

wlj[W nal make the latier wreiii bigger, in tlie tame way thai a greater I'n- 

tnaOt In the Telliinl siiiiiulalloii inak<i> it seem bigger -, or in Ibe waj Ibat 

* ftvMrr eaieni uf lurfac-e exclii'il ninkea Ilie color of llic surface M«m 

aUwapFT, or i( it lie a ikln 'Surface, maken its heat aecni greater ; ur la the 

•«f thai Ibe coldnete of the dollar on liie foreliend lln WclH-r'it <ild ei|M'ri- 

■trvts) nkih' Ihe dnllar u^'in li'itvler. Iliil tlilk 1> a pifnutogiml way . nud 


a limb about a joint was no less when the movement was 
' active ' or produced by muscular contraction than when it 
was * passively ' impressed.* The consciousness of active 
movement became so blunt when the joint (alone!) was 
made anaesthetic by faradization, that it became evident 
that the feeling of contraction could never be used for 
fine discrimination of extents. And that it was not used 
for coarse discriminations appeared clear to Gk)ldscheider 
from certain other results which are too circumstantial 
for me to quote in detaiLf His general conclusion is that 
we feel our movements exclusivelv in our articular sur- 
faces, and that our muscular contractions in all probability 
hardly occasion this sort of perception at alL % 

My conclusion is that the ' muscular sense * must fall 

back to the humble position from which Charles Bell raised 

it, and no longer figure in Psychology as the leading organ 

in space-perception which it has been so long 'cracked up' 

% to be. 

Before making a minuter study of Space as apprehended 
by the eye, we must turn to see what we can discover of 
space as known to the blind. But as we do so, let us cast 
^^T ) a glance upon the results of the last pages, and ask our- 
selves once more whether the building up of orderly 
space-perceptions out of primitive incoherency requires 
any mental powers beyond those displayed in ordinary in- 
tellectual operations. I think it is obvious — granting the 
spacial quale to exist in the primitive sensations — that dis- 
crimination, association, addition, multiplication, and divi- 
sion, blending into generic images, substitution of similars, 
selective emphasis, and abstraction from uninteresting de- 
tails, are quite capable of giving us all the space-percep- 

tbe bigness gained is that of the retinal image after all. If I understand 
MQusterberg's meaning, it is quite different from this : the bigness be- 
longs to the muscular feelings, as such, and is merely cutociated with those 
of the retina. Tfm is what 1 deny. 

* Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol.\l889». p. 542. 

t Ibid, p. 496. 

\ Ibid. p. 497. Goldscheider thinks that our muscles do not even give 
us the feeling of remUinre, that being also due to the articular surfaces: 
whilst wnghi is due to the tendons. Ibid, p. 541. 


tiouM we li«ve »u far studied, witliuut the aid of a,ay mya- 

kritiQx ' mi-ittul i-heoiititry' ur power of ' syutlieuis ' to create 

I ileucjiU abaeut from the origiual data of feeling. It citu- 

)t br too Htnuigl V urged in the face uf iii,v>ttical attetii|itK, 

r leKined, that tliere is not a laadimirk, aot a length, 

X> poiut of tlie compass in real space which is uot mtun. 

of our ffielingH, either experienced directly as a preseu- 

1 ur ideally ttngKested by anotUer feeliug which has 

« bi sene as its sign. In degrading some sensations 

kiUie rank of signs and exalting others to that of realities' 

I'liguified, we >(Uii>oth out the wrinkles of our first chaotic 

■girewtiiios uud make a continuous order of what was a 

tlicr incoherent multiplicity. But tlie content of the order 

M identical with that of the multiplicity — sensational,* 

1, through and through. 


The blind mau'n construe tion of real space differs from^ 
of the seeing man most obviously in the larger part 
fieii synthesis plays in it, an<l the relative subordination . 

fuialysis. The seeing baby's eyes take in the whole ^r^AX 
"QB at oacA, aurl lUscriminative attention must arise in 
■ before single objects are ^"iaually discerueiL The blind 
1 the contrary, must form his mental image of the 
by the addition, piece to piece, of parts wldch he 
1 to know successively. With our eyes we may ap- 
)hend instantly, tu an enormous bird's-eye view, a land- 
«»pe which the blind man ik condemned to Itnild up hit 
hjr bit after weeks perhaps of exploration. We are exactly .ai 
ia bis predieaiueut, however, for spaces which exceed our 
rtmtal range. Wo think the ocean as a whole by multiply- 
ing n«Dtally the impression we get at any moment when at 
mm. Tbe distance between New York and San Francisco 
^B enmpnted in days' joameys ; that from earth to suu is so 
^^faay times the earth's diameter, eti^'. ; and of longer dis- 
^^^eell Htill we way bo sikid to have no adequate mental 
nuf^ whatever, bnt only nnnierical verbal symbols. 

Bnt the symbol will often give us the eniotioual olTect 
of the perception. Huch expressions as the abysmal vault 
of beaveo, tlie endless expanse of ocean, etc., summaiize 

204 P8YCH0L00T, 

many computations to the imagination, and give the sense 
of an enormous horizon. So it seems with the blind. Thev 
multiply mentally the amount of a distinctly felt freedom 
to move, and gain the immediate sense of a vaster freedom 
still. Thus it is that blind men are never without the con- 
sciousness of their horizon. They all enjoj^ travelling, es- 
pecially with a companion who can describe to them the 
objects they pass. On the prairies they feel the great open- 
ness ; in valleys they feel closed in ; and one has told me 
that he thought few seeing people could enjoj' the view 
from a mountain-top more than he. A blind person on 
entering a house or room immediately receives, from the 
reverberations of his voice and steps, an impression of its 
dimensions, and to a certain extent of its arrangement. 
The tympanic sense noticed on p. 140, supra^ comes in to 
help here, and possibly other forms of tactile sensibility not 
yet understood. Mr. W. Hanks Levy, the blind author of 
* Blindness and the Blind' (London), gives the following ac- 
count of his powers of perception : 

** Whether within a liouse or in the open air, whether walking or 
standing still, I can tell, although quite blind, when I am opposite an 
object, and can perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky. 
I can also detect whether it be a solitary object or a continuous fence ; 
whether it be a close fence or composed of open rails ; and often whether 
it be a wooden fence, a brick or stone wall, or a quick-set hedge. 1 
cannot usually perceive objects if much lower than my shoulder, but 
fiometimes very low objects can be detected. This may depend on the 
nature of the objects, or on some abnormal stato of the atmosphere. 
The currents of air can have nothing to do with this power, as the state 
of the wind does not directly affect it; the sense of hearing has nothing 
to do with it, as when snow lies thickly on the ground objects are more 
distinct, although the footfall cannot be heard. I seem to perceive 
objects through the skin of my face, and to have the impressions im- 
mediately transmitted to the brain. The only part of my body possess- 
ing this power is my face ; this 1 have ascertained by suitable exiKjri- 
ments. Stopping my ears does not interfere with it, but covering my 
face with a thick veil destroys it altogether. None of the five senses 
have anything to do with the existence of this power, and the circum- 
stances above named induce me to call this unrecognized sense by the 
name of 'facial perception.' . . . When passing along a street I can 
distinguish shops from private houses, and even point out the doors and 
windows, etc., and this whether the doora be shut or open. When a 
window consists of one entire sheet of glass, it is more difficult to dis 



ftfltie oftmpcwrd ola number of sqirII paues. Fruoi thu it 

ir ihal glass is a bad uonducMr of sensation, or at aiiy rate 

Miun >pt>ciiUly I'rninected with (hu senate. When objects 

« Ibcv nro ppri^piveil. ilie sensation seems to come in an ublique 

iiw (rwa the obji^i lo ihi- upper part of ihe face. While wnllciiig with 

ttnewl In Foitvst Ijinc, !*tratford. I said, pointing to a fern* wlikih 

, Nptnlid Ui« nmd from u field, 'Those rails are not quite as high He 

Uw •twoldar. ' He Inoked at Ibem, and said the}' were higher. We. 

tneaaurcd. and found them about thre« inobta lowt^r than my 

At Ihd limi* of making tliis oliscri'ation I was about fonr 

■ Um mil*. Certainly in this instance facial perception was 
i thai) sigtit. Whi-'n tiie lower |iart of a fence is brick- 

■ upper part rails, the fact, cah be detected, and the line 

■ tvo me«t Maaily |>i>ivcive<l. Irregularities in liuighl, and pro- 
Maiid idontati»iis in walla, can also be discovered." 

ilccordiDg to Mr. Levy, thiH j>owt>r of seeing witli tlie 

) is diniiiiisbed by a fog, but not by ordiaiiri' dark- 

"" t due time lie could tell when a cloud obscured the 

I hot he hfts now lost that power, which lie hus 

yaevera) potvons to po»ueH8 who are totally bliud. 

«*fl^<^ctM of aqueonu vapor HUggest immediately timt 

■rtiutjotis ia the beat radiat«d by the objects may be the 

in-e of the }K>roeptiou. Que blind geutleinuii, Mr. Kil- 

ne, aa ituttniotor in the Perkinu lustitutiou in South 

m, who haft the power npokeu of ia an uauuual degree, 

', however, to have no more delicate a ^eiise of tem- 

. hiM face than ordinary per«iou!4. He himself 

ut his ears had aothiug to do with the faculty 

lomplete atopfiage of theiu, uot only with cottnu 

I with putty on tup of it, by nb<diHlmig the perception 
entinlj, prov4>d hts first impresxion to l>e erroneous. Many 
bUad men aay immediately that their ears are concerned 
ia the matter. 

Soanda certainly play a far more prominent part in 
thm mental life of the blind than in onr own. In taking a 
walk through the country, the niutationti of Houud, far and 
M*r, couHtitut'.' tb(>ir chief delight. And to a grvat extent 
U>«ir imsfciuation of diMtance and ot objectH moving fruin 
uoe diataut it)>ot to another »e<>mi4 to consint in thinking 
bow ■ certain aonority would be modified by the change 
a( plMcB. It is unqaeMiouable that the semi-ciccular-cuual 
fatiingt pl>5 a gr<M>t purt in di-riniiig tht; [Hjinta of the com- 


206 P8TCH0L00T. 

pass and the direction of distant spots, in the blind as in 
us. We start towards them by feelings of this sort ; and so 
many directions, so many different-feeling starts.* 

The only point that offers any theoretic difficulty is the 
prolongation into space of the direction, after the start. We 
saw, ten pages back, that for extradition to occur beyond the 
skin, the portion of skin in question and the space beyond 
must form a common object for some other sensory surface. 
The eyes are for most of us this sensory surface ; for the 
blind it can only be other parts of the skin, coupled or not 
with motion. But the mere gropings of the hands in every 
direction must end by surrounding the whole body with a 
sphere of felt space. And this sphere must become en- 
larged with every movei^ient of locomotion, these move- 
ments gaining their space-values from the semi-circular- 
canal feelings which accompany them, and from the farther 
and farther parts of large fixed objects (such as the bed, 
the wainscoting, or a fence) which they bring within the 
grasp. It might be supposed that a knowledge of space 
acquired by so many successive discrete acts would always 
retain a somewhat jointed and so to speak, granulated char- 
acter. When we who are gifted with sight think of a space 
too large tf> come into a single field of Adew, we are apt to 
imagine it as composite, and filled with more or less jerky 
stoppings and startings (think, for instance, of the space 
from here to San Francisco), or else we reduce the scale 
symbolically and imagine how much larger on a map the 
distance would look than others with whose totality we are 

I am disposed to believe, after interrogating many blind 
persons, that the use of imaginary maps on a reduced scale 
is less frequent with them than with the rest of us. Possi- 
bly the extraordinary changeableness of the visual magni- 
tudes of things makes this habit natural to us, while the 
fixity of tactile magnitudes keeps them from falling into it 
(When the blind young man operated on by Dr. Franz was 

* "Whilst the memories wliich we seeing folks preserve of a man all 
centre round a certain exterior form composed of his image, his height, 
his gait, in the blind all these memories are referred to something quite 
different, namely, ihe sound of his voice." (Dunau, Uev. Phil, xxv. 857.) 

rUK ftCHCKl'Ttoy OF tiPACK. 


^Ui'nii a portrait in a locket, Le was vantlj sarprised that 

lie fitri> ('(iiild Ih^ put into so gtuoll a c^ompHKB ; it would 

luTeMmuivdttj liim, he Buid, as impossible a.s to put a buahel 

A pint) Be this an it ma}', however, the space which 

■h hliud man f*:eU to exteud beyoiid hla btwlj is felt by 

lut iimi smooth conttnaum — aJl trace of those muscular 

.inKR uid stoppings and reversals M*hich presided oAer 

foriuatiou lla^'iIlg beeu eliminated from the memory. It 

!Uis, iu otlier wonls, a Renerio intake of the space-element 

to all these experiences, with the auesseutial par- 

licuUritieKof each left nut. In trnth, where in this space 

■Urtora i«t<ip may have occurred was quite accidental 

tUT never occur just there again, and so the attention 

il drojM altogether. Even as Inn^ a space as that 

irwMl in » several-mile walk will not necessarily appear 

I lilitid man's thought iu the guine of a series of locomo- 

actH. Only where there is some distinct locomotor difH- 

Ity, such as a step to ascend, a difiicnlt crossing, or a 

ip]NUtrunce of the path, will distinct locomotor images 

itntc the idea. Elsewhere the space seems continuous, 

itn parts may even all seem coexistent; though, as a 

TMj int«-lli^eut hliud friend once remarked to me, 'To 

Uiiiik of such tlistaiices involves jirobabl}' more mental 

,tMr and tear and hrain-waste in the blind than iu the see* 

Thia seems to point to a greater element of succes- 

iMitioD and construction in the blind man's idea. 

Unr iiwn visual explorations go on by means of innnm- 

enble otuppings and starlings of the eyeballs. Yet these 

an all eflnced from the tiual space-sphere of our visual 

ttion. They have neutralized each other. We can 

dwtributt^ our atti^itiou to the right and left sides 

llAni-ouiiIy, and think ot thotte two quarters of apace 

coexistAuL Does the smoothing out of the locomotor 

irruptions from the blind man's tactile space-spliero 

any greut4>r paradox? Sarely not. And it is carious 

■oto that both in him and in us there is one particular 

itor feailiug that is apt to assert itself obstinately to 

Wi> and he aliko spontaneously imagine space as 

im front of us, for reasons too obrions to euiimerate, 

w« think of tlie space behind ua, we, as a rubs have to 


208 P8YCH0L00T, 

turn round mentally, and in doing so the front space van- 
ishes. But in this, as in the other things of which we have 
been talking, individuals differ widely. Some, in imagin- 
ing a room, can think of all its six surfaces at once. Others 
mentally turn round, or, at least, imagine the room in sev- 
eral successive and mutually exclusive acts (cf. p. 54, above). 

Sir William Hamilton, and J. S. Mill after him, have 
quoted approvingly an opinion of Platner (an eighteenth- 
century philosopher) regarding the space-perceptions of 
the blind. Platner says : 

**The attentive observation of a person born blind . . . has con- 
vinced me that the sense of touch by itself is altogether incompetent to 
afford us the representation of extension and space. ... In fact, to 
those born blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and distance 
mean in their mouths nothing more than the shorter or longer time 
. . . necessary to attain from some one feeling to some other." 

^ After my own observation of blind people, I should 

£ hardly have considered this as anything but an eccentric 
^4(/L opinion, worthy to pair off with that other belief that color 
' w is primitively seen without extent, had it not been for the 
remarkable Essay on Tactile and Visual Space by M. Ch. 
Duuan, which appeared in the Revue Philosophique for 
1888. This author quotes * three very competent witnesses,, 
all officials in institutions for the blind [it does not appear 
from the text that more than one of them was blind him- 
self], who say that blind people only live in time. M. 
Dunan himself does not share exactly this belief, but he 
insists that the blind man's and the seeing man's represen- 
tation of space have absolutely naught in common, and that 
we are deceived into believing that what they mean by 
space is analogous to what we mean, by the fact that so many 
of them are but semi-blind and still think in visual terms, 
and from the farther fact that they all talk in visual terms 
just like ourselves. But on examining M. Dunan's reasons 
one finds that they all rest on the groundless logical as- 
sumption that the perception of a geometrical form which 
we get with our eyes, and that which a blind man gets with 

♦Vol. XXV. pp. 857-8. 

Taic PKHCEPTitm of space. 


iJ< fingers, most either be absolutely ideutieal or absolntely 
uulikf. They catitiot be similar in diversity, " for they are 
'LiDple nutioux, hd<1 it is of the essence of such to enter tfao 
Niiuii or leave tl all at once, «jo that oue who has a simple no- 
D'tiat all, poHseHses it ill all itacomplet«ue8s. . . . There- 
I ir>-. iiiii-e it in impos»il>le that the bliud should have of 
iiir fiTniis in question ideas comjJett^y idevltcai with our see- 
ing n-^'i, il follows that their ideaH raUHt be radtcafli/ dif- 
'•TTtifrom and tchoiiy irreiliictbie to our oiiti." * Hereupon 
M DuDiiu Iia>t no diSicnlty in finding a Vilind man who still 
: r«i«rte8 n cmde aeusation of diffused light, and who says 
^lirn qneMinned that this light has no extent. Having 'no 
"\i'-Dl ' npjH-nra, however, on farther ijuestiouing, to signify 
MTi'lv not enveloping any piirticular tactile objects, nor 
li^mL' located within their outline ; so that (allowing for 
'UiQilrt t>f exjiresxion) the result tallies perfectly with our 
' a vi«w. A relatively stagnant retinal sensation of diffused 
li^iit, not varying when different objects are handled, would 
Mtanllj remain an object quite apart. If the word 'ex- 
mt ' ««re habitually used to denote tactile extent, this sen- 
uliua, haTing no tactile associates whatever, would natu- 
r*lly have ' extent ' denied of it And yet all the while it 
luali] b« anatogova to the tactile sensations in having the 
^lulity of bigness. Of course it would have no other tao- 
til" <|iut)t)ea, jnst as the tactile objects have no other opti- 
ol qnalitiea than bigness. All sorts of analogies obtain 
Mwtvo the spheres of sensibility. Why are ' sweet ' and 
'Mift' aaed BO synonymously in most languages? and why 
ut both these adjectives applied to objects of so many 
vaoiilc kinds. Uongh sounds, heavy smells, hard lights, 
Id oolont, are other examples. Nor does it follow from 
-iL'h ualogies as these that the sensations compared need 
I' I'omposite and have some of their parts identical. We 
u« in Chapter XI11 that likeness and difference are an ele- 
■CDluj relation, not to be resolved in every case into a 
auttnrv of absolute identity and absolute heterogeneity of 
oatent (cj. VoL I, pp. 492-3). 
loooaliide, then, that although in its more superficial 

210 P8TCH0L0QT. 

determinations the blind man's space is very different from 
our space, yet a deep analogy remains between the two. 
* Big ' and * little/ * far ' and ' near/ are similar contents of con 
sciousness in both of us. But the measure of the bigness and 
the farness is very different in him and in ourselves. He, foi 
example, can have no notion of what we mean by objects 
appearing smaller as they move away, because he musi 
always conceive of them as of their constant tactile size. 
Nor, whatever analogy the two extensions involve, should 
we expect that a blind man receiving sight for the firsi 
time should recognize his new-given optical objects by theii 
familiar tactile names. Molyneux wrote to Locke : 

** Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by histoucti 
to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, ... so as to tell, when he 
felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose 
then the cube and sphere placed on a table and the blind man to be 
made to see ; query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, be 
ooold now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube V 

This has remained in literature as * Molyneux's query,* 
Molyneux answered *No.' And Locke says :* 

*^ I agree with this thinking gentleman whom I am proud to call my 
friend, and am of opinion that the blind man at first sight would not be 
able to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw 
them ; though he could unerringly name them by his touch and 
certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt.^' 

This opinion has not lacked experimental confirmation. 
From Chesselden's case downwards, patients operated for 
congenital cataract have been unable to name at first the 
things they saw. " So, Puss, I shall know you another time," 
said Chesseldeu*s patient, after catching the cat, looking at 
her steadfastly, and setting her down. Some of this inca- 
pacity is unquestionably due to general mental confusion at 
the new experience, and to the excessively unfavorable con- 
ditions for perception which an eye with its lens just extir- 
pated affords. That the analogy of inner nature between 
the retinal and tactile sensations goes beyond mere exten- 
sity is proved by the cases where the patients were the most 
intelligent, as in the young man operated on by Dr. Fran& 

♦ Essay cone. Hum. Und. , bk. ii. chap. ix. § 8. 



I circular, triangular, ami quadraugulnr figurest 

II IB wh#B we come to unulyze minutely tlie conditioiis 
\'{ tittwai perception that ditticulties ari»e wliicL have made 
|i>rcbolnf^bi iipfieiU to new and jiuMi-iuythicaJ rneutal 
]'>^tn. But 1 tinuly believe that even here exact tuvesti- 
iiatiiiu will 1,-ield the tiame verdict a» lu the cases studied 
Jlii-rfj. ThiK Hubject will close our survey of the facta ; 
■ 'I it it givH the result I foretell, we shall be iu the bestof 
' •itwua for A few final [jagea of critically historical review. 
If A (iibiinoD persou is asked how he is enabled to see 
iLiuj;^ n--* they are, he will simply replj, by opeuing his 
"<■' and looking. This innocent au»wer has, however, 
I;; niuin becu impossible for science. There are various 
i:i.i"\.w null irregularities ulwut wAa/we appear to per- 
' V* ander seemingly identical optical conditions, which 
immediately raise questions. To say nothing now of the 
tiBf-bdbored couundrums of why we see upright with uu 
bnrted rrtiual picture, and why we do not see double ; 
ud to leave aside the whole field of color-contrasts and 
unhignitieA, as not directly relevant to the space-problem, — 
lit* certain that the same retinal image makes us see quite 
(G&mitly-tdzed and differently-shai)ed objects at different 
tinea, and it is equally certain that the name ocular uiove- 
■ort varies in ita perceptive im[Mirt It ought to be poi*- 
kbb, were tho act of perception completely and aimply 
inlelbgible, to assign for every distinct judgment of size, 
>kipe, atkd position a distinct optical modification of some 
Uul MM it» occasion. .And the connection between the two 
OB^t to he so constant that, given the same roo<lificatiou, 
•t ibonld always have the same judgment But if «e 

■ PhlkNOpbiMl TreonclioDs. 1641 In T. K. ArilMilH SIgtit ftiiil ToiicU 
tetbafood dbcuMionof ihe*v imses. Obviniinly, positl**.' i-oms are of 
MKlnpertanoe ibsn nfgnXiye. An undcr-wllinl pnount. Nov M., wIhmic 
«»lliHCf11«] by Dr. Diifoiir of Uiiwiiuc <Qiii'-rlfK>ii il'iin Avouictt^ ni. 
KM) b KU»eb made of \ty MM. Navlllc aud Dudrq ; but It scmiib to ma 
nlfla Aam bow little mhm pmpiv ran JmI wtlh new cxperleDoes tu wbicli 
W bii lliiil l lm iiwliii iiutckly >t boini-, TliU nun oouid not «VFn tril 
« of hi* tint nbJFClK of sight moved or ttoud «lill tp. Bk 


study the facts closely toe soon find no such constant con-- 
nection hetiveen either judgment and retinal modification^ or 
judgment and muscular modifica;tion^ to exist. The judgment 
seems to result from the combination of retinal, muscular 
and intellectual factors with each other ; and any one of 
them may occasionally overpower the rest in a way which 
seems to leave the matter subject to no simple law. 

The scientific study of the subject, if we omit Descartes, 
began witfi Berkeley, and the particular perception he 
analyzed in his New Theory of Vision was that of distance 
or depth. Starting with the physical assumption that a 
difference in the distance of a point can make no difference 
in the nature of its retinal image, since '' distance being a 
line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point 
in the fund of the eye — which point remains invariably the 
same, whether the distance be longer or shorter," he con- 
cluded that distance could not possibly be a visual sensation, 
but must be an intellectual ' suggestion ' from * custom ' 
of some non-visual experience. According to Berkeley this 
experience was tactile. His whole treatment of the subject 
was excessively vague, — ^no shame to him, as a breaker of 
fresh ground, — but as it has been adopted and enthusiasti- 
ally hugged in all its vagueness by nearly the whole line of 
British psychologists who have succeeded him, it will be 
well for us to begin our study of vision by refuting his 
notion that depth cannot possibly be perceived in terms of 
purely visual feeling. 

ITie Third Dimension. 

Berkeleyans unanimously assume that no retinal sensa- 
tion can primitively be of volume ; if it be of extension at 
all (which they are barely disposed to admit), it can be only 
of two-, not of three-, dimensional extension. At the begin- 
ning of the present chapter we denied this, and adduced 
facts to show that all objects of sensation are voluminous 
in three dimensions (cf. p. 136 ff.). It is impossible to lie 
on one's back on a hill, to let the empty abyss of blue fill 
one's whole visual field, and to sink deeper and deeper into 
the merely sensational mode of consciousness regarding it^ 
without feeling that an indeterminate, palpitating, oircling 


! pth in as indefeasibly one of its 8ttribuf<>9 as its breadth. 
V.I' may Artificially exaggerate this neiiHatioii of depth. 
Iliw and look from the hill-tup at tlie distant view ; repre- 
t'Dl to yoarself aM vividly as possible the distaiice of the 
tiitiTiuost horizou ; aud then \mth inverted hfnti look at the 
uia«. Tliv^re will be a Btartling increase in tlie perspective, 
t Boat neDAible recession of the maximum dintauce ; and 
u TOO raifte the head you can actually see the horizon- 
bie «i;aiD draw near.* 

Mind, 1 aay nothing as yet about onr estimate of the 
'nal' amnimt of this depth or distance. I only want to 
etufirm its existence as a natural and inevitable optical 
antort of th« two other optical dimensions. The field of 
Tir» t« always a po?(«»w-unit. Wiiatever be supposed to be 
tti ibaolnte and ' real ' size, the relative sizes of its dimen- 
iiau are functioua of each otlier. Indeed, it hapitens per- 
lu{M Biwt fAUfu that the breiidtli- and height-feeling take 
tlieir abaulnte measure from the depth- feeling. If we plunge 
our head into a watth-bnsiu, the felt neai'neHs of the bottom 
tBakw n» feel the lateral expanse to be smalL If, ou the 
MOlnrjr, we are on a mountain-top, the distance of the 
horiiDD carries with it in our judgment a pmportionate 

* What nay brtbcphyiiologlcBl process counMlrd with lli(» iDtreased 
jwirtuu otdeptb It turd to dIscoTer. Il *Min» to bavr uoililug lo do with 
a* puu ot lb« TtMiua >flected, ilnce the mere tDTrralun of Ibe pirtnre iby 
almn^ nlleoting (irluiu, elc.i, without Inveniog (be bnul, docs not Bceu 
(•briof It Bbout: niiihing wlih nympitihctlr axUI rutaiiou of tbe eyes, 
vUiftBigbl otthmaco tho pcmpccllvr through cxaggonited disparity of 
atl«« ndnl iiita|:i« (nv J. J. Unllrr. ' Ilnddrebung u. Ticfcndimeti- 
itan,* U|«lg Acad. Bfrii^Ule. 18TS, page 124), Tor iine-cyrd persons get 
iMUnMifty BD tboM' Willi two ryea. I caQoul tliid It to b« niiiUH'led 
Mfe amf ahriatioo In Ihv [lupll or w!lb aoy awcrtalnablr Nlraln In Ibe 
M«dM uf llw eyii, lympalbUltig with tlKwu of Ibe body- Thcexnggcra- 
ta af dktaiint b Ftvu gri-ater when nr throw tbc brnd over hai-kwartl* 
Md nalntct our Bupt-rior recti lu gctlbig lb« view. Ihna wbca wc brnd 
hnnnlaad ooninwHibe Inftrlor rccil. Making tbv ey>tdiv(T)^allghily 
tr «wk priMDMlc ghuKct baa no *uch effect To me, aiid In all whom I 
km Hkad %o repeal ibe oba<?rrBti«o, tbe reauh U ■» tnarkoii that I do not 
Ml nadcnuod bow audi an obicrver aa Uelmbullc. who baa mrctully 
I laiafaiil vWoa with liiTerted head, cau have overlooked tt. <See bla 
fHya. Ofalk. pp. 488. Ti3, TX. Tt^i.) I cannot bi'li> Ibbiklng ibnt anyone 
«ka eu ncplaln tbe cKaneniUiii of lb« dcpib-wnutloD In this caac wtQ 
■ Mmmam time Lbniw much Itgbt on ita aunnal coustltutlmi 

214 P8TCH0L0QT. 

height and length in the monntain-chains that bonnd it to 
our view. But as aforesaid, let ns not consider the ques- 
tion of absolute size now, — it must later be taken up in a 
thorough way. Let us confine ourselves to the way in 
which the three dimensions which are seen, get their yaJues 
fixed rdcUivdy to each other. 

Beid, in his Inquiry into the Human Mind, has a section 
*0t the Greometry of Yisibles/ in which he assumes to 
trace what the perceptions would be of a race of ' Idome* 
nians ' reduced to the sole sense of sight Agreeing with 
Berkeley that sight alone can give no knowledge of the third 
dimension, he humorously deduces various ingenious ab- 
surdities in their interpretations of the material appear- 
ances before their eyes. 

Now I firmly believe, on the contrary, that one of Beid's 
Idomenians would frame precisely the same conception of 
the external world that we do, if he had our intellectual 
powers.* Even were his very eyeballs fixed and not mov- 
able like ours, that would only retard, not frustrate, his 
education. For the same object, by alternately covering in 
its lateral movements different parts of his retina, would 
determine the mutual equivalencies of the first two dimen- 
sions of the field of view ; and by exciting the physiological 
cause of his perception of depth in various degrees, it would 
establish a scale of equivalency between the first two and 
the third. 

First of all, one of the sensations given by the object 
is chosen to represent its ' real ' size and shape, in accord-^ 
ance with the principles laid down on pp. 178 and 179. 
One sensation measures the * thing ' present, and the * thing * then 
^^ measures the other sensations. The peripheral parts of the 
J retina are equated with the central by receiving the image 
of the same object This needs no elucidation in case the 

* " In Froriep's Notizeu (1838, July), No. 188, is to be found a detailed 
account, with a picture, of an Esthonian girl, Eva Lauk, then fourteen 
years old. born with neither arms nor legs, which concludes with the 
following words : ' According to the mother, her intellect developed quite 
as fast as that of her brother and sisters ; in particular, she came as quickljf 
to a right judgment of the size and distance of visible objects, although, 
of course, she had no use of hands.' " (Schopenhauer, Welt als WUle, IL 


< ':>i«i:t do4>fl uot dmtige its distAnce or its front. But snp- 
• ■^, lo lake a more complic'tted case, that the object is a 
■ \ \, iwH^n first in itd wholo length, aiij then rotated round 
r ii( its iinin ; let tliia tised eud l>e the one near the eje. 
I. ■d.i- luuveuiKUt the stick's image will grow progressively 
-L.i<nr[ ; its farther end will appear less and less sepa- 
tatnl laterally from its lised near end ; soon it will be 
•cm<iiMl bv the latter, and then reappear on the opposite 
»,ADd finally on that aide resume its original length. 
a tbia movement tu become a familiar experience; 
i vill presumably react upon it after its asaal fash- 
hivkich u that of unifying all data which it is in any 
Itfpoaaihle to onify), and consider it the movement of a 
mt object rather than tlie transformation of a ductuat- 
S^iuw, the nmsittioTi '^ depth which it receives dur- 
lerience is awakened more by the far than by the 
io( the object. But huw much depth ? What shall 
AHb anioniit? Why, at the moment the far end is 
nady tti be eclipsed, the difference of its distance from the 
BMi eaj'it distance must be judged equal to the stick's 
«huJi] Icufjth ; but that length has already been judged 
efuU loa certain optical sensation of breadth. Thus tve 
fid thai fipen amomUji of I he vtsuai deplh-/eelittg hecome signs 
*f/u»d amoiaUs (^ the vuwtl breiMlth-/*xUng. The meaaure- 
mnd 1^ dialaiwe is, as Brrkeiey trtdy itaid, a reavU of auggea- 
(w* Mid experience. Hut visual experience almie is adequate 
bfmWHor it, ami this he rrronmusly deni«t. 

HappoMV a colonel in front of his regiment at dreBs- 

{■wade, and Huppone he walks at right angles towards the 

^JjdstfMt man of the line. As he advances, and »urveya 

^^^lise in eitlior lUrection, he looks more and more doifn 

^^^pd lewi and lesa at it, until, when alireast of the mid- 

^Bm buui. be feelH the end men to be most distant; then 

vhfn the line cjutta banllr any lateral image on bis retina 

tt ail, what distaucf i^hall he jiidf^e to be that of the end 

■«a? Why, half the length of the regiment as it was 

Atigjoally aeflu, of ooarse; but thin length was a moment 

•^ a rt'tinal object spread out laterally before hia sight 

Ha has now merely njnuti-d a retinal depth -feeling with a 

MitBal breadth* feel lug. If the regiment moved, and the 


colonel stood 8till» the result would be the same. In sucl 
ways as these a creature endowed with eyes alone could 
hardly fail of measuring out all three dimensions of the 
space he inhabited. And we ourselves, I think, although 
we may often 'realize' distance in locomotor terms 
(as Berkeley says we must always do), yet do so no lest 
often in terms of our retinal map, and always in this wa^ 
the more spontaneously. Were this not so, the three visua 
dimensions could not possibly feel to us as homogeneous a^ 
they do, nor as commensurable inter ae. 

Let U8 then admit distance to be at least as genuindy optica 
a content of consciousness as either height or breadth, Th 
question immediately returns, Can any of them be said in awj 
strictness to be optical sensations ? We have contended al 
along for the affirmative reply to this question, but musi 
now cope with difficulties greater than any that have as- 
sailed us hitherto. 

Hdmholtz and Reid on Sensations, 

A sensation is, as we have seen in Chapter XVil, 
the mental affection that follows most immediately upon 
the stimulation of the sense-tract Its antecedent is di- 
rectly physical, no psychic links, no acts of memory, infer- 
ence, or association intervening. Accordingly, if we sup- 
pose the nexus between neural process in the sense-organ, 
on the one hand, and conscious affection, on the other, to 
be by nature uniform, the same process ought altvays to givt 
the same sensation ; and conversely, if what seems to be a sen- 
sation varies whilst the process in the sense-organ remains un- 
changed, the reason is presumably that it is really not a sensa- 
tion but a higher mental product, whereof the variations depend 
on events occurring in the system of higher cerebral centres. 

Now the size of the field of view varies enormously in all 
three dimensious, without our being able to assign with any 
definiteness the process in the ^nsual tract on which the 
variation depends. We just saw how impossible such 
assignment was in the case where turning down the head 
produces the enlargement. In general, the maximum feel- 
ing of depth or distance seems to take the lead in deter- 
mining the apparent magnitude of the whole field, and the 


111) oth^r dimeniiinuB neem t<> follow. If, to use the foiiuer 
iwUnw, I look close into a wasli-biisiu, the lateral exteut 
"ftlie field Hhriiiku proportionately to its uearuess. If I 
: >ik (ram a mouiiLniii, the tliiuffs seen ure v»»t in height 
mil breadth, in proportion ti> the faruess of the horizon. 
tiul wAmi wt oak tehat ckaitges in the eye determine how great 
ikii maximum /vtliny o/ d^th or disltnwr (whieli is uudoubt- 
*Jlv (elt as a unitary vitstuesB) sfutll If, uv Jind ourwivea 
MuUr to point to any one of them as being its ahsoiut^y rerjidar 
tamtmiiant. Conver|;eD('e, oceoumndntion, double and 
diiparate imagea, differences in the parallactic (Usplacement 
^—vhcD «e Diove our head, faintness of tint, diniues^ of out- 
^Bhe. &ad amalluess of the retinal image of objects named 
^^■d koown. are all processes that have something to do with 
^Vm percejitiuii of 'far' and of 'near'; but the effect of 
Mch (tnd any one of them in determiniug such a perception 
•t (iDf inoiuent may at another moment be reversed by the 
pnwnee of some other sensible quality in the object, that 
tttkv* us, evidently by reminding us of past experience, 
jodfp it to be at a different distance and of another shape. 
C wfl paint the inside of n pasteboard-mask like the out- 
tuU, and look at it with one e^'e, the accommodation- and 
]>willsx.feeliugH are there, but fail to make us see it hollow, 
M it iH. Our raeutal knowledge of the fact that human 
fits are always convex overpowers them, and we directly 
pmeive the nose to be uearer to us than the cheek instead 
_<rffartI)M of. 

l_ TEb other organic tokeuii of famess and nearness are 

i by aimilar experiments (of which we shall ere long 

__ k more in detail) to have an equally fluctuating imjiort, 

ntj Imie all their value whenever the collateral circnm- 

■tuoM favor a strong intellectual conviction that the object 

[Wtentiifl to the gaze is imprahnHe — cannot be either ichat 

^■tvArrv they would make us perceive it to be. 

^B Kow the query immediately arises: Can the /eetingx nf 

^^m proteMtfn in thf rye, innce they are so easily neutral izfd nnrf 

■f by intflltvfwil giujifMtinnj>, mer have heen dii-eci nensa- 

I of distance at all? Ought we not rather to assume, 

e the distances which we see in spile of tiiem are con- 

» from pant exin'rience, that tlie distances which we 


see by means of them are equally such conclusions ? Ought 
we noty in short, to say unhesitatingly that distance must be 
an intellectual and not a sensible content of consciousness ? 
and that each of these eye-feelings serves as a mere signal 
to awaken this content, our intellect being so framed that 
sometimes it notices one signal more readily and sometimes 
another ? 

Reid long ago (Inquiry, c. vl sec. 17) said : 

''It may be taken for a general rule that things which are prodaoed 
by custom may be undone or changed by disuse or by contrary custom. 
On the other hand, it is a strong argument that an effect is not owing 
to custom, but to the constitution of nature, when a contrary custom is 
found neither to change nor to weaken it." 

More briefly, a way of seeing things that can be un- 
learned was presumably learned, and only what we cannot 
unlearn is instinctive. 

This seems to be Helmholtz 's view, for he confirms 
Beid's maxim by saying in emphatic print : 

** No elements in our perception can be sensational which may be 

overcome or reversed by factors of demonstrably experimental origin. 

■^ fi^ l^t Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience must be re- 

( garded as itself a product of experience and custom. If we follow this 

rule it will appear that only qualities are sensational, whilst almost all 

spatial attributes are results of habit and experience."* 

This passage of Helmholtz's has obtained, it seems to 
me, an almost deplorable celebrity. The reader will please 
observe its very radical import Not only would he, and 
does he, for the reasons we have just been ourselves con- 
sidering, deny distance to be an optical sensation ; but, 
extending the same method of criticism to judgments of 
size, shape, and direction, and finding no single retinal or 
muscular process in the eyes to be indissolubly linked with 
any one of these, he goes so far as to say that all optical 
space-perceptions whatsoever must have an intellectual 

♦ Physiol. Optik, p. 438. Helmholtz's reservation of 'qualities' ishi- 
consistent. Our judgments of light and color vary as much as our judg- 
ments of size, shape, and place, and ought by parity of reasoning to be 
called intellectual products and not sensations. In other places he does 
treat color as if it were an intellectual product. 



1 A content tJiat do items of visaal sensibility can 

M WaotH and others agree with Helmholtz here, and 
Mtii^ir coDclnsioDM, if tmc, are irreconcilable nith all the 
wuMtionaliBni which I have been teacliiug hitherto, it 
fl(4rlj devolves apt^n me to defend my position against this 
wm ilUrk. But as thin chapter ou Spai-e is already so 
'it«<r^nini with episodes and details, I think it best to 
rntm the refutation of their general principle for the next 
ciup4''r. Mtid xiruply to assume at this point its nntenability. 
~l\i* liiw of oonrse an arrogant look ; bnt if the reader will 
b«u with me for not ver>' many pages more, 1 shall hope to 
ippeue bis mind. Meanwhile I affirm conlideutly that 
>it Mmf ouftT oiijivtii acUuiilij FEEL cltff'erent to ns acconHitg as 
"«f brain rmcU on them in onr iifty or ttnothfr by mating ta 
jftmir them tis thle or cm i)uii sort of thing. So true is this 
tWoiM m»y well, with 8tnmpf,t reverse Helmholtz's query, 
ud ask : " What would become of our sense-perceptiooB 
to caae experience were not able so to transform them ? " 
Sloinpf adds : " All wrong perceptions that depeud oa 
pMvlurities in the organs are more or less perfectly cor- 
rMMl by the influence of imagination following the goid- 
iMc of experience." 

If, therefore, among the facts of optical space-perceptioD 
iwhicb we must now proceed to consider in more detail) we 
And ini^taiices of an identical organic eye-process, ginug as 
iflien<Dt {lerceptions at different times, in consequence of 
lerenl collateral circumstances suggesting different objec- 
I fat-ts to our imai^iuution, we must not hastily conclude, 
b tht< H<rh<)()l of Helmholtz and Wundt, that the orgaDio 
l^procewt pure and simple, without the collateral circum- 
I, is incapable of giving us any sensation of a spatial 
] at all. We must rather seek to discover hy what meana 

* rircamatances cwu no have trnusfornieil » spatte-sensn- 
tifia, which, bat for their presence, would probably hare 
been felt iu ita natural purity. And I may as well aay 

* Ii I* M<«MllM*ai thta point to cooaider wb«t Helmbolu'B vlewi ut tb« 
MioTT' i>r the tntvllcMiul qwce-ylclding pnK,-cn mmy be^ He vtcillkUs— 

ItOr-fU. p. 314. 



BOW in advance that we shall find the means to be nothing 
more or less than association — the suggestion to the mind of 
optical objects not actually present, but more habitually asso- 
ciated with the ' collateral circumstances ' than the sensa- 
tion which they now displace and being imagined now with 
a quasi-hallucinatory strength. But before this conclu- 
sion emerges, it will be necessary to have reviewed the 
most important facts of optical space-perception, in relation 
to the organic conditions on which they depend. Headers 
acquainted with German optics will excuse what is already 
familiar to them in the following section.* 

* Before embarking on this new topic it will be well to shelve, once for 
all, the problem of what is the physiological process that underlies the 
distance-feeling, Since one-eyed people have it, and are inferior to the 
two-eyed only in measuring ita gradations, it can have no exclusive connec- 
tion with the double and disparate images produced by binocular parallax. 
Since people with closed eyes, looking at an after-image, do not usually 
Me it draw near or recede with varying convergence, it cannot be simply 
constituted by the convergence- feeling. For the same reason it would 
appear non-identical with the feeling of accommodation. The differ- 
ences of apparent parallactic movement between far and near objects as 
we move our head cannot constitute the distance-sensation, for such dif- 
ferences may be easily reproduced experimentally (in the movements of 
visible spots against a background) without engendering any illusion of per- 
spective. Finally, it is obvious that visible faintness, dimness, and small- 
ness are not per se the feeling of visible distance, however much in the 
case of well-known objects they may serve as signs to suggest it. 

A certain maximum distance-value, however, being given to the field of 
view of the moment, whatever it be, the feelings that accompany the pro- 
cesses just enumerated become so many local ngns of the gnidation of 
distances within this maximum depth. They help us to subdivide and 
measure it. Itself, however, is felt as a unit, a total distance- value, deter- 
mining the vastness of the whole field of view, which accordingly appears 
as an abyss of a certain volume. And the question still persists, what 
ueurnl process is it that underlies the sense of this d istance- value ? 

Hering, who has tried to explain the gradations within it by the inter- 
action of certain native distance- values belonging to each point of the two 
retinie, seems willing to admit that the absolute scale of the space-volume 
within which the natively fixed relative distances shall appear is not fixed, 
but determined each time by ' experience in the widest sense of the word ' 
{Beitrnge, p. 844). What he calls the Kernpunkt of this space-volume is 
the point we are momentarily fixating. The absolute scale of the whole 
volume depends on the absolute distance at which this KempuTikt is judged 
to lie from the pei-son of the looker. ** By an alteration of the localization 
of the Kernpunkt, the inner relations of the seen space are nowise altered ; 
this space in its totality is a«» a flxeii unit, so to speak, displaced with re- 

TUK I'SHCEprioy uy spava: 221 

Lrt ns begin tLe long ami ratlier t«ilioiiH inquiry by the 
t imixirtast case. Pliyniologitits ha\e long sought for 

qiKi lo ibc wlf »[ (be looker" (|i, 34^). But what conslUiilea tlie IocbUm- 
tk«n.' Ibc tumpufJtt Itself al any given lime, extwpl ' Exp«rieDCii.' i.e., 
Uflwrcimbral and IntdlectuHl pnxtMra. fuvolviog memory. HerinK (toe» 
B-4 mil lo dcOtie. 

StUD|if. Ihr o11i«T MnwIioiiBlUt writer wbo baa beat milized tlie dlfli- 
nilllft of ih« pri'blera. IhiDks that the primitive senutlun uf dlstiiDc« 
w bitt ui imintidijile physical antccedtDi. eiibcr lu ilie tttupK ol"»a 
nak tltosUon hcccmfMuylog tbe proce«B of BccommodHtiao. or «1m 
n dlncily Id tho aptclHc energy of tbe optic oerve. " Id conlrasl wllb 
, br thinks thai ti is ibe abK>tvtti distance of tbe spot 
b la ihut primitively, immediately, titid physlologicatly given, 
blBlalivr diilanceeof other IhingB about IhUspoi. 'Diese, be 
■•rfflnally leeii in wbat, broadly speakiog. may be i«nned ooe 
■ It. Wbvibcr tbe distaoce of this plane, considered aa a pb»- 
• of oiir prlmilive teDslbllity. be sn Invariable datum, or suscvplU 
it v( Dnrtlulton. be doc* not, if I uudetstaud blm rightly, undertake 
ftfBalkmlly lo decide, but incline* to tbe former view. For him then, 
V tw iloing. higher cerebnil processes of Hssoclatlou, under thi- name ot 
EtptrlniM,' are the authors of fully ono-balf part of tbe dlsiance-percep- 
ils<»htcti we al an/ given lime may have. 

Htflng's and Siutnpf '■ tbcoriea are reported for tbe English reader by 
lU 6nllr (In Mind, ui. pp. 172-0). Mr. Abbott, in bis Sight and Touch 
W M-^h tl*" * theory wbicb h to me ao obscure that 1 only refer the 
iMbr M ha pbw*, widing tliat it seems to make of distance a flied tunc- 
•faa a| rMlMl acnMlIon ai mndifie<l by focal adjuslmeut. Besides thtna 
Ifenw anlhoT* 1 am Ignorant ot any, except Panum , who may have atlcmpt- 
i4 ta ikAnv dhOMicc u In any degree an immediate sensation. A.nd wlih 
Ikm the dttrct MnNiliunal share is reduced to a very small proportional 
fttt. la our cvmplrltd dtslance Judgments, 

P ro fs — w LIplH, in hU alngularty acut« PKychologiscbe Studien (p. SB 
1 Latfuo. ka Fcrrier. in his review of Berkeley (Plilloeophlcal Rcmsins. il. 
W II ), bad argued before blm, thai II is togiatUg impotible we should 
fotrh* tbe dMauce <it aiiytbliig fium the eye by night : for a mtit dlstanco 
laaaaljrbe btHWeen Hrn termini ; and one ofihe lertniot. In tliecase ofdls- 
1MC« (nn tbe pye. Is ilie eye Itselt, which Is ool nxu. Similarly of tb« 
^iMaaca ol two points behind («cb other : the ui«r one Aida the far one, 
M tptt* U (Hn bttwevn Ibem. For the space between two objects to b« 
an. lnHli nusl appi«riatiUe nach other. Iben tbe apace in ((ucnllun will be 
wMr, >JU DO olLer condition Is ita visibility powiiblc. The canclusloo la 
\iM IblBg* can properly be seen only In what Lippa calls a surrace, and 
that oar knowledge of tbo third dimvnsiuu rnunt needs be concvptiMl, not 
■msiJuimI or Tisunlly inluilivc. 

But no argumriiU. in tbe world can prove a feeling which actually 
nlsu lo be Itfipcwlhle. Tbe feelios of depth or distance, of farnoM or 
mjvtm. ihw* actually calsl as a fact uf our visual sensibility. All that 
fni^aot Lipps'a reawningi prove cuucerulug il is (bat il is nut lincBr In 



a simple law by which to connect the seen direction and 
distance of objects with the retinal impressions they pro- 
duce. Two principal theories have been held of this mat- 
ter, the * theory of identical points/ and the * theory of pro- 
jections—each incompatible with the other, and each 
beyond certain limits becoming inconsistent with the 

The Theory of Identical Points. 

This theory starts from the truth that on both retime 
an impression on the upper half makes us perceive an ob- 
ject as below, on the lower half as above, the horizon ; and 

Fio. S4. 

on the right half an object to the left, on the left half one 
to the right, of the median line. Thus each quadrant of one 
retina corresponds as a whole to the similar quadrant of 

its character, or in its immediacy fully homogeneous and consubstantial 
with the feeling of literal distance between two seen termini ; in short, 
that there are two sorts of optical sensation, each inexplicably due to a 
peculiar neural process. The neural process is easily discoyered, in the 
case of lateral extension or spreadoutness, to be the number of retinal 
nerve-ends affected by the light ; in the case of protension or mere f amess 
it is more complicated and, as we have concluded, is still to seek. The 
two sensible qualities unite in the primitiye visual bigness. The measure- 
ment of their various amounts against each other obeys the general laws 
of all such measurements. We discover their equivalencies by means 
of objects, apply the same units to both, and translate them into each other 
so habitually that at last they get to seem to us even quite similar in kind. 
This final appearance of homogeneity may perhaps be facilitated by the 
fact that in binocular vision two points situated on the prolongation of the 
optical axis of one of the eyes, so that the near one hides the far one, are by 
the other eye seen laterally apart. Each eye has in fact a foreehortened 
lateral view of the other's line of sight. In The London Times for Feb. 8, 
1884, is an interesting letter by J. D. Dougal, who tries to explain hf this 
reason why two-eyed rifle-shootmg has such advantages over shooting with 
one eye closed. 



the olh^r; and within two similHr quadrants, nl and ar for 
fUQiple, tbere shonld, H the correspondence were cousist- 
wmiij carried out, be geometrically nimilur points which, if 
■fapHMod at thi> ftame time bj light emitted from the same 
Bb|M:t, ftlmuld causi- thnt object to ajipeur in the same direv- 
Hnto either ere. Experim(?nt verifiet^ this sumiiae. If 
Ke Ioi>k at the starry vault nitli parallel eyes, the ^tara all 
■Nm Kingle ; and the laws of [verspective show that under 
Hkrin-amfttancex the parallel tight-rays coming from each 
m/at rnUHt impinge on pointu within either retina which are 
HBDuetricallr Kiniilar to each other. The same reBuLt may 
^^AOU artificially obtained. If we take two exactly simi- 
^HwiBw, smaller, or at least no larger, than those on an 
^^P^P ■tereoBcopic slide, and if we look at them as 
BBiMM)|Mc slides are looked at, that is, at one with each 
P^ (a mi-dtsn partition oonfiniDg the view of either eye to 
nk picture opposite it), we shall see but one flat picture, 
pO of whotte parts appear sharp and single.* Ideotical 
RBiatB Iwing impressed, both eyes see their object iu the 
fiuw direction, and the two objects conseqiiently coalesce 

P The 8llm)^ thing may be shonii in still another way, 
pMi fixed head converge the eyes upon some conspicuous 
native p<nDt behind a pane of glass ; then close either 
■•slt4>m«t^[y and make a little ink-mark on the glass, 
■Drering' the object as seen by the eye which is momea- 
■eOt open. On looking now with both eyes the ink-marks 
HI Mwm aiugb', and in the same direction as the objective 
Hbt. Conversely, let the eyes converge on a single ink- 

^0 Jtnl M>. a pair ot ipectaclM held on Inch or so from ibe ey*a »vem 
^B*D« targe medlMi gVuh. Tlie fiicully of mrclDg itereoscopic Milv» Kiiiglv 
^■•ul an Initnitncnt U of ibc iiiniOKl iiillliy to Ilic Miidcnt of pliysln- 
^^W op(tB», BUil pctwinii witli PtroDg eyn can ciurily KOiiiIrr It. Tlie 
^■dlAralir lit* In (liaaoclaiiog Ibedcftriv of iKVommodalinn from tha J 
^■cB ot niQvi-iiiriK-i' wliii'L il uiualty ■civiiipaiiliw. If the righl plclur*'! 
^fcw «d \ty the rlgbt ryt. Ih« left by Uic left eye. the opilc axf> mutt I 
pb bf parallel or conTcriro upon nti Inia^sry point tiome dlnanoa ^ 
^Bd iIm plane at tbR plciiix'*, according to ihe lAte aod dinance apart 
^Ba pleturet. The Bn-otninodalioii , however, has to bo tnaile for ths 
^■t«( Um plctur«a iUeir. and a oi-ar Brcotamodalioa with a far-oil con- 
^bpM I»«MMtUo( irUdiUie onlhiarj u«e of our ejw never teuhn iu 

224 P8YCU0L0G7, 

spot on the glass, and then by alternate shutting of them 
let it be noted what objects behind the glass the spot 
covers to the right and left eye respectively. Now with 
both eyes open, both these objects and the spot will 
appear in the same place, one or other of the three becom- 
ing more distinct according to the fluctuations of retinal 

Now what is the direction of this common place ? The 
only way of defining the direction of an object is by point- 
ing to it. Most people, if asked to look at an object over 
the horizontal edge of a sheet of paper which conceals their 
hand and arm, and then to point their finger at it (raising 
the hand gradually so that at last a finger-tip will appear 
above the sheet of paper), are found to place the finger not 
between either eye and the object, but between the latter 
and the root of the nose, and this whether both eyes or 
either alone be used. Hering and Helmholtz express this 
by saying that we judge of the direction of objects as they 
would appear to an imaginary cyclopean eye, situated be- 
tween our two real eyes, and with its optical axis bisecting 
the angle of oonvei^nce of the latter. Our two retinae act> 
according to Hering, as if they were superposed in the 
plHi*e of this imaginary double-eye ; we see by the corre- 
8)H)uding points of each, situated far asunder as they really 
an\ just as we should see if they were superposed and could 
hoiix be exoiteil together. 

The judgment of objective singleness and that of identi- 
cal direction seem to hang necessarily together. And that 
of identical ilirection seems to carry with it the necessity of 
a oonnuon origin, lietween the eyes or elsewhere, from which 
all the directions felt mav seem to be estimated. This is 
why the oyclo)>ean eye is really a fundamental part of the 
formulation of the theory of identical retinal points, and 
why Hering, the greatest champion of this theory, lays so 
much stress upon it 

// iVi cm imfHeiiiote con^guence of the law qfidentic(d pro- 

* Th«ti«e two oloenratioQS proTe the Uw of idendcal direcUoii only for 
obj«i'U vrhich rxcile Ihe foTvie or Ik in tbe line of direct kx>king. Ol^ 
««xvvT« ^iUvil iu iuiiirvi^l risjon can. however, more or leas easUy verify the 
Uw for ouUyiug retiiml )xnutj$^ 



friiim (/ imngat <m tfrontftrtcnliy similar points thnt imfigea 
rkickfall uptm tjmmetricaUy disparate ;xw'ii/« of the ttm retina 
ikiM bf pmjcrtnl in DISPARATE dirfxrlions, ond that their ohjfcts 
•iotld cowieqwnHy appi^ar in TWO jJnces, or LOOK DOPBLR 
T»ke tlif jMHTiUf 1 rays from a star falling upon two eyes 
•bid i-onvergi? npon a near object, O, instead of beiufi; 
|Mnlle1,aH in tlie previonsly instanced case. If SL and Sit 
in Pig. 5.5 Ije the parallel rays, each of them will fall upon 
the nasal half of the retina which it strikes. 

'i^-m .—^ 

Bat the two na^al halves are dispHrut«, geometrically 
fmmftriaal, aot geometrically mmilar. The image on the 
kfl ODA will therefore appear as if Ijing in a direction left- 
•uil of Uie Cyclopean eye's lino of sight; tht> image of the 
ri^t one will appear far to the right of the »amo direction. 
TV alar will, in nhort, be seen ilonble, — ' homonymously ' 

OooTeraely, if the star be looked at directly with parallel 
u«*, will b« aeen donble, because ibt images will affect 
tkooleror cheek halves of ttie two retiiito, instead of one 
<:4(r and one naaal ball The position of the images will 
Iwa be rerened from that of the previous case. The right 


eye's image will now appear to the left, the left eye's to the 
right — the doable images will be ' heteronymous.' 

The same reasoning and the same result ought to apply 
where the object's place with respect to the direction of the 
two optic axes is such as to make its images fall not on non- 
similar retinal halves,' but on non-similar parts of similar 
halves. Here, of course, the directions of projection will 
be less widely disparate than in the other case, and the 
double images will appear to lie less widely apart 

Careful experiments made by many observers according 
to the so-called haploscopic method confirm this law, and 
show that corresponding points^ of single visual direction, exist 
upon the two retinte. For the detail of these one must con- 
sult the special treatises. 

Note now an important consequence. If we take a 
stationary object and allow the eyes to vary their direction 
and convergence, a purely geometrical study will show that 
there will be some positions in which its two images impress 
corresponding retinal points, but more in which they im- 
press disparate points. The former constitute the so-called 
horopter, and their discovery has been attended with great 
mathematical difficulty. Objects or pai-ts of objects which 
lie in the eyes' hoiX)pter at anj' given time cannot appear 
double. Objects lying out of the horopter loovld seeniy if the 
theory of identical points icere strictly true, necessarily and al- 
imys to appear douUe, 

Here comes the first great conflict of the identity-theory 
with experience. Were the theory true, we ought all to 
have an intuitive knowledge of the hoi*opter as the line of 
distiuctest vision. Objects placed elsewhere ought to seem, 
if not actually double, at least blurred. And yet no living 
man makes any such distinction l>etween the parts of his 
field of vision. To most of us the whole field appears single, 
and it is only by rare accident or by special education that 
we ever catch a glimpse of a double image. In 1838, Wheat- 
stouo, in his trul}' chvssical memoir on binocular vision and 
the stereoscope,^ showed that the disparateness of the 

* Thi8 essay, publislied in the Philomphical Traosactions, oontains the 
genii of almost all the methiHls applied since to the study of optical peroep- 
tkNi. It seems a pity that Eug:land. leading off so brilliantly the modem 



a uB wliicii the two images of aD object fall does not 
I certain limits affect its iteeii uiiigleDetts at all, bat 
li»Uaux at wliieli it sball appear. Wheattitoue 
Mrratiou, moreover, which subseqiieutly bect^oie 
I c^ much but oouteutiuu, iu whinb ht; strove to 
t not oul^ might iliHparate iiuagus fuse, but im- 
aoD correspoudiiig or tdeutical poiutit might l>« E<ut<D 

I I am unfortiuiBtely prerented by the weaknesH of my 
D ewK from exjM'rimeiitiiig euough to form a decided 
1 opiuiou ou till- iiiattvr. It s<.'t«iii8 to ue, however, 
it ibf balance of evidence in againnt the Wheat^toDian 
brpr^tHtiou, aud that diHimrate poiutn luay faaa, without 
tstiul jifjint* for thitt rea»on ever giviug double images. 
i> twii ijaeHtiouH, " Cau we ttee siugle with disparate 
fah!'" and "Oau we see double with ideutical points?" 
'wogli at tlift firHt bbtsh thev may appear, as to Helra- 
■ tb«y apiwar, to be but two moden of expreKHiug the 
« inquiry, are in reality diatiuct. The first may quite 
U \te atiHwered affirmatively aud the xerond uegatively. 
f Add to lliia that the experiment quoted from Helmholts 
« by no means always HUCceodH, but that many indi- 
I place their finger between the object and one of 
r eyes, ofteueat the right ; t finally, observe that the 

fA of tbia ciady. •boiiM m> quickly bare dropped out of the Beld. 
^■■1 in nhMiiaeiii progrcH his be«n nude in Gevmany. HollnDd. and, 
l^vfamaOa. America. 

"rW» u no pWic lo tBpon ibfs contTOT(>r«y, but h few bibliographic 
'dnwcB mty not bi' Inappruprkle, Wheaistone's own experimeDl la in 
■vtloa It of hU memoir la fnvor of bla intcrprelalion see HeltnbolU, 
'■"^yt. opt., pp. 78T-S : Wundi. Pliyriol- PSyrbol . 3le AuH. p. IM ; N»gel. 
-•^•a bK iwef AiigCB, pp. TB-83 AgaliiHt WheatsUinc sra Vnlkmann. 
Iff*, f. Ophth., V. 2-74, and Uiiit<rauchun^ii. p, 8M ; Hfring. Bcltrfl^xiir 
i'^rWDfto. »-«. b1«. In Hermann'* H«ll)ch. d Phy»iol.. Bil ill. 1 Th. 
H», Aobert. Phy»lolog|prt NcUhant, p, S33 ; Schftn Arcbir f OphUiol., 
an 1. pp. 38-85 . „„i Dondi-n., {bid mi 1- p. 10 and note, 

t WbM we ).er the fliigor Ibe wbolf Itme, we u»u«IIy put il In Ibe line 
.- .ibf ab]m ami left eye tf It tie the leFt lIuEer, ialalng objerl and rigUl 
' If II be ib» right Cnitvr, Microiicop!««, niarliatiicit. or pcraooRone of 
'^"•ayra U mui-'h lir««r tban llie other, nlinoal alwaya refer dlnviiona to 
' "acta »yr, m may br even by tha poallion of the aliadow oii Ihoir face 
" '«( ibry poiiii ai ■ oindlr flame. 

228 i'> YCUOLOG Y. 

identitr-theorTy with its Cjclopean starting point for all 
lines of direction, giTes br itself no ground for the diatamx 
on any line at which an object shall appear, and has to be 
helped out in this respect by subsidiary hypotheses, which, 
in the hands of Bering and others, hare become so complex 
as easily to fall a prey to critical attacks ; and it wiU soon 
seem as if f Ae late of identical seen directions by correspomding 
poifUSf aUhaugh a simple formula for expressing concisely many 
fundamental phenomena, is by no means an adequate ^account of 
the whole matter cf retinal perception,* 

Hie Projection' Theory. 

Does the theory of projection fare any better? This 
theory admits that each eye sees the object in a different 
direction from the other, along the line, namely, passing 
from the object through the middle of the pupil to the 
retina. A point directly fixated is thus seen on the optical 
axes of both eyes. There ia only one point, however, 
which these two optical axes have in common, and that is 
the point to which they converge. Everything directly 
looked at is seen at this point, and is thus seen both single 
and at its proper distance. It is easy to show the incom- 
patibility of this theory with the theory of identity. Take 
an objective point (like O in Fig. 50, when the star is looked 
at) casting its images B' and L' on geometrically dissimilar 
parts of the two retinae and affecting the outer half of each 
eye. On the identity-theory it ought necessarily to appear 
double, whilst on the projection-theory there is no reason 
whatever why it should not appear single, provided only 
it be located by the judgment on each line of visible direc- 

* Professor Joseph Le CoDte, who believes strongly in the identity- 
theory, has embodied the latter in a pair of laws of the relation between 
positions seen single and double, near or far, on the one hand, and con- 
vergences and retinal impressions, on the other, which, though compli- 
cated, seems to me by far the best descriptive formulation yet made of the 
normal facts of vision. His account is easily accessible to the reader in his 
volume ' Sight * in the Intemntional Scientific Series, bk. n. c. 8, so I say 
no more about it now, except that it does not solve any of the difficulties 
we are noting in the identity-theory, nor account for the other fluctuating 
perceptions of which we go on to treat. 


], naitber nearer Dor farther tlmu it» jioint of interaectioD 
b Uw other line. 

I IheJMd of vifw owjlit, in truth, if the pro- 

ini/onnly valid, to appear single, entirely 

s varying positions of the eyes, for from 

7p<dnt of spAce two lines of viHJhle direction pass to 

) retJOip; and at the intersection of these lines, or 

where the point is, tltere, according to the theory, it 

lottld appear. The oltjrvlion to thig theory m thtm prectsdy 

^ <^ the objection to the identHy-theory. If the latter 

*T«W, at ought to ser. moat thingx double all the time. If the 

projfriiim-lheftry rvlal, mv oiighf never to see anything donUe, 

.h n matter (f fact w* get too feiP doiMe images for the idtm- 

titif4}teory, and too many for Ike projectio7i-iheory. 

The partiiuuia of the projection-theory, beginning with 

A^QiloninH, have always explained double images as the 
ftmilt of an erroneous jui^ment of the dtntiince of the object, 
the images of the latter being pmjected by the imagination 
along the two linen of ^-isible direction either nearer or 
fartber than the point of iuteraectiou of the latter. A 
•liagnun will make this clear. 

380 P8TCH0L0QT. 

Let O be the point looked at, M an object farther, and 
N an object nearer, than it. Then M and N will send the 
lines of visible direction MM and NX to the two retinae. 
If N be judged as far as O, it must necessarily lie where 
the two lines of visible direction NN intersect the plane of 
the arrow, or in two places, at N' and at N''. If M be 
judged as near as O, it must for the same reason form two 
images at M^ and M'^ 

It is, as a matter of fact, true that we often misjudge 
the distance in the way alleged. If the reader will hold his 
forefingers, one beyond the other, in the median line, and 
fixate them alternately, he will see the one not looked at» 
double ; and he will also notice that it appears nearer to the 
plane of the one looked at, whichever the latter may be» 
than it really is. Its changes of apparent size, as the con- 
vergence of the eyes alter, also prove the change of appa- 
rent distance. The distance at which the axes converge 
seems, in fact, to exert a sort of attraction upon objects 
situated elsewhere. Being the distance of which we are 
most acutely sensible, it invades, so to speak, the whole 
field of our perception. If two half-dollars be laid on the 
table an inch or two apart, and thi^ eyes fixate steadily- the 
point of a pen held in the median line at varying dis- 
tances between the coins and the face, there will come a 
distance at which the pen stands between the left half- 
dollar and the right eye, and the right half-dollar and the 
left eye. The two half-dollars will then coalesce into one ; 
and this one will show its apparent approach to the pen- 
point by seeming suddenly much reduced in size.* 

Yet, in spite of this tendency to inaccuracy, we are never 
actually mistaken about the half-dollar being behind the 
pen-point. It may not seem far enough oflf, but still it is 
farther than the point. In general it may be said that 
where the objects are known to us, no such illusion of dis- 
tance occurs in any one as the theory would require. And 
in some observers, Herirg for example, it seems hardly to 
occur at all. If I look into infinite distance and get my 
finger in double images, they do not seem infinitely far oft 

* Naturally it takes a smaller object at a less distance to cover by its 
image a constant amount of retinal surface. 



Tn mak« nbjvctK at <Uffereut (listiuiceH seem equicliHtant, 
nnivi precsadtiDa iuu8t he tnkeu to have tbeiii alike in 
ipjmnuiM!, au<l to exclude all outwanl i-eaMina fur aucrib- 
iii|>fa>thfl oao a tliffereut lotatiou from that ascribed to the 
other, Tbua Donders tries to prove the law of projection 
ttv taking two suniilar electric sparks, one behind the other 
iin a ilark K>^>nD4l, one sef u double ; or au iron rod placed 
Ml uear t<> the oven that its doublf images Beam as broad aa 
tLslofa fisatofl stove-pipe, the top and bottom of the objects 
Iving cat off bv screens, so as to prevent all sugKestiona 
of [wntpective, etc. The three objects in each experiment 
Mvm in the same plane.* 

XiVi to this the impossibility, recognized by aU observ- 
ers, iifijver seeing donble with theyuvfrp, and the fact that 
aatliurities as able as those quoted in the note on Wheat- 
ktuDp'ii observation deny that they can see double tlien with 
Mfntirnl points, ami we are forced to conclude that the 
pnjrriirm-thniry, hke its pmtrcesmr, breaks down. Neither 
finHtJalm exactly or exkanJtfiveJf/ n Inw/or aU our perceptioru. 

Amhi^ly 1/ Retinnl Imprfmions. 
What doea each theory try to do ? To make of sf^i location 

Em. 0/ retinal imprtsaUm. Other facta may be 
rd tn ghoir hnwfnrfrotnfxfd are the perceptive 
etiwd impvsjtiong. We alluded a while ago to 
nary ambiKuit^- of the retinal image as a re- 
•ealer of magnitude. Produce au after-image of the sun 
tad took at ronr fiuger-tip : it will be smaller than your 
oaiL Project it on the table, and it will be as big as & 
»trawb«rry; on the wall, as large as a plate: on yonder 
Monntwn, biKger than a boose. And yet it is an nuchanged 

•AidilTf. Ophthal., Bd. xvii, Abib- S, pp. «-« (1871). 



retinal impression. Prepare a sheet with the figures shown 
in Fig. 57 strongly marked upon it, and get by direct fixa- 
tion a distinct after-image of each. 

Project the after-image of the cross upon the upper left- 
hand part of the waU, it will appear as in Fig. 58 ; on the 
upper right-hand it will appear as in Fig. 59. The circle 

Fko. 86. 

Fio. so. 

similarly projected will be distorted into two different 
ellipses. If the two parallel lines be projected upon the 
ceiling or floor far in front, the farther ends will diverge ; 
and if the three parallel lines be thrown on the same sur- 
faces, the upper pair will seem farther apart than the lower. 
Adding certain lines to others has the same distorting 
effect. In what is known as ZoUner's pattern (Fig. 60), the 
long parallels tip towards each other the moment we draw 
the short slanting lines over them yet their retinal images 


^ V y y y y 

y y y y y 

y y y y 

y y y y 

Fio. 60. 

are the same they always were. A similar distortion of 
parallels appears in Fig 61. 

Drawing a square inside the circle (Fig. 52) gives to the 
outline of the latter an indented appearance where the 
square's comers touch it Drawing the radii inside of one 



of the right angles in the same figure makes it seem larger 
than the other. In Fig. 63, the retinal image of the space 
between the extreme dots is in all three lines the same, yet 
it seems much larger the moment it is fiUed up with other 

In the stereoscope certain pairs of lines which look 
single under ordinary circumstances immediately seem 
double when we add certain other lines to them.* 

Ambigtwus Import of Eye-movements. 

These facts show the indeterminateness of the space- 
import of various retinal impressions. Take now the eye's 
movements, and we find a similar vacillation. When ^e 
follow a moving object with our gaze, the motion is * volun- 
tary ' ; when our eyes oscillate to and fro after we have 
made ourselves dizzy by spinning around, it is * reflex ' ; 
and when the eyeball is pushed with the finger, it is ' pas- 
sive.' Now, in all three of these cases we get a feeling 
from the movement as it effects itself. But the objective 
perceptions to which the feeling assists us are by no meana 
the same. In the first case we may see a stationary field 
of view with one moving object in it ; in the second, the 
total field swimming more or less steadily in one direction ; 
in the third, a sudden jump or twist of the same total 

The/edings of convergence of the eyeballs permit of the 
same ambiguous interpretation. When objects are near we 
converge strongly upon them in order to see them ; when 
far, we set our optic axes parallel. But the exact degree of 
convergence fails to be felt ; or rather, being felt, fails to 
tell us the absolute distance of the object we are regarding. 
Wheatstone arranged his stereoscope in such a way that the 
size of the retinal images might change without the con- 
vergence altering ; or conversely, the convergence might 
change without the retinal image altering. Under these 
circumstances, be say8,t the object seemed to approach or 
recede in the first case, without altering its size ; in the 
second, to change its size without altering its distance — ^just 

*A. W. Volkmaun, Uutersucbungen, p. 258. 
t Philosophical Transactious, 1852, p. 4. 



liBronrBe of wimt might have been esiiect^d. Wheatstooe 
Idii, howevfit, that ' tixing the attention ' converted each of 
tLei» perr«|>tioQM into its oppositt^. The same perplexity 
ti-ars in looking through priumHtii- glasses, which alt«r the 
'ii's'«)nvergence. We cannot decide whether the object 
1.1" pome nearer, or grown larger, or both, or neither ; and 
.r]iiil(nn<^ut TiicillnteH in the most surprising way. We 
ni(ir ?ven make our eyes diverge, and the object will none 
'l]^l*»« appear at a finite diHtance, When we look through 
■.\\i- *U-T'^oiiC<y\w, Uie picture seems at no determinate dis- 
iiniv. These and other facts have led Uelmholtz to deny 
;liiil the feeling of convergence has any very exact value as 
. 4iiitance-roeasurer.* 

With thr /iviingf (^ acomviodolion it is very much the 

■wtw. Douders has shown t that the apparent maguifj-ing 

po»fir(if «|>»'ct»('lesof nioilerate convexity hardly depends at 

4li upon their enlargement of the retinal iiuage, but rather 

•n the relaxation they permit of the muscle of accommiMla- 

I iL ThiK snggestti an object farther off, and consequently 

uiich larger one, Hini% its retinal size rather increases 

'Ji*n dimimshes. But in this case the same vacillation of 

jndfraent as in the previously mentioned case of converge 

RDM take* phice. The recession made the object seem 

^uger, but the apparent growth in size of the object now 

^MkM it look as if it came nearer instead of receding. The 

Hpbet thoM ooutrwlicts its own cause. Everyone is eonscious, 

BlHi fimi putting on a pair of spectacles, of a doubt whether 

the field of view draws near or retreats.^ 

There is still another decepHtm, occurring in persons who 
^OK had ome eye-mtwcfe siid^lmly jximlymi. This deception 

^^tf Ajr^^d- Optik, 649-W4. Later Uh'r auUiur in led lo value oonverg' 
^K Mora Ughlr. Arch. f. (Aukt. u.) Ph>-slul. (ItiTS), p. 822. 

t AbormIIw of Accommodation miiI ItetcHClioo INvw S^dentiAin 8oc. 
TruML. LoadnD. ItMHi. p. lU. 

t Tbew Mnogp i-onlrwllclioiiB have licea calli'd by Aiilirrt ' wconilary ' 
il«mp*(0(U of JudKiDCDl. Six OrundiiQiji- d. I'tiysliilogiscbcn Opllk (l^lp- 
^ UTS), pp. flOl. Bia. C2T, Uui' or tb(! iHst exampluH of iLuiu iHtlieatnaU 
tfaa of Uh atoon u flm H«n ibnxi^li n inlev-npe. It i* largfr and blighter. 
■ «« aM U* detaib more dUtlnctly aod Judge It nearer. But becauto w« 

Eitaonucb nearer wt lb ink It rotui have grown tmaller. Cf . Cluu^ 
r la Jabr«*berichi. x. 430. 


has led Wnndt to affirm that the ejeball-feelmg proper, the 
incoming sensation of effected rotation, tells us only of the 
direction of our eye-movements, but not of their whole ex- 
tent* For this reason, and because not only Wundt, but 
many other authors, think the phenomena in these partial 
paralyses demonstrate the existence of a feeling of innerva- 
tion, a feeling of the outgoing nervous current, opposed to 
every afferent sensation whatever, it seems proper to note 
the facts with a certain degree of detail 

Suppose a man wakes up some morning with the exter- 
nal rectus muscle of his right eye half paralyzed, what will 
be the result ? He will be enabled only with great effort 
to rotate the eye so as to look at objects lying far off to the 
right. Something in the effort he makes will make him feel 
as if the object lay much farther to the right than it really 
is. If the left and sound eye be closed, and he be asked 
to touch rapidly with his finger an object situated towards 
his right, he will point the finger to the right of it. The 
current explanation of the ' something ' in the effort which 
causes this deception is that it is the sensation of the out- 
going discharge from the nervous centres, the * feeling of 
innervation,' to use Wundt's expression, requisite for bring- 
ing the open eye with its weakened muscle to bear upon 
the object to be touched. If that object be situated 20 
degrees to the right, the patient has now to innervate as 
powerfully to turn the eye those 20 degrees as formerly 
he did to turn the eye 30 degrees. He consequently 
believes as before that he 1ms turned it 30 degrees ; until, 
by a newly-acquired custom, he learns the altered spatial 
import of all the discharges his brain makes into his right 
abducens nerve. The ' feeling of innervation,' maintained 
to exist by this and other observations, plays an immense 
part in the space-theories of certain philosophers, especial- 
ly Wundt. I shall elsewhere try to show that the observa- 
tions by no means warrant the conclusions drawn from 
them, and that the feeling in question is probably a wholly 
fictitious entity, t Meanwhile it suffices to point out that 
even those who set most store by it are compelled, by the 

* Revue Philosophique, iii. 9, p. 220. 
f See Chapter XXIV. 


readiness with which the translocation of the field of view 
becomes corrected and further errors avoided, to admit 
that the precise space-import of the supposed sensation of 
omtgoing energy is as ambiguous and indeterminate as that of 
any other of the eye-feelings tve have considered hitherto. 

I have now given what no one will call an understate- 
ment of the facts and arguments by which it is sought to 
banish the credit of directly revealing space from each and 
every kind of eye-sensation taken by itself. The reader 
will confess that they make a very plausible show, and 
most likely wonder whether my own theory of the matter 
can rally from their damaging evidence. But the case is. 
far from being hopeless ; and the introduction of a discrimi- 
nation hitherto unmade will, if I mistake not, easily vindi- 
cate the view adopted in these pages, whilst at the same 
time it makes ungrudging allowance for all the ambiguity 
and illusion on which so much stress is laid by the advo- 
cates of the intellectualist-theory. 

The Choice of the Visual Reality. /Q rJ 

We have native and fixed optical space-sensations ; but xiAc^ 
experience leads us to sdect certain ones from among them to be . y 
the exclusive bearers of reality : the rest become mere signs and C ^y^^^ 
suggesters of these. The factor ol sdectjon , on which we have 1/ juaU, 
already laid so much Htress, here as elsewhere is the solving (J 
word of the enigma. If Helinholtz, Wundt, and the rest, 
with an ambiguous retinal Heusatiou before them, meaning 
now one size and distance, and now another, had not con- 
tented themselves with merely saying:— The size and dis- 
tance are not this sensation, they are something beyond it 
which it merely calls up, and whose own birthplace is afar 
— in 'synthesis' (Wundt) or in 'experience' (Helmholtz) as 
the case may be ; if they had gone on definitely to ask and 
definitely to answer the question, What are the size and 
distance in their proj)er selves ? they would not only have 
escaped the present deplorable vagueness of their space- 
theories, but they would have seen that the objective 
spatial attributes ' signified * are simply and solely ceriavk 

238 P6TCH0L0GT. 

other optical aenaaiiona now cAaeni, but which the preBent 
Bensations suggest. 

What, for example, is the slant-legged orosa which we 
think we see on the wall when we project the rectangular 
after-image high up towards our right or left (Figs. 58 and 
59) ? Is it not in very sooth a retinal sensation itself ? An 
imagined sensation, not a felt one, it is true, but none the 
less essentially and originally sensational or retinal for that, 
— the sensation, namely, which we should receive if a * real ' 
slant-legged cross stood on the wall in front of ua and threw 
its image on our eye. That image is not the one our retina 
now holds. Our retina now holds the image which a cross 
of square shape throws when in front, but which a cross of 
the slant-legged pattern xoovld throw, provided it were 
actually on the wall in the distant place at which we look. 
Call this actual retinal image the ' square ' image. The 
square image is then one of the innumerable images the 
slant-legged cross can throw. Why should another one, 
and that an absent one, of those innumerable images be 
picked out to represent exclusively the slant-legged cross's 
* true ' shape ? Why should that absent and imagined 
slant-legged image displace the present and felt square 
image from our mind? Why, when the objective cross 
gives us so many shapes, as it varies its position, should we 
think we feel the true shape only when the cross is directly 
in front ? And when that question is answered, how can 
the absent and represented feeling of a slant-legged figure 
so successfully intrude itself into the place of a presented 
square one ? 

Before answering either question, let us be doubly sure 
about our facts, and see how true it is that in our dealinga 
tvith objects loe altcays do pick out one of the viaital images they 
yield y to constitute the real form or size. 

The matter of size has been already touched upon, so 
that no more need be said of it here. As regards shape, 
almost all the retinal shapes that objects throw are perspec- 
tive * distortions.' Square table-tops constantly present two 
acute and two obtuse angles ; circles drawn on our wall- 
papers, our carpets, or on sheets of paper, usually show like 
ellipses ; parallels approach as they recede ; human bodies 


ore foreiilitirtoued ; ttnd the traiinitioDa from one in anntLer 
of tlir'iU! nlt^^riiig forniH are iutiiiite aud contiuual. (^\it nf ' 
ihr flm. bowevgr. one phase alwa^ti stau da pro minei it. It 
!• lii>* f(irm tilt' olijpct lias wbpu we Hee it easiest and best : 
w\ that IK wlieii our eyes aud tLe object both are m what 
Lus be cAlled the iwrimil position. la this position our 
Iwaii is aprigbt and onr optic axes either parallel or sym- 
iK^tricsllr coiivergeut ; the plane of the object is i>erpf*n- 
dicuUrto the xHsaal plane; and if the object in ouecoutainiug 
nuu}' lioea it in tunied ho as to make them, n» fai' an possible, 
Mthf-r )>ar>iUel or [u^rjiendicular to the visual plane. lu this 
Mlnation it is that we compare nil shapes with each other ; 
lifre evfrv eiact imtasurenient and decision is made.* 

/( M (Try i^tiry (o ttta u-hy the normal mtiuition slioidd have 

tHi atrtordituiry prr-rmiverur. First, it is tlie position in 

*bjch we easiest bold anything we are examining in our 

hatnU ; iu-ci(t)d, it is a tniii in g- point between all right- and 

nil l^ft-hand perspective viewH of a given object; third, it 

- iKi* finlv |>ositiou in which symmetrical figures seem sym- 

■ ■trical and etjiial augles seem equal ; fourth, it is often 

■ it starting- point of movements from which the eye is 

t 'riubled by Axift] rotations, by which ««p(*rpo»>'(font of 

-'ti[i/)1 images of different lines and different parta of 

;:, ^illll.■ line is easiest produced, and consequently by 

«iiich th« Ave ran make the best comparative measnre- 

BPBta in its ttweeps. All these merits single the normal 

pmntion oat to Ije chosen. No other point of view offers 

in nuwy WNtlietic and practical advantages. Here we be- 

liwnj we Kee the object as it i« ; elsewhere, only as it seems. 

EEperipoce and castom soon teach us, however, that the 

Ring appearance passes inb^ the real one by continuous 
ittniis. They ten«h us, moreover, that seeming and 
[ may be strangely interchanged. Now a real circle 
iilid« into a seeming ellipse ; now an ellipse may, by 
IK in the same direction, become a seeming circle ; now 

* rfacotil}' KXcvptloD Mctiu U> be wlieu we exprewily wisb 1o abatncl frum 
IMJtkilUn. •n'l lo JuddfPuf Ibc guuerKi 'rtterX,' WitPcus laUiiTg trying 
kM> dtoaKv Willi tlwlr lindH inctiued kqiI tlieir eyes wk&uctr ;orpiiliilorsl 
llMwmeBUtiiitk}ii>l|iln|t of llii^ ' vnliim 'In their ploliireti. 

f Th» itnporbuicr itf 8u|MT|Ku>itlon will niipmr l»ltT ou. 

■m k 

340 P8TCH0L0O T 

a rectangular cross grows slaut-Iegged ; now a slant-legged 
one grows rectangular. 

Almost any form in oblique vision may be thus a deriva- 
tive of almost any other in * primary ' vision ; and we must 
learn, when we get one of the former appearances, to trans- 
late it into the appropriate one of the latter class ; we must 
learn of what optical ' reality ' it is one of the optical signs. 
Having learned this, we do but obey that law of economy 
or simplification which dominates our whole psychic life, 
when we attend exclusively to the * reality ' and ignore as 
much as our consciousness will let us the * sign ' by which 
we came to apprehend it The signs of each probable real 
thing being multiple and the thing itself one and fixed, 
we gain the same mental relief by abandoning the former 
for the latter that we do when we abandon mental images, 
with all their fluctuating characters, for the definite and 
unchangeable rvames which they suggest. The selection of 
the several * normal ' appearances from out of the jungle 
of our optical experiences, to serve as the real sights of 
which we shall think, is psychologically a parallel phenom- 
enon to the habit of thinking in words, and has a like use. 
Both are substitutions of terms few and fixed for terms 
manifold and vague. 

Sensations lohich tve Ignore, 

This service of sensations as mere signs, to be ignored 

when they have evoked the other sensations which are their 

significates, was noticed first by Berkeley and remarked in 

many passages, as the following : 

'* Signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, 
but only in their relative capacity and for the sake of those things 
whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind overlooks them, 
so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified . . . 
which in truth and strictness are not seen, but only suggested and ap- 
prehended by means of the proper objects of sight which alone are 
seen." (Divine Visual Language, § 12.) 

Berkeley of course erred in supposing that the thing 

suggested was not even originally an object of sight, as the 

sign now is which calls it up. Reid expressed Berkeley's 

principle in yet clearer language : 

**The visible appearances of objects are intended by nature only at 
signs or indications, and the mind passes instantly to the things sig- 


ulnl. aiUiout maVinK tbe leMt rvflectivn upon the sign, or nvpn per- 
mTin; (hilt tliitrn i« any Biioli Ihiug. . . . The mind hasAcqulreil acon- 
DnM aail iDToientle habit of mnltoniion to them iiht; Higiixj. For 
'fi no toontu' itppiinr tluui, (juiuk us li){btiiiuK, r.lit> thing signlllMl suo- 
■ ■i»uiA engrosbm all oar n^anl. Tbi-y liuvu no imniti in Iflii^iiagu ; 
«l alcbou^li we ixn i.-uii8oioiis uf thi-Di wht^n t\\vy ijiuk ihruu);!) [ha 
iirl, nc thpir p(uwi|{i^ is so ((uii^k iiml sci [iimilmr thut it is iibsulutcly 
iMdMl ; uor ilo ihey leave nuy Tootsteps uf tiieuiHclves, eitlier in th« 
TFDory or tmii^uiiiion," (Inquiry. chit)i, v. ^i, 3.j 

If we rpview the facts we ehall iind every grade of non- 
ri'utioQ between the extreme furin of overlooking nien- 
■■ LpJ by Ueid (or forms ^vt^ii more extreme atill)Aiiil foiii* 
liWt c»Q»uii>u» [lerwption of the sensation present. Soine- 
■i!ii™ It iM literally imp»tisibletol>ecoine aware of the latter. 
'^'UDeEimeH a little artifice or effort enKily leads uh to discern 
iitofiethT, or in alteniatiou, with the 'object' it reveals. 
SiuiAtinmi* the present sensation \» held to l>e the object or 
t>- ifprotluce ltd features in uiulistorteil shape, aiul t^^n, of 
B'une, it receives the mind's full glare. 

Th« deepest inattention is to subjective optical seusa- 
hoiw, Htrictly so called, or those which are not signs of 
oati>r nhjects at all. Helmholtz's treatment of these phe- 
MimeDa, tnvjn:ir voUfantri, negative after-images, doable 
uuges, etc., is very satisfactory. He says : 

" W» oaly Altrnd with nuy ctuu^ nn<] exuctnem lo oar flenaalioTu in so 
bi htnli as they can bo ntilisml Tor th« knowledge of outward things : 
■ad wr WD- MNiistoninl lu Degleol all iLohk portiniia of them whiuh have 
M Hcniflconre as rem"''' t^'' cxtcrniil worUI. So iniu'h is this thecaso 
ilui (or tbi- taoiti part special artiAces anil practice are required for 
tte obtprvBliun of thm- IhiFit ninrr «uhJ(H.-tive reelrntc«. Althoiifth it 
oucbl *)>em lUut noihirjtc ihoulil be I'asier than lo be eonscious of one's 
"vntniiwlioiw. pupi-nnntv neviTihrltsfi shows thai iiftAn riion^h either a 
•pMuI tatont lik« that showed in eminent degree by Purkinje. oracd- 
diMor ihmrvlrc npn'ulatlon. nn- nBCiHsarycMnditiuns for the liiscovery 
«( *ub>Mrtive pberkomeiia. Thus, for examplii (he blind a|x)t on ih« 
waia wax dtNcoverLil by Hariolte by tbe ibiviretlc way ; similarly by 
W thsttxIaUDce of ' Kiimmatinn '-toni« in acouHtiea, In Ihe majority 
*t turn accidmi is what first led observers whose att«iilioii was esps- 
eiilly uuiralMd on *iibj«<;tiv» phrnomoiia to disc-over this one or Ihal ; 
wly wbotv lb<' Hubjei-Ilve appearanees are so intense that they inter- 
fmwuh the pcriTptinn of objivts an' they notiied bv all men alik«. 
Bh t( ihpy K>ve unce been discovered It is for the most part easy for 
i^MqiuiDl obwtrTers who pliui: thi'mstlves in proper eonditiona and 
had tb«iraIt«Btlon in tbe right din^ctioii to percoive them. But in 

242 ParCHOLOGT. 

many casos — for example, in the phenomena of the blind spot, in the 
discrimination of over-tones and combination-tones from the ground- 
tone of musical sounds, etc. — such a strain of the attention is required, 
even with appropriate instnimeotal aids, that most persons faiL The 
very after- imagf» of bright objects are by most men perceived only 
under exceptionally favorable conditions, and it takes steady practice 
to see the fainter images of this kind. It is a commonly recurring ex- 
perience that persons smitten with some eye-disease which impairs 
vision suddenly remark for the first time the mutca roiUantes which 
all through life their vitreous humor has contained, but which they now 
firmly believe to have arisen since their malady ; the truth being that 
the latter has only made them more observant of all their visual sensa- 
tions. There are also cases where one eye has gradually grown blind, 
and the patient lived for an indefinite time without knowing it, until, 
through the accidental closure of the healthy eye alone, the blindness 
of the other was brought to attention. 

**Most people, when first made aware of binocular double images, 
are uncommonly astonished that they should never have noticed them 
before, although all through their life they had been in the habit of see- 
ing singly only those few objects which were about equally distant with 
the point of fixation, and the rest, those nearer and farther, which con- 
stitute the great majority, had always been doable. 

" We must then learn to turn our attention to our particular sensa- 
tions, and we learn this commonly only for such sensations as are means 
of cognition of the outer world. Only so far as they serve this end have 
our sensations any importance for us in ordinary life. Subjective 
feelings are mostly interesting only to scientific investigators ; were 
they remarked in the ordinary use of the senses, they could only causc> 
disturbance. Whilst, therefore, we reach an extraordinary degree of 
firmness and security in objective observation, we not only do not reach 
this where subjective phenomena are concerned, but we actually attain 
in a high degree the faculty of overlooking these altogether, and keep- 
ing ourselves independent of their influence in judging of objects, even 
in cases where their strength might lead them easily to attract our at- 
tention.' (Physiol. Optik, pp. 431~2.> 

Even where the sensation is not merely subjective, as in 
the cases of which Helmholtz speaks, but is a sign of some- 
thing outward, we are also liable, as Reid says, to overlook 
its intrinsic quality and attend exclusively to the image of 
the * thing ' it suggests. But here everyone can easily notice 
the sensation itself if he will. Usually we see a sheet of 
paper as uniformly white, although a part of it may be in 
shadow. But we can in an instant, if we please, notice the 
shadow as l<K*al color. A man walking towards us does 
not usually seem to alter his size ; but we can, by setting 



1 in a peculiar way make him appear to do so. 

\ edacatiuu of the artist couaiBt« in his learning 

b^^UM presented sigiis as well as tlie repreBentetl things, 
N < iiialter what the tield of view means, he sees it also ati 
: irrtt—ihaX itt, a« a cuUectiuu of patches of color bounded 
1 lines — the whole forming an optical diagram of whose 
:.'UiuNic pru{H)rtioDa one who \» not an artist has hardly a 
: ijicwtw iuVlibg. The ordiuarj muu's atteDtion pasnes 
' T tL«m to their import ; the artist's turns back aud 
':h-IIb h^ior tliem for their own sake. 'Don't draw the 
'i\a% u it M, but fts it Iwkv ! ' is the endless advice of every 
ir»cher to liis pupil ; forgetting that what it ' is ' is what it 
«ouM also ' look,' provided it were placed in what we have 
ckiW the ' normal ' situation for risiou. lu this situation 
Ibti MDSBtion us ' sign ' and the sensation as ' object ' co- 
klMc« into one, and there is no contmst between them. 

Seiuiationa which seem Suppressed. 
But A great difficulty has been made of certaiu peculiar 
<MM sbivh we uukI now turn to consider. They are crutea 
ia which a prtamt aeiuiation. wlioHe existence is supposed lo he 
fnnrd by Us outuurd conditions being there, seeins nlisoiuf^y 
Mfjnmaed or changed by the image of the ' thing ' it suggests. 

Thu matter carries us back to what was said on p. 218. 
Tbe pMUMge there qnoted from Uelmholtz refers to these 
cuMA He thinks they conclusively disprove the original 
I iatriDMic spatiality of any of our retinal sensations ; 
I if BQch a one, nc.tnally present, had an immanent aud 
aitial spaiMf-de termination of its own, that might well 
* l«d to Hud overlaid or even momentarily eclipsed by 
I of its signification, bnt how could it possibly 
I or completely «u/ipwjt««i thereby? Of actuallT 
at iwnfwtious, be says, lieing Muppressed by suggestions 

^ We have nol a ulUKte wp|l-att«ale<l example. In all those illusions 
vprnvoknl bj nmmdirms in the nbemce of their usnttlly Bxvit- 
fW^iwU. tbie DilMAkc Dever vanittheo by ibe belter uDdcniaiiding of 
iltr ot/Jed ntalty [ircwnl. luul liy iiuijjlit iiitn iliu cuust! of duoeption. 
Fbi«|>bpnm proTolivd by pn»»ure on the eyebtill. by iractioo on tho <m- 
m>or of tbe opilc iiprve. efier-iniutcis, riv. . rr-mniii projuDled into their 
a|>pumt pUre in lhi> Hold of vtsiou, jii»l im (Ik- imnfte projected from 


a mirror's surface continues to be seem behind the mirror, althougb we 
know that to all these appearances no outward reality oorresponds. 
True enough, we can remove our attention, and keep it removed, from 
sensations that have no reference to the outer world, those, e.g., of the 
weaker after-images, and of entoptic objects, etc. . . . But what would 
become of our perceptions at all if we had the power not only of ignor- 
ing, but of transforming into their opposites, any part of them that 
differed from that outward experience, the image of which, as that t)f 
a present reality, accompanies them in the mind ? " * 

And again : 

** On the analogy of all other experience, we should expect that the 
conquered feelings would persist to our perception, even if only in the 
shape of recognized illusions. But this is not the case. One does not 
see how the assumption of originally spatial sensations can explain our 
optical cognitions, when in the last resort those who believe in these 
very sensations find themselves obliged to assume that they are aver- 
come by our better judgment, based on experience." 

These words, coming from such a quarter, necessarily 
carry great weight. But the authority even of a Helmholtz 
ought not to shake one's critical composure. And the mo- 
ment one abandons abstract generalities and comes to close 
quarters with the particulars, I think one easily sees that 
no such conclusions as those we have quoted follow from 
the latter. But profitably to conduct the discussion tve 
must divide the alleged instances into groups. 

(a) With Helmholtz, color-perception is equally with space- 
perception an intellectual aflfair. The so-called simulta- 
neous color-contrast, by which one color modifies another 
alongside of which it is said, is explained by him as an 
unconscious inference. In Chapter XVII we discussed the 
color-contrast problem ; the principles which applied to its 
solution will prove also applicable to part of the present 
problem. In my opinion, Hering has definitively proved 
that, when one color is laid beside another, it modifies the 
sensation of the latter, not by virtue of any mere mental 
suggestion, as Helmholtz would have it, but by actually 
exciting a new nerve-process, to which the modified feeling 
of color immediately corresponds. The explanation is 
physiological, not psychological. The transformation of 

*Pliysiol. Optik, p. 817. 



nn nrit if ihi- m<ivi<iiii3nt, of revolution ia in the opposite direction. !f 
ai th» fnmnr lawn iheeyM of the obwrvers arp turned from tlie rotat- 
ing dkk lowards any fnini liar object — e. g. the face of a friend — the latter 
Mvn to GunlTML't or recede in a somewhat striking manner, and to 
'iiaul or approach nfn<r tho opposite motion of the spirid." • 

Ad olementary form of thf se motor illusioiiH neeiQH to be 
Uif one (lescribfid Viy Helmholtz on pp. 568-571 of his 
Optik. The motiou of anythiu^^ in the iielii of TwioD aloiif; 
aa tcntA angle tovardx n Htrnigbt line sensibly distorts 

thit line. Tims iu Fifi. 66 ; Let AB be a line drawu on 
[•per, C1>E tbn tracinfi ma<lb over thitt line by tbe point 
wl a C4IIDJIUKI) Ktenilily followed by tlie eye, an it moves. As 
tiiR »>tnpafia-point pasaes from C to D, tbe liue appears to 
iB'>redownwanlH ; as it passes from D to E, tbe line appears 
tomiiTe upwards; at tbe same time tbe wbole Hue ueema 
loiui'liue itself in the direction FG during tbe first bait 
nft&e Fompaas'a movement; and in the direction HI dnr- 
iuK itjt laat half ; tbe change from one inclinatinu to au- 
"tlwr being quite diatiuct aa the c^mpasn-point passes 
"vrr D. 

Any line acroas wbiob we draw a pencil-point appears 
!•■ \m animated by a rapid movement of its own towards 
llie fiencil-point. This apparent movement of bntb of two 
tfaiufpi in relative motiou to each other, even when one of 
litem ia abMolately atiU, reminds iis of tbe instances ijuoted 

■ Bnwrilick ud Hall. In Juumal uf Phy*ioru)(y. vol. iii. p. 360. Ilelm- 
kiihx Iris t« viplaln ihiii phenumirDun by uonuiucloiia rutHtJom of the cyo- 
b*il. Bat iDOTpmenta of the eyebnil can only explain auch AppmniDCea 
irf OKiTnnvnl* u arc the tame over the whole Qeld. 1o the windowed 
b«i4 CMC fiart ol the flrtd K«ni* la move In ODe way, aooUier part [□ au- 
Mlwr. Tb* Mimr b iruc wb»n wc turn from llm spirt) to look at thr wall 
— Ibe omfrv of tbe fleltl hIodc swelli out or ^onl^lCl^ llie mar^iu clues the 
i « >tf ». M maaln* at rml. linch anil Dvorak hnvc hcantlfnlly pnivcrl tha 
[■^nriMUly of rre-rolallui>« in Ihb i-n»e iSllmnffuhi-r il, Wiriier Akiid.. 
•d. UL). 8w alio Bnwditrli and Kall'ii (Mpor ai above p 300. 


direction to that iu wliicli, a moment pre^'ioiiHlj, we hi 
been seeing the water nmve, whilst on either side of thi 
band another band of plaukB will move as the water did- 
Lookiug &t H waterfall, or ut tlie road from out of a car- 
window in a moving tiain, produces the same illusion, whicl 
may be easily verified in the laboratoiy by a simple piect 
of apparatus. A board with a window five or six inchei 
wide and of any convenient length is supported upright oa 
two feet. On the back side of the board, above and below 
the window, are two rollers, one of which is provided with 
a crank. Au endless band of any figured stuff is pas^d 
over these rollers (one of which can be ao adjusted on its 
bearings as to keep the stnff always tant and not liable to 
slip), and the surface of the front board is also covered with 
stuff or paper of a nature to catch the eye. Turning the 
crank now seta the central band iu continuous motion, 
whilst the margins of the field remain really at rest, but 
after a while appear mowng in the contrary way. Stopping 
the crank results in an illusory appearance of motion in 
reverse directions all over the field. 

A disk with an Archimedean sjiiral drawn upon it, 
whirled round on an ordinary rotating machine, produces 
still more startliiif^ i-ffpctH. 

" If Itae revolutiou ts in the direction in which the apirkl liob J 
«|:^roaohes tbe centre of the di^ the entire surface of the latter w 
to expand during revolution and to contract after it has oeaeed ; 

THK pujicmTioif ay spack 



n movpinent at revolntlon ia in the opposite direction. If 
A Ikeeyaenf the obwi'VorR are tunicrt from the rotat- 
bftnyfiunilinrnhject — e.g. the face of a friend — the bitter 
* tu ooninict ur rm^vd^ iu a 8oiu(>whHl striking inaDnir, atid to 
* approach aHutt Ih" opposite motion of the spiral." ■ 

An elf'inentary form of these motor iUuKJonn Heetns to be 

one lieBcrihed by Helmholtz on pp. 568-671 of bia 

The motion of nDytbing in the tield of vision along 

kcat« angle towards a straiglit line sensibly distorts 

t^t liue. Thus iu Fig. 6t): Let AB be a line drawn on 

j>»I*r, C'UK the tracing made over thiw line by the j'oint 

;it a rompass ateiidily followed by the eye, kh it nioveti. As 

» coropasH-point paHsea from C to D, the line appears to 

OTPcIownwardw ; an it passes from 1) to E, the line ap]>ears 

bnnve npwanlH; at tliei Mme time the whole line seems 

■ iDcIUie itMelf in the direction FG during the first half 

pthf i-omptutH H movement; and in the direction HI dnr- 

\ ifat last bnlf ; tlio change from one inclination to an- 

h«r beinii; qnit« tliMtiuct an the compaHS-point passes 


Adt line aorosa wliidi we draw a peui;i]-point appears 
f\»i animated by a rapid movement of its own towards 
i peufiNpoint. TIiin apparent movement of both of two 
4 in relative motion t^i each other, even when one of 
D ia absolutely atUl, reminds us of the instances quoted 

I* BowJjicli ud lUI. In Juunul uf Fbyilolotcy, vol. ttt, p. 3W. Helm- 

•xplnlii Ihl* phcoomtuou by uhcophcIdiis rutallons of Ihe cyo- 

But moTViitenu of Ibe uychnll chii only explain luch appenrancca 

u aie ttie Mne over the whole Gold. In the windowed 

j^ljJLi 1I>M aMnu to taofc In one way. anoUier piirt in ao- 

H wbcn w« turn fmro tlir spiral lo look Rt llie wall 

li alone (welh out or eontmcls. tlir margin doc* Iba 

Mach and Dvomk have Iwautlfidly pmvi-d ib« 

*S-httaI(on* In Ihia on«e (8itEuu|cs1x-T. d. Wicuor Aknd.. 

L 1AI.\ SwabuBawdili-h and IIall'ipapcTa*al)ove p 800. 


from Vierordt on page 188, and seems to take ns back to & 
priinitivo stage of perception, in which the discriminatioiis 
Wf^ now inako w)ieu we feel a movement have not jet been 
nui(K\ If wo draw the point of a pencil through * Zollner's 
piittorn * (Fig. 60, p. 232), and follow it with the eye, the 
wliolo figure l>eoome3 the scene of the most singular 
npparout unrest, of which Helmholtz has very carefully 
notc^I tho conditions. The illusion of Zollner's figure vao- 
iiihoH «Miiirt^Iy, or almost so, with most people, if they 
NicMitiily look at one }>oint of it with an unmoving eye ; and 
iho Minu^ is iho o^ise with many other illusions. 

A*i)tr nil iheftf facts token together seem to show — ^vaguely 
it {•* trno, but oortainly — that present excitements and q/ter- 
flft^'fs if former excitements may alter the result of processes 
inH'f/friwjf simfJtaiuH>vsly at a distance from them in the retina 
%\V oitior portii>us of the apj^aratua for optical sensation. In 
\\\ts onmoH lav4i ^^Misidonnl, the moving eye, as it sweeps the 
foxtail twor oortoiin ^larts of the figure, seems thereby to 
•|ofo» nun«^ a nuHlifio^tiou in the feeling which the o/Acr parts 
oonff^v, >x hioh nu>^lirioation is the figure's 'distortion.' It is 
inio \\\\\\ UuM MUtomont explains nothing. It only keeps 
Itio onwo>* Us \^\\w\\ it applies from being explained spuri- 
\s\\^\\ . 1% spfn^fofts iyrv»?/w/ tf these illusiofis is that they are 
f n/*7/<s'/*/,i/» >».v/ .VT^»>,vi>/?,iwi>7, fhii they are secondary ^ notprimary, 
♦M. M/,r/ f,uts. Tho distoTt^i figure is said to be one which 
• III* «iuud ^^ lod to ?'w«>47/»w; bv falsely drawing an uncon- 
uttoun lufoivnoo fn^ni ^^-rtain premises of which it is not 
d)hhu«lU «>x«iv. And the imagineii figure is supposed to 
Uv y^hou^ «vnou»;li to suppress the [perception of whatever 
M,\\ NouNntionN thoiv n^iiv W. But Helmholtz, Wundt, 
\^sA\u\ Ml, ZoUnov, and all the advivates of unconscious in- 
liMi »u»^ iWH"^ a\ xavianoo >*ith oa^h other when it comes to 
I ho «|M«'Nhou >xh«t thi^so nuoonscious premises and infer- 

\UM niuhU anj;)«^NKv>k pro|v>rtaoBally larger than larger 
o^»% r^ »!%. \\\ buo1\ \)u^ tundamr^ntal illusion t(> which almost all 
«u«Uio^> >xonKJ >vdn*N- tbr ^wuharily of Rp, €7, asof Hgs. 
a^ \\\ loJ ^jxj\ ^;:W, 9:^^^ This ^xvuliarity ci small angles 
»> \\\ \\ wwM f^Nvj^UsJ a.s the case of a filled space seeming 
^iu*;; \ i\\^u !%u omptx o7>rv. a> ir. V"^. 6S ; and AiR,a<WMdmg 



to both Delb<eaf and Wuudt, is owing to the fact that more 
ttiaM:uI»r innervation is needed for the eje to traverse a 
tilled space than an empty one, because the points and lines 

fthe filled space inevitably arrest and constrain the eye, 
1 this makes us feel as if it were doing more work, i,& 
THrniig a louger distance.* When, however, we recol- 
« » f hmm ' 

lect that muwiular movements are poHitively proved to have 
i*o share in tlie waterfall and revolving -spiral illuBions, and 
that it is hanl to see how Wuudt's and Delbffinf's particular 
of muHole-«>iplanatiou can possibly apply to the com- 
»-p<titit illusion considered a moment ago, we must con- 
's that these writers have probably exaggerated, to aay 
1^ the reach of their mnscle-explanation iu the caae 

^^^., » d« I'AckI. i1b Belgiquc itxi. 8: Revue PhilumpUique. vi, 

^p^M-Bi PbifilologUcb* pRycbologie. 'il« Aull. p. 103. Coupnn- HOn- 
•WWvf'* vlewR. BHtrlfc. iUfi 2, p. Ill 

J50 PS7CBf>^ 

fd ihit mlMimded vof^ and lines. Semr do w« get sacb 
utmng mxuMmlAr feelnifEH an wbem, agaiBflt the comae of nft- 
inn^y we obtifr^ ovr e jen fr> be still ; bvt fixing the ejes on 
one point of the figure, ^4o far from making thj^t pi^rt of die 
latter 4eem larger, ri»peb^ in most persons the illiision of 
thefle diagranft altogether. 

Ail for Helm hoi tz, he inTokes, to explain the enlarge- 
ment of small angle^ky* what he calls a '^Inw €/ amiragi^ 
between directions and distances of lines, analogous to that 
between colors and intensities of light Lines cutting 
another line make the latter seem more inclined away from 
them than it really \sl MoreoTer, clearly recognizable mag* 
nitodes appear greater than equal magnitudes which we 
hot yagnely apprehend. Bot this is surely a sensational- 
istic law, a natire function of our seeing-apparatnsw Qnite 
as little as the negative after-image of the reTolving spiral 
could SQch contrast be deduced from anr association of 
ideas or recall of past objects. The principle of contrast 
is criticised by Wondt, f who says that by it small spaces 
ought to appear to ns smaller, and not larger, than they 
really are. Helmholtz might have retorted (had not the 
retort V>ee]j as fatal to the uniformity of his own principle 
as i/) Wnndt's) that if the muscle-explanation were true, it 
ought not to give rise to just the opposite iUusions in the 
skin. We ksw on p. 141 that subdivided spaces appear 
shorter than empty ones upon the skin. To the instances 
there given A<ld this : Divide a line on paper into equal 
halveH, puncture the extremities, and make punctures all 
along one of the halves ; then, with the finger-tip on the 
opposite Hide of the paper, follow the line of punctures ; 
the empty half will seem much longer than the punctured 
half. This seems to bring things back to unanalyzable 
laws, by reason of which our feeling of size is determined 
differently in the skin and in the retina, even when the 
objective conditions are the same. Hering*8 explanation 
of Zcillner's figure is to be found in Hermann's Handb. d. 
Physiologic, III. 1. p. 579. Lipps % gives another reason 

• Physiol. Optik. pp. 661^71. 
t Physiol. Psych., pp. 107-6. 
I Gnindtiilsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 526-80. 



mhj li&PA rnttiDg another line tnahe tlip latter Heem to 
brud Avtiy from tlit^ni more tliaii in really the cane. If, 
he Mrs "c draw (Fi^- 69) the line pin upon the line eh, 
ud follow the latter with our eye, we shall, on reaching 
iht^ point m, tentl for a momeut to slip off nh and to follow 
mp, withont distiiictly realizing that we are not still nn the 
EBikin line. This makes us feel as if the remainder mh of 
its main line were bent a little away from its original direc- 
tion. The illosiou is apparent in the shape of a seeming 

■pproacli of the ends ft, h, of the two main lines. This to 
mr mind would be a more eatisfnetorj explanation of this 
cliuw of illuaions than any of those given by previous nn- 
tbcin, were it not again for what happens in the skin. 

Cynui^friwj iJl the circuvmfmicm, J ffd jnstififd tn d'ls- 
mnliag his fntirr fxttch 0/ Uliutiims as tmleviinl to our prrs- 
"•/ imjuiry. Whatever they may prove, they do not pnjv© 
that oor rixual percepts of form and movement may not be 
woMitioDH strictly bo called. They much more probably 
fall intri line with the phenomena of irradiation and of 
Hilnr-contraftt, and with Vierordt's primitive illatdons of 
inoveneut They show as. if anything, a realm of sen- 
f«tiotifi in which our habitual eiperienoe has not yet made 
tra««s mud which persist in apite of our lietter knowledge, 
■jHfOggeMtive of those other space-sensations which we all 
the time know from extrinsic evidence to constitute the real 
apaee-determinationa of the diagram. Very likely, if these 
aeimtioas were as frequent and as practically imi>ortant as 
Ihay miw are insignificant and rare, we sliouhl end by aub- 
Mtitntilig their significates — the real spac«-valnes of the 
diaf^iDi* — for them. These latter we should then seem to 



see directly, and the illusions would disappear like that of 
the size of a tooth-socket when the tooth has been out a 

(6) Another hatch of cases which toe may discard is that of 
donUe images. A thoroughgoing anti-sensationalist ought 
to deny all native tendency to see double images when 
disparate retinal points are stimulated, because, he should 
say, most people never get them, but see all things single 
which experience has led them to believe to be single. 
" Can a doubleness, so easily neutralized by our knowledge, 
ever be a datum of sensation at all ? " such an anti-sensa- 
tionalist might ask. 

To which the answer is that it t^ a datum of sensation, 
but a datum which, like many other data, must first be 
discriminated. As a rule, no sensible qualities are dis- 
criminated without a motive.* And those that later we 
learn to discriminate were originally felt confused. As 
well pretend that a voice, or an odor, which we have 
learned to pick out, is no sensation now. One may easily 
acquire skill in discriminating double images, though, as 
Bering somewhere says, it is an art of which one cannot 
become master in one j'ear or in two. For masters like 
Bering himself, or Le Conte, the ordinary stereoscopic dia- 
grams are of little use. Instead of combining into one solid 
appearance, they simply cross each other with their doubled 








Fio. 70. 

lines. Volkmann has shown a great variety of ways in 
which the addition of .seoi>ndar5' lines, differing in the two 

• /^ 

C'f. HHjrra, p. 515 ff. 



*. helps as to see the primary lines double. The pffet-t 
il AUtdci0oiui to that bIiowd in the cases which we despatched 
I ni'iint'tit »gn, where given lines have their spiLi-c- value 
bIiuikr] bj the additiDa of new liiie!^, ^tbont oar being 
llik to aay why, except that a certain mutmil adbeHiou of 
t)>* liiir* and modification of the resultant feeliug takes 
pUw by itsychophysiolofipcttl laws. Thus, if in Fig, 65, / 
uil r be crossed by au horizoutiki tine at the »aiue level, 
and Tiewed stereoscopically, they appear as a single pair of 
liii'^, #, in ttpn(%. But if the horizontal be at different 
Uvel», as in I', r', three lines appear, as in «'.* 

Let DH then say no more about double images. All that 
e {acta prove is what Vnlkmann 8ays,t that, although 
bfremay be sets of retinal fibres so organized as to give 
a imprewiton nf two separate spots, yet the excitement of 
tiller rptiual fibres may inhibit the effect of the first ex- 
teiDRtil, anil prevent us from actually making the dls- 
juiiuttiou. Still farther retinal processes may, however, 
■ te«|t the donbleness to the eye of attention ; and, once 
^w, it is as genuine a sensatioii as any that our life 

(f) Thftegroupi! o^ ill wtions being fitmimUfd, either as caaea 
iUf«rtivB discrimination, or as changes of one space- 
■tiMtinn into another when the total retinal process 
flui[i)(f>s, thrrr. rettunn fiut ttoo nther ejrdnpn lo ptade m. The 
fitvl is that of the after-images distorted by projection on to 
oliliijti^ planes ; the second relates to the instability of 
'>iir jud((ineuts of relative distance and size by the eye, 
tuA locludes especially what are known as psendoscopic 

8w ArehiT t. OphihBlin. , v. 3, 1 (1839). where nuny more ex&mple* 

t liDlmucbuagen. ii. 250 : mw alto p, iA'i. 

1 1 p*« (>Tpr ccitniD dlfficiillirs iiboiil double imsgea, drawn froDi ibe 
pntvplionii of B frw K|ufDlfn [c g. by Srhwcig^r. Klin. UnterHucli Dlwr 
** ScMoIni, Brrlin, 1881 -. by Jmv&I. Annaleii d'UciiliHllque. i.xixv_ 
t- tiXi, bccauM' Uit ficU Brv exi'r[)tli)ni>1 al bml soil vfry dilBcult uf InliT 
prttMioB. Id tmvor of the iH>iii>alb>oali«iic or HHiivlstlc v1«h uf our «ii('ti 
am, Mt Uw tiDpon»nt patxr by Von Kric*. Archlv f. Opbtbalm , xxiv. 


The phenomena of the first groap were deaexibed on 
page *2SSl A. W. Yolkmann h&» studied them with his 
accustomed cleameaa and care.* E^en an imaginarilj 
inclined wall, in a pictnre, will, if an after-image be thrown 
upon it, distort the shape thereof, and maike ns mp a form 
of which our afterimage would be the natural projection 
on the retina, were that form laid upon the walL Thus a 
signboard is painted in perspeetire cm a screen, and the 
eye, after steadily looking at a rectangular cro6s» is turned 
to the painted signboard. The a&fter-image appears as an 
oblique-legged cross upon the signboard. It is the conrerse 
phenomenon of a perspective drawing like Fig. 71, in which 

really oblique-legged figures are seen as rectangular crosses. 
The unstable judgments of relatire distance and size 
were also mentioned on pp. 231-± Whatever the size may 
be of the retinal image which an object makes^ the object is 
seen as of its own normal siae. A man moving towards us 
is not sensibly j^^rceived to jjrnHf, for example; and my 
finger* of which a single joint may more than conceal him 
from my view, is nevertheless seen as a much smaller object 
than the man. As for liistanoes^ it is often possible to make 
the farther part of an i>bjev-s seem near and the nearer part 
far. A human prv^file in intaglio, Kv^ked at steadily with 
one eye, or even U^th. s^x^u appears irresistibly as a bas- 
relief. The inside of a ctuumon pasteK>ard mask, painted 
like the outside, anvl viewed with one eye in a direct light, 
als*^ Kx»ks ov^nvex iuslea^l of hollow. So strong is the illu- 



■ loan fixntioQ, tliat a friend who paiut^d such a 

Be told lue it aoou became difficult to aee how to 

^Am brush. Bend a viaitlug-uAnl ucio^s the middle, 
(o ttut its halves form an angle of 90" more or less ; set it 
upright on the table, as in Fig. 72, and view it with one eje. 

Tod can make it appear eitlier as if it upened towards 300 
«r ftwaj (rom yoa. Id the former case, the ailgle ab lies 

i table, b being aearer to you than a ; in the latter 
eM» 06 B«ems vertical to the table — as indeed it really is — 
vitb a nearer U> yon tliau &.* Afcain, look, with either one or 
* Cf. E. H«cb. Bcftrflgi' lur A.oa))'M iler EinpBnduugcD. p. t^7. 



two eyes, at the openiDg of a wiue-glasB or tnmbler (Fig. 
73), held either above or below the eye's level. The retinid 
image of the openiug is ao oval, but we can see the oval in 
either of two ways, — as if it were the perspective view of a 
circle whose edge h were farther from us than its edge n 
(in which case we should seem to be looking down on the 
circle), or as if its edge a were the more distant edge (in 
which case we should be looking up at it through the b side 
of the glass). As the manner of seeing the edge changes, 
the glass itself alters its form in space and looks straight 
or seems bent towards or from the eye," according as the 
latter is placed beneath or above it 

Plane diagrams also can be conceived as solids, and that 
in more than one way. Figs. 74, 75, 76, for example, are am- 

biguons perspective projections, and may each of tliem re- 
mind na of two different natnrrtl objects. Whichever of these 

" Cf, V. Egfc'ii-, lleviii' I'biios., ^<c. 48S. 



iiljjrctBWfl conceive clearly &t the moment of looking at the 
ti;:urF, we seem to w« in all its solidity before us. A little piac- 
tic>- vill enable as to flaj) the tigureu, no to speak, backwards 
Aui! furwanls from one object to the other at will. Vt'e need 
<iulv attend to one of the angles represented, and imagine it 
*itlier solid or hollow — pulled towards us out of the plane 
• ■i tht! [iK{>«r, or pushed back behind the name — and the 
wiiiii^ tififure olieyH the cue and is instantaneously trans- 
fumed beneath our gaze.* 

Tie peculiarity <if all these cases is the ambiguity of 
llie [wrception to which the fixed retinal iinpressiou gives 
ri*e. With our retina excited in exactly the same way, 
whether by after-image, mask or diagram, we see now this 
"bjtvt uid now that, as if the retinal image per se had no 
e^MQtial space-import Surely if form and length were 
"Initially retinal sensations, retinal rectangles ought not to 
Wrome acute or obtuse, and lines ought not to alter their 
relative lengths as tliey do. If relief were an optical 
(KUng, it ought not to flap to and fro, with every optical con- 
ation nnchiutf^ed. Here, if anywhere, the deniers of space- 
wiuttion ought to be able to make their final stand.t 

It most be confessed that their plea is plausible at first 
■ighL But it is one thing to throw out retinal sensibility 
»ltagclh«r as a space-yieldiug function the moment we find 
w unbignity in its deliverances, and another thing to 
uuaine vondidly the conditions which may have brought 
tke ftmbigni^ about The former way is cheap, wholesale, 
■^low; the latter difHcult and complicated, bnt full of 
X'ltmctioii in tlio end. Let ns try it for ourselves. 

In the case of the <liagraros 72, 73, 74, 75. 76, the real 
"nJMt, lines meeting or crossing each other on a plane, ifl 

' Lurli (Pdngi-r'n ArcJiiv, ; 
^'UiiiUlloD In l)iv tyt ror ne 
<<^(rfttui relief, 

t Tb« ■urougcal pMMge lii IJclmhollz's argumeut Hgninxt EeDSBlluns of 
■Mwb (vlatlrv 1u thae flucluallona i>( Men relief: "Uugbt oue not 
^dod* IImI If avnutluui uf relict «xUi hI all, tlivy diuhI be to falni m 
'■ftw ■• to bave n« Influeoce compan'd with thM of [>n«t fxperienreFU 
Uoflit we DM U> believe tlial ll)« p<T<vptlnti of llie tlilrH [llmcnsloii mtf 
kn» iriMD witAMd Uuun. alaco wc now acv U taklog place aa well agaiiMt 
ihsaawMtbemT" (Pbyalol. Oplik. p. HIT.) 


replaced by an imagined solid which we describe as seen, 
ReoHy it is not seen hut only so vivuHy conceived as to 
approach a vision of reality. We feel all the while, howeyer, 
that the solid suggested is not solidly there. The reason 
why one solid may seem more easily suggested than 
another, and why it is easier in general to perceive the 
diagram solid than Jlat^ seems due to probability* Those 
lines have countless times in our past experience been 
drawn on our retina by solids for once that we have seen 
them flat on paper. And hundreds of times we have 
looked down upon the upper surface of parallelopipeds, 
stairs and glasses, for once that we have looked upwards 
at their bottom — hence we see the solids easiest as if from 

Habit or probability seems also to govern the illusion of 
the intaglio profile, and of the hollow mask. We have never 
seen a human face except in relief — hence the case with 
which the present sensation is overpowered. Hence, too, 
the obstinacy T^dth which human faces and forms, and 
other extremely familiar convex objects, refuse to appear 
hollow when viewed through Wheatstone's pseudoscope. 
Our perception seems wedded to certain total ways of 
seeing certain objects. The moment the object is suggested 
at all, it takes possession of the mind in the fulness of its 
stereotyped habitual form. This explains the suddenness 
of the transformations when the perceptions change. The 
object shoots back and forth completely from this to that 
familiar thing, and doubtful, indeterminate, and composite 
things are excluded, apparently because we are unused to 
their existence. 

When we turn from the diagrams to the actual folded 
visiting-card and to the real glass, the imagined form seems 
fully as real as the correct one. The card flaps over ; the 
glass rim tilts this way or that, as if some inward spring 
suddenly became released in our eye. In these changes the 
actual retinal image receives different complements /rom the 
mind. But the remarkable thing is that the complement 

* Cf. £. Mach, Beitrftg^, etc.» p. 90, and the preceding chapter of the 
present work, p. 86 ff. 


^nil Uie iiDH|{e combiae »<> completelj tli&t the twain sre 
' Qp HfiJi, AS it were, aiid cannot be discriminated in the 
rwait. If the crtinplemeiit bo, us we have called it (on pp, 
33T-S), a set of imaginary ub»eut eye-seosatious, they seem 
iM xhit letra rividly tliere than the sensatiou which the eye 
t'i» receives from without. 

Ttic case of the after-images distorted by projection upon 
au nlili^ue plane is even more Htrange, for the imagined 
[•'nipM'tJve figure, lying in the plane, seems less to combine 
»ilh llie one a moment prenously seen by the eye than to 
nappr^fui it and take its place.* The point needing explana- 
tion, then, iu all this, is how it comes to pass that, wheu 
iDUt^uii) Meiiwitions are usually so inferior iii vivacity to real 
>'ii<^ ther ahould iii these few experiences prove to be 
\\tQmi or qoite their match. 

Tb*" mri*tery is solved whou we note the class to which 
»li UiMie experitmceH belong. They are 'perceptions' of 
itfiniw ' tbingH,' definitely situated in tridimensional »puce. 
mind attiformly uses itH seuHatious to identify IhinyH by. 
WDsation 18 invariably apperceived by the idea, name, 
M ■ Donnal ' aspect (p. 238) of the //k'im/. The peculiarity of 
thp opticid MigiiH of things is their extraordinary mutability. 
A 'tlung " which we follow with the eye, never doubting of 
iii physical identity, will change its retinal image inces- 
iwitlT. A cr<)Bi*, a ring, waved about in the air, will pass 
tlimo|{h even' conceivable angular and elliptical form. All 
tile *Iule, however, as we look at them, we hold fast to the 
I^-iciition of their ' real ' shape, by mentally combining 
llie [iicturea momeutarily received with the notion of peculiar 
["Mitiona in space. It is not the cross and ring pure and 
!iimp]e which we perceive, but the cross #" tu^ii, the ring m 
W./. From the day of our birth we have sought every hoar 
"J oar lives to curred the apparent form of things, and trans- 

* 1 an0il to aty tlimt t wotn always able to Bee lli«i crow rvcUugiilar *! 
riO. Bat tbb apptmn tu come trom an linprrTcct Hliaorptioa of Uic 
IMMBcnlar Kflar-loMgu hy tbe Inclined plnnc al wliUb the eyes look. Tli« 
•M^wWlBM. ItsinlodclMliltiwIfrr'iRi iIiIhiiikI llirn look aquire. IgetUie 
■hIn twtlar from Ibe cin-lfi. who*« ■ft«r-lm>ge becomn In various ways 
rf*^*^^ oa being pniJ«cU)d upon Ibe dfflcrcni surfucvs of Ihe room, and 
oBBDot thai be vaally m»At Iu look circular again. 

Ml I 

260 P8TCH0L0QT. 

late it into the real form by keeping note of the way they 
are placed or held. In no other class of sensations does 
this incessant correction occur. What wonder, then, that 
the notion * so placed ' should invincibly exert its habitual 
corrective eflfect, even when the object with which it com- 
bines is only an after-image, and make us perceive the latter 
under a changed but more * real ' form ? The * real ' form 
is also a sensation conjured up by memory ; but it is one so 
probable, so habituoRy conjured up when we have just this 
combination of optical experiences, that it partakes of the 
invincible freshness of reality, and seems to break through 
that law which elsewhere condemns reproductive processes 
to being so much fainter than sensations. 

Once more, these cases form an extreme. Somewhere^ in 
the list of our imaginations of absent fedings^ there must be found 
the vividest of aU. These optical reproductions of real form are 
the vividest of all. It is foolish to reason from cases lower 
in the scale, to prove that the scale can contain no such ex- 
treme cases as these ; and particularly foolish since we can 
definitely see why these imaginations ought to be more 
vivid than any others, whenever they recall the forms of 
habitual and probable things. These latter, by incessantly 
repeated presence and reproduction, will plough deep 
grooves in the nervous system. There will be developed^ 
to correspond to them, paths of least resistance, of unstable 
equilibrium, liable to become active in their totality when 
any point is touched oflf. Even when the objective stimulus 
is imperfect, we shall still see the full convexity of a human 
face, the correct inclination of an angle or sweep of a curve^ 
or the distance of two lines. Our mind will be like a poly- 
hedron, whose facets are the attitudes of perception in which 
it can most easily rest These are worn upon it by habitual 
objects, and from one of these it can pass only by tumbling 
over into another.* 

Bering has well accounted for the sensationally vivid 
character of these habitually reproduced forms. He says, 

• In Chapter XVIII, p. 74. I gave a reason why imaginations ought not 
to be as vivid as sensations. It should be borne in mind that that reason 
does not apply to these complemental imaginings of the real shape of 
things actually before our eyes. 


»ft«r Teminding ua that every visual seusation is correlated 
b> Ik physical process in the nervous apparatus : 

"If ihl>(wyehoiihysiOBl proceae is aroused, as iiBually happens. hy>^.9. 
blhl-nyi impingiDg on tho retina, its form depends not only ou the na 
tui* uf tli»e rays, but oii tht constitntion of the entire nervona appa- , 
wu ohich is mMinect««l with the organ of Tision. and on the state in 
vtufb it finija itself. The aame stimulus may excila widely different 
aaMuniM >«M>rdiiig to this state. 

"ThecunstitDtfon of the nervous apparatus depends naturally in 
(ut Kfiun Iniuitti prediapoaition ; but the enwmble of effects wrought by 
CmuUapuo il iutbeooureeof life, whether those come through the eyes 
or (win elHwbere, is a co-factor of its development. To express it 
flCfcwwU'. Irivotunt&ry and voluntary experienie and exercise assist in 
driTmiutng the mBtnrial structure of the nervous organ of vision, and 
WtiMtbe ways in which it may react on a retinal image as an outward 
Kimulus. That experience and exercise should be possible at all in 
TuloD il a (Minsequenoe of the reproductive power, or memory, of its 
vm-Mibttantw. Every particular activity of (be organ makes it more 
ioIIm] to a repetition of the game ; ever slighter touclice are required to 
ukt ihe repotitiuu occur. The orgau habituates itself to the repeated 
irtittljr. . . . 

"SnppoM) now that, in the llrst experience of a complex sensation 
pfulnced by a particular retinal image, certain portions were made the 
«p«al objw;tji at atteuiioti. In a repetition of the sensible experience 
n*ill happeo that nniwithslandiug the identity of the outward stimulus 
tl>rM portions will be more easily and strongly reproduced; and \vbuu 
Ihu happens a hnndred limes the inequality with which the various 
maaltDBiiiB of the complex sensation appeal to eonsciousness grows 
«™ greater. 

' Xow In the preeenl slate of our knowledge we cannot assert thai 
in hoA the flnt and the last occurrence of the retinal image in question 
Ibttune jiurt ttiTumtinn is pniviiked, but that the mind inUrpretg it 
diSnreatly the last lime in consequence of experience: for ihe only 
f^ things wc know are on the one hand the relinal image which is 
Inib llmcH the same, and on the other the menial percept which is both 
■iafli different ; of a third thing, such as a pure sensation; int«rpolated 
Mvnm image and percept, we know nothing. Wu ought, therefore. 
t'«e wish tu avoid hypotheses, simply lossy that the nervous apparatus 
nw4* Ibp last lime diffen-ntly from Ihe first, and gives us in oonse- 
^RBiuw a different group of sensations, 

" Bat tint only )iy n.']R-titiun of the snmi^ retinal image, but l)y that 
nfalinibu- ones, will the law obtain. Porilonsof the image common in 
itiE (opemaivi- expi-riiiuces will awaken, as it were, a stronger echo in 
llw nrrvous apparatus than other portions, Heiin' it results that rfprt>- 
iltittoa u uMutiily eltctiee : the more strongly reverberating parts of the 
piBtorv jield stronger feelings than the rest. This may n-aull in the 


latter being quite overlooked and, as it were, eliminated from perception. 
It may even come to pass that instead of these parts eliminated by elec- 
tion a feeling of entirely different elements comes to consciousness- 
elements not objectively contained in the stimulus. A group of sensa- 
tions, namely, for which a strong tendency to reproduction has become, 
by frequent repetition, ingrained in the nervous system will easily revive 
as a whole when, not its whole retinal image, but only an essential part 
thereof, returns. In this case we get some sensations to which no ade- 
quate stimulus exists in the retinal image, and which owe their being 
solely to the reproductive power of the nervous ap(>aratU8. This is 
catnplemefUary {ergdiizende) reprodtwtion. 

**Thus a few points and disconnected strokes are sufficient to make 
ns see a human face, and without specially directed attention we fail to 
note that we see much that really is not drawn on the paper. Attention 
will show that the outlines were deficient in spots where we thought 
them complete. . . . The portions of the percept supplied by comple- 
mentary reproduction depend, however, just as much as its other por- 
tions, on the reaction of the nervous apparatus upon the retinal image, 
indirect though this reaction may, in the case of the supplied portions, 
be. And so long as they are present, we have a perfect right to call 
them sensations, for they differ in no wise from such sensations as cor- 
respond to an actual stimulus in the retina. Often, however, they are 
not persistent ; many of them may be expelled by more close observa- 
tion, but this is not proved to be the case with all. ... In vision with 
one eye . . . the distribution of parts within the third dimension is 
essentially the work of this complementary reproduction, i.e. of former 
experience. . . . When a certain way of localizing a particular group 
of sensations has become with us a second nature, our better knowl- 
edge, our judgment, our logic, are of no avail. . . . Things actually 
diverse may give similar or almost identical retinal images; e.g., an 
object extended in three dimensions, and its flat perspective picture. 
In such cases it often depends on small accidents, and especially on our 
will, whether the one or the other group of sensations shall be excited. 
. . . We can see a relief hollow, as a mould, or m'ce versd; for a relief 
illuminated from the left can look just like its mould illuminated from 
the right. Reflecting upon this, one may infer from the direction of 
the shadows that one has a relief before one, and the idea of the relief 
will guide the nerve-processes into the right path, so that t\iQ feeling of 
the relief is suddenly aroused. . . . Whenever the retinal image is of 
such a nature that two diverse modes of reaction on the part of the 
nervous apparatus are, so to speak, equally, or nearly equally, immi- 
nent, it must depend on small accidents whether the one or the other 
reaction is realized. In these cases our previous knowledge often has a 
decisive effect, and helps the correct perception to victory. The bare 
idea of the right object is itself a feeble reproduction which with the 
help of the proper retinal picture develops into clear and lively sensa- 
tion. But if there be not already in the nervous apparatus a disposi- 


tim 10 tbp pimltirtion nf Ihnt percept which our jiidgrnent trltfi us is 
r^ oar kaowieilge firivra io vain to conjure up the feeling ut it : 
*t iliMi know thiit we stw RometUiug to which nn reulitj coiTMponds. 
tpot le Me li all tho bame." * 

S<4r tknt no iJiyxt wit prnbaUe, no ofiject Khich we are not 
iwrwan'/y pniciiard in reproducing, con aoqmrt this vividwis 
r» ima^iuUinn, Objective corners are ever chauging tlieir 
M^v* to the eyes, Hpiices their apparent size, liues tlieir 
ilittauoe. Dat by do truusmutiitino of po»itioD iu »paee 
liiiea an fihjectivH xtruigbt Uue appear bent, aud only in one 
|HHutiiiu out of HU intiiiity does a brokeu line look straight. 
AminUagly, it \& impossible by projec-tiiig the after-image 

A B 

of » straight line ni>oti two aurfaces which make a oolid 
•t>|Cle vith each other to give the line itself a seuaible 
'kick.* Tj<Krk with it at the corner of yoar roou] : the 
Kfler4 Bulge, whioh may overlap all three Ktirfaces of the 
eomer, atill contiuoeB straight Volkmann constrncted a 
complicated surface of jirojectjoii like that dniwu in Fig. 
77, but \ui found it imjxmxible so to throw a straight after- 
ina^ apuD it a« to alter itH visible form. 


One of the :§itiuitioii;is in which we oftenest see things is 
spread oat on the ground before as. We are incessantly 
drilled in making allowance for tki» perspective, and reduc- 
ing things to their real form in spite of optical foreshorten- 
ing. Hence if the preceding explanations are true, we 
onght to find this habit inveterate. The lower half of the 
retina, which habitoallj sees the /artker half of things 
spread oat on the groond, oaght to have acquired a habit 
of enlarging its pictures bv imagination, so as to make 
them more than equal to those which fall on the upper 
retinal surface ; and this habit ought to be hard to escape 
from, even when both halves of the object are equidistimt 
from the eve, as in a vertical line on paper. Delboeuf has 
found, accordingly, that if we trr to bisect such a line we 
place the point of division about -^ of its length too high.* 

Similarly, a square cross, or a square, drawn on paper, 
should look higher than it is broad. And that this is actu- 
ally the case, the reader may verify bv a glance at Fig. 78. 


Flo. 7?. 

For analogous reasons the upper and lower halves of the 
letter S, or of the figure 8, hardly seem to differ. But when 
turned upside down, as g, g, the upper half looks much the 

* Bulletin de rAcademie de Belgique, 2me Serie, xii. 2. 

f Wundt seek^ to explain all these illusions by the relativelj stronger 
' feeling of innervation ' needed to move the ejeballs upwards, — a careful 
study of the muscles concerned is taken to prove this, — and a consequently 
greater estimate of the distance traversed. It suffices to remaiiL, however, 
with Lipps, that were the innervation all, a column of S's placed on top 
of each other should look each larger than the one below it, and a wealher- 
r-ock on a steeple gigantic, neither of which is the case. Only the halves 
of the mme object look different in size, because the customar}' correction 


Hering has tried to explain our exaggeration of small 
angles in the same way. We have more to do with right 
angles than with any others : right angles, in fact, have an 
altogether unique sort of interest for the human mind. 
Nature almost never begets them, but we think space by 
means of them and put them everywhere. Consequently 
obtuse and acute ones, liable always to be the images of 
right ones foreshortened, particularly easily revive right 
ones in memor}\ It is hard to look at such figures as 
a, ft, c, in Fig. 79, without seeing them in perspective, as 

Fio. T». 

approximations, at least, to foreshortened rectangular 
forms. * 

At the same time the genuine sensational form of the 
lines before us can, in all the cases of distortion by sug- 
gested |>erspective, be felt correctly by a mind able to ab- 
stract from the notion of perspective altogether. Individ- 
uals differ in this abstracting power. Artistic training im- 
proves it, so that after a little while errors in vertical bi- 
section, in estimating height relatively to breadth, etc., l)e- 
come imposHi])le. In other words, we learn to take the 
optical sensation ])efore us />wr^. + 

for foresbortoning 1>oar9 only on the relutions of the ]>artH of special (h%ng% 
iiprea<l out before U8 C'f. Wnndt. Physiol. PMycb.. 2le Aufl. ii. 0^-6; 
Tb. Lippe, OnindtatHaclien. etc.. p 585. 

• Hering would partly solve in this way the mystery of Figs. 80. 61. and 
67. No doubt the explanation partly applies ; but the strange cessiitioD of 
the illusion when we ti.x the jraze fails to Ik* accounted for thereby. 

♦ Helmboltz has sought (Physiol. Optik. p. 715) to explain the diverg- 
<rnce <»f the apimrent vertical meridians of the two retinip. by the manner 
in which an identical line (irawn on the gnmnd before us in the nuMlian 
plane will throw it.s iinagt^s on the two eyes resptK'tively. The matt«T is 
too technical for description here : the unl<*arn<Hl reader may be n'ferred 
for it to J. Le Conies Sijrht in the Intemat Scient. Serit*. p. liJS ff. Hut, for 
the beoefit of thoM^* to whom wrhum Mt, 1 cannot help saying that it seems 
tome that the extictneu of the relation of the two meridians— whether direr. 


We may then sum up our study of illusions by saying that 
they in no wise undermine our view that every spatial determi- 
nation of things is originally given in the shape of a sensation 
of the eyes. They only show how very potent certain 
imagined sensations of the eyes may become. 

These sensations, so far as they bring definite forms to 
the mind, appear to be retinal exclusively. The moYe- 
ments of the eyeballs play a great part in educating our 
perception, it is true ; but they have nothing to do with 
constituting any one feeling of form. Their function is 
limited to exciting the various feelings of form, by tracing 
retinal streaks ; and to comparing them, and measuring them 
off against each other, by applying different parts of the 
retinal surface to the same objective thing. Helmholtz*s 
analysis of the facts of our * mjeasurement of thefidd of vietc^ 
is, bating a lapse or two, masterly, and seems to prove that 
the movements of the eye have had some part in bringing 
our sense of retinal equivalencies about — equivalenciesy mind, 
of different retinal forms and sizes, not forms and sizes 
themselves. Superposition is the way in which the eye- 
movements accomplish this result An object traces the 
line AB on a peripheral tract of the retina. Quickly we 
move the eye so that the same object traces the line ab on 
a central tract Forthwith, to our mind, AB and ab are 
judged equivalent. But, as Helmholtz admits, the equiv- 
alence-judgment is independent of the way in which we 
may feel the form and length of the several retinal pic- 
tures themselves : 

"The retina is like a pair of compasses, whose points we apply in 
succession to the ends of several lines to see whether they agree or not in 
length. All we need know meanwhile about the compasses is that the 
distance of their points remains unchanged. What that distance is, and 
what is the shape of the compasses, is a matter of no account."* 

gent or not, for their divergence differs in individuals and often in one in- 
dividual at diverse times— precludes its being due to the mere habitual 
falliug-off of the image of one objective line on both. Le Conte, e.g., 
measures their position down to a sixth of a degree, others to tenths. This 
indicates an organic identity in the sensations of the two retins, which the 
experience of median perspective horizontals may roughly have agreed 
with, but hardly can have engendered. Wundt explains the diveigenoe 
usual, by the Innervatumsgefuhl {op, eit ii. 99 ft.). 
♦ Physiol. Optik, p. 547. 



JintMuretuent imjiies n Muff to measure. Retinal aerutn- _ 
lioM yirc tht ttttfff"; ulffectivf thint/a /onu llif yardstick ; mo- '"^ 

I (ioidoM the mea^mring operation; which cau, of courhe, Vie 
II performftd only where it is posBible to make the same 

dijiK-t t&ll on many retinal traots. Thi^ ia jtractically im- 
udbln where tlie tractn make a wide auglt^ with each 
But there are i-ertaUi directions in the field of view, 
un retinal lines, along which it is particularly easy to 
^ the image of an object elide. The object then be- 
• ruler' for these lines, as Helmholtz puts it,* 
ikiDtt them seem strai(;ht tlirou^^hout if the object looked 
igbt to UH in that part of them at which it was moat 
uitly seen. 
IJnt all this need of superposition shows how devoid of 
4 I^M^imjiort the feelings of movement are per ne. As 
ft the space-valne of two retinal tracts by super- 
n aaccessively upon the same objective line, so 
9 have to compare the space-value of objective angles 
A limw by superiiosing them on the same retinal tract, 
jer procedure would be required if our eye-movements 
F apprehended immediately, by pure muscular feeling 
> itmurration, for example, as distinct lengths and direc- 
a Bpa«e. To compare retinal tracts, it wonld then 
e simply to notice how it feels to move uny image over 
And two objective lines could be compared as 
I by moving different retinal tracts along them as by 
[ titam along the same. It would be us easy to com- 

* " W« r*B witb ■ abort ruler draw a line At loug an we (ileaw on 4 
|ha» mufmof bjr first drawiDji <mt a« long •» tlic ruler permlta. aod then *\ 
dUlaf lb* ruler lomewtwl hIoii){ the drawn line and drawing again, tlo, 

II Dm rolw b eucil; lUntiglit. we get in ihU way a Wndphi line. If it ia 
■aawwlial currwl v,t get a ilrrlu. Now, InMcad of lb(! sliding ruler wc 
we in Ibe field ot alelil ilierriitral (pot of dlxtlnclest vision lm|ir>'iKed with 
a llMsr Miw«llon of nlghl. wliirli at llmra may bo Inienallled till it b«coniea 
u after' iuarr Werollow.ln UHikliig. the dirivtion of tlii« liiio, and In 
n doJ«f or illdc Ibc line along lisolf nnil gel a prolongalinn of lis tenglli. 
Oa • pknr Mirtacv w« ran rarry on iliix |iri>ce«liire on any «ori of a oiraigbt 
m oarrfd ruler, but In tbp field of rinlon there is for earh dlrM'lioo and 
mofrmrtA of the eyo naly imc nort of line which It la poaslblc tor iih to 
•lUcaloimlBiuowQ dirertton continually " These are what Helmbolis 
(alia llu ' circiea of diroctJon ' of tlir viniial field— lines whirh be tiu , 
Madlad wllb hU uatwl care. Cf Physiol Opiili. p. JAfi tt. 


pare non-parallel figures as it now is to judge of those 
which are paraUeL* Those which it took the same amount 
of movement to traverse would be equal, in whatever direc- 
tion the movement occurred. 

With this we may end our long and, I fear to many 
readers, tediouslv minute survev. The facts of vision form 
a jungle of intricacy ; and those who penetrate deeply into 
physiological optics will be more struck by our omissions 
than by our abundance of detaiL But for students who 
may have lost sight of the forest for the trees, I will re- 
capitulate briefly the points of our whole argument from 
the beginning, and then proceed to a short historical survey, 
which will set them in relief. 

/^ All our sensations are positively and inexplicably exten- 
sive wholes. 

j The sensations contributing to space-j^ercepfton seem 

exclusively to be the surface of skin, retina, and joints. 
* Muscular ' feelings play no appreciable part in the genera- 
tion of our feelings of form, direction, etc. 

2 The total bigness of a cutaneous or retinal feeling soon 

becomes subdivided by discriminative attention. 

Movements assist this discrimination by reason of the 
peculiarly exciting quality of the sensations which stimuli 
moving over surfaces arouse. 

^ Subdinsions, once discriminated, acquire definite rela- 
tions of position towards each other within the total space. 
These * relations ' are themselves feelings of the subdivis- 
ions that intervene. When these subdivisions are not the 
seat of stimuli, the relations are only reproduced in imagi- 
narv form. 

The various sense-spaces are, in the first instance, inco- 
herent with each other ; and primitively both they and 
their subdivisions are but vaguely comparable in point of 
bulk and form.' 

^ The education of our space-perception consists largely 
of two processes — reducing the various sense-feelings to a 

♦ Cf. Heriug iu Hermann's Hnndb. der Physiol., in. I, pp. 558-4. 


fomroon menamr, and mUHjig them together into the giugle 
ill-iui'lutlmg Hjiace of the real world. 

Both the mettsariug and the adding are performed bv 
tli-^ «f] of things. 

Tli<^ itDHgtued a ggregate of positioiis occupied by all the 
wtnol or iK>Hsible, moving or stationarj, things which we /.' ' 
know, is oar notion of ' real ' space — a very incomplete 
uil va^ufi conception in all minds. 

Tb4> ttututuring of our space -fee lings against each other 
mftiiilv comoH about through the successive arousal of dif- 
fpr^Dt ones by the same thing, by our selection of certain 
oDe* wt feelings of its real size and shape, and by the deg- 
mUlioB of others to the status of being merely signs of 


For tho sowessive application of the same thing to dif- 
[pTuit flpacO'giving surfaces motion is indispensable, and 
heocc pUys a great part in our h pace -education, especially 
"a tliat of the eye. Abstractly considered, the motion of 
■ fte ubjoict over lliP sensitive surface would educate us quite 
■ «»11 «« that of the surface over the object But the self- 
ubility of the organ carrying the surface accelerates im- 
mAj the result. 

In completely educated space-perception, the present L 
I mMtiou M usually just what Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, 
P- TUT) calls it, ' a sign, the iuterjiretation of whose mean- 
ihk IB left to the understanding.' But the understanding is 
nclniuvelT reproductive and never productive in the pi'o- 
mm; and its function is limited to the recall of pre^-ious 
^ww-HenaationH with which the present one has been as- 
•oriat^d and which may he judged more real than it. 

Finally, this reproduction may in the case of cei-tain 
rinu) forms be as vi\id, or almost ho, as actual senuation is. 

The third dimension forms an original element of all y 
oor spaoB-seiisations. In the eye it is snbdinded by various ' 
iliHerimiuatious. The more distant subdivisions are often 
■hot out altogether, and, in being suppressed, have the 
effect of diminidhing the absolute space-value of the total 
field of view." 

* lU* aluitikkge >im1 expuialoti of tlie absolute ipocc-VBlue of Ihe UiUl 
" > mjr min'l llie musl obwurc purt of llie wLok 



270 P8TCH0L0QT. 


Let us now close with a brief historical survey. The 
first achievement of note in the study of space-perception 
Jt^ was Berkeley's theory of vision. This undertook to establish 
two points, first that distance was not a visual but a tactile 
form of consciousness, suggested by visual signs ; secondly, 
that there is no one quality or ' idea ' common to the sensa- 
tions of touch and sight, such that prior to experience one 
might possibly anticipate from the look of an object any- 
thing about its felt size, shape, or position, or from the 
touch of it anything about its look. 

In other words, that primitively chaotic or semi-chaotic 
condition of our various sense-spaces which we have 
demonstrated, was established for good by Berkeley ; and 
he bequeathed to psychology the problem of describing the 
manner in which the deliverances are harmonized so as all 
to refer to one and the same extended world. 

His disciples in Great Britain have solved this problem 
I^J^^ after Berkeley's own fashion, and to a great extent as we 
have done ourselves, by the ideas of the various senses sug- 
gesting each other in consequence of Association. But, either 
because they were intoxicated with the principle of associa- 
tion, or because in the number of details they lost their 
general bearings, they have forgotten, as a rule, to state under 
what sevsiNe/orm the primitive spatial experiences are /o^ind 
which later became associated with so many other sensible 
signs. Heedless of their master Locke's precept, that the 
mind can frame unto itself no one new simple idea, they 
seem for the most part to be trying to explain the extensive 
gvality itself, account for it, and evolve it, by the mere asso- 
ciation together of feelings which originally possessed it not. 
They first evaporate the nature of extension by making it 
tantamount to mere * coexistence,' and then they explain 
coexistence as being the same thing as stiocession, provided it 

subject. It is a real optical sensation, seeming introspectively to have 
nothing to do with locomotor or other suggestions. It is easy to say thai 
*the Intellect produces it,' but what does that mean? The investigator 
who will throw light on this one point will probably clear up other diffi- 
culties as well. 



a estreeaely rajitd or a reversible tmcceHsion. Space* 
n>pt)r>n Uinu enifrges without beiu({ huv wliere jMintulateil. 
KfulrtliiiiftspostnlHtedareuuextetjded feeliugMHUil time. 
HTbomsH Bro«n (lecture xxili.): " 1 am iucliuf<tl to re 
ictlv the pnicetsoorauioDly HDppiised ; and iustead 
of denriiig tile meaanre of time from exteusiou, to derive 
tiic knowledKe aud orij^iiial measure of ettenHiou from time." 
Itmwu and Ikoth the Millie think that retiual KeuHatiooa, 
■Jont, in their primitiTe coodttiou, are felt with do exteoaion 
1 that the Utter merely becomes inseparably aHMoeiated 
Ik them. Joho Mill aays : " Whatever may be the retinal 
ipiTiwion wmveyed by a line which boundB two colors, I 
( OQ fcronnd for thinking that by the eye alone we could 
e the I'ODi'eptioD of what we now meau when we »ay 
hitcio»of the enlom i.i ontaide [beside j the other."" 
Whence does the extension come which get» ao iusepa- 
ir MHOciatiHl with the^e non-extended colored sensations ? 
tern tb« 'awrep ami iuovemen(«* of the eye — from mus- 
l«r feeltngM. Bnt, ah Prof. Bain says, if move me ut- fee 1- 
p gi»ft UB any property of things, " it would seem Ut lie 
< space, but time." t Aud Johu Mill sayx that " the idea 
I ipAce is, at bottom, one of time." % Space, then, is uot to 
Ifotifid )u any elementary sensation, but, in Bain's words, 
B ■ qnaJity, tt has uo other origiu aud no other meaning 
1 the OMOciafion of these different [non-spatial] motor 
d WDidtiTe effects." iS 

I This phra»e is mystical-scmuding enough to one who 
lerstands association as prfxfucing nothing, bnt ouly as 
ritdng together things already produced in separate ways. 
• truth ia that the English Associatiouist school, in trying 
|ihow bow mnch their principle can accomplish, tuive 
{ether overshot the mark and espoused a kind of theory 
lireapect to space-perception which the general tenor of 
llMir philosophy should lead them to abhor. Really there «7^ 
•» hut three iHjssible kinds of theorj' concerning space. '*™**-*' 
Ether (I) there is no spatial qiuiUty of sensation at all, and t* 

■ ExuDlnmloii of H-piiliun. M ihI. p. 28H. M 

I S«iiM» UkI iDlellcct. 8«l 111 |i. 1H3, I 

t Ekuh, nf Uamillon, 8<l e<l. p. 983. 
g ScniHW Bni) Iiiii'llii'i, p ST2. 


space is a mere symbol of succession ; or (2) there is an e^ 
tensive quality given immediately in certain particular sen- 
sations ; or, finally, (3) there is a quality prodvced out of the 
inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensa.tions which, 
as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on being 
cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This 
last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it 
as the * psychic stimulus ' theory, the crude sensations being 
considered as goads to the mind to put forth its slumbering 

Brown, the Mills, and Bain, amid these possibiUties, 
seem to have gone astray like lost sheep. With the ' men- 
tal chemistry ' of which the Mills speak — precisely the 
same thing as the * psychical synthesis ' of Wundt, which, 
as we shall soon see, is a principle expressly intended to do 
what Association can never perform — they hold the third 
view, but again in other places imply the first And, be-^ 
tween the impossibility of getting from mere associations 
anything not contained in the sensations associated and the 
dislike to allow spontaneous mental productivity, they 
flounder in a dismal dilemma. Mr. Sully joins them there 
in what I must call a vague and vacillating way. Mr. 
Spencer of course is bound to pretend to * evolve ' all 
mental qualities out of antecedents different from them- 
selves, so that we need perhaps not wonder at his refusal 
to accord the spatial quality to any of the several elemen- 
tary sensations out of which our space-perception grows. 
Thus (Psychology, ii. 168, 172, 218) : 

" No idea of extension can arise from a simultaneous excitation " of 
a multitude of nerve-terminations likfe those of the skin or the retina, 
since this would imply a ** knowledge of their relative positions '' — that 
is, ** a pre-existent idea of a special extension, which is absurd." ** No 
relation between sticcessive states of consciousness gives in itself any 
idea of extension." ** The muscular sensations accompanying motion 
are quite distinct from the notions of space and time associated with 
them. ' 

Mr. Spencer none the less inveighs vociferously against 
the Kantian position that space is produced by the mind's 
own resources. And yet he nowhere denies space to be a 
specific affection of consciousness different from time ! 

rilK mUCKI'TION ilF Sl'AVJi. 273 

kl Soi'Ii LU<ti[if reuuy in iiitiful. The fact is that, at lK)ttuiu, 
iD UitM! aatlidrii nre really' ' paycliicul Htimullsts,' or Kant- 
W Tlie spai^ethey speiikuf isasuper-MoiiHatioiiitl meutul - , 
|)iiiiliict Thin position appears to lue thoioiigliiv uiyllm-Jfe,,.*^ 
LipMl, But let us sen liow it is hold by tliosi* who know r 
mura (lefitiitel; what they mean. ScliopfknhaiieiexpreHseH •' 
tlie Kantiau new with more vigor ami uleameBa thaii any- 
iitr «!«;. Ue tuiys : 

-A man rou«t bo romakeu byAllllie t^odstodienm (hut lIiK wiirld wn 
wouuidoor IIS, Ailing »pnco in its tlirui.- dimensions, moving down Ibti 
iMibntilrairvam ut time, govenied «t each step by CauaaltEjr'n iiivariablL- 
Uv.-boi m itll ihi« only followinK ruk-s whiub \ce may proacribr fur it 
in uJTuuv of all vKperlencp. — to dtvnni. I say. ihat such h M'orld tthould 
"Uwl tliirr iint.iidc nt tiK, ijuiiu ukijwtively rwil with no uumpllnly of 
<-un,UHl thcivBpon by a KUl)M^uont acf , thruiigU tlic iimtnimemality 
"f nTbteoMiiou. ibat iiHhuuIdi-ittvrourheudand recuuEtrui-t ndupli- 
niif filiiM<lf tuit wad outbid I'. Kor whnl npovcrty-strl(;ken thin^iaiLia 
O'lVH-iLviiiuu ! K.\vu in tbu iioblett organs of sense ii is nothing more 
^^D« local and spt^ilic ftvling, HuiM.'qitibli' within its kind of a few 
h but always Btrictly Bnbjc<ctiV(- and containing in itself uolh- 
P objtciirii, nothing rnM-mbling n ptTctipIion. Forsensation of erer? 
n I* unl remainii a process in the organism itself. As such it Is limited 
'^ l«nil«ry inside tlin skin and oau never, accordingly, prr at con- 
b uytlilag that lies outsido thr skin or otitsidR ourselves. . . . Only 
1 thr I'Ddrrstaiiding . . . ia roused to activity and iii-iugs its 
hI only form, the law nf Caunality, into piny, only then does lb« 
ty tnuuformafioD take plae« which makes oni of subjective svnia- 
l<4ijMiTo inlniticin. T)ie tlndensiandiiig. namrly, gmspsby means 
Plb itinat«. a priori. aDie-«xpcrientia1 form, ihtr given senuiticiii uf the 
in ^eei which an kucIi miut ni'ceatuirily have a cause. At the 
■■<» lime the rniler^ilanding xiimranns In lis Hid the form of the outer 
"iw which similarly lies nlri'ady preformed In ihe Intellii'i (or brain), 
)oJ vbicb n Spam, in order tn locatn that luiuar oulsido nf rim organ- 
""n- ■ . . In tbia process tht^ UDderslandlng. as I nhall soon xhow. take* 
**• nf the mn«t miniit4-pp«mli»riti«!of (he given sensation in order to 
'iTiMnici III tlie outtT »|>fflci' ii eaiini- wliii-h sliatl completely aeeouul for 
"•fin Till. o[.pration of Ilie f uOereUmlilig is, lii.wcvfr. iiol one iLal 
"l"» plaoe dincumlvrly. ri'tlfiriivcly, in aMrado, by means of wunU 
MJoourepts: but is Intuitive and imniediate. , . . Thus the L'ndci- 
"•i^ine mum flmt crtiate the objective wnrhl ; never i-nn the latter. 
" ""t ' ■ 'iupl>-i« it4 », simply promenade into mir liends through Ihii 
"iifantf Bperiumi. For the (teiiiu-H yield ns nothing funher 
. » tnalehnt which must hn first elaborated into the Dbjectire 
! ■fan orderly physical world-system by moans of the nfure- 
•1 "mj'le fumia of Space, Time, and Cuiisnlity. . . . Ij'I hid show tho 


great chasm between sensation and perception by showing how raw the 
material is out of which the fair structure is upreared. Only two senses 
serve objective perception : touch and sight. They alone furnish the 
data on the basis whereof the Underst^inding, by the process indicated, 
erects the objective world. . . . These data in themselves are still uo 
perception ; that is the Understanding's work. If 1 press with my hand 
against the table, the sensation I receive has no analogy with the idea 
of the firm cohesion of the parts of this mass : only when my Under- 
standing passes from the sensation to its cause does it create for itself 
a body with the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness. 
When in the dark 1 lay my hand on a surface, or grasp a ball of three 
inches diameter, in either case the same parts of the hand receive the 
impression : but out of the different contraction of the hand m the two 
cases my Understanding constructs the form of the body whose contact 
caused the feeling, and confirms its construction by leading me to move 
my hand over the body. If one born blind handles a cubical body, the 
sensations of his hand are quite uniform on all sides and in all direc- 
tions,— only the corners press upon a smaller part of his skin. In these 
sensations, as such, there is nothing what<3ver analogous to a cube. But 
from the felt resistance his Understanding infers immediately and 
intuitively a cause thereof, which now presents itself as a solid body; 
and from the movements of exploration which the arms made whilst 
the feelings of the hands remained constant he constructs, in the space 
known to him a priori^ the body's cubical shape. Did he not bring 
with him ready-made the idea of a cause and of a space, with the laws 
thereof, there never could arise, out of those successive feelings in his 
hand, the image of a cube. If we let a string run through our closed 
hand, we immediately construct as the cause of the friction and its dura- 
tion in such an attitude of the hand, a long cylindrical body moving 
uniformly in one direction. But never out of the pure sensation in the 
hand could the idea of movement, that is, of change of |>osition in space 
by means of time, aris(; : such a content can never lie in sensation, nor 
come out of it. Our Intellect, antecedently to all experience, must bt^ir 
in itself the intuitions of Space and Time, and therewithal of the possi- 
bility of motion, and no less the idea of Causality, to pass from the 
empirically given feeling to its cause, and to construct the latter as a 
so moving body of the designated shape. For how great is the abyss 
between the mere sensation in the hand and the ideas of causalitv. 
materiality, and movement through Space, occurring in Time I The 
feeling in the hand, even with different contacts and positions, is some- 
thing far too uniform and |x>()r in (content for it to be possible to con- 
struct out of it the idea of Space with its three dimensions, of the 
action of bodies on each other, with the properties of extension, impen- 
etrability, cohesion, shape, hardness, softness, rest, and motion — in 
short, the foundations of the objective world. This is only possible 
through Space, Time, an<i Causality . . . l)eing preformed in the 
Intellect itself. . . . from whence it again follows that the perception 

I' It 

rim pumsi'TJON ojc spach. 27B 

tf the eit«rtiA] world is <»»pntintl)' nn intellectual prouess, a workof the 
'[i<|pnUDdln;iC. to le/iieh ittiaaliaii furnishes merel]/ th" ixi-jtsUrn, and 
IT clkta u> Iw inlrrprett<(1 in tMcti particular i!HM. " * 
I call Uiis i-iew m^tliological. because I hid conHciouti of 
I Id trach KAtitina niHohine-slinp io m_v mind, and feel ud 
o disparage t\if powers of poor i>«uMation in thiH tuem- 
leaawnv. I have no iutroHpectivp experience of mentally 
pmdacini! or creating spai^e. My apace-intnitiona occur 
unl in two timeH but in one. Tbere it* not one moment of 
psMtivfv )ii«xt«m4ive seiisation, aiiccee<1ed by another of ac- 
ti»i> PI tensive perception, but tlie form I see ia as immpdi- 
«tpl_t felt as the color which fills it ont Thiit the higher 
parts of the mint] come in, who can deny V They add and 
rabtrm-t, they compare and meaMare, tliey reproduce and 
ibiitract. They inweave the spaee-sensatiouK with intel- 
Isrtiid n^Iatioui* ; hut Ihew relations are the same when they 
ubtaiii between the elements of the space-sytstem as when 
thi^obtjtin between any of the other eleuieutB of which the 
arid i» tunde. 
Th« ttfiseuce of the Kantian contention is that there are 
t fpacvi, but Spatx — one infinite coutinnonn Vnit — and 
that «iir knowledge of thiti cannot be a piecemeal sensa- 
tional affair, produced by summation and abstraction. To 
»hicli the obvious reply is that, if any known thing bears 
onitMfmnt the "jTpwininrt* of piecemeal construction and 
abMnrtiou, it is thiK veri- notion of the infinite unitary 
ifswe of the world. It is a no^'ow, it ever there was one; 
ukIho iutiiitiori. Most of us apprehend it in the barest 
■•mMic abrid^jment: and if percliance we ever do try to 
I "lake it more adeqnate, we just add one ima^e of sensible 
^■ntcoaioD to another until we are tiivd. Most of us are 
^^pUifiM) to tuni round and drop the thought of the space in 
^^■otttof Cfi when we think of that behind. And the space 
^^HprBMntAd as near to us seems more minutely subdivisible 
^^BkO that we think of an lying far away. 

^■^ The other prominent German writers on space are also 
' 'paychical tttimulists.' Uerbart, whose influence has been 
t, sayo ' the resting ej'e sees no space, 'f and ascribes 

* Vhrlacbe Wiirael daiSaiuM toiii zuri'li'lieuilvu UruudL', \i\>. S3-7, 

t l^jcbul all. W[«M<aiH.'l;nft. g 111. 

l th.70 

H^ Til 



276 P8YCH0L0OT. 

visual extension to the influence of movements combining 
with the non-spatial retinal feelings so as to form gradated 
series of the latter. A given sensation of such a series 
reproduces the idea of its associates in regular order, and 
its idea is similarly reproduced by any one of them with 
the order reversed. Out of the fusion of these two con- 
trasted reproductions comes the form of space* — Heaves 
knows how. 

The obvious objection is that mere serial order is a genus, 
and space-order a very peculiar species of that genua ; and 
that, if the terms of reversible series became bv that faci 
coexistent terms in space, the musical scale, the degrees oi 
warmth and cold, and all other ideally graded series oughl 
to appear to us in the shape of extended corporeal aggre- 
gates, — which they notoriously do not, though we may o\ 
course symbolize their order by a spatial scheme. W 
Volkmann von Volkmar, the Herbai^tian, takes the bull here 
by the horns, and says the musical scale is spatially ex- 
tended, though he admits that its space does not belong tc 
the real world.t I am unacquainted with any other Her- 
bartian so bold. 

To Lotze we owe the much-used term * local sign.' He 
insisted that space could not emigi-ate directly into the 
mind from without, but must be reconstructed bv the soul : 
and he seemed to think that the first reconstinictions of it 
by the soul must be super-sensational. But why sensa- 
tions themselves might not be the soul's original spatial re- 
constructive acts Lotze fails to explain. 

Wundt has all liis life devoted himself to the elaboration 
of a space-theory, of which the neatest and most final ex- 
pression is to be found in his Logik (ii. -457-60). He says : 

'*In the eye, space-perception ha»s certain constant peculiarities 
which prove that no single optical sensation by itself possesses the ex 
tensive form, but that everywhere in our perception of space heterogene- 

♦ Psychol. His Wissenschaft, § 118. 

f Lehrbucb d. Psychol., 2te Autlage. Bd. ii. p. 66. Volkmanu's tiftL 
chapter contains a really precious collection of historical notices concern 
ing space- perception theories. 



I «■ Mings combine. If we aimply mippo!M> tliHl tuminous sensations 
nrm M ntnnsivi!. our su|ipu«.Uio» in shattered bv thnt influenee of 
MomiM>i in mion which is so dearly to be traced in many normal 
•mm m Uw mmauremenl of tbe fleld of view. If we assume, on the 
nW bmn), ihm Ihr movomcnta and their feelings are alone possessed 
"( ihir extKDilvcqnalit). wl- nutke ut unjustified hypothesis, for the 
phnximrna eon]|H'I ii», it in true, lo tiuoord iiu illflDeni-e to movement, 
% glre us no righl to cmII [h« retinal sensations indifforenl, for Iheru 
^fr no ri»u»l idens without retinal sensatiouii. If ilii-ii we nnsh rignr- 
"«*'y to eiprrsM llie giren fncts. we c»n nscrib<' ii !t|>ai.i»l i-iippiiiutiop i^lA 
•ijlf Uiaimbimitliiiuiol reliiml xensaltuus with tlionu of muvomenl." T^ 

ThuH Wiujiit, dividing theories into ' nativistic ' and 

t'fi^tifrtir,' caIU liis owu a genetic theory*. To distinii^isb it 
"■*Hi oLher theories of the same clans, he uames it a 'theory 

mplex lora) ni^tis.' 

"It wi|ip<ie« two aysicmH of local signs, whose relniions— taking ihn 
wail (tiamplv— we may think aM . . . the mcaaurini; of the miiul- 
lnrBlnign sygilttm of the retina tiy the simple local-sign system of 
mnn-iDcntm. In lis psychological natnre Ihis in n process of associa- 
"^"••inrhi*!" : it cuob1sI« in the fusion of both groupii of sensations 
l*^*** jiroducl. whose rlementnry components are no longer separabli' 
*~*^ai uktIi other In idea. In melting wholly away inio the product 
'kiicb th<>y croHt^ they become coniwiously nndistinguishnble. and the 
apprvhends only their resultant, the intuition of space. Thus 
alrtaln* a eirrtain aunlogy between this psychic synihesis and that 
leal synthesis which nut of simple bodies generates a compound 
aitfKnn to our inimediair iK-reeptiou as a hmniigeneoits whole with 

Now let no modest reader think that if this sonnda ob- 
t-%rnre to him it is becaase he does not know the fall con- 
' frxt; and that if a wise profeHHor tike Wundt can talk so 
fla<>tiUy and phinaibly about 'combination' and ' psyitliio 
itTHtbeitis,' it must surely be because those words convey a 
ao macb Kreatt^r fulness of positive meaning to the scholar- 
ly tlwn to the nnlearned mind. Heally it is t^uite the re- 
, Tnrw ; all tlif iirtui> of th<>r (ihrase lies in its meif sound 
] akiiL Ijearning does but make one the more sensible of 
s inward nnintelligibility. Wundt's 'theory' is the tlim- 
Mt thing in the world. It startn liy an iiiitrne assumji- 
ud then correcttt it by an unmeaning phrase. Retinal 
ions arr spatial ; and were they not. no amount of 
leais' with eijually spai-eless motor seusations could 


278 P8YCH0L0GT, 

intelligibly make them so. Wuudt's theory is, in short, 
but an avowal of impotence, and an appeal to the inscru- 
table powers of the soul.* It confesses that we cannot 
analyze the constitution or give the genesis of the spatial 
quality in consciousness. But at the same time it says the 
antecedents thereof are psychical and not cerebral facts. 
In calling the quality in question a sensational quality, our 
own account equally disclaimed ability to analyze it, but 
said its antecedents were cerebral, not psychical — in other 
words, that it was 2l first psychical thing. This is merely 
a question of probable fact, which the reader may decide. 

JfiJilifi And now what shall be said of Helmholtz? Can I find 
^ fault with a book which, on the whole, I imagine to be one 
of the four or five greatest monuments of human genius in 
the scientific line? If truth impels I must fain try, and 
take the risks. It seems to me that Helmholtz's genius 
moves most securely when it keeps close to particular facts. 
At any rate, it shows least strong in purely speculative 
passages, which in the Optics, in spite of many beauties, 
seem to me fundamentally vacillating and obscure. The 
. *empiristic' view which Helmholtz defends is that the 
ft p^.f*p..flfttftrrm'na.finna wft perceive are in every case pro- 
ducts of a process of unconscious inference, f The infer- 
ence is similar to one from induction or analogj\ % We al- 
ways see that form before us which habitually would have 
caused the sensation we now have. § But the latter sensa- 
tion can never be intrinsically spatial, or its intrinsic space- 
determinations would never be overcome as they are so 
often by the 'illusory' space-determinations it so often 
suggests.! Since the illusory determination can be traced 
to a suggestion of Experience, the * real * one must also be 
such a suggestion : so that all space intuitions are due sole- 

* Why talk of 'genetic theories '? when we have in the next breath to 
write as Wundt does: "If then we mii8t regard the intuition of space as a 
product that simply emerges from the conditions of our mental and physi- 
cal organization, nothing need stand in the way of our designating it asone 
of the a priori functions with which consciousness is endowed." (Logik^ 
II. 4«0.) 

t P. 480. I Pp. 430. 449. § P. 428. | P. 442. 


Ii to Exj»erii»in;e.* The only ptsjclik- ai-tivity reqnired for 
tliM \*t the HfMociation of ideas.! 

Btit how, it may t»e anliMi, cau aasociatioii produce a 
i)>i((«-<| utility not in the things liHsociiited ? How vnn we ^"-^ ■ 
*> indnrtJKii or HU«logy infer wliat we do imt already 
„'U«rioally know? Cau ' liiiggestions of experience' repro- 
n.v ^If'roeutB which no jiarticuliir experience originally 
■nUincil? This is the jioiut l.y which Helnihnitz'a 'em- 
[triAlic ' tbeor)-, ait a iheori/. must Ije judged. No theory is 
Torthy itf the name which leaves such a point olmcure. 

nVll, Heltaholtz does ho leave it At one time he seeuiH 

n fall bock on inscrutable powers of the soul, aud to rauge 

Bii^lf with the ' psychical »tiiuulifits.' He npt^nksof Kant 

t having nuule the eftoential step iu the matter in dis- 

igniflhiug the oontent of experience from that form — 

oarsf! — which in given it by the peculiar faculties 

Itheiuind. ^ But elsewhere, again, § speaking of senuu- 

' malifitic theories which wonld connect spatially determi- 

R fM>lttigs ttirfctly with certain neural events, he Miys it 

I better to assume only such simple psychic activities aa 

u to exist, and gives the association of ideas as an 

9 uf what he means. Later,t{ he reinforces this re- 

urk by confcsiting that he does nut see how any neural 

( give rise without antecedent experience to a 

■(iT-inade i/frtige) perception of space. And, finally, iu 

Irinjfle nioment^ius sentence, he speaks of sensations of 

d if they might he the original niaterial of our space- 

»j»t*«^which thus, from the optical point of view, ' may 

I assamed as <jiv^'i 

Of coarse the eye-man has a right to fall back on the 

]-roan f<ir help at a pinch. But doesn't this mean that 

visa mere eye-man ami not a complete psychologist? In 

ilinr words, Helmholtz'n Optics and the 'enipiristic theory' 

Wreiu professed mu»t not be understood as attempts at 

Mweriug the gntrral iiuestion of how space-consciousness 

^nlen* the mind. They simply d>^uy that it euteru with the 

- {"p M2.n8. t P. 796. Cf. ftleo Popular Bclenllfic Ledum, pp. 301-3. 
iP. 4Hi MC»lK>UB.441. it P. T»7. | P. »I2. 

m ot [Mfe 7ST, 

280 PS ¥('110 LOG y. 

first optical sensations.* Our own acconnt has affirmed 
stoutly that it enters then : but no more than Helmholtz 
liave we pretended to show why. Who calls a thing a first 
sensation admits he has no theory of its production. Helm- 
holtz, though all the while without an articulate theory, 
makes the world think he has one. He beautifully traces 
the immense part which reproductiye processes play in our 
vision of space, and never — except in that one pitiful little 
sentence about touch — does he tell us just what it is they 
reproduce. He limits himself to denying that thej- repro- 
duce originals of a visual sort. And so difficult is the 
subject, and so magically do catch-words work on the 
popular-scientist ear, that most likely, had he written 
* physiological ' instead of * nativistic,' and * spiritualistic ' 
instead of * empiristic ' (which synonyms Hering suggests), 
numbers of his present empirical evolutionary' followers 
would fail to find in his teaching anything worthy of praise. 
But since he wrote otherwise, they hurrah for him as a sort 
of second Locke, dealing another death-blow at the old 
bugaboo of * innate ideas.' His * nativistic ' adversary 
Hering they probably imagine — Heaven save the mark ! — 
to be a scholastic in modern disguise. 

After Wundt and Helmholtz, the most important anti- 
sensationalist space-philosopher in Germany is Professor 
Lipps, whose deduction of space from an order of non- 
spatial differences, continuous yet separate, is a wonderful 
piece of subtlety and logic. And yet he has to confess that 
continuous differences form in the first instance only a logi- 
cal series, which need not appear spatial, and that wher- 
ever it does so appear, this must be accounted a * fact,' due 
merely *to the nature of the soul.'t 

Lipps, and almost all the anti-sensationalist theorists 
except Helmholtz, seem guilty of that confusion which Mr. 

*In fnct, to borrow a simile from Prof. G. E. Mftller (Tlieorie der sinnl. 
AufmerksHiiikeit, p. 38), the various senses bear in the Helmholtziau phi- 
losophy of pereeption the same relation to tlie ' object ' perceived by their 
means that a troop of jolly drinkers bear to the landlord's bill, when no 
one has any money, but each hopes that one of the rest will pay. 

tGrundtatsjichen iles Seelenlebens (1888), pp. 480. 591-2. Psycholo- 
gische Studieu (188*)), p. 14. 

THE PEitcufTioy oy si'Ack. 


'iiailu-ortlj Hu<l(,'!sou Unn (luuH so niuuli to ulear away, viz., 
!•- roufuuutUii^ the aualyaiH of a& ide& witli the memifi of 
• jmMlnctiim. Lijijm, for example, linils that svery spauf 
< tliiiik of oau be broken tip into positious, aud voucludes 
;il in hoiiiB niitletioLHl way the several positJouH must have 
r- -(^iiMt««l ill thought before the ag^it^gate spai;e could ^ 
•1" iipjHMired to peri-eptiou. Siuiilnrly Mr. Spemier, de- ^^4>l«* 
'■mg cxLeOKioD na nu ' H(^|^regate of relaUous of eoexisteut / 
-itiou,' Hays " every ooguitiou of niaguitude w a cugni- 
II of reUti'iOH of jioBithm,"* ami " uo idea uf entenaiuu 
>ii uriiH) from the siiiiultuueons excitatiou " of many aefves 
unless there in a knowledge of their relative positions/'t 
astau IVif. Bain iuHists tb«t the very meuniwj of space is /X*~^ 
up [or iiiovetiietit, t '^■■d tliat therefore distance and mag- 
lie can be uo origiual attributeH of the eye's sensibility. 
Iwly bevniise tuovemeut in aualyzable iuto pouithms 
iliied at succesaivo moments by the mover, philoso- 
itB(e.g. Schopenhauer, as quoted above) have repeatedly 
ilrnied (hti possibility of its being an immediate sensation. 
We Lave, however, seen that it ia the most immediate of all 
spMc-fwnsatious. Because it can only occur in a defi- 
Erection the impossibility of perceiving it without 
iring its direction haw been decreed — a decree which 
BiiDplnst esiwriweut overthrows. § It is a case of what 
callpd the 'psychnli^ist's fallacy': mere acquaint- 
witti dpace is treated as tantamount to ever}' sort of 
rledge about it, the conditions of the latter are de- 
file former stale of miml,and all sorls of inytho. 
processes are brought in to help. II As well might 
ty that Iwtcauae the world consists of all its parts, there- 

Mlocr. ». p. IT4. 
phU. p. 1S8. 

■ uiil loivlltrcl. Sd i-il pp. 860-70. 
|Cr Hall BDit [>.iD.lil«iii ill MlD>J. X. n.'>»- 

^ollierrxuiip)c<i)r tbcranfiislon, lake Mr. Sully : " Tlir fatlaeiou* 
• tbu tbcrv ran be nn Idm of ilUbmcc In geticnil. npnrt from 
MriimlKr <lisiaui:»" iStiod. m. p. ITT): Mil Wuodt: "An tndedniir 
>i«-»litatton. which wilu tur nperlence lo ^ivi' U (u refereace to r««l 
:. Manila In ranliadkltoii wllti lh« vi-ry tdcn of Inmlixatliiii, vrtili^b 
Mtbr rvformrc to a drli-nnliiiitr [mint of apncc" iPliysinl. ISyc-L., 
1 p. 480i 


fore we can only appreliend it at all by having unconsciously 
summed these up in our head. It is the old idea of our 
actual knowledge being drawn out from a pre-existent 
potentiality, an idea which, whatever worth it may meta- 
physically possess, does no good in psychology. 

M}' own sensationalistic account has derived most aid 
and comfort from the writings of Hering, A. W. VolkmanD, 
Stumpf, Leconte, and Schon. All these authors allow 
ample scope to that Experience which Berkeley's geniutv 
saw to be a present factor in all our visual acts. But they 
give Experience some grist to grind, which the soi-disiant 
* empiristic ' school forgets to do. Stumpf seems to me the 
most philosophical and profound of all these writers ; and 
I owe him much. I should doubtless have owed almost as 
much to Mr. James Ward, had his article on Psychologj- in 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica appeared before my own 
thoughts were written down. The literature of the question 
is in all languages very voluminous. I content myself with 
referring to the bibliography in Helmholtz's and Aubert's 
works on Physiological Optics for the \asual part of the 
subject, and with naming in a note the ablest works in the 
English tongue which have treated of the subject in a gen- 
eral way.* 

* G. Berkeley : Essay towards a new Theory of Vision ; Samuel Bailey : 
A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision (1842) ; J. S. Mill's Review of 
Bailey, in his Dissertations and TMwjuisitions, vol. u ; Jas. Ferrier : Re- 
view of Bailey, in •Philosophical Remaius,* vol. ii ; A. Bain: Senses and 
Intellect, 'Intellect,' chap, it H. Spencer: Principles of Psychology, pt. 
VI. chaps. XIV, XVI ; J. S. Mill : Examination of Hamilton, chap, xiii 
(the best statement of the so-called English empiricist position) ; T. K. 
Abbott : Sight and Touch. 1861 (the lirst English book to go at all mi- 
nutely m\o facts ; Mr. Abbott maintaining retinal sensations to be originally 
of space in three dimensions) ; A. C. Eraser : Review of Abbott, in North 
British Review for Aug. 1864 ; another review in Macmillan's Magazine,. 
Aug. 1866 ; J. Sully : Outlines of Psychology, chap, vi ; J. Ward : En- 
cyclop. Britannica, 9th Ed., article ' Psychology,' pp. 63-5 ; J. £. Walter; 
The Perception of Space and Matter (1870) —I may also refer to a * discrus- 
sion ' between Prof. G. Croom Robertson, Mr. J. Ward, and the present 
writer, in Mind. vol. xiii. — The present chapter is only the filling out with 
detail of an article entitled 'The Spatial Quale,* which appeared in the 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January 1879 (xiii. 64). 


Btxrtoxe knowH the difference between imaginicg a 
tiiiog and believing in its existence, between supposing a 
pTopoditioD and acqaiescing in its tmtb. In the case of 
tcqaiefwence or belief, the object is not only apprehended 
liv tlip miud, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the ^ 
mental ntjite or faactiou of cognizing reality. As used in 
the following pages, ' Belief ' will mean every degree of as- 
nnuice, including the Iiigheat possible certainty and con- 

Tberi* are, as we know, two ways of studying every ■ 
p«Tchic Htate. First, the way of analysis: What does it 
touut in? What is ibt iuuer nature'^ Of what sort of 
■ilid-flhiff ts it composed? Second, the way of history: 
What are its conditions of prodnction, and its connection 
with other facta? 

Into the first way we cannot go very far. In Us fvner /. 
naimre, Mief, or the aenar of reaiitj/, is a sort of f^ing more 
tjlied to the emotiojui than to anything eUe. Mr. Bagehot dis- 
ttoctly calU it thu ' amotion ' of conviction. I just now 
upoke of it an acquiescence. It resembles more than any> 
Itung what in the psychology of volition we know as con- 
MOt. Cim»«nt is recognized by all to lie a manifestation 
of am active nature. It would naturally be described by 
■Doh tenna as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our dispo- 
■Hkiti.' What characterizes both consent and belief is the 
tion of theoretic agitation, through the wlvent of aii 
which ia inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to 
Uw esdorioD of contradictory ideaM. When this ia the 
CMS, motor efTects are apt to foHow. Hence the states of 

•tteprioted, with Bildillooa. from 'Mind' for-Iul^ 1889. 


consent and belief, characterized by repose on the pt 
intellectual side, are both intimately connected with si 
qnent practical activity. This inward stability of the m 

/V content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. Br 
y shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything 

/ <5ept for the reason that we believe something else V\ 

contradicts the first thing.^ Disbelief is thus an incid* 
complication to belief, and need not be considered by i 


The irxie oppoaiies of hdiefy psychologically consid 
are dovbt and inquiry , not disbelie/. In both these state 
content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion ei 
dered thereby is, like the emotion of belief itself, perf 
-distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both 
of emotion may be pathologically exalted. One of 
harms of drunkenness unquestionably lies in the dee 
ing of the sense of reality and truth which is gained the 
In whatever light things may then appear to us, they i 
more utterly what they are, more * utterly utter ' than i 
we are sober. This goes to a fully unutterable ext: 
in the nitrous oxide intoxication, in which a man's very 
will sweat with conviction, and he be all the while ur 
to tell what he is convinced of at all.f The patholo 
«tate opposed to this solidity and deepening has been a 
the questioning mania ( Qriibelsvcht b y the Germans), 
sometimes found as a substantive affection, parox3'8mj 
chronic, and consists in the inability to rest in any cod 
tion, and the need of having it confirmed and explaj 
* Why do I stand here where I stand ? * * Why is a gla 
glass, a chair a chair ? ' * How is it that men are on 
the size they are ? Why not as big as houses,' etc., 

* Compare this psychological fuel with the corresponding logical 
that all negation ri-sts on covert assertion of something else than the 
denied. (See Bradley's Principles of Logic, bk. i. ch. 3.) 

f See that very remarkable little work, * The Anesthetic Revelatio 
the Gist of Philosophy,' by Benj. P. Blood (Amsterdam, N. Y., 
Compare also Mind. vii. 206. 

t "To one whose mind is healthy thoughts come and go unnot 
with me they have to be faced, thought about in a peculiar fashioc 
then disposed of as finished, and this often when I am utterly wearie 
would be at peace ; but the call is impenitive. This goes on to the 

■ W 



I AcK is, it ui true, another pathological state which i» as 
I far nmoTed from doubt au from belief, auil which some 
T pmfer to consider the proper contrai-j- of the latter 
e of miud. I refer to the feeling that eTerythiiig is 
, lureal, dead. I shall speak of this state again 
pOQ a Ut*ir imge. The jioiut 1 wish to notice here is sim- 
jr Hut belivf and disbelief are hut two aspects of one 
jR-cbic state. 

■Inho Mill, reviewiug various opinions about belief, 
nei to tha conelnBion that no account of it can be given : 
■ffbat," hi- says, "is Ihp differenre to our mliiila betweoii tljinking 
••( * nality unil rcprenenLinft to ourselves an imaginary picture f 1 con- 
'iM I uD MX' no t«cape from tht> opiiiioD that tlie distinction in ultimate 
lud pnin»rdial. Tlir.n: is iio more difficulty in htililing it to be so than 
m boUiDit ib« difference between a Kensation and au idea to bo primor- 
liiii. It MniM ulniust nnuthi^r iispoct of the same dilTcrcnce. ... 1 
niittot help iblnhiiig. Iherorore, that there is in the remembrance of a 
■.'ilttet. Ba dlstlaKUinbed from ttuit of a thought, an clenmnt whivh 
■'r* tioi onnrist . . . in a liiltcrrr™' hetWHTii the mere idea:* which nri) 
i"-*'!!! t" thr mind in ibe t<ro cases. This element, howsoever we de- 
'Lin- ii. cuaililDtis lH.-lief. and is the ilifference between Memory and 
iih»;riimiiuu. From whatever direction we approach, this difference 
•fii' 111 fiimv: nur path. When we arrive at it, we seem to liiivv reacliMl, 
■■: ■.■n-. the central point of our intellectual nature, presupposed and 
.ii| ti\vn in every attempt we make to explain the more recondite 
.1 ni.!HpnB of our mcnlAl hi-ing."* 

- n.r .if all natunil action. If 1 were lold Ihal tbe Blnlrcust was ou fire 
-- ^ I hwl ouly ■ miDUl« lo escape, and llie though! mone— ' Have tbey 
■ Qi for Ure-viigliitv? 1h it protwble that the num mLo has the key is ou 
teuil ! Ik iIh) man ■ careful sort of perton 't Will tbc liey be hanging on 

• IKgl An 1 thinking rightly? PerhajM ibcy dou'i loclc ihe depot' — 
■y tool would Iw lifted to go down : 1 should be conscious lo ckcitement 
Utt I waa loring my chance ; but 1 ihould Iw unable lo stir until all these 
•taonliliea were eutertahied and dlH)M>Hed of. Id the most critical momenta 
nl mj life, when I ought to have l>een xo engromd at to Uaw no room for 
»»f mM»i\Mt thought*, I haviT hccii oppressed by the Inability to br at 
tmtm. And In the most onlinary circumstances it is all the same. Let me 
iaaaaee tfeo other morning I went to walk. The day wax biting cold, but 
I waa tUMMe lu proceed except Uy Jurlu. Once I gol arni>led. my leet in 

• anddy pool. One font was lifted to go, knowiug that it wnk not guvd lo 
!■ KatKllag In walrr. but there 1 wan fast, the cause of detention being the 
4hm>«iBe o'tl) mywK the reasons wliy I should n»l t>lsn<J in ilisl iKxd " 
iT B. CkNWIw. Clinical l,rf<(turea on MenUl Diseases. I8t», p 43- 8e« 

_iMBtTKvr. In Art'blv t. Fsychlatrie. vi. 317.) 
• Mule «• Jsa. Mill* AnalysU, i 412 423. 


If tlie words of Mill be taken to apply to the mere snlv 
jective analysis of belief — to the question. What does it 
feel like when we have it ? — they must be held, on the whole, 

I ^ ^ to be correct Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself — 

* ' that is about as much as we can say. 

Prof. Brentano, in an admirable chapter of his Psycho- 
logiCf expresses this by sajdng that conception and belief 
(which he names jvdgment) are two different fundamental 
psychic phenomena. What I myself have called (Vol. I, p. 
275) the * object ' of thought may be comparatively simple, 
like "Ha! what a pain," or "It-thunders"; or it may be 
complex, like " Columbus-discovered- America-in-1492," or 
" There-exista-an-all-wise-Creator-of-the-world." In either 
case, however, the mere thought of the object may exist as 
something quite distinct from the belief in its reality. The 
belief, as Brentano says, presupposes the mere thought : 

** Every object comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply 
thought of [vorgestelU] and as admitted [anerkannt] or denied. The 
relation is analogous to that which is assumed by most philosophers 
<by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought and 
desire. Nothing is ever desired without Iwjing thought of ; but the 
desiring is nevertheless a second quite new and peculiar form of rela- 
tion to the object, a second quite new way of receiving it into 
consciousness. No more is anything judged [i.e., believed or disbelieved] 
which is not thought of too. But we must insist that, so soon as the 
object of a thouglit becomes the object of an assenting or rejecting 
judgment, our consciousness steps into an entirely new relation to- 
wards it. It is then twice present in consciousness, as thought of, and 
as held for real or denied ; just as when desire awakens for it, it is both 
thought and simultaneously desired." (P. 266.) 

The commonplace doctrine of 'judgment' is that it 
consists in the combination of * ideas ' by a * copula ' into 
a ' proposition,* wliich may be of various sorts, as affir- 
mative, negative, hypothetical, etc. But who does not see 
that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or condi- 
tional proposition, the ideas are combined in the same 
identical way in which they are in a proposition which is 
solidlv believed ? The icaii in ivhich tlie idexis are combined w 
a part of the ivner catistifufion of the thoughVs object or content. 
That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations 
between its j)arts, amongst wliich relations, that of predicate 


to subject may be one. But wheu we have got our object 
with itH inner coustitntion thus defined in a proposition, 
then the question comes up regarding the object as a whole : 
' Is it a real object ? is this proposition a true proposition 
or not ? * And in the answer Yes to this question lies that 
new ))sychic act which Brentano calls 'judgment,* but which 
1 prefer to call ' belief.' 

In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, ques- 
tioned, or disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished, 7^ 
the subject, the predicate, and their relation (of whatever ***^-^ 
>*ort it be) — these form the object of belief — and finally the 
jmychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the 
|>n>position taken as a whole — and this is the belief itself.* 

Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of conscious-] 
uess sui generisy about Tprhich nothing more can be said in| 
the way of internal analysis, let us proceed to the second 
way of studnng the subject of belief: Under what circum- 
stances do tee think things real ? We shall soon see how much 
matter this gives us to discuss. 


Suppose a new-bom mind, entirely blank and waiting 
for experience to be^in. SupjM)8e that it l>egins in the 
form of li visual ini])ressi(m (whether faint or ^-ivid is im- 
iiiaterial) of a lighted cHudle a^^ainst a dark background, 
and nothing else, so that whilst this inia^e hists it consti- 
tutes the entire univi»rse known to the mind in question. 
Suppose, mf)re<)ver (to simplify the hyj»otliesis\ that the 
candle is only imaginary, and that no *ori^iial* of it is 
recognized by us jisyelinlcjt^ists nutsidt'. Will this hallu- 
cinatory candle Ih» lM»li«*ve<l in, will it have a real existence 
fi»r the mind ? 

What ]K>ssible s<mis«' <for that niiiid» would a suspicion 
have that the candle was not real ? What would doubt or 
disWlief of it imply? When //v, tli»* oiilnnkin^ psycholo- 
gists, say the candle is unreal, we ni(*aii something quite 
detinit«s nz., that there is a world known to hm which if* 

* For an excellent nctvjuut of tli*- lii^^tttn* of opinion fHi this subject 
(A. Marty, in Vlertrljalir'^li. f. wi^s. Phil., viii. HU iI. i Isbli 

288 P8YCH0L00Y. ^ 

real, and to which we perceive that the candle does laot 
belong ; it belongs exclusively to that individual mind, \m.^ 
no status anywhere else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in » 
fashion, for it forms the content of that mind's halluciE:».a- 
tion ; but the hallucination itself, though unquestionalj^ly 
it is a sort of existing fact, has no knowledge of other fac^^bs; 
and since those other facts are the realities |>ar exc^enoe i^E^or 
us, and the only things we believe in, the candle is simp^ly 
outside of our reality and belief altogether. 

By the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the carut^dU 
can spin no such considerations as these about it, for <>^ 
other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatevi^^ 
That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty ^^ 
attention is absorbed by it. It is, it is that ; it is there ; 
other possible caudle, or quality of this candle, no oth 
possible place, or possible object in the place, no altern 
tive, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable ; so ho 
can the mind help believing the candle real ? The suppo — 
sition that it might possibly not do so is, under the sup- 
posed conditions, unintelligible.* 

This is what Spinoza long ago announced : 

*'Let us conceive a boy," he said, ** imagining to himself a hone, 
and taking note of nothing else. As this imagination involves the ex- 
istence of the horse, and the hoy has iw perception which annuls its 
existence J he will necessarily contemplate the horse as present^ nor will 
he be able to doubt of its existence, however little certain of it he may 
be. I deny that a man in so far as he imagines [percipit] affirms noth- 
ing. For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that the 
horse [that horse, namely] has wings ? For if the mind had nothing 
before it but the winged horse it would contemplate the same as pres- 
ent, would have no cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of 
dissenting from its existence, unless the imagination of the winged 
horse were joined to an idea which contradicted [tollit] its existence." 
(Ethics, II. 49, Scholium.) 

The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only 
come, then, when that thing is contradicted by bome other 

* We saw uear the end of Chapter XIX that a candle-image taking ex- 
clusive possession of the mind in this way would probably acquire the 
sensational vividness. But this physiological accident is logically im- 
material to the argument in the text, whicli ought to apply as well to the 
dimmest sort of mental image as to the brightest sensation. 


tfiiuft of which we think. Any ahject which 

tnniicted is ipan/acto MiVtwrf (nid puaitfd as absolute r^a^ty. =. jiJ"£X 

Sow, how comes it that one thing thought of cau be eon- J 
tnulicted by auother ? It cannot unless it begins the quur- 
r<rl l>r »ttying Homethiiig inadniinsilile almiit tlint other. 
Txke the mind with the candle, or the boy with the horse. ^ -4 
It either of them aay. ' That ijandle or that horse, even when t'^'*'* 
I li'in't »te« it, exists in the outer u-oHd,' he pnahea intft ' the ^t^*t. i 
nct«r world ' an object which may be iui-ompatible with 
e«m'tbiux which he otherwise knows of that world. If so, 
hr iBuiit take his choice of which to hold by, the present 
p^mpdons or the other knowledge of the world. If hd 
holdti to the other knowledge, the present perceptioQB are 
cotitrvlicteil, no far na tiieir rdoUtm to that worhl goes. Can- 
<Ue ud horse, whatever they may be, are not existents in 
ootward space. They are existentu, nf course ; they are 
Besul objects ; mental objects have existence as mental 
"bjecU. But they are sitnated in their own spaces, the 
"t^c^ in wliich they severally appear, and neither of those 
'pawti iM the space iii which the realities called ' the outer 
^•Md ' exint 

Take again the horse with wings. If I merely dream of 
abonw with wings, my horse interferes with nothing else 
ud ha« not to be contradicted. That horse, its wings, and 
ita pL»c«, are all e({ually real. That horse exists no other- 
wiM thai) as winged, and iii moreover really there, for that 
place exiifts no otherwise than as the place of that horse, 
aod rlainr* u yet uu couue<'tiou with the other places of 
the workt But if with this horse I make an inroad into 
the tporid otherwise knottti, and say, for example, ' That is 
my old mare Maggie, haWug grown a pair of nings where 
<be (ttauila in her stall,' the whole case is altered ; for now 
tliA bonte and place are identified with a horse and place 
otherwise known, and irhnt is known of the latter objects is 
incampatible with what ia perceived M-ith the former. 
'Maggie in her stall with wings! Never!' The wingn are 
onraal, then, visioaaiy. I have dreamed a lie sliont Mag- 
f^ in bar xtall. 

The reader will recognize in these two cases the two i ^j^ 
»Qrta_of judgment called ia the logic-books existential and ^^ (ZSSud 


attributive respectively. *The candle exists as an outer 
reality ' is an existential, ' My Maggie has got a pair of 
wings ' is an attributive, proposition ;* and it follows from 
what was first said that oH propositions, whether cUtributive 
or existential^ are believed through the very fact of being con- 
ceivedf unless they dash tvith other propositions believed at the 
same time, by affirming tha^ their terms are the same with the 
terms of these other propositions, A dream-candle has exist- 
ence, true enough ; but not the same existence (existence 
for itself, namely, or eoctra mentem meam) which the candles 
of waking perception have. A dream-horse has wings ; but 
then neither horse nor wings are the same with any horses 
or wings known to memory. That we can at any moment 
think of the same thing which at any former moment we 
thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitu- 
tion. But when we now think of it incompatibly with our 
other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way 
to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contra- 
V^^^j^^ctory ways at once. The whole distinction of real and nn- 
/- * ^ ' ^^> ^^^ lohole psychology of bdief, disbelief, and doubt, 'Is thus 
•*^^*«/ grounded on ttvo mental fa/cts— first, that we are liable to think 
A differently of the same ; and second, that when toe have done so, 
(/ we can choose which vmy of thinking to adhere to and which to 

The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the at- 
tributes adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered 
to real existence ; whilst the subjects disregarded become 
imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous 

* In both existential and attributive judgments a syntliesis is repre- 
sented. The syllable ex in the word Existence, da in the word Ikuein, ex- 
press it. • The candle exists ' is equivalent to * The candle is over there,' 
And the * over there * means real space, space related to other reals. The 
proposition amounts to saying : ' The candle is in the same space with 
other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very concrete predicate—namely, 
this relation to other particular concrete things. ITieir real existence, as 
we shall later see. resolves itself into their peculiar relation to aurtelcee. 
Existence is thus no substantive quality when we predicate It of any ob* 
Ject ; it is a relation, ultimately terminating in ourselves, and at the mo- 
ment when it terminates, becoming a practical relation. But of this mora 
anon. I only wish now to indicate the superficial nature of the distinctioa 
between the existential and the attributive proposition. 


/mbabw, aimI the exiBteuce disreganled au esititeDce in 
: ' mui'a land, in the limbo ' where footlenH fancies dwell.' 
i U' n-tA Ibiugfl nre, iu M. Taiue's termiiiologj-, the reduc- 
-r* of the things judged unreal. 


Hatiitnallj and practicallj we do not count these disre- 

Kirileil thiugti as exiateuts at all. For them Va vktia is the 

iai in the jtopolar philottophy ; they are iiot even treated ae 

iplMamnopM ; they are treated a» if they were mere waste, 

oqniralent to nothing at all. To the genuinely philosophic 

Buiid, however, they still have existence, though not the 

woe •xutenve, an the real things, ^in objects of fancy, as 

nnn, a« occupants of dreamland, etc., they are in their 

n; u iudefeasiblp parts of life, as undeniable features of 

&t rnivenie, km the realities are in their way. The total 

vorld of which the philosophers must take account is thus 

OpoiuKl of the realities jdus the fancies and illusions. 

~ sub-universes, at least, connected by relations 

1 philosophy tries («> ascertain ! Really tliare are more 

) Bub-uni verses of which we take account, some of 

L« one, and otlit^rs of that. For there are various 

[Dries both of illusion and of reality, and alongside of 

I worlil of absolnte error (i.e., error confined to single 

'Wdaals) but xtill within the world of absolute reality 

^ iBftUty believed by the complete philosopher) there is 

vorhl of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract 

; of relative or practical reality, of ideal relations, 

kere is the suj>ematural world. \The popular mind 

wives of all tliese sub-worlds more or lews diucon- 

idlr ; and when dealing with one of them, forgets for 

s bluing its relations to the res^ The complete phi- 

her ia he who seeks not only to assigu to every given 

Kt of his thought ita right place in one or other of these 

i»-«orldii, but he also seeks U^ determine the relation of 

1 sab-world to the others in the tiital world which is. 

It moat important sub-aniverses commonly discnmi- 

'roin oach otht-r and recognixeil by most of us as 

, each with itit own special oad separate style of 

UiBce, are the following : 

292 P8YGH0L0OT. 

(1) The world of sense, or of physical * thicgs ' as ve 
instinctively apprehend them, with such qualities as heat, 
color, and sound, and such ' forces ' as life, chemical affinity, 
gravity, electricity, all existing as such within or on the 
surface of the things. 

(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the 
learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' 
(in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but sohds 
and fluids and their * laws ' (i.e., customs) of motion.* 

(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths be- 
lieved or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathe- 
matical, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions. 

(4) The world of * idols of the tribe,' illusions or preju- 
dices common to the race. All educated people recognize 
these as forming one sub-universe. The motion of the sky 
round the earth, for example, belongs to this world. That 
motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds ; 
but as an ' idol of the tribe ' it really exists. For certain 
philosophers * matter * exists only as an idol of the tribe. 
For science, the ^ secondary qualities ' of matter are but 
•idols of the tribe.* 

(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian 
heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology, the 
world of Swedenborg's visa et audita, etc. Each of these is 
a consistent system, with definite relations among its own 
parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality what- 
ever in the Christian heaven ; but within the classic Olym- 
pus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe 
in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not 
The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with 
these worlds of faitli — the world of the Iliad, that of King 
Lear, of the Pickivick Papers, etc.t 

* I define the scientific universe here in the radical mechanical way. 
Practically, it is oftener thought of in a mongrel way and resembles in 
more points the popular physical world. 

f It thus comes about that we can say such things as that Ivanhoe 
did not reaily marry Rebecca, as Thackeray falsely makes him do. The 
real Ivanhoe-world is the one which Scott wrote down for us. Jn that 
teorld Ivanhoe does not marry Rebecca. The objects within that world 
are knit together by perfectly definite relations, which can be affirmed 
or denied. Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn our backs on all other 


(Q Tbo TarionB worlds of individual opimou, ae uumer- 
ow u taea are. 

Ill The worldH of sheer madness aud mgary, also in- 
drfinitoly namerouH. 

Kvery object ur think of gets at lasf ivfenvd to one tcorfd or 
firt- (/ this or (y Himif mmUnr list. It settles into our be- 
an a common-sense object, a scieutitic object, an abstract 
iJMt, a mythological object, an object of some one's mis- 
u cnnceptiiiu, or a madman's object; and it reaches 
Htate sometimes immediately, but often only after be- 
hiuttl^ aud bandied about amongst other objects until 
itfitii]« Kome which will tolerate its presence and stand in 
nlstiaus to it which nothing contradicts. The molecules 
ud ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply 
bck the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to 
btT» any relations with them. But the world nf ' idols of 
tlu tjihe ' stands ready to take tliem in. Just so the world 
of classio myth takes up the winged horse ; the world of 
iBiliTiduAl hallucination, the visiou of the candle; the 
«nrld of abstract truth, the proposition that justice is 
iingly, though no actual king be just. The various worlds 
!}i<-mselveK, however, api>ear (as aforesaid) to most men's 
:uiDils in no ver^- definitely conceived relation to each 
f4iift, aud our attention, when it turns to one, is apt to 
drop the others for the time being out of its account Pro- 
|KMitioiu concemiug the different worlds are made from 
Terent points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic 
the cotiscionsness of most thinkers remains to the 
£ach world whUat if is affnuM tu is real after its own 
>u ; only the reality lapses with the attention. 


Each thinker, however, has dominant habits of atten- 
tiriD ; and these pmctically elect frmn among the veirioua 
tmrfiUt mtme one to be for kitu the tmrlii (f vltimate realitiea. 
Ftnm thia world's objects he does not appeal. Whatever 

veri^ Mid, for tbe time, ibe Ivanhoe-worlil rcmaJDB our absolute realtiy. 
Wh«a w« wake ttam the apeU, bowevcr. wc dnil a Mill more real world, 
wUcb rvduM* Irauboe, ud kit tblo^ (.■ounecied wlib lilni, to tbe Octlve 
■UUM. and RleEBlea lllem Ic aav of tlie sub-uuiTenes grouped under No. 0. 


294 P8TCH0L0OT. 

positively contradicts them mnst get into another world or 
die. The horse, e.g.y may have wings to its heart's content, 
so long as it does not pretend to be the real world's horse— 
that horse is absolutely wingless. For most men, as we shall 
immediately see, the ' things of sense ' hold this prerogative 
position, and are the absolutely real world's nucleus. Other 
things, to be sure, may be real for this man or for that — 
things of science, abstract moral relations, things of the 
Christian theology, or what not But even for the special 
man, these things are usually real with a less real reality 
than that of the things of sense. They are taken less 
seriously ; and the very utmost that can be said for any- 
one's belief in them is that it is as strong as his * belief in 
his own senses.' * 

In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows 
itself, our inveterate propensity to choice. For, in the 
strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything 
which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object, 
whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, or ob- 
ject in outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors, 
fictions, tribal beliefs, are parts of the whole great Universe 
which Gtxl has made, and He must have meant all these 
things to be in it, each in its respective place. But for us 
finite creatures, " 'tis to consider too curiously to consider 

* The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, because 
our attention then lapses from the sensible world. Conversely, when we 
wake the attention usually lapses from the dream-world and that becomes 
unreal. But if ii dream haunts us and compels our attention during the 
day it is very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort of sub- 
universe alongside of the waking world. Most people have probably had 
dreams which it is hard to imagine not to have been glimpses into an 
actually existing region of being, perhaps a comer of the ' spiritual world.' 
And dreams have accordingly in all ages been regarded as revelations, and 
have played a large part in furnishing forth mythologies and creating 
themes for faith to lay hold upon. The 'larger universe,' here, which 
helps us to believe both in the dream and in the waking reality which is 
its immediate reductive, is the tatcU universe, of Nature plu$ the Super- 
natural. The dream holds true, namely, in one half of that universe ; the 
waking perceptions in the other half. Even to-day dream-objects figure 
among the realities in which some ' psychic- researchers ' are seekhig to rouse 
our belief. All our theories, not only those about the supernatural, but 
our philosophic and scientific theories as well, are like our dreams in rous- 
ing such different degrees of belief in different minds. 



The mprp fact of appearing as au object at nil is not 

aotigb to miiKtitnte realitr. That may be metaphyttical 

llMlin, reality for God ; but what we need is practical 

l^\iy, reality for ouraelves; antl, to have that, an object 

■tuit u>>t only appear, but it must appear both infrresUng 

aiportaut. The worlds whose objects are neither in- 

urpHtiwH niir in>j>ortAnt we treat simply negatively, we 

Iniml thetn mn »nr(?nl. 

/n thf rfiative aeitsf, then, the sense in which we contrast 
rrnlily with simple unreality, and in wliich one thing is 
Mid ti> hftvi* nurre reality than another, and to lie rmire be- 
lieved, mitity mmn» simpltf Matitm to our rmi^imutl and 
(WiV li/f. This is the only sense which the word ever has 
in the months of practical men. fn this >tense, whnUver «■- 
cUfn nnti Ktimvlata our interest is real : wlieiiever an object 
Ml apiieals to as that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind 
with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for 
aiid we believe it Whenever, on the contrary, we 
Hire it, fail to c4>nHider it or act upon it, despiHe it, reject 
I forgot it, HO far it is unreal for us and disl^elieved, 
t*^'a account of the matter was then essentially correct, 
len be MAid tliat belief in anytliiu(< was simply the ha\-iug 
of it in a lively and active manner : 

\0t ttMn. that belief Is nothing but a more virid, lively, forcible. 

f eonmpUoti uf an object than the imagination alone is ever 

. It oonsUls not in the peculiar nature or order of 

tlw idnw. but 111 ihH ntanner of their i.i)it(W|)lion ami in tbi^ir /eeling to 

I' Hiind. I confm* that it i« impuuibte perfectly to iMplain Ibis fcel- 

i>: 'It manour of Minotrptlun- ... Its iruo and proper namu . . . U 

.1./', whirh i«atvrro that I'vurjoDetiifflcientlyiiiiderstAndit in common 

Ai'l Iti philoMophjr we can |[o no farther tlian asK-rt that l>elief is 

:.i. ijiri^ 'i-ll liy ilicmind, which distinguiHhett the ldi!« of tlie judg- 

■ 111 ("111) the Ootinns of the imagination.* li gi^iw them mure wnight 

an<l inftui'aii.' : makm Ihcm appmr of )rrenler importano': enforce* 

ikf^D in tlw mlnil : Rivr* them a superior inRuence on the paMioiis. and 

rr-Dil'^Tii (hrm the Kovernlng priuciplu in our actions." t 

* DlrtlnpilriiM realities frDOi uarealftiiM, the aaentlal from the nibblfthy 
■ acgleciabk. 
f lM|<ilry onnc«mln( Hum. UudentendlDg, eec. T. pL i (■lightly traiu- 
■Mi la uj qoolatlon). 

296 P8TCH0L00T 

Or as Prof. Bain puts it : "In its essential character, 
belief is a phase of our active nature — otherwise called the 
Will." * 

The object of belief, then, reality or real existence, is 
l/jh o something quite different from all the other predicates which 
^t/ a subject may possess. Those are properties intellectnallj 
/*^<^^ or sensibly intuited. When we add any one of them to the 
rAic i / ^f ffl^^^i^^^r we increase the intrinsic content of the latter, we 
11 enrich its picture in our mind. But adding reality does 

not enrich the picture in any such inward way ; it leaves i^ 
inwardly as it finds it, and only fixes it and stamps it in i^ 

** The real,'' as J^^li^ says, ** contains no more than the possible. ^ 
hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred 
sible dollars. ... By whatever, and by however many, predicates 
may think a thing, nothing is added to it if I add that the thing exist 
. . . Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, i^^* 
must always step outside of it in order to attribute to it existence.'* t 

The * stepping outside ' of it is the establishment eith^ ^ 
of immediate practical relations between it and ourselves* 
or of relations between it and other objects with which w^ 
have immediate practical relations. Relations of this sorty 
which are as yet not transcended or superseded by others^ 
are ipso facto real relations, and confer reality upon their 
objective term. Thefons et origo of aU reality, whether frof^^ 

* Note to Jas. Mill's Annlysis, i. 894. 

t Critique of Pure Reason, trans. MUller, ii. 515-17. Hume also: 
"When, after the simple conception of anything, we would coDceivc it as 
existent, we in reality make no addition to, or alteration of, our first idea. 
Thus, when we affirm that God is existent, we simply fonu the idea of 
such a being as He is represented to us ; nor is the existence which we at- 
tribute to Him conceived by a particular idea, which we join to His other 
qualities, and am again separate and distinguish from them. . . . The be- 
lief of the existence joins no new idea to those which compose the ideas of 
the object. Wiien I think of Goil, when I think of Him as ezistent, aud 
when I believe Him to be existent, my idea of Him neither increases nor 
diminishes. But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the sim- 
ple conception of the existence of an object and the belief of it, and as this 
difference lies not in the facts or compositions of the idea which we con- 
reive, it follows that it must lie in the manner in which we conceiye it.** 
(Treatise of Human Nature, pt. ni. sec. 7.) 


^^^^^^Bb or (A< practitxi! point of view, is thns eubjective, is S^J^mma 
^^^Pm^ An bare logictvl thiDkers, without emotiutial re- 'jr*^ 
odifM, WB give reality to whatever objects we tbiuk of, for (J 
ii-'v kre really pheuomena, or objects of our passiD^ 
:iii>«gtit, if uothiug more. But, <tg thinkers with emotional 
'^renction, we give what seems to im a stUl higher degree <^ ■ 
^fcsofiVy ('» ichaieDe}- things tee s^ect and emphasize and tarn 
^Wo »7Tti A vnvL. These are our living realities; and uot 
oiiIt ttie^e. Init all the other thiugs which are intimately 
connected with these. Reality, startiug from onr Ego, 
tiiUH ftlieda itself from poiut to point — first, upou all objeets 
wliich have au immediate utiiig of interest for our Ego iu 
*Iaem, and next, upon the objects most eoutiiiuoualy related 
"•^tb the*f. It only fails when the connecting thread is 
lost. A whole system may be real, if it only haiig to our 
E^o by one immediately Minging term. But what ooutra- 
4ictH any such stinging term, even though it be auother 
••tinging term itself, is either uf>t believed, or onlj- believed 
After Hettlem.^ut of the dispute. 

We reach thus the important couclnsiou that our men 
mifiVy, /Au( geiuf ^ our own life which tee ot everi/ moment pos- 
«•*, i» the fdtimate of iJtimntes for our Mief. ' As sure as I 
«xi«t! ' — this is oar uttermost warrant for the being of all 
otiior tfaingH. Ah Descartes made the indubitable reality 
of the coj/iVo g(> bail for the reality of all that tiie coyiVo iu- 
Tolred, so we all of na, feeling our own present reality with 
jibaolately nwrcive force, ascribe an all bnt eipial degree 
ol reality, fintt to whatever things wo lay hold on with a 
■ftBMe of personal need, and second, to whatever farther 
tluDKH eoutinnously beloug with these. "Mein Jet/,t und 
Hier," an Pnif. IJpps says, " ist der letzte Angelpuukt fur 
"e AVirklichkeit, also alle Erkenntniss." 
) The world of living realities as contrasted with unreali- 
H w thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active 
I emotional term.* That is the hook from which the 
t dnnglps, the absolute snpport And as from a painted 


lOD'WnM.' uacs ll, Nntlilog 
lultsi ur ulti-rlur alt^mpti lo 


298 P8TCH0L00T, 

hook it has been said that one can only hang a pamt9^ 
chain, so conversely, from a real hook only a real chaL^, 
can properly be hung. Whateoer things have ifUimaie an^^ 
continuovs connection ivith my life are things of whose redib^^ 
I cannot dovbt. Whatever things fail to establish this con-^^ 
nection are things which are practically no better for me 
than if they existed not at all. 

In certain forms of melancholic perversion of the sensi- 
bilities and reactive powers, nothing touches us intimately, 
rouses us, or wakens natural feeling. The consequence is 
the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients, 
that nothing is believed in by them as it used to be, and 
that all sense of reality is fled from life. They are sheathed 
in india-rubber ; nothing penetrates to the quick or draws 
blood, as it were. According to Griesinger, " I see, I hear !" 
such patients say, ' but the objects do not reach me, it is as 
if there were a wall between me and the outer world !*' 

'* In such patients there often is an alteration of the cutaneous sen- 
sibility. SQch that things feel indistinct or sometimes rough and woolly. 
But even were this change always present, it would not completely ex- 
plain the psychic phenomenon . . . which reminds us more of the altera- 
tion in our psychic relations to the outer world which advancing age on 
the one hand, and on the other emotions and passions, may bring about 
In childhood we feel ourselves to be closer to the world of sensible 
phenomena, we live immediately with them and in them; an intimately 
vital tie binds us and them together. But with the ripening of reflec- 
tion this tie is loosened, the warmth of our interest cools, things look 
differently to us. and we act more as foreigners to the outer world, even 
though we know it a great deal better. Joy and expansive emotions in 
general draw it nearer to us again. Everything makes a more lively 
impression, and with the quick immediate return of this warm recep^ 
tivity for sense impressions, joy makes us feel young again. In depress- 
ing emotions it is the other way. Outer things, whether living or in- 
organic, suddenly grow cold and foreign to us, and even our favorite 
objects of interest feel as if they belonged to us no more. Under these 
circumstances, receiving no longer from anything a lively impression, 
we cease to turn towards outer things, and the sense of inward loneliness 
grows upon us. . . . Where there is no strong intelligence to control this 
blas^ condition, this psychic coldness and lack of interest, the issue of 
these states in which all seems so cold and hollow, the heart dried up, 
the world grown dead and empty, is often suicide or the deeper forms 
of insanity.* 

* GriesiDger, Mental Diseases, ^g 50, 98. The neologism we so often 



fiat ti«w we ore met hy (jiieBtioiiu of detail. What dn«8 
stirriug, tluH es<;itui}f power, thk interest, cnusi^t in, 
jrb Bome objevtH have ? which art thosf; ' intimate rela- 
>■ with our life whit.h give reality V And what things 
1 in these relatione immediatelj, aoil what others are 
D closeW coDDected with the former that (in Hume's lau- 
;e) w« * carry our tlispoHition ' also on to them ? 
Id n simple and direct way these questioDs cannot be 
ati8irered at all. The whole history of human thought is 
bnt an nufiniahed attempt to answer them. For what hnve 
uvo been trying to Hud out, Hiiiee men were meu, but just 
those tkiagH: "Where do our true intereatM lie — whicli re- 
Ulii)D8 aball we call tlie intimate and real oues — which 
tkiDf^ Mhall we call liviug realities aud which not ?" A few 
paycbologicHl poiuts cau, however, be made clear. 

Afy ntalion to our mind at all, in the absence o/n sfrwiger 

wtiun, sH^ces I" vutke an ob ject re<il . The barest appeal 

'p ciar attention is euough for that. Revert to the begitv- 

^ of the chapter, and take the candle entering the vacant 

[ad. The miiul was waittng for just some such object to 

ike ita spring upon. It makes its spring and the candle 

kWlJAved. But when the candle appears at the same time 

b other objects, it niast run the gauntlet of their rivalry, 

1 then it becomes a (|nestioa which of the various caudi- 

» for attention shall compel belief. As a rule we Ife- 

B a» much as we can. We would Vielieve everj-thiug if 

i nnly cniild. When objects are represented by ns quitA 

nttftmatically they conflict bnt little with each other, 

aod the number of them which in this chaotic manner we 

ran believe is limitless, The primitive savage's mind is a- 

^inugle in which hallncinatinns, dreams, superstitions, con- 

^wptiotu. and seusible objects all flourish alongside of each 

^Hjlier, nnregulated except by the attention turning in this 

^Eltjr or iu that. The child's mind is the same. It is only 

!■ objects become permanent and their relations fixed that 

Inw, ihal *» nperleure ' ^v«e ue t reiiUting lenm ' at the tnitL of M)in« 
prepeahka or Mbcr, illuitrales Ibe dcpoudencc of Lhe mukc of reality upon 
Ontr what Mire us in ' rMlIit^.' 


discrepancies and contradictions are felt and must be set^ 
tied in some stable way. As a rule, the success with whicJ^ 
a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is pro^ 
portional to several qualities which it must possess. OC 
these the one which would be put first by most people, 
because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its — 

(1) Goerciveness over attention, or the mere power to 
possess consciousness : then follow — 

(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the 
way of exciting pleasure or pain ; 

(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to 
arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the better; 

(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admira- 
tion, desire, etc. ; 

(5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contempla- 
tion — unit}', simplicity, permanence, and the like ; 

(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal 

- These characters run into each other. Goerciveness is 
the result of liveliness or emotional interest What is lively 
and interesting stimulates eo ipso the will ; congruity holds 
of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms ; causal 
independence and importance suit a certain contemplative 
demand, etc. I will therefore abandon all attempt at a 
formal treatment, and simply proceed to make remarks in 
the most convenient order of exposition. 

As a whole, sensations are more lively and are judged 
more real than conceptions ; things met with every hour 
more real than things seen once ; attributes perceived when 
awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream. 
But, owing to the diverse relations contracted by the various 
objects tnth each other, the simple rule that the lively and 
permanent is the real is often enough disguised. A con- 
jgeived thing may be deemed more real than a certain sen- 
sible thing, if it only be intimately related to other sensible 
things more vivid, permanent, or interesting than the first 
one. Conceived molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the 
physicist judged more real than felt warmth, because so 
intimately related to all those other facts of motion in the 


world which he has made his special study. Similarly, a 
rare thing may be deemed more real than a permanent 
thing if it be more widely related to other permanent 
tilings. All the occasional crucial observations of science 
are examples of this. A rare experience, too, is likely to 
be judged more real than a permanent one, if it be more in- 
teresting and exciting. Such is the sight of Saturn through 
a telescope ; such are the occasional insights and illumi- 
nations which upset our habitual ways of thought 

But no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected 
rarity, ever displaces vind things or permanent things from 
rnir belief. A conception, to prevail, must terminate in the 
world of orderly sensible experience. A rare phenomenon, 
to displace frequent ones, must belong with others more 
frequent still. The history of science is strewn with wrecks 
and ruins of theory — essences and principles, fluids and 
forces — once fondly clung to, but found to hang together 
with no facts of sense. And exceptional phenomena solicit 
our l>elief in vain until such time as we chance to conceive 
them as of kinds already admitted to exist What science ^ * •/ 
means by * verification ' is no more than this, that no object ^^^^^^ 
of conception shall be believed which sooner or later has [/ 
not some {>ermanent and vivid object of sensation for its 
term. Compare what was said on pages 3-7, above. 

Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our 
realities. Conceived ol>Jects must show sensiUe effects or else te 
ilisMieved. And the effects, even though reduced to relative 
unreality when their causes come to view (as heat, which 
molecular \'ibrations make unreal), are yet the things on 
which our knowledge of the causes rests. Strange mutual 
de]HMidence this, in which the appearance needs the reality 
in order to exist, hut the reality needs the ap]>earance in 
order to W known ! 

SensiUe viviihwss <>r pungency is then the vital /actor in c ^ 

reality when once the conflict Itetioeen altjects, and the connecting "^^ 
r/ them together in the mimly has begun. No object which '•^^^^ 
neither possesses this vividness in its own right nor is able ^^tujt^ 
to iMirrow it from anything else hiis a chance of making 
headway against y\\\\{ rivals, or of rousing in us that re- 
action in which belief C(>nsist». On the y\y\A, objects we 

302 parcnoLOOT. 

pin^ as the saying is, our faith in all the rest ; and our 
belief returns instinctively even to those of them from 
which reflection has led it away. Witness the obduracy 
with which the popular world of colors, sounds, and snijlls 
holds its own against that of molecules and vibrations. 
Let the physicist himself but nod, like Homer, and the 
world of sense becomes his absolute reality again.* 

^j-s TViftt thingfl originally devoid of fhia Rtjypnlnting power 

should be enabled, b}' association with other things which 

have it, to compel our belief as if they had it themselves, is a 

remarkable psychological fact, which since Hume's time it 

has been impossible to overlook. 

**The vividness of the first conception," he writes, ^'diffuses itself 
along the relations and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or channels, to 
-every idea that has any communication with the primary one. . . • 
Superstitious people are fond of the relics of saints and holy men, for the 
same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to enliven 
their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of 
those exemplary lives. . . . Now, 'tis evident one of the best relics a 
devotee could procure would be the handiwork of a saint, and if bis 
clothes and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, 'tis because 
they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in 
which respect they are . . . connected with him by a shorter train of 
•consequences than any of those from which we learn the reality of his 

* The way in which sensations are pitted against systematized concep- 
tions, and in which the one or the other then prevails according as the 
sensations are felt by ourselves or merely known by report, is interestingly 
illustrated at the present day by the state of public belief about ' spiritual- 
istic ' phenomena. There exist numerous narratives of movement without 
•contact on the part of articles of furniture and other material objects, in 
the presence of certain privileged individuals called mediums. Such move- 
ment violates our memories, and the whole system of accepted physical 
'science.' Consequently those who have not seen it either brand the 
narratives immediately as lies or call the phenomena * illusions * of sense, 
produced by fraud or due to hallucination. But one who has actually seen 
such a phenomenon, under what seems to him sufficiently ' test-conditions/ 
will hold to his sensible experience through thick and thin, even though 
the whole fabric of 'science' should be rent in twain. That man would 
be a weak-spirited creature indeed who should allow any fly-blown gener- 
alities about ' the liability of the senses to be deceived ' to bully him out of 
his adhesion to what for him was an indubitable experience of sight. K 
man may err in this obstinacy, sure enough, in any particular case. But 
the spirit that animates him is that on which ultimately the very life and 
health of Science rest. 


existence. This phenomenon clearly proves that a present impression, 
with a relation of cauriation, may enliven any idea, and consequently 
produce belief or assent, according to the precedent definition of it. . . . 
It ban been remarked among the Mahometans as well as Christians 
that those pilgrims who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever 
after more faithful and zealous believers than those who have not had 
that advantage. A man whose memory presents him with a lively 
image of the Red Sea and the Desert and Jerusalem and Galilee can 
never doubt of any miraculous events which are related either by Moses 
or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy 
transition to the facts which arc supposed to have been related to them 
by contiguity, and increases the belief by increasing the vivacity of the 
conception. The remembrance of those fields and rivers has the same 
influence as a new argument. . . . The ceremonies of the Catholic 
religion may be considered as instances of the same nature. The 
devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse for the 
mummeries with which they are upbraided that they feel the good effect 
of external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their 
devotion and quickening their fervor, which otherwise would decay, 
if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out 
the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and 
render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these 
types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and 
contemplation.** * 

Hume's cases are rather tri\ial ; and the things which 
asHociated sensible objects make us believe in are supposed 
by him to l>e unreal. But all the more manifest for that is 
the fact of their psychological influence. Who does not 
'realize' more the fact of a dead or distant friend's 
existence, at the moment when a {>ortrait, letter, garment 
or <»ther material reminder of him is found? The whole 
notion of him then grows pungent and speaks to us and 
shakes us, in a manner unknown at other times. In chil- 
dren's minds, fancies and realities live side by side. But 
however lively their fancies may be, they still gain help 
from association with reality. The imaginative child 
identifies its dramntxH pernomr with some doll or other 
material object, an<l this evidently solidifies l>elief, little as 
it may resemble what it is held to stand for. A tiling not 
too interesting by its own real ({ualities generally does the 
l»eHt service here. The mc»st useful doll I ever saw was a 
large cucumber in the hands of a little Amazonian-Indian 

* Treatise of lluuiiiu Naturt- . bk. i. pt. iii. ^i*. 7 


girl; she nursed it and washed it and rocked it to sleeip^ 
a hammock, and talked to it all day long — there wa^ ^o 
part in life which the cucumber did not play. Sayi^ Hi. 
Tylor : 

^^ An imaginative child will make a dog do duty for a horse, or ^^ sol- 
dier for a shepherd, till at last the objective resemblance almost dL ^^sap- 
pears, and a bit of wood may be dragged about, resembling a shipos::* the 
sea or a coach on the road. Here the likeness of the bit of wood to a 
ship or coach is very slight indeed; but it is a thing, and can b^ m^yed 
about, . . . and is an evident assistance to the child in enabling Mt to 
arrange and develop its ideas. ... Of how much use . . . may 6e 
seen by taking it away, and leaving the child nothing to play with. ... 
In later years and among highly educated people the mental prooew 
which goes on in a child's playing with wooden soldiers and horses, 
though it never disappears, must be sought for in more complex phfr* 
nomena. Perhaps nothing in after-life more closely resembles the effect 
of a doll upon a child than the effect of the illustrations of a tale upon 
a grown reader. Here the objective resemblance is very indefinite . . . 
yet what reality is given to the scene by a good picture. . . . Mr. Back- 
house one day noticed in Van Diemen's Land a woman arranging 
several stones that were flat, oval, and about two inches wide, and 
marked in various directions with black and red lines. These, he 
learned, represented absent friends, and one larger than the rest stood 
for a fat native woman on Flinder's Island, known by the name of 
Mother Brown. Similar practices are found among far higher races 
than the ill-fated Tasmanians. Among some North American tribes a 
mother who has lost a child keeps its memory ever present to her by 
filling its cradle with black feathers and quills, and carrying it about 
with her for a year or more. When she stops anywhere, she sets up the 
cradle and talks to it as she goes about her work, just as she would 
have done if the dead body had been still alive within it. Here we have 
an image; but in Africa we find a rude doll representing the child, kept 
as a memorial. . . . Bastian saw Indian women in Peru who had lost 
an infant carrying about on their backs a wooden doll to represent it."* 

To many persons among us, photographs of lost ones 
seem to be fetishes. They, it is true, resemble ; but the 
fact that the mere materiality of the reminder is almost as 
important as its resemblance is shown by the popularity a 
hundred years ago of the black taflfeta * silhouettes ' which 
are still found among family relics, and of one of which 
Fichte could write to his affianced : * Die Farbe fehU, das 
Augefehlti es fehlt der himndische Ansdruck deiner lieblichen 

♦ Early Hist, of Mankind, p. 108. 


Z(kge ' — and yet go on worshipping it all the same. The 
opinion so stoutly professed by many, that language is es- 
sential to thought, seems to have this much of truth in it, 
that all our inward images tend invincibly to attach them- 
selves to something sensible, so as to gain in corporeity and 
life. Words serve this purpose, gestures serve it, stones, 
straws, chalk-marks, anything will do. As soon as anyone 
of these things stands for the idea, the latter seems to be 
more reaL Some persons, the present writer among the 
number, can hardly lecture without a black-board : the ab- 
stract conceptions must be symbolized by letters, squares 
or circles, and the relations between them by lines. All 
this symbolism, linguistic, graphic, and dramatic, has other 
uses too, for it abridges thought and fixes terms. But one 
of its uses is surely to rouse the believing reaction and give 
to the ideas a more living reality. As, when we are told a 
story, and shown the very knife that did the murder, the 
Tery ring whose hiding-place the clairvoyant revealed, the 
whole thing passes from fairy-land to mother-earth, so here 
we believe all the more, if only we see that ' the bricks are 
alive to tell the tale.' 

So much for the prerogative position of sensations in 
regard to our belief. But among the sensations themselves 
all are not deemed equally real. The more practically 
important ones, the more permanent ones, and the more ^Ql^^jAjm 
aesthetically apprehensible ones are selected from the mass, ^ ji^^ 
to be l)elieved in most of all ; the others are degraded to -^^^ * ^^ 
the position of mere signs and suggestions of these. This 
fact has already been adverted to in former chapters.* 
The real color of a thing is that one color-sensation which 
it gives us when most favorably lighted for vision. So 
of its real size, its real shape, etc. — these are but optical 
sensations selected out of thousands of others, because 
they have aesthetic characteristics which appeal to our 
convenience or delight But I will not repeat what I have 
already written about this matter, but pass on to our 
treatment of tactile and muscular sensations, as ' primary 

• See Vol. I. pp. 2e5-«; Vol II. pp. 387 fl. 


qualities/ more real than those ' secondar}' ' qualities wbich 
eye and ear and nose reveal. W hy do we thus so markedly 
select thft tangible to hft the real ? Our motives are not far 

to seek. The tangible qualities are the least fluctuating. 
J When we get them at all we get them the same. The oiher 
J q nalitiftfl fluctuate enormousl}' as our relative position to 
^^*^he object changes. Then, more decisive still, the tactile 
^ properties are those most intimately- connected with out 
weal or woe. A dagger hurts us onlj' when in contact with 
our skin, a poison only when we take it into our monthft^ 
and we can only use an object for our advantage when we 
have it in our muscular control. It is as tangibles, theiv 
that things concern us most ; and the other senses, so {ax* 
as their practical use goes, do but warn us of what tangi- 
ble things to expect They are but organs of anticipa- 
tory touch, as Berkeley has with perfect clearness ex- 

Among all sensations, the most belief -compelling are 
those productive of pleasure or of pain. Locke expressly 
makes the pteasure- or |xitn-giving quality to be the ultimate 
human criterion of anything's reality. Discussing (with a 
supposed Berkeleyan before Berkeley) the notion that all 
our perceptions may be but a dream, he says : 

^^ He may please to dream that I make him this answer . . . that I 
believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of 
being in the fire and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to 
appear so sceptical as to maintain that what I call being actually in the 
Are is nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know 
that any such thing as fire actually exists without us, I answer that we, 
certainly finding that pleasure or pain [or emotion of any sort] follows 
upon the application of certain objects to us, whoso existence we per- 
ceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses, this certainly is cu great 
as oil r happiness or misery^ beyond which we have no coneemment to 
know or to be/'f 

♦ See Theory of VUion, § 59. 

t Essay, bk. iv. chap. 2. g 14. In auother place: "He that sees a 
candle burning and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting 
his finger into it, will little doubt that this is something existing without 
him, which does him harm and puts him to great pain. . . . And if our 
dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing beat of a glass famace be 
barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy by putting his 
hand into it. he may, perhaps, be awakened into a certainty greater than 


Th* qoalitv of arotiHtng emotion, of Hliaking, niovutf; U! 
friBtitilig 118 to actinu, has as much to do with our belief ii 
Dolijtvt'K n^lity an the quality of giiing pleitsure (tr [xiin. y 
a t'liBptcr XSXV' I shall ttevk t(j show that our etnotiouH | ^ 
Jiljr owe their ]iupgeat quality to the bodily t^eusatioua \_fl 
■boil th*y involve. Our tf iidoucy to believe in emotioually ^^^ 
I «intiiig object* (objectB of fear, desire, etc.) is thus es- ^ 

]>Uiii»i] withoat resortiug to any fuudaiiieutally new priu- 
(ipli; of rhoii-u. Si>eakiag Renerally, the more a coufeived 
"liji-L-t emtev UH, the more reality it ha». The »anie object 
"it-iiM UH iliffeK-ntly at different timeH. Moral and religious 
Imtlix (-*>mc> ' liotDi^ ' to us far more on some ocoasioun than 
"a i-llieni. Ah EmortKtu saj's, " There is a difference between 
■de and another hoar of life in their authority and subse- 
'jutnl effvc'L Our faith comes in moments, . . . yet there 
^ ailejith in those brief moments which constrains us to 
k-tibft wore reality to them than to all other experiences." 
'df^th' is partly, uo doubt, the insight into wider aytt-fi, 
«of unified relation, bat far more often than that it i8(-| 
«iMnntioual thrilL Thus, to descend to more tri^'ial ex- ^ 
EspW, a man who hivs no belief in ghosts by daylight will 
mporarily believe iu them when, alone at midnight, he 
wla his bloi^l rurdle at a myst«riouH sound or visiou, his 
t thatnpiug, und his legs impelled to l]ee. The thought 
t falling when wo walk along a carbtitoac awakens un emo- 
a of (Ireail ; so uo wuse of reality attacheH to it, and we 
B Sim we slmll not fall. Ou a precipice's edge, however, 
e sickening emotion which the notion of a possible fall 
uilers makes as believe in the latter's imminent reality, 
i quite unStii lu U> proceed. 

ba tuHld wUb, Umi It b lonielbiDg more Uun iMTv Imaginallna. So tlinl 
llwnidcnco bugn«t Mwo<mii ilctlrc, bciug uccrlaiD Uius uoiir p1i->s- 
nt* or p«ln. Le. happItiBHOr ml«ery; beyond wLieh we Imvc aa oonc^rn- 
■Mil. dUwr of knowlodan or being. Such ui uximuor i>f the eiittrQcv 
of Utlas* wltboiit ii» h mifTlclrnt to direri ur Iu the atMiiibg Ibe g<M»i atid 
«n>Uliif thr evil which U cBiiacd bj- Ihcin. which U the Iraporlaiil ron- 
nnuBMit we bar* at being made w^quainlcd with them." {Hid. bk. iv. 



The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability 
to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting 
idea. To give this power is the highest result of education. 
In untutored minds the power does not exist. Every excit- 
ing thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To 
conceive with passion is eo ipso to affirm. As Bagehot says : 

**The Caliph Omar burnt the Alexandrian Library, saying: *AD 
books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous. All which 
contain what is in it are useless I ^ Probably no one ever had an inteoser 
belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to 
imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the 
Koran, and in the sufficiency of the Koran, probably came to him in 
spontaneous rushes of emotion ; there may have been little vestiges of 
argument floating here and there, but they did not justify the strength 
of the emotion, still less did they create it, and they hardly even excused 
it. . . . Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined, convictioii 
will be found to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one 
most closely connected with the bodily state, . . . accompanied or pre- 
ceded by the sensation that Scott makes his seer describe as the prelude 
of a prophecy : 

* At length the fatal answer came, 
In characters of living flame — 
Not spoke iu words, nor blazed in scroll, 
But borne and branded on my soul.' 

A hot flash seems to burn across the brain. Men in these intense states 
of mind have altered all history, changed for better or worse the creed 
of myriads, and desolated or redeemed provinces or ages. Nor is this 
^^ •-*- intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in those points in 
which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his anti- 
Catholicism ; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I 
suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it." * 

The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily com- 
motion which the exciting idea sets up. * Nothing which 
I can feel like that can be false.' All our religious and 
supernatural beliefs are of this order. The surest warrant 
for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our dear 
ones ; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no 
such Providence or help. So of our political or pecuniary 
hopes and fears, and things and persons dreaded and 


* W. Bagehot, 'The Emotion of Conviction,* Literary Studies, l 


" A grocor has a full creed as to forPign policy, 

; lad)' a complete theory' of the »acraiiieut8, as b) 

lirh aeitb^r bar* auy doal>t. ... A girl iu a conntrj' ]>ar- 

B will be sure tbat Paris never fan be takeu, or tliat 

•larck ui a wretch" — all becauMe they have either cou- 

1 thetM' thing:4 »t some luoiuent with passioD, or asHo- 

ttted them with other things Vi-hi<.-h they have conceived 

nib piuuiion. 

M. R^DODvier calls this l>elie{ of & thing (or uo other 

Ireuon than that we conceive it with passion, by the name 

m! atndal veriigo* Other objects whisper doubt or dis- 

I Wiff; but the object of passion makes us deaf to all but 

iwlf, and we affirm it unhesitatingly. 8ucb objects are the 

iManiona of insanity, which the insane person can at odd 

DinuwDtN steady himself against, but which again return to 

a«Mp liini off his feet. Such are the revelations of m3-sti- 

fiffln. Sncb, particularly, are the sudden beliefs which ani-\ 

Qute mobH of men when frenzied impulse to action is 

iuTnlred. Whatever l>e the action in point— whether the 

*tniiiag of a prophet, the hailing of a conqueror, the buru- 

ioK of a witch, the baiting of a heretic or Jew, the starting 

"f a (orlora h<>|ie, or the flying from a foe — the fact that tti 

belit-vp a i-ertain object will cause that actum to explotle is a 

I fuffiriaut reoHou for that belief to come. The motor im- 

^ft pnlae KweopH it unresisting iu its train. 

^H The whole history of witchcraft and early medicine is 

^rk ("mmentary on the facility with which anything wbicli 

[ rJuncejt to bo conceived is believed the moment the belief 

I'liimfttin with an emotional mood. 'The cause of sickness?' 

^lirn a aavage asks the cause of anything he means to ask 

"wlnsivtfly ' What is U* blame?" The theoretic curiosity 

«l«rts from the practical life's demands. I^et some one then 

"poiiw a necromancer, suggest a charm or sjwll which has 

l*rn eiutt, and no wore 'evidence' is asked for. What evi- 

"^ncv is rmjuired beyond this iutimatf sense of the culprit's 

f^^NiDiiihility, to which our very viscera and limbs reply '?t 

Ptydiotogtc KsiloDDtllc. cli 12. 
\ Two riamplM oat nf ■ lboui«U)<l : 

lM|Ulry, rb.ll.KB. ''I reiiiembrr, nun)' yean kgo. ■ wbllc ox 
lolo Uw tounlrj, of mi «a(iruii>ii« nizt iIibI jHwpIc aiiiic taimy 

310 P8YCH0L0OT. 

Human credulity in the way of therapeutics has similar 
psychological roots. If there is anything intolerable (espe- 
cially to the heart of a woman), it is to do nothing when a 

miles to see him. There happened, some months after, an uncommon 
fatality among women in child-bearing. Two such uncommon eyents, fol- 
lowing one another, gave a suspicion of their connection, and occasioned 
a common opinion among the country people that the white ox was the 
cause of this fatality. " 

U. M. Stanley, Through the Dark Ck)ntinent, ii. 888 : "On the third 
day of our stay at Mowa, feeling quite comfortable amongst the people, on 
account of their friendly bearing, I began to write in my note-book the 
terms for articles, in order to improve my already copious vocabulary of 
native words. I had proceeded only a few minutes when I observed a 
strange commotion amongst the people who had been flocking about me, 
and presently they ran away. In a short time we heard war-cries ringing 
loudly and shrilly over the table-land. Two hours afterwards a long line 
of warriors were seen descending the table-land and advancing toward* 
our camp. There may have been between five and six hundred of than. 
We, on the other hand, bad made but few preparations except such aa 
would justify us replying to them in the event of the actual oonunence* 
ment of hostilities. But I had made many Arm friends among them, and 
I firmly believed that I should be able to avert an open rupture. When 
they had assembled at about a hundred yards in front of our camp, Safeni 
and I walked up towards them and sat down midway. Some half-dozen 
of the Mowa people came near, and the shauri began. 

" * What is the matter, my friends? ' I asked. ' Why do you come 
with guns in your hands, in such numbers, as though you were coming^ 
to fight ? Fight ? fight us, your f nends ! Tut I this is some great mis- 
take, surely.' 

"Mundele,' replied one of them, . . . *our people saw you yesterday 
make marks on some tara-tara [paper]. This is very bad. Oar country 
will waste, our goats will die, our bananas will rot, and our women will 
dry up. What have we done to you that you should wish to kill us ? 
We have sold you food and we have brought you wine each day. Your 
people are allowed to wander where they please without trouble. Why is 
the Mundele so wicked? We have gathered together to fight 3'ou if you 
do not burn that tara-tara now before our eyes. If you bum it we go 
away, and shall be your friends as heretofore.' 

"I told them to rest there, and left Safeni in their hands as a pledge 
that I should return. My tent was not fifty yards from the spot, but 
while going towards it my brain was busy in devising some plan to foil 
this superstitious madness. My note-book contained a vast number of val- 
uable notes. ... I could not sarritice it to the childish caprice of savagea. 
As I was rummaging my book-box, I came across a volume of Shakespeare 
[Cbandos edition] much worn, and well thumbed, and which was of the 
same size as my field-book ; its cover was similar also, and it might be 
passed for the field-book, provided that no one remembered its appearance 


s ttirk € 

I pam. 

To ilo 

.njtliing i 

- relief. 

Aeconiinglj', whatever remedy may be suggeati 
"D ii)j«iumabl« aoil. Tlie uiml makes its npriug towards 
.icdoQ III) tliat (.'tM-, Keudri for tLat remedy, and for a day at 
IrMt believes tlie iliuiger past. Blame, dread, and hope are 
UiUfi the great belief-iuspirittg piiHsiouB, and cover among 
tliem the futare, the present, and the past. 

Tli)?»c rvuiarks illustrate the earlier heads of the list on > 
I <*^ 21*2. Whichever represented objects give ns^eusa- 
&*«, especially interesting ones, or'incite our motor im- /^ 
tahteti, or arouse ounliate, desire, or fear, are real enough ''*'* 
for lu. Oar reqnirements in the wajof reality terunnate in 
cor own acta antl emotiouH, oiir own pleasures and pains. 
Tl)<^s« «ro the ultimaUi fixities from which, au we formerly 
"iMervvd, the whole chain of our beliefs depends, object 
Imifiing to object, as the bees, in swarming, haug to each 
otb«r uutil, lie pnxhe eii procke, the supporting branch, the 
&eU, i» reachetl and held. 


Sow the merely conceived or imagined objects which 
our mind represents as hanging to the sensations (causing 
tlwat, etc. I, filUiig the gaps lietween them, and weaving their 
•Mermpted chaos into order are innumerable. Whole sys- 

t of them conflict with other systems, and our choice of 

IM vetl. 1 look it lo Uiem. ' U tliU Uio Uraiani. frieutls, iLnl you wish 

" ■ Y«», yr«. thnl U ll. ' 
*' ' Wall, ukr U, uid bum it. or keep It.' 
r "M-n- Nu, DO, no. We will doI tuuili it It i« TetbL. You mutt 

|[ "'It Will.Mltbnio. I will tInauythJngloplFiuH! iny goodrricDda 


" Wr wklknl Ui tlie nnrml Are. I lirvftlhctl a rpgrelftil fartrwel) to my 
(taU oaarpBnloD. wbirli. iliiriog my mftoy weary houra of Dight. had 
««Im*4 lo reline my iiilu<l wtwti opprHwed liy almost iDlolrratile wom, 
■ad tbni fT«T«I]^ dimlpifil ilic Innoct'iii Slixk^p^are lo ibe Biuiica, hmp- 
tag lb* bniah lxit\ nvrr ll wllli cerrmnnioiis nare. 

'" A b-li,' bmthpd Ihcpnor Uclitdpil nallvMBlgliins Itielr rEli)?r . . . 
'Tbcre b nn Iruuble niiw.' . . . Auil tomi-tlilDg Kppnwcblug to a cbe«r 
*m tkiRilcd naang Hwrn, wlikb i«rml[Ml«d tbc episode o( ibe burntag of 

312 P8YCH0L0G7. 

which system shall carry our belief is governed by princi- 
ples which are simple enough, however subtle and diifficnlt 
may be their application to details. The conceived systtfii, to 
pass for true, must at hast indvde the reality of the sensOit 
objects in it, by explaining theni as effects on us^ if nothing more. 
The system which includes the most of them, and definitdy ex- 
plains or pretends to explain the most of them, will, ceteris 
paribus, prevail. It is needless to say how far mankind still 
is from having excogitated such a system. But the various 
materialisms, idealisms, and hylozoisms show with what in- 
dustry the attempt is forever made. It is conceivable that 
several rival theories should equally well include the actual 
order of our sensations in their scheme, much as the one- 
fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity formulated all the 
common electrical phenomena equally well. The sciences 
are full of these alternatives. Which theory is then to be 
believed? That theory tvHl be most generally believed which, 
besides offerivjg us objects able to aocount satisfactorily for our 
sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting, 
those which appeal most urgently to our (esthetic, emotional, and 
active needs. So here, in the higher intellectual life, the 
same selection among general conceptions goes on which 
went on among the sensations themselves. First, a word 
of their relation to our emotional and active needs — and 
here I can do no better than quote from an article pub- 
lished some years ago :* 

** A philosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either 
of two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, ita ulti- 
mate principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints 
our dearest desires and mast cherished powers. A pessimistic principle 
like Schopenhauer's incurably vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann's 
wicked jack-at-all-trades, the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth 
essays at other philosophies. Incompatibility of the future with their 
desires and active tendencies is, in fact, to most men a source of more 
fixed disquietude than uncertainty itself. Witness the attempts to 
overcome the * problem of evil/ the ' mystery of pain.* There is no 
problem of *good.' 

'' But a second and woi*se defect in a philosophy than that of con- 
tradicting our active propensities is to give them no Object whatever 

* 'Rationality. Activity, [and Faith' (Princeton Review, July 1883, 
pp. 64-9). 


.L.TUiist, A philosoph.-' whose iirincipic is so ineoraraensnrate 

riiii«t imimnte potrnrs t^ to duny Ihem all relevancy in uoiver- 

A& lo Hnoiliilatfl thoJT motives nt one blow, will be even more 

. >r '.luui prsjaiiniflin. Better face the enemy than the eternal 

. ! 14 IS why awtvmliBm will always fail of univental aduptiuu, 

»<-ll it may fiue thing* into an atomielic unity, howtTer 

' mny pmphesy the futuitt eternity. Fur mnteriiilism denies 

"' <i ii [<< iliv ubJet'tH of almost all the impulses which we moet churish. 

-hi :,.■,) iinanirigot thr Impulses, it says, is loniulhing which has no 

'^j UiLiial interest for ua whatever. But what is CHlled extradition Is 

Suiiraiotianotcristlcofourcinotloiw Its of our sense. Both point to an 

Ub>wt m* the cnuM) of the present feeling. What an intensely objective 

f*tereovv \in in fww : In like maimer an enraptured man, a drmr}*- 

ibeltBS <■*"'• '"^ "'^^ simply aware of tfacir subjective states ; if they 

fttH«. tbe foiee ot their feelings would evaporate. Both iN'lievo there 

4a anlmud canar vAy they should feel as they do : either ' It is a glad 

iPOt I d * bow good is life !' or ' What a loathsome tedium isi-xistenco I' 

Abj pbiloaopby which annibilatee the validity of the reference by ex- 

plMDtnK away li» objecbt or translatiug them into terms of no emo- 

ttonal ptTtinency leaves tho mind with little to care or act for. This 

la tb* oppoaite condition from tliat of nightmare, but when acutely 

IwoDcht home to onnsclonsneM it pmdticns a kindred horror. In nighl- 

Bwr* wc bave mollvea to act, but no power : bore we have powers, but 

tko imtlvai. A nameloM Unheimtiehkttt comes over us at the thought 

of Ibm bvltig nothing eternal in our final puriioses. in the nbjccta of 

tbtMC loTwand lupinKiDiM which are our deepest energies. TIte mon- 

«tn>iMly lupfllded equation of the iinivenc and lis knower, which we 

IMMtaUlr » the idi.*al of cognition, is perfectly paralleled by tbe no leas 

VafKldcd equation of the univcrM and the doer. We demand In it a 

dk«raKl«r fur which our emotions and active propensKles shall be a 

natdL Small »> wc are, minute as Is the point by which the Cosmos 

impini«* u|iOD each one of us. each one desires to feci that his reaction 

at ibal potni i» congruous with the demands of the vast whole, that ho 

a (ho latter, so to npeak. and is able to do what it expeclK of 

But aahiA abilities to *do' lie wholly In the line of his naliiral 

: as he cnjoj-a reaction with such emotions ns fortitude. 

bopr, rapinn!, admiration. eammtncMi. and the hke: and as he very 

oDwllliiigly rcnciR with fear, disgust, despair, or doubt, —a philosophy 

whiefa abould legitiinale only emotions uf the latter son would be sun 

to leavv ttie mind a iinty to discontent and craving. 

" It la far too little reoognised how entirely the iiiivllmt is built np 
<A ptkcUesl lutereata. The tluiory ul Kvolution is beginnmg to do very 
tioAmnhne by it« reduction of all men tulity to tbetyfie of reHnx action. 
i-'<jfiiitian, m tbia view, is bui a Heeling moment, a i-ross-seclion at a l 
i;?naln puint of what In ita totality is n motor phenomenon. In the \. 
lower forma of life no one will pretend that cognition in aoyihiug moru V" 
Uhb a fuldu to appropriate action. Tbe germinal que^^iiun eoiicv>miag 


314 psrcHOLoojr, 


things 'brought for the first time before; consciousness is not the theo- 
retic * What is that ?' but the practical A Who goes there? ' or rather, as 
Horwicz has admirably put it, ' What 'h^ to be done?' — * Was fang* ich 
anf^ in all our discussions about the intelligence of lower animals the 
only te&c we use is that of their acting as if for a purpose. Ck)gnitioQ, 
V in short, is incomplete until discharged in act. And although it is true 
that the iater mental development, which attains its maximum through 
the hypertrophied cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of 
theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately ministerial 
to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not effaced, and the 
active nature asserts its rights to the end. 

*' If there be any truth at all in this view, it follows that however 
vaguely a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum, he can- 
not be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest 
degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude towards it should 
be of one sort rather than another. He who says, ' Life is real, life ]& 
earnest,* however much he may speak of the fundamental mysterious- 
ness of things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by 
ascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called 
seriousness, which means the willingness to live with energy, though 
energy bring pain. The same is true of him who says that all is vanity. 
Indefinable as the predicate vanity may be in se^ it is clearly enough 
something which permits ansBsthesia, mere escape from suffering, to be 
our rule of life. There is no more ludicrous incongruity than for 
agnostics to proclaim with one breath that the substance of things ia 
unknowable, and with the next that the thought of it should inspire us 
with admiration of its glory, reverence, and a willingness to add our co- 
operative push in the direction towards which its manifestAtions seem 
to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make 
such distinct demands upon our activity, we surely are not ignorant of 
its essential quality. 

'^ If we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great 
periods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, 
we shall find, I think, simply this : that each and all of them have said 
to the human being, * The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to 
powers which you possess.' In what did the emancipating message of 
primitive Christianity consist, but in the announcement that Grod rec- 
ognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely 
overlooked ? Take repentance : the man who can do nothing rightly can 
at least repent of his failures. But for pjiganism this faculty of re- 
pentance was a pure su|)ernumerary, a straggler too late for the fair. 
Christianity took it and made it the one power within us which appealed 
straight to the heart of God. And after the night of the Middle Ages 
had so long branded with oblo(juy even the generous impulses of the flesh, 
and defined the Reality to be such that only slavish natures could com- 
mune with it, in what did the JSursum corda! of the Renaissance lie 
but in the proclamation that the archetype of verity in things laid claim 



n \bt whbist aeilTlly of our whole ie8lhi>iic bcJDg? What irere 

■iibrr"« oiisxinn nnrf Wraley's but Rpi>cnls to powirs which even the 

'"■anrkt nf mm might carry with Ihcm. f»i(h aud si-lf-despair, but 

* iijrb sent p«nnnal. r«ifiiiriiig uo priestly iiitermediBtiou, And which 

i>«^t thdi umuer ianx to Uux with Uod ! ff liat unused the wild-lire 

-'fl(WDc« of RouM^iiu hut the assurance he gave Ihnt man's nature 

•■< tn ImnDon; with the nntureof thintiB, if only the paralyzing cor- 

'YqitiaBii of enstam wnnld 8tnnd from between? How did Kant and 

VMitr, bfNtthe and fichliler. inspire their time with cheer, except by 

^ving, * Uie all your powers ; that ii» ibR only obedience which the uni- 

«-«n»«ucU'l And Carlyle with bis gospel of Work, uf Fact, of Ve- 

nwilj, buw doM he moie lu except by saying tbnt the universe imposes 

as taaJtc Bpnn as but such as the most humble can perform i Emerson's 

fad that ererything that ever was or will be Is here iu the envflopmg 
* : that man hns but fi o)>ey himself—' He who will rest in what ho 
b a |iart nf I>e«tiTiy '—is in like manner nothing but an exorcism of 
■cv^ktlsm aa to the perlinnocy uf one's natural faculties. 
'* Id • word, * tion of Man. »tni»i upon Oig fut and I will speak 
WHO the« I ' ia the only revelation of truth lo which the solving ppocha 
hsw bolped the diswiplr. But that has been enough to sjiilsfy the 
t»iam part of bis rational need. In trandpff-M the universal eaaeticfl 
baa hardly lirrn mori' dvlln^d by any of these fomiulie than by the 
annuatio x; bat Ibo taere sssnrance that my powers, such as they are^ 
■it> not irrrie^aut to it. but p«rtin«nt, that it epvaks to them and will 
b) wine w»y recognize thnr reply, that I can be n match for it it 1 will, 
aad not a foolleaa waif, suffices to make it rational to my feeling in the 
wWr giren above. Nothing could be more absurd than to hope for the 
deAnitive triumph uf any philosophy which should refuae to legitimate, 
and to legitimate in an t-mphatic manner, the more powerful of our 
«BMiati*l and practical tendeticim. Fatalism, whose solving word in 
allrnaraaf bebi^rioria ' All striving Is vain,' will never reign supreme, 
for U>o impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible Id the race. 
Kond creed* wliich speak to that impulse will bo wideJy successful m 
ipiie of incDDalftency. vagueneen, and shadowy determination ul Cxpec- 
taey. M&D needs a nde for bis will, and will invent one if one be not 

r tlie eraotton&l and active Deeds oome the intellec- 

il Mod KBtlwtic oueiL The two great aesthetic- principles, 

JuMSH Mid ol ense, ilominitte our intelle<.'tual as well 

r MDmotui lile. And, txtrrin purilmn, no sratem vhicli 

■aid not Im rich, Hiiap]e, and haroionious would have a 

loce of bainjt choMn tor belief, if rieh, simple, aud har- 

nioQB ^BtetDfl wctf uUo there. Into the latt(^^ we ahonid 

■itotinglj settle, with that welcoming atUttide of the will 


316 ParCHOLOGY. 

in which belief consists. To quote from a remarkable 
book : 

*^This law that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum 
of complexity and to the maximum of definiteness, is of great impor- 
tance for all our knowledge. . . . Our own activity of attention will thus 
determine what we are to know and what we are to believe. If things 
have more than a certain complexity, not only will our limited powers 
of attention forbid us to unravel this complexity, but we shall strongly 
desire to believe the things much simpler than they are. For our 
thoughts about them will have a constant tendency to become as simple 
and definite as possible. Put a man into a perfect chaos of phenomena 
— sounds, sights, feelings — and if the man continued to exist, and to 
be rational at all, his attention would doubtless soon find for him away 
to make up some kind of rhythmic regularity, which he would impute 
to the things about him, so as to imagine that he bad discovered some 
laws of sequence in this mad new world. And thus, in every case 
where we fancy ourselves sure of a simple law of Nature, we must re- 
member that a great deal of the fancied simplicity may be due, in the 
given case, not to Nature, but to the ineradicable prejudice of oar own 
minds in favor of regularity and simplicity. All our thoughts are de- 
termined, in great measure, by this law of least efifort, as it is found 
exemplified in our activity of attention. . . . The aim of the whole 
process seems to be to reach as complete and united a conception of 
reality as possible, a conception wherein the greatest fulness of data 
shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of conception. The effort 
of consciousness seems to be to combine the greatest richness of content 
with the greatest definiteness of organization."* 

The richness is got by including all the facts of sense 
in the scheme ; the simplicity, by deducing them out of the 
smallest possible number of permanent and independent 
primordial entities : the definite organization, by assimi- 
lating these latter to ideal objects between which relations 
of an inwardly rational sort obtain. "What these ideal ob- 
jects and rational relations are will require a separate 
chapter to show.t Meanwhile, enough has surely been said 
to justify the assertion made above that no general offhand 
answer can be given as to which objects mankind shall 
choose as its realities. The fight is still under way. Our 
minds are yet chaotic ; and at best we make a mixture and 

♦ J. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Phil^wphy (Boston, 18S5), pp. 

t Chapter XXVII. 



* c^om promise, as we yield to the claim of this interest or 
tbat, uui follow first ou» aud tlieii tuintber priuoiple in 
'^rn. It is nndeuiiibly true that materialistic, or so-called 
-oientiiic,' conceptions of the universe Iiavo so far gratified 
iif parelr int<>]lectuHl interests more than the mere seuti- 
'uvuut conceptions have. But, on the other hand, as 
%lrftad_v remarked, thev leave the enmtioual and active 
iciterest« cold. The perfect ohjeet of hefief ivotild be a God or 
' Soul of ihr. Worid,' represented both optimistitxiRy ami morcd- 
i^ticaBff (if gitch a condnnafhn could be), and wifhcd so defi- 
»M]f cofuxivfd as to show us why our phenomenal expertejtces 
*V>nM At »nd to its by Him injmt the very tvay in which fhey 
ft>Mv. All Science and all History would thus be acoonnted 
for in the deepest and simplest fashion. The very room in 
which I t(it, its sensible walls aud floor, and the feeling the 
■ir and fire within it give me, no less than the 'scientific ' 
'ptions which I am nrged to frame concerning the 
il^ of existence of all these phenomena when my back is 
i«l. would then all be corro!»nrated, not de-realized, by 
ultimate principle of my belief. The World-soul sends 
jtut those phenomena in order that I may react upon 
and among the reactions is the intellectual one of 
loing these conceptinus. What is beyond the crude 
riences is not an nllerjiattve to them, but something 
mtan8 them for me here and now. It is safe to say 
it ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated, 
■Mauktnd will drop all other sj'stems and cling to that one 
alone as rt-al. Meanwhile the other systems coexist with 
tfa« attemptH at that one, and, all being alike fragmentary, 
ti baa its little Hudience aud day. 

I have now, I trust, shown snfliciently what the psycho- 

Roarces of the sense of realityare. Certain postulates 

giren in our nature ; and whatever satisfies those pos- 

kl«8 is treated as if real.* I might therefore liuish the 



Prat Hujrcc pula this w«ll lu iJUctmlii^ Iduulisui uiil die tmlityuf ui 
world ■■ I( lb* hisiory of popular spoculsl Ion on Ibcuc topica 
ODoM be writlcii, bow mtirb of rowanlirp aniJ siiuQI lag would )>« found In 
Um beb«lioT o[ Ibc nstunl niiuti befoiv llic queatioD. ' How doai Ibou 
kM>«(if UI «al«rtial Rslllyi' ItmUiid of BSnipl; aiid pUiuIy noawuriiig; 
*l ■w by tlw«xt«Iiikl world In the IIr«L place sometbiDg ibat I kccepl 



chapter here, were it not that a few additional words w^^ " 
set the truth in a still clearer light 


There is hardly a common man who (if consalte< 
would not say that things come to us in the first instani 
as ideas; and that if we take them for realities, it is becauf 
we add something to them, namely, the predicate of havin^^i^ 
also * real existence outside of our thought.* This notion thatft 
a higher faculty than the mere having of a conscious con-* 
tent is needed to make us know anything real by its mean» 
has pervaded psychology from the earliest times, and is the 
tradition of Scholasticism, Kantism, and Common-sense. 
Just as sensations must come as inward affections and then 
be ' extradited ; ' as objects of memory must appear at first 
as presently unrealities, and subsequently be 'projected' 
backwards as past realities ; so conceptions must be entia 
rationis till a higher faculty uses them as windows to look 
beyond the ego, into the real er^ra-mental world ; — so runs 
the orthodox and popular account. 

And there is no question that this is a true account of 
the way in which many of our later beliefs come to pass. 
The logical distinction between the bare thought of an object 
and belief in the object's reality is often a chronological 
distinction as well. The having and the crediting of an 

or demand, that I posit, postulate, actively construct on the basis of sense- 
data/ the natural man givc;|9 us all kinds of vague compromise answers. . . . 

Where shall these endless turnings and twistings have an end? All 

these lesser motives are appealed to. and the one ultimate motive is 
J neglected. The ultimate motive with the man of everj'-day life is the will 
I to harf an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will 
( persist in spontaneously adding the thought: * But there shall be something 
beyond this.' . . . The popular assurance of an external world is ihefijud 
determinatitm to moAf one, now and henceforth." (Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy, p. 804 — the italics are my own.) This immixture of the will 
appears most tlagrantly in the fact that although external matter is 
doubted commonly enough, minds external to our own are never doubted. 
We neeil them too much, are too essentially social to dispense with them. 
Semblances of matter may sufllce to react upon, but not semblances of 
communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery of our 
wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously entertained.— 
Chapters ix and x of Pn>f. Royce's work are on the whole the clearest 
account of the psychology of l>elief w ith which I am acquainted. 


alwAjH coalesce ; for often we fir»t ^lappose and 

re ; first play with the notion, frame the hvpoth 

then affirm the existeuce, of «u object of thought. 

il we ar*> (|iiit« coBHcioiin of the KUccesttiou of the two 

tiU atfts. But the«e coses are noup of tlieni primUivf 

»uv*. Tln'v only occnr in inintls long schooleil to iloubt 

'■ ■ V the contradictioUB of experience. The primilive imptihf 

' tn affirm immediatrly (he reality of nil that is cononiwl.* 

W'hfn we iln lioiiht, however, in what iloes the Kuhi^equeiit 

ri-m>latinn of the doubt cousiHt? It either cousinta in a 

jinrely Terbal jjerformauce, the coupling of the adjecUves 

fai ' fir ' cmtwardly exiHting ' (as predicates) to the thing 

ni^iuAlly conceived (tut snbject) : or it consist'^ in the per- 

-prion in the given case of that /or which these adjectives, ftb- 

-tniolr*! fmm other Himilar concrete oases, etaml. But what 

i.iiMt adj<>ctivftt Htund for. we now know weH. They stand 

1 itirtaiu relations (immediate, or through intermediaries) 

ii» onrselves. Whatever concrete objects have hitherto stood 

in th<MW> relations have been for ns * real,' ' outwardly exist- 

iai;.' 8e» that when we now abxtraotly admit a thing to be 

' (without perhaps going through any definite percep- 

u 1 

leading fkct In Belief, according to my view of li, Is am Prlmj- 
Clrdnlliy. We bt-gln by hcllevibg cTerythitig ; whateTcr U, is ime. 
. . . Tkc Milmal bum in lli« tnoming of n summer day proceeiU upon Ihe 
f*n Hf daylight: auumM the perpotiilly of ILat tact. Whatever it la 
ilI*|UHi) to do. It di>nt wiUioiit uiiagiviogs. If Id ibe DDorDing U Ik^ii a 
fa«ml ot Ofmliotu continuing for lumr^, under the full benefit of day- 
H|ht. Rirmld uoliesilatlDgty Irrgln the name round In Uie evening, lu 
«aM of ulad la pnctleally uoc of unbounded confldence : but. as yel. il 
doci not nnderetaad wLat conlldencc ineaUH. 

"ThtpTkllneawunDrelHMjou inci by check*: a disagreeable experience 
hMMllg 10 Wt insight. To be thwartcl and opposed is one of our earllMt 
■Ml a««C fraquBnl paint. It develops the nenv of a distinction between 
fia* and obatriH-'la] impuliun ; llie unuoiuclousiieaB of au u|M'n way la ex- 
rfaanf«d fur cvtiM^luiiMiicaa : we are now said propewly tu believe la wliat 
hat Dvrei Iwvii ' "ntfartteleil, a* we disbelieve In what baa been cnniradirted. 
We tell*** Ibal. atlei Ihi* dawn of day, there Is ttcfore us a continuance 
nf Itsht i w* da not bellave ilial this light is l« ciinliaue forerer. 

" Thin, the vital cimjni»tanie in belief in never to be ton tmdlcUrd— never 
lo toaejgirai^. Tlie number uf repetitions counts for little lu the proc(«»: 
*« an umnch coDvlnced after ten aaafier llfiy; we are mora convtoccd 
bf ton unbrokra than by Aft.v for nnd one ngfainal. " ( Bain : The EraMlona 
■^ Uie Will. fp. Sn S19 I 

320 PSYCHO LOG 7, 

tion of its relations), it is as if we said '' it belongs in the 
same world with those other objects.'* Naturally enough, 
we have hourly opportunities for this summary process of 
belief. All remote objects in space or time are believed in 
this way. When I believe that some prehistoric savage 
chipped this flint, for example, the reality of the savage and 
of his act makes no direct appeal either to my sensation, 
emotion, or volition. What I mean by my belief in it is 
simply my dim sense of a continuity between the long dead 
savage and his doings and the present world of which the 
flint forms part. It is pre-eminently a case for applying 
our doctrine of the * fringe ' (see Vol L p. 258). When I think 
the savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him ; 
when I think him vnthout that fringe, or vnth another one 
(as, e.g., if I should class him with * scientific vagaries ' in 
general), I disbelieve him. The word ' real ' itself is, in 
short, a fringe. 


We shall see in Chapter XXY that will consists in 
nothing but a manner of attending to certain objects, or 
consenting to their stable presence before the mind. The 
objects, in the case of will, are those whose existence 
depends on our thought, movements of our own body for 
example, or facts which such movements executed in future 
may make real. Objects of belief, on the contrary, are those 
which do not change according as we think regarding them. 
I unU to get up early to-morrow morning ; I believe that I 
got up late yesterday morning; I tciU that my foreign 
bookseller in Boston shall procure me a German book and 
write to him to that effect I believe that he will make me 
pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc. Now the im- 
portant thing to notice is that this difference between the 
objects of will and belief is entirely immaterial, as far as 
the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the mind 
does is in both cases the same ; it looks at the object and 
consents to its existence, espouses it, says * it shall be my 
reality.' It turns to it, in short, in the interested active 
emotional way. Tlie rest is done by nature, which in some 
cases makes the objects real which we think of in this 


and iu other caues (]oes Dot, Nature cannot change 
the |iiuit to Huit our thinking. She cannot chauf^e the stars 
or Ui« winds; bnt kIk? <^je« chauge our l)odie» to suit our 
tUnldiig, and through their instruineutality changes much 
ImMca; »o the great practical dintinction between objects 
*hicb we may will or nnwill, and objects which we can merely 
b»li«Te or disbelieve, grows up, and is of course one of the 
most ituptirtaut distinctions in the world. Its roots, hnw- 
CTM. do not lie in psychology, but in physiology ; its the 
elut|)t«r on Volition will abmidautly make plain. Will and 
Muf, in short, mmning a cerfnin jvhfion betut^n objects and 
(ifSflJf, «ir* two names /or one and the same PSVOiOLOGlCAl. 
pAnnmcMM. All the questions which arise concerning one 
*n qoestioDfl which arise concerning the other. The causea 
tad conditionB of the peculiar relation must be the same 
bboth. The free-will question arises as regards belief. 
U our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, etc. 
I Th' fin«t aet of free-will, iu short, would naturally he to 
''ii«te io free-will, etc. In Chapter XXVI, I shall mention 

A practical obsenfation may end this chapter. If belief 

jLHLHta iu an emotional reaction of the entire man on an 

i j-ict, how CKin we Iwlieve at will ? We cannot control our 

i>>tiou8. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will 

icuptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infre- 

ir-ntly, produces instAntaneous conversions for us. She 

^hleuly puts lis in an active comiection with objects of 

Jiicb ahe hail till then left uh cold. " I realize for the first 

-■Dt;," we then wiy, "what that means!" This happens often 

■■ith moral pro{K)sitions. We have often heard them ; but 

now they sh*»>t into our lives ; they move ns ; we feel their 

liriug force. Such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not 

to hv iM.-hi«viHl by will. But gradually our will can lead unto 

the tuinie rvttnlts by a very simple method : tn* ntrd only 

im enld Uowt act as if /Ac Minj/ r'ji tfuexfiitn tivrr rwt/, and keep 

■^g iM if it trrre real, and it icHl infaflilily end by grmftnff 
f tuck a ctmttfctiim with our life that it to?/ liecfinie rent. 
will become so knit with hal>it and emotion that our 
iiterests in it will be those which characterize belief. 


Those to whom * God ' and * Duty ' are now mere nam^* * 
can make them much more than that, if they make a littl- ^ 
sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well know:^ 
in moral and religious education that I need say no more."^ 

♦ Literature. D. Hume : Treatise on Human Nature, part in. §g vn- — 
X. A. Bain : Emotions and Will, chapter on Belief (also pp. 20 ff^t— 
J. Sully: Sensation and Intuition, essay it. J. Mill: Analysis of HumnrT 

Mind, chapter xi. Ch. Renouvier: Psychologie Rationnelle, voL n 

pt. II ; and Esquisse d'une Classitication systematique des Doctrines 
Philosophiques, part vi. J. H. Newman: The Grammar of Assent J. 
Venn: Some Characteristics of Belief. V. Brochard: De TErreur, part, 
n. chap. VI, ix ; and Revue Pbilosophique, xxviii. 1. E. Rabier : Psy— 
cholo^e, chap xxi. Appendix. OlIeLaprune: La Certitude Morale (1881). 
G. F. Stout: On Grenesis of Coguitionof Physical Reality, in * 3find,' Jan. 
18W. J. Pikler: The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence 
(London, 1890).— Mill says that we believe present sensations ; and makes 
our belief in all other things a matter of assoeiaiian with these. So far so 
good; but as he makes no mention of emotional or volitional reaction. Bain 
rightly charges him with treating belief as a purely intellectual state. For 
Bain belief is rather an incident of our active life. When a thing is such 
as to make us act on it, then we believe it, according to Bain. " But how 
about past things, or remote things, upon which no reaction of ours is pos- 
sible? And how about belief in things which check 2^X\ouV* mys Sully; 
who considers that we believe a ihingonly when "the idea of it has an in 
herent tendency to approximate in character and intensity to a sensation.'' 
It is obvious that each of these authors emphasizes a true aspect of the 
question. My own account has sought to be more complete, sensation, 
association, and active reaction all being acknowledged to be concerned. 
The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that our beli^ 
and attention are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is 
reality ; Attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations 
force attention from us. On Belief and Conduct see an article by Leslie 
Stephen, Fortnightly I^view, July 188S. 

A set of facts have been recently brought to my attention which I 
hardly know how to treat, so I say a word about them in this footnote. I 
refer to a type of experience which has frequently found a place amongst 
the * Yes* answers to the * Census of Hallucinations,' and which is gener- 
ally described by those who report it a£i an ' impression of the presence * of 
someone near them, although no sensation either of sight, hearing, or touch 
is involved. From the way in which this experience is spoken of by those 
who have had it, it would appear to be an extremely definite and positive 
state of mind, coupled with a belief in the reality of its object quite as 
strong as any direct sensation ever g^ves. And yet no sensation seems to 
be connected with it at all. Sometimes the person whose nearness is thus 
impressed is a known person, dead or living, sometimes an unknown one. 
His attitude and situation are often very definitely impressed, and so, some- 
times (though not by way of hearing), are words which he wishes to say. 

The phenomenon would seem to be due to a pure eoneepiion becoming 


dwiih tbr Burt of MingiDg urgency wliiob ordliiariljr ouly wdM' 

ttbriog Bill I caanol JH perauAde myMlf tliHt llie urgency fn ques- 

mcuntiaut etnuiioiifti ttuA motor impii lues. Tlie inipres- 

aay coine (jiiile »iiddi.'uly auil dcimit igiiickly, it iiiiiy (imy uu 

1 fnggcBliouB, nud H>ke do motor coiisc<|UciiceB bvyoud tliutie 

inaiieading tult. Altogether, [beiiiutierUBumewliaiparudoxfcnl. 

i mo concliulriD am be oomn lo unlll loorc di-lliiite datn ant oblaloed. 

Ptrfaapi ibe moat ciirioiio uwe of ibe aort wbicb 1 bnve rvMived is tbe 

luUowlBif. Tbe iubjeci of tbe obaervntlou, Ur P., is ui olceptioD&lly 

htetllgBBt wluian, tbougb Ui« wunl8 of Lbe narrative arc his wife's. 

-'Mr P bas all hie life beea the occasioDal subject of ralber slngulHr 
ir tiDprfMlona of Tarious Itinds. If I bad belief Id the eiisieoce 
il or embryo facilities, other ihan tbe five seoses, I should explalu 
I pound. Being totally bltnil, bi> other perceptions ar« 
y keen and dvvdoped. and givtui the existence of a riidiiiieDtnry 
t tl would be only tialuml that this also should be more acute In 
kto UtUI la olberv. One of the most iutereallDg of hia experiences in ibi* 
Una WM ibc frw)ii^nt appnrlllon of a corpse some years ago, whkb may be 
vorlb lb* attmllon of your Coumittee on Ihal subjecl. At the lime Mr. 
f bMt a amalc-nMitu in Buvton on Btacon Street, where he used to do 
wtntr and protiMcted practice with little interruption. Now. all one avaaaa 
b waa • VMy familiar occurrence with bim while In (be midHl of work to 
fee) • «old dntfl of air suddenly upon hla face, wiih a prickling seDsatlon 
H Urn raoU of bU hair, when be would turn f rum tbe piano, and a Hgiue 
■htcb he knew lo be d«rut wouhl cuiue sliding under the crack of Ibe door 
tran wtlhmil, flatl«ulug itself lo xquerEe Miroiigb and rounding out again 
la tlte faumaa fomi. It was of a middtc-aged mnn. and drew Itself along 
tbr <'>ni*< <H> hands nud knees, bul with bend ibruwu back till it reached 
lb* rnttM, apon which It stretcht'd itself. It remained some momenta, but 
**iilrftnl alwaya tf Mr P. spoke or made a decided movrmeut Tbe uioet 
tiafuku polBI In tbe occurrence was lis freijuent repeiltioD. He might 
expect It ott any day between two and four o'clock, and it came always 
hvaldad by the mudc suddrn cold »hlver. and was Invariably Ibe same flg- 
ib« whklb want through ibe same maveiiit<ntB. He afterwards traced the 
wkole expertenoe to sirong lea. He was in tbe habll of lakitig cold It-a. 
■Ueb always Uimnlalcs him. for lunch, snd on giving up Ibis practice he 
^nmr nw lltta or any other apparition again. However, even allowing, aa 
t* dmbtlaN true, that tbe event was a delusion of nerves Aral fatigued by 
ai ai woi k and tbca cicltod by this sliuiulatit. there is one point which la 
■HI wboUy Inexplicable and highly Inlcrrsling to me. Mr. P. has do 
ly whatever of slgbl, nor conci-ption of It. It Is Impossible for him 
B aay Idea of what we mean by light or color, consequently he baa 
aa eogalBUiea of any objecst which doea not mch bis sense of bearing 
of iMKh. thvuj^ these ar« ao acute aa to give a contrary Impression miu 
ttmea to Olhrr people. When be brcomm aware of the presence of a prrsgn 
waa object, by mean* wbtrhMvin mysterious to oiitsideis. be tan alwajMi 
liaea ll aataially and legitimately to slight echoes, perceptible only to " ' 
b«ca aan, or to dlBereacea in atmospheric preaHurc. perceptible only b> 
Kite Mill Hi of touch; but with the apparition described, fot Ibe only tlma 
!■ Ul a pwteaca, he was awar* of pmcn'-r, %\tr. and sppcarance, witbottt 


IBM ^^^ 


the use of either of these mediums. The figure never produced the least 
sound nor came within a number of feet of his person, yet he knew thAt it 
was a man, that it moved, and in what direction, even that it wore a full 
beard, which, like the thick curly hair, was partially gray; also that it was 
dressed in the style of suit known as ' pepper and salt.' These points were 
all perfectly distinct and invariable each time. If asked how he percei?^ 
them, he will answer he cannot tell, he simply knew it. and so strongly and 
80 distinctly that it is impossible to shake his opinion as to the exact details 
of the man's appearance. It would seem that in this delusion of the senses 
he really saw, as he has never done in the actual experiences of life, except 
in the first two years of childhood." 

On cross-examining Mr. P., I could not make out that there was any* 
thing like visual imagination involved, although he was quite unable to 
describe in just what terms the false perception was carried on. It seemed 
to be more like an intensely definite conception than anything else, a con- 
ception to which the feeling of present reality was attached, but in no sack 
ibape as easily to fall under the heads laid down in my text. 

We talk of man being the rational animal; and the tra- 
!;!inn»I inteUectQ&Iint philostipby lias always made a great 
,1 mt of treating the brat«s as wholly irrational creatarea. 
Xeverthelesa, it is by no means easy to decide jast what is 
m^ftDt b>- reason, or how the pecnlisr tbioking process 
callfKl reasoning differs from other thonght-sequences which 
Uat lead to similar results. 

Mocb of our thinking couaists of trains of images sng- 
gmttml one by another, of a sort of spontaneons revery of 
which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should 
b» capable. This sort of thinking leads neverthelefls to 
ratiooal conclusions, both practical and theoretical. The 
links between the terms are either ' contiguity ' or ' similar- 
ity,' and with a mixtore of both these things we can hard- 
ly be very incoherent. As a rule, in this sort of irrespon- 
sible thinking, the terms which fall to be coupled together 
are empirical concretes, not abstractioum. A sunset may 
rail dp the ressel's deck from which I saw one lastsnmmer, 
the cotnpaniona of my voyage, luy arrival into port, etc.; or 
it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercnies' and 
Bector'fl fnneral pyres, of Homer and whether he could 
writo^ of the Greek alphabet, etc. If habitual contiguities 
predominate, we have a prosaic tuiud; if rare coatignities, 
or similarities, have free play, we call the person fanciful, 
poetic, or witty. But the thought as a rule is of matters 
taken in their entirety. Having been thinking of one, we 
find later that we are thinking of another, to which we have 
been lifted along, we hardly know bow. If an abstract 

' The ■ubaUncr of UU* cbl^)ter, utd a good uuuiy pmgt» ot tbe text, 
Mrifloallj appaared In an krilcle enlitled ' Bralc and Humaa Intellect,' In 
tke Jiwnial of SpcGulatIn PbiltMopby for July 1878 (vol xu. p. SSS). 

326 P8TCH0L0OT. 

quality figures in the procession, it arrests our attenti^^ 
but for a moment, and fades into something else ; and ^ 
never very abstract Thus, in thinking of the sun-myths, ^^® 
may have a gleam of admiration at the gracefulness of i9^^ 
primitive human mind, or a moment of disgust at the ni^>^' 
rowness of modem interpreters. But, in the main, i^^< 
think less of qualities than of whole things, real or pose^^ 
ble, just as we may experience them. 

The upshot of it may be that we are reminded of so 
practical duty : we write a letter to a friend abroad, or 
take down the lexicon and study our Oreek lesson. 0\m^ 
thought is rational, and leads to a rational act, but it ca 
hardly be called reasoning in a strict sense of the term. 

There are other shorter flights of thought, single coup- 
lings of terms which suggest one another by association, 
which approach more to what would commonly be classed 
as acts of reasoning proper. Those are where a present sign 
suggests an unseen, distant, or future reality. Where tiie 
sign and what it suggests are both concretes which have 
been coupled together on previous occasions, the inference 
is common to both brutes and men, being really nothing 
more than association by contiguity. A and B, dinner-bell 
and dinner, have been experienced in immediate succes- 
sion. Hence A no sooner falls upon the sense than B is 
anticipated, and steps are taken to meet it The whole 
education of our domestic beasts, all the cunning added by 
age and experience to wild ones, and the greater part of 
our human knowingness consists in the ability to make a 
mass of inferences of this simplest sort Our ' perceptions,' 
or recognitions of what objects are before us, are inferences 
of this kind. We feel a patch of color, and we say * a dis- 
tant house,' a whifiF of odor crosses us, and we say *a 
skunk,' a faint sound is heard, and we call it ' a railroad 
train.' Examples are needless ; for such inferences of sen- 
sations not presented form the staple and tissue of our 
perceptive life, and our Chapter XIX was full of them, 
illusory or veracious. They have l>een called unconscious 
inferences. Certainly w*e are commonly unconscious that 
we are inferring at alL The sign and the signified melt 
into what seems to us the object of a single pulse o£ 


'iought. Immediate infrrewxn winild be a good iiame lot 
■'n-M simple at-ts of roaoomng requiring but two terms,* 
*ere it not tltst formal logic Laa already appropriated tbe 
^xpre&siou for a taore technical u»e. 

In tliese first and uiuipleut infereoces tlie conclasiou 
tthtjr follow t(o cuutiDaousIy npou the ' sign ' that the latter 
yaotdutcriminated or attended tt) as a separate object by the 
ind. Even now we can seldom detine the optical signs 
u:b load us to infer the shapes iiud distances of the ob- 
wbtcfa by their aid ve so uu hesitatingly perceive. 
objects, too, wheu thus inferred, are general objects. 
t dog crosaing a scent thinks of a deer in general, or of 
mootber dog in general, not of a particular deer or dog. To 
ibeiw) moat primitive abstract objects Dr. G. J. Romanes 
idvfit th<- name of rerepts or genertc ideas, to distinguish 
them from concepts and general ideas properly so called-t 
They are not analyzed or defined, but only imagined. 

-- It niqntivK but n slight atinl.vsis uf nur nrdimiry mental prooeaaes 
to iwvm that all our simpler ideaa are group-arranKemeuUi wtiic-li have 
fam fofvml •ponlaneoualj ur without any of thnt intentJoiuitlr wm- 
INrtOK, vlftiDf, and combhtin^ proceas which \s required ia the highnr 
liffutmeatt ot idtiailoual activity. Tin? <-i)in paring, rifling, ntid i-om- 
1nitB)[ ia licw dnwe, ati It were, /or the cuTisofniii agent, not bp him. 
R(w|iU an nwoived ; it ia only concept h tlial riKjuin- to bi' (Minceived, 
. - . 1( I am cnHHing a sti^x-i and hear Ixiliitid niv a sudden shout, I 
•IdboI iwiaire to wait in order to prodicalt' totnyself that there ia prol>- 
Mj a hatiBom-cab just abool to ran me down : a cry of this kind, and 
e eirautiUitanM.-s, in »a iiitiimilely uk-Miciaied in my mind with its 

* I w* no nefd of unumlog more than Iwo terms in this sort of rai 
^Inl, the itgn. and »«»ocl. the thing InrptTed from it. Either nuqr'' 
uplex, but Msenttaliy It la hut A calllitg up B, and no middle term la 
' H. Bioul, la his most tntelligiMil llule book. La Psychologic du 
Dent, malnlaltiH that thi.-re are thnie termH. The present aensa. 
r dgu must, amtrdiag >o him. Dm evoke from the past on Imago 
b rwMables U and fnii-a with it. and ibe tljlogs suggested ur Inforred 
ant alwayi tbe coatlguous anoclatm of thin intcrmrdlate image, and not of 
" e ■enaation. Ttin n-adcr of Chapter XIX will nee why I do 
1 1n the ' Image ' Id queitian aa a iliattnct psychic fact. 
lal Emliitlon In Man (1889). chapters iii and tv. See wpeolalty ,' 
k 4B-MI, anil later 838, SM. 

828 P8TCH0L0GT, 

purpose, that the idea which it arouses need not rise above the level of 
a recept ; and the adaptive movements on my part which that idea im- 
mediately prompts are performed without any intelligent reflection. 
Yet, on the other hand, they are neither reflex actions nor instinctive 
actions ; thty are what may be termed receptual actions, or actions de- 
pending on recepts." * 

" How far can this kind of unnamed or non-conceptional 
ideation extend ?" Dr. Bomanes asks ; and answers by a 
variety of examples taken from the life of brutes, for wLich 
I must refer to his book. One or two of them, however, I 
will quote : 

*' Houzeau writes that while crossing a wide and arid plain in- Texas, 
his two dogs suffered greatly from thirst, and that between thirty and 
forty times they rushed down the hollows to search for water. The hol- 
lows were not valleys, and there were no trees in them, or any other 
difference in the vegetation ; and as they were absolutely dry, there 
could have been no smell of damp earth. The dogs behaved as if they 
knew that a dip in the ground offered them the best chance of finding 
water, and Houzeau has often witnessed the same behavior in other ani- 
mals. . . . 

** Mr. Darwin writes : * When I say to my terrier in an eager voice 
(and I have made the trial many times), ** Hi ! hi ! where is it ?" she at 
once takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally 
first looks quickly all round, and then rushes into the nearest thicket, 
to scout for any game, but finding nothing she looks up into any neigh 
boring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly show that 
she had in her mind a general idea, or concept, that some animal is to 
be discovered and hunted ? ' " f 

Tliey certainly show this. But the idea in question is 
of an object about which nothing farther may be articulately 
known. The thought of it prompts to activity, but to no 
theoretic consequence. Similarly in the following ex- 
ami)le : 

** Water-fowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting upon 
land, or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when alighting 
upon water; and those kinds which dive from a height (such as terns 
and gannets) never do so u|)on land or upon ice. These facts prove 
that the animals have one reoopt answering to a solid surface, and an- 
other answering to a fluid. Similarly a man will not dive from a height 
over hard ground or over ice, nor will he jump into water in the same 
way as he jumps upon dry land. In other words, like the water-fowl 

* Iak. cit. p. 50. t P- 52. 


be haA two distinct reoepts, one of which answere to solid ground, and 
the other to an unresisting fluid. But unlike the water-fowl he is able 
to bestow upon each of these recepts a name, and thus to raise them 
both to the level of concepts. So far as the practical purposes of loco- 
motion are concerned, it is of course immaterial whether or not he thus 
raises his recepts into concepts ; but ... for many other purposes it is 
of the highest importance that he is able to do thin." * 


The chief of these purposes is predication^ a theoretic 
function which, though it always leads eventually to some 
kind of action, yet tends as often as not to inhibit the imme- 
diate motor response to which the simple inferences of 
which we have been s{)eaking give rise. In reasoning, A 
may suggest B ; but B, instead of l>eing an idea which is 
Himply obeyed by us, is an idea which suggests the distinct 
additional idea C. And where the train of suggestion is one 
of reasoning distinctively so called as contrasted with mere 
revery or * associative * sequence, the ideas bear certain 
inward relations to each other which we must proceed to 
examine with some care. 

The result C yielded by a true act of reasoning is apt 
to l>e a thing voluntariiy soiujht, such as the means to a 
proposed end, the ground for an observed effect, or the 
effect of an assumed cause. All these results mav be 
thought of as concrete things, but they are not nnggestetl im- 
mt^liately by other amcrete thintjs, as in the trains of simply as- 
sociative thought They are linked to the ccmcretes which 
precede theui by intermediate sti*ps, and these steps are 
formed by general rhanirters articulately denoted and ex- 
pressly analy/ed out. A thing inferred by reasoning need 
neither have been an habitual iissociate of the datum from 
whirh we infer it, nor nee^l it be similar to it It mav l>e 
a thing entirely unkiiDwn to our previous experience, some- 
thing which no simph* assoeiation of concretes couhl ever 
have evoked. The great <lifference, in fact, l)etwei»ii that 
simpler kind of rational thinking which c^msists in the con- 
crete objects of past experience merely suggesting each 
other, and reasoning distinctively so called, is this, that 

* />>*■. n't. p. 74. 


whilst the empirical thinking is only reprodnctiyey reaeN3i^* 
ing is productive. An empirical, or * nile»of-thumb.* thia^l^CT 
can j ediyft yintl^inpr fro m data w f^^ wTirt^^ VirhftY^or i^^ 
asso ciates in thft copfirptft he is nnfamiliar . But pn.' t k 
reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which he Ij ^ 
n eitherseen nor hear^ ^f hafg^A anrl r litflA timii^ r^^ 
he IS a go od reaso nf^r, hfi will maVn nnrh infAf^nfiAft fr^^m 
tl iem as will quite ati ine fpr T^ia ignnmn/^A BeasouSJ^ 
helps us out of unprecedented situations — situations :^or 
which all our common associative wisdom, all the ' edn^c^a- 
tion ' which we share in common with the beasts, leaves ^ 
without resource. 

Let us make this ability to deal tmth novel data the 
intocrZ differentia of reasoning. This will sufficiently 
it out from common associative thinking, and will imm< 
ately enable us to say just what peculiarity it contains. 

It contains analysi s and abstractio n. Whereas the mer> Jy 
empirical thinker stares at a fact in its entirety, and remaiM:'^ 
helpless, or gets * stuck,' if it suggests no concomitant ci^i* 
similar, the reasoner breaks it up and notices some one o/ 
its separate attributes. This attribute he takes to be the 
essential part of the whole fact before him. This attribute 
has properties or consequences which the fact until then 
was not known to have, but which, now that it is noticed 
to contain the attribute, it must have. 

Call the fact or concrete datum S ; 
the essential attribute M ; 
the attribute's property P. 

Then the reasoned inference of P from 8 cannot be 
made without M's intermediation. The * essence ' M ia 
thus that third or middle term in the reasoning which a 
moment ago was pronounced essential. For his original 
concrete S the yrasouer snhstitutes its abstract property, if. 
}Vhat is true of M, wluit is coupled with M, then holds 
true of S, is coupled with S. As M is properly one of the 
patis of the entire S, mtsontJig tnnif then he very wdl defitifi d 

as the stthstittitinn nfptiijo ^»^ //i^tV :LjJtWi(in^^^Qf f^pm^%^i^m 

for tvj ^s^ And the art of the reasoner will consist of two 
stages : 

r the ability to discover what part, H, 
iddeil in the whole S which is before him ; 
gpcond. learm Tjg, or the ability to recall promptly M's 
<<oiis«t)n<>Dces, coacomitaots, or implications.'t 
Ojglance at th? ordinary ayliogisi 
S iaM; 
H isP 

*J. Liuck«. E«i»y coDC. Hum UnderaiandiDg. bk. iv chap, it g8. 
t To b( MgBCious to lo be a good observer. J S. Mill h as a )>a«8age 
'««Uck b <o much in the spirit of ibe lext iLat 1 cnnboi I or bear lo quote it. 
" Tkr otMcfTct b tiot be who merely »ees (he thing wbicb Is before h la 
«jica, but be wbu sec* wlul pans Ibat thing is composed of. To do ibis 
'^•11 i* a nuE i>lt.'Ut. One peiicn, from inatlention, or Bttending only in 
%]m 'mmmf platv. overlooks half of wb&t he «eet : auotber aete dowD much 
■MM* tbaii lu- sees, contoiiDdiDg i1 with what he Imagines, or »)ih what 
ka Uitutt; uiotiier ukes Hole of ibe kind of all Lbe clrcutnslaoces. but 
beinj iBcSpert In iwUtuallng their degree, leaves the quantity of eacb 
T^H ■)») uacertoiii ; anuiher m^s iudeed lbe whole, but muke^ such 
•a awkward dlTlaiou of it Into pnru. Ibrowlng ihiugs into out- ointi* 
vbh^tt mjuire to b« B«p«raied, atid M'pHrailng oibera which might more 
roawmiMitly b« considered as one. tlinl the result is much Ibe iMine, 
•DBctlinea even wop«. than If no analysis had been MIempted at nil. It 
««Ud be puMiblu to point oiii what <|UMlltlea of mind, and modes of 
nvtUal cnllore. fit a pi-mon for being a good obw-tver : tbat, howewer. la 
■ iiiNatkia tH't of Logir, but of the TlieDt-y of Kdura^ion in the most En- 
hr^ anise of Hie irrm. There is not properly an Art of OhservTug. 
TG^maj be rul™ for obserrlng. But I bene, like ruleH for inventing, arc 
|rap»r1y UwlnicOonB for the prepamlloti of oue'« own mind ; for pulling 
% \m%D Uh Mate In wbkh It will be most tllK-d lo obwrve. or most Hkrly W> 
bVMl. Tbey are. Ihrrefore, ewenllally rules of wlf-edutBtion, wbith la 
adUTcml thing from Logic Tbcy do not leoeli bow to do the thing, 
. Im bo^ M, p .»krj,urffi-^ rTPfl'''- "^ '<"'"ff " ''"hey "* »" »" of 
minfTihe lliubn, not an nrliif uxinglhi'm. Tiie i-xient and minut«- 
tlon whieh mav be re<|uiitile, and the degree of derotnposl- 

D lu wtili-h It mav hp nn-c-mry lo carry the menial aiialjMn, depend on 

IWpBnleular purpo"- in view. To aKrerlain the at ate of the wlioir unl- 
Tencaluy (arliruUr mumeni \h lmpo«ible. but would bI«) be useleM. 
Id malileg rbeminl ciperimenin. we do not Ibink it neceswty lo note lbe 
pmJlkiBof ibe planit*^ h«-n.i»p eipcrlenee liwt shown, as a very superficial 
n^^^rnr^\^ MifflctenI to show, ihni iu mich ca*e« Ibat circumslaoee is not 
Mai>ri>l to the r»«iilt : and iit-rordlnBly. In Ihengee when msn helieted In 
Ibr omiti Inflneiic™ nf Ibe he»Tenly bodies. It mlgbi bare been unpblto- 
M>T4ilrBl to .milt ascertalnlnK tbe precise condition of IboMi bodies at Ihe 
noMMil iif tlw eiperlnent." (Logic, bk ill. chap vii. g 1. Cf. also hk. 


— we see that the jecogd or minor premise, the 'subsump- 
tion ' as it is sometimes called, is the one requiring the sa- 
gacity ; the first or major the one requiring the fertil ity, or 
fulness of learning. Usually the learning is more apt to be 
ready than the sagacity, the ability to seize fresh aspects 
in concrete things, being rarer than the ability to learn old 
rules ; so that, in most actual cases of reasoning, the minor 
premise, or the way of conceiving the subject, is the one 
that makes the novel step in thought This is, to be sure, 
not always the case ; for the fact that M carries P with it 
may also be unfamiliar and now formulated for the first 

The perception that S is M is a mode of conceiving S. 
The statement that M is P is an abstract or general proposi- 
tion, A word about both is necessary. 


When we conceive of S merely as M (of vermilion 
merely as a mercury-compound, for example), we neglect 
all the other attributes which it may have, and attend 
exclusively to this one. We mutilate the fulness of 
S's reality. Every reality has an infinity of aspects or 
properties. Even so simple a fact as a line which you trace 
in the air may be considered in respect to its form, its 
length, its direction, and its location. When we reach 
more complex facts, the number of ways in which we may 
regard them is literally endless. Vermilion is not only a 
mercury-compound, it is vi\ddly red, heavy, and expensive, 
it comes from China, and so on, in infinitum. All objects are 
well-springs of properties, which are only little by little 
developed to our knowledge, and it is truly said that to 
know one thing thoroughly would be to know the whole 
universe. Mediately or immediately, that one thing is re- 
lated to everything else ; and to know oR about it, all its 
relations need be known. But each relation forms one of 
its attributes, one angle by which some one may conceive it, 
and while so conceiving it may ignore the rest of it. A man 
is such a complex fact. But out of the complexity all that 
an army commissary picks out as important for his purposes 
is his property of eating so many pounds a day ; the general. 



' f marching so mnnj miles; the cliair-maker, of haWng 
■'•QcL ft Hbupe; the orator, of responding to such and sucL 
cliogK; the thefttre-manager, of being Trilling to pay just 
Ich s price, and no more, for an evening's amasement. 
b of these persona ningles out the particular side of the 
D which has a bearing on his concema, and not till 
t i» distiuctlj and separately conceived can the 
|gfncticalconclnsionsyV)rfiWf r€%i«on«r be drawn ; and 
n titer are drawn the man's other attribntes may be ig- 

L All ways of cunceiring a concrete fact, if tliey are trne 
ljri» At all, we equally tnie ways. There is no prope rty 
WMXT EL X aaential to tin y "«*• th iiu]. The same property 
Uch figures aa Ihe essence of a. thing on one occastoti be- 
ooni'S a very iuesfiential feature upon another. Now that 
I am writing, it is essential tbut I coDf^eive roj paper as a 
fiorface for inscription. If I failed to do that, I should hare 
to sl^ip my work. But if I wished to light a tire, and no 
othi<r matoriols were by, the essential way of concei\-ing 
the paper would bo as combustible material ; and I need 
iWd bare no thought of any of its oUier destinations. It is 
r>'allr tJl that it is : a combustible, a writing surface, a thin 
Uiinj^ a hydrocarboDSceous thing, a thing eight inches one 
ttij and tAn another, a thing just one furlong east of a certain 
me in my neighbor's tield, uu American thing, etc., etc., 
I infinitHm. Whichorer one of these aspects of its being I 
Bporarilr class it under, makes me unjust to the other 
MctM. Bnt as I always am classing it under one aspect 
, I am always unjust, always partial, always ex- 
Jly excuse is necessity — the necessity which my 
1 practical nature lays upou me. My thinking is 
[last and always for the sake of my doing, and I 
diu/ do one thing at a time. A Otxl, who is suppo)«ed 
EdriTA the whole universe abresxt, may nlsobe supposed, 
' iboQl detriment to his activity, to see all parts of it at 
neeand without emphasis. But were our human attention 
ao to dii>)<«rse ita^lf we Hhonli) simply stare vacantly at 
thingH at largB and forfeit our opportunity of doing any 
particular aci Sir. Warner, in his Adirondack story, shot a 
li«ar by aiming, not at lun eye or heart, but 'nt him gt>b- 

334 PB7CH0L0OY. 

erally.' But we cannot aim ' generally * at the jniverse ; 
or if we do, w e^iss o u r gam e. Our scope is narrow, and 
we^ust attack things piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness 
in which the elements of Nature exist, and stringing one 
after another of them together in a serial way, to suit our 
little interests as they change from hour to hour. In this, 
the partiality of one moment is partly atoned for by the 
different sort of partiality of the next To me now, writing 
these words, emphasis anduSfilection seem to be the essence 
of the human mind. In other chapters other qualities have 
seemed, and will again seem, more important parts of psy- 

Men are so ingrainedly partial that, for common-sense 
and scholasticism (which is only common-sense grown artic- 
ulate), the notion that there is no one quality genuinely, 
absolutely, and exclusively essential to anything is almost 
unthinkable. " A thing's essence makes it whai it is. With- 
out an exclusive essence it would be nothing in particular, 
would be quite nameless, we could not say it was this 
rather than that. What you write on, for example, — why 
talk of its being combustible, rectangular, and the like, 
when you know that these are mere accidents, and that 
what it really is, and was made to be, is just paper and 
nothing else ?" The reader is pretty sure to make some 
such comment as this. But he is himself merely insisting 
on an aspect of the thing which suits his own petty purpose, 
that of naming the thing ; or else on an aspect which suits 
the manufacturer's purpose, that of producing an artide 
for which there is a vtdgar demand. Meanwhile the reality 
overflows these purposes at every pore. Our usual purpose 
with it, our commonest title for it, and the properties which 
this title suggests, have in reality nothing sacramental. 
They characterize ns more than they characterize the thing. 
But we are so stuck in our prejudices, so petrified intellec- 
tually, tliat to our vulgarest names, with their suggestions, 
we ascribe an eternal and exclusive worth. The thing must 
be, essentially, what the vulgarest name connotes ; what 
less usual names connote, it can be only in an ' accidental * 
and relatively unreal sense.* 

* Readers brought up od Popular Science may think that the molecular 

RSASoyiNa. 330 

Locke undermined the fallacy. But noDe of his succes- 
l^^^n, so far as I kuow, liave nnUcallv encaiwd it, or ween 
J ^1*1 the (mly meaning of essence w teienlngienl, and t/iiU dcssi- 
I jGcoTi'oN and ronrtflum tire purely iHeoltyiiii! tceap<ms of fhe 
*niu(i. The eHsencf? of a tLing is that oue of its properties 
which is BO important /or my interests that in comparison 
Willi it I may ueglect tlie rest. Auionffst tbosi- other things 
which hare thin importaut property 1 class it, after tliU 
property I name it, as a thiuR eutlowed with tliis property 
I rouceive it ; ami whilst so dassiug, naming, and conceiv- 
ing it, nil other tmth^t a>x>itt it t>eorime to me as naught* 
The propertipH which are important vary from man to man 
and from hour to hour.t Hence divers appellatioua and 

V of Uiinga ii Ibeit real fmcdcc In kd abwltile aenav, nuiI lUnl wal«r 
it B-0~B more di^pty Mid Inily tlua It W a wtvcnt ul su^r or a 
titker of tttlr-i Noi ■ « tilt ! II ii aU of llicie tliiugi wIlli i^iiinl iVKlity. 
Md Uir ooly r«uon tiXtf far tin rhemitl ll U H-0~U prlntniily, nod an\j 
Moawfarily tbc other lhlnK». *» ihaxfar kit purfot nfdtduelion andeom- 
jwJtWM dgtoJUm the IMJ-H iu.prct of ll is (be more iu«ful one to bcar 

'" WefliMlUiBlw«Uik«forj;[siiti:iliiTraiMlblytliBieacli liiud|uf lliiog] 
hM t»M» ehmtmner whk-ti dlMlngiiMieA ii from utber cUs»es. . . What 
b the fmuiiUiloD of ibU poalulate i What U llie grouud of Ihii* assumplioa 
llMi Iben miut exiet a deOtilduD nbkb wc have never wen, nnd wbjcli 
fMlM|w III! mil bill m I II iri a nnllnfiii Inrj fiirni T . . . 1 reply [bat nurcon- 
rinkM Uial Iheri! muat necilg be cbaiw-teristic niarks by whicb Ible^ can 
ta <Mlitwt In Monla t» foiibdcd upoa tlie nsMimplloa of lAt rwddwry potn- 
MUV^raMMtaff."lW. Wl>«wcl1 . HUi. of Scientiflc Ideaa, bk nil. cbap 

( I may quote • pnangt- from an artlrle enlfilecl 'Tbe Scocimeiit of 
RaUoMlltjr.' pubHahR] In vol. iv of Uln<t, 1870: " V/iinl is n eaneeplion r 
ll U • ittrntegieai fAtfrunwnt li U a portinl aspect of a ihiog wbicb 
j^ Mir purpam w« reganl aa Its menlial anpi.'cl, as Ihu reprateDtative 
of ihf tnlUv thing. In rumparisoti wfib tbU aspect, Kbalever other 
fKfrnitt andqiMlltlea tlie tbing may have are unimportant acridenla 
wUck we nwy without blame l^ore. But tbe easence, the gruiinil 
of ooactptkm. Tarin with ibc end we have In view, A Bubtiauce like 
«a kis M BaDjr dlfl«Mnl iwcdchi aa il haa luea to different [udlviduiUt. 
Om mm OMMelTM It a* a combuttiblc, another aa a lubricator, another as 
■ Caod ( tlta cbvmlM thinks of it as a hydrocartMn : tbe furaliure maker 
Madarkeiwr of wood : ibr speculator aa a commodity whoMmarkelpriiv 
Mday is Ulis and IU'Diuttow that. The soap-boiler, the pbyricist. tbe 
(Lki«ke««coatTr siTfrrally aacrlbe to It otber eu^oces In relation to iliHr 
»n>l* r«bv>-RR'i riorlrinr Ibal tbe ewvtitial ■lualit)' of a thing is tbe i 


conceptions for the same thing. But many objects of daily 
use — as paper, ink, butter, horse-car — have properties of 
such constant unwavering importance, and have such stereo- 
typed names, that we end by believing that to conceive 
them in those ways is to conceive them in the only true 
way. Th ose are no truer ways of conceivi ng thpm than any 
others f they are ^nl y more important ways, mor e fre- 
- -q^etttlynsernceable ways.* 



quality of most loorih is strictly true ; but Ueberweg has failed to note 
that the worth is wholly relative to the temporary interests of the conceiver. 
And, even, when his interest is distinctly defined in his own mind, the 
discrimination of the quality in the object which has the closest connection 
with it is a thing which no rules can teach. The only a priori advice that 
can be given to a man embarking on life with a certain purpose is the 
somewhat barren counsel : Be sure that in the circumstances that meet 
you, you attend to the right ones for your purpose. To pick out the right 
ones Is the measure of the man. ' Millions,' says Hartmann, ' stare at the 
phenomenon before a genialer Kojf \iO\iiices on the concept.' The genius 
is simply he to whom, when he opens his eyes upon the world, the * right ' 
characters are the prominent ones. The fool is he who, with the same 
purposes as the genius, infallibly gets his attention tangled amid the 

* Only if one of our purposes were itself truer than another, could one 
of our conceptions become the truer conception. To be a truer purpose, 
however, our purpose must conform more to some absolute standard of 
purpose in things to which our purposes ought to conform. This shows 
that the whole doctrine of essential characters is intimately bound up 
with a teleological view of the ,world. Materialism becomes self-contra- 
dictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls atoms, etc., 
the essential facts. The world contains consciousness as well as atoms — and 
the one must be written down as just as essential as the other, in the ab- 
sence of any declared purpose regarding them on the creator's part, or in 
the absence of any creator. As far as we ourselves go, the atoms are worth 
more for purposes of deduction, the consciousness for purposes of inspira- 
tion. We muy fairly write the Universe in either way, thus: Atoms- 
producing-cousciousness ; or CoNSCiousNESS-produced-by-atoms. Atoms 
alone, or consciousness alone, are precisely equal mutilations of the truth. 
If, without believing in a God, I still continue to talk of what the world 
' essentially is.' I am just as much entitled to define it as a place in which 
my nose itches, or as a place where at a certain comer I can get a mess 
of oysters for twenty cents, as to call it an evolving nebula differentiating 
and integrating itself. It is hard to say which of the three abstractions is 
the more rotten or miserable substitute for the world's concrete fulness. 
To conceive it merely as ' God's work ' would be a similar mutilation of 
it, so long as we said not what God, or what kind of woik. The only real 
truth about the world, apart from particular purposes, is t\e total truth. 



So mncli for what w iinplieJ, wlien the i 
o*ivea of tb« (act 8 befi)ri> liiui aau wise of which the 
>* to l>« H. One word now as to what iu involved in M's 
^ting properti«8, consequences, nr iui plications, and we 
»'j|fl go liack to the study of the reasoning process agaiu. 


M is not a ooucretf, ur ' sfU-MilHtieut,' as Mr, Clay 
Would say. It ia au ab-stract character which may exist, 
cml>edded with other characters, in many concretes, Whe- 
Uier it b* the character of being a writing Hitrtace, of being 
made in America or China, ol being eight incheu square, or 
f being in a certain part of upace, this is always true of it, 
Nnw «i^ might chnceive of this being a world in which all 
-m-h geni-nil characters were independent of each other, so 
ttiat if any one of them were found in a subject 8, we never 
ranld be snre what others would be found alongside of it. 
On one ncc»siou there might bo P with M, on another Q, 
aod BO on. In auch a world there would be no gaieral 
M<]a«ncf«s or coexistences, and no universal lavs. Each 
^roapint; would be s»i generis ; from the experience of the 
past no future could be predicted ; and reasoning, as we 
ahall presently see, would be an impossibility. 

Bat thn world we live in is not one of this sort. Though 
II any general characters seem indifferent to each other, 
■ in-re reniain a number of them which affect constant habits 
■■'. mutual concomitance or repuganoe. They involve or 
imply pach other. One of them is a sign to us that the 
f^hcr will \m tountL They hiint in couples, as it were ; and 
»acJj m proposition as that M is P, or includes P, or prece<le8 
or accompanies P, if it prove t^ be true in one instance, 
may very likely be true in every other instance which we 
mc«L This is, in fact, a world in which general laws obtain, 
in which univt-rxni jinipositionK are true, and in which rea- 
soning in tbert-fnre possible. Fortunately for us: for since 
we cannot handle things as wholes, but only by conceiving 
them through some general character which for the time 
we mil thoir essence, it would be a great pity >f the matter 
ended there, and if the general character, once picked out 
ud in our possesfiion, helped us to no farther .idvance. In 

838 P8YCU0L0OY, 

Chapter XXYIII we shall have again to consider this har- 
mony between our reasoning faculty and the world in which 
its lot is cast^ 

To revert now to our symbolic representation of the 
reasoning process : 



M is discerned and picked out for the time being to be 
the essence of the concrete fact, phenomenon, or reality, 8. 
But M in this world of ours is inevitably conjoined with P; 
so that P is the next thing that we may expect to find con- 
joined with the fact S. We may conclude or infer P, 
through the intermediation of the M which our sagacity 
began by discerning, when S came before it, to be the 
essence of the case. 

Now note that if P have any value or importance for us, 
M was a very good character for our sagacity to pounce upon 
and abstract. If, on the contrary, P were of no importance, 
some other character than M would have been a better 
essence for us to conceive of S by. Psychologically, as a 
rule, P overshadows the process from the start. We are 
seeking P, or something like P. But the bare totality of 8 
does not yield it to our gaze ; and casting about for some 
point in S to take hold of, which will lead us to P, we hit, 
if we are sagacious, upon M, because M happens to be just 
the character which is knit up with P. Had we wished Q 
instead of P, and were N a property of S conjoined with Q, 
we ought to have ignored M, noticed N, and conceived of S 
as a sort of N exclusively. 

Reasoning is always for a subjective interest, to attain 
some particular conclusion, or to gratify some special 
curiosity. It not only breaks up the datum placed before 
it and conceives it abstractly ; it must conceive it rightly 
too ; and conceiving it rightly means conceiving it by that 
one particular abstract character which leads to the one 

* Compare Lotze, Metaphysik. g§ 58. 67, for some iDstruclive remarks 
on ways in which the world's constitution might differ from what it actu- 
ally Is. Compare also Chapter XXVIII. 

■AOKof eonelosioD which it is the reasouer's temporary iii- 
f^fwrt to atUun.* 

Til* rera^ of reasonijtg may be hit npon by accident 
The lU^reoscope wa» a4.'tuHlly a result of reasoning; it ia 
'^ODwiTftble, however, that a man placing with pictures and 
uiirrors might accidentally have hit upon it. Cats have been 
kuomu to op«n doors by pulling latches, etc. But no cat, 
if thr> latch got out of order, could opeu the door again, 
QuIesH some a«w accident of random fumbling taught her 
t<. aKAociatv some new total movement with the total phe- 
>meuuu of the closed d<ior. A reattotiiug man, however, 
Jpoold open the door by tirtit analyzing the hindrance. He 
lid ancertain what particular feature of the door was 
•ug. The lever, e.g., does not raise the latch sulMcientlj 
from ita slot — case of insufficient elevation — raise door 
bodily on hinges I Or door sticks at top by friction against 
linti'l — press it bodily down! Now it is obvious that a 
. !idd or an idiot might without this reasoning learn the nJe 
: r opeiiiug tliat particular door. I remember a clock which 
' !•- maid-bervaut hiul discovered would not go unless it 
' . re snpported so as to tilt slightly forwards. She had 
-titmblfd outhis method after many weeks of groping. The 
.\«au of the stoppage was the friction of the pendnlnm- 
<)i agsinxt the hack of the clock-case, a reason which aa 
"Itimtf^d man would have analyzed out in tive minutes. 1 | 

' Bnmclinin, il mini be rni\leimei\. tlieconceircr's purpose r»lU abort of J 
icMcnlnX "id Ui*^ i^ly ouoclusioo be cores 1o r«acU is lli« Imre naming <rfH 
the (Ulan. " What fs tlwIT" in our Qnt guMtlon relative to any unknowm'l 
tbtnf- And lliti f«a« with wlilrU our riiriosllj U qiieoctied as wiod a« ^9M 
uvMipplM wllli»iiyKin or auunc locall tbo object by. h ridiculuiM I 
aiMi(li. To quolc from an uapubliBbcd euaj' by a fanner iluilenl at 
mine, Mr. R. W Black : - Tb>- iiinipl<»t end which a thing's predicate cau 
WTTT b Um) MtirfacilDti of the dL>sirc tot nohy iiwlf, the mvre desire that 
th* ihlag sball b« the aamn with tomtlhing elfie. Why. the uiber day, 
vlwn I nbtiMk a i>nrtndi of Sbakaifimre fur one of Hawthonie, was I not, 
(■ (BydK^aif Iml prinL'jplw. as riglit u if 1 had rorroctly oatn<it It T— the 
twu plnatw had ■ cuminou Merucf, Imld forcbcad. musiai'lia. Uowlng 
hair ShaplybKauK the titily end thai muldpnnibly be Mtrved by naming 
It Hawibn«no WMiny dcslrr m hate It ■•>■ With referenee loauy other end 
thai claMlftcatlnn of It would not wrre And orery unity, every Identity, 
•*«r] rlflni attmi li rigblly called faiiclfiil unlc» It wnrcs »omc oltut end 
tfeM ilw Bov MilsEartloQ. «inotlon. or InopimlioD caught by niomeuurily 

riatt.- ] 

340 P8YCH0L0Q Y. 

have a student's lamp of which the flame vibrates most un- 
pleasantly unless the collar which bears the chimney be 
raised about a sixteenth of an inch. I learned the remedy 
after much torment by accident, and now always keep the 
collar up with a small wedge. But my procedure is a mere 
association of two totals, diseased object and remedy. One 
learned in pneumatics could have named the oa/am of the 
disease, and thence inferred the remedy immediately. By 
many measurements of triangles one might find their area 
always equal to their height multiplied by half their base, 
and one might formulate an empirical law to that effect 
But a reasoner saves himself all this trouble by seeing that 
it is the essence (jpro hac vice) of a triangle to be the half of 
a parallelogram whose area is the height into the entire 
base. To see this he must invent additional lines ; and the 
geometer must often draw such to get at the essential prop- 
erty he may require in a figure. The essence consists in 
some rdation of the figure to the new lines, a relation not ob- 
vious at all until they are put in. The geometer's sagacity 
lies in the invention of the new lines. 


First, an extracted character is taken as equivalent to the 
entire datum from tvhich it comes ; and, 

Second, the character thiis taken suggests a certain conse- 
quence more obviously than it teas suggest^ by the total datum 
as it originally came. Take them again, successively. 

1 . Suppose I say, when offered a piece of cloth, " I won't 
l)uy that; it looks as if it would fade," meaning merely 
that something about it suggests the idea of fading to my 
mind, — my judgment, though possibly correct, is not rea- 
soned, but purely empirical ; but, if I can say that into the 
color there enters a certain dve which I know to be chemi- 
cally unstable, and that therefore the color will fade, my judg- 
ment is reasoned. The notion of the dye which is one of the 
parts of the cloth, is the connecting link between the latter 
and the notion of fading. So, again, an uneducated man 
will expect from past experience to see a piece of ice melt 
if placed near the fire, and the tip of his finger look coarse 

if lit TiewR it through a convex glass. In neither of these 
OwM ennUI th« ivsult be anticipated without full previous 
'^<|it&tataa<.^e nith the entire pheuonienou. It in not a 
'■■salt of reasoning. 

Bnt a man who should conceive heat as a mode of 
Uiotioo, sod liqaefactiun as identical with increased motion 
of moltMsoItis ; who should know that curved surfaces bend 
light-rays in si>ecial ways, and that the apparent size of 
lything is connected with the amount of the ' bend ' of its 
t-rays as they enter the eye, — sncli a man would make 
right iufereuctts for all these objects, even though he 
lud neror in Lis life had any concrete experience of them ; 
and he would do this because the ideas which we have 
■bov9 Map|>osed Iiim to possess would mediate in his mind 
betwp«Q the phenomeniL he starts with and the conclusioOB 
he draws. But thes« ideas or reasons for his conclusions 
mv* all mere extracted portions or circumstances singled 
not from the mass of characters which make up the entire 
pheunmeiis. The motions which form heat, the bending 
of th« ligbt-waves, are, it is true, excessively recondite 
ingrodients ; the hidden pendulam I spoke of above is less 
M> ; and the sticking of a door on its sill in the earlier ex- 
ample would hardly be so at all. But each and all agree 
in this, that they bear a vtore evident relntim to the con- 
cloidoQ than did the immediate data in their full totality. 

The difficulty is, in each case, to extract from the im- 
luediats data that particular ingredient which shall have 
thia Terj evident relation to the conclasion. Every phe- 
noneDOD or so-called ' fact ' has an infinity of aspects or 
properties, as we have seen, amongst which the fool, or 
man with little sagacity, will inevitably go astray. But no 
niatter for this point now. The lirst thing is to have seen 
that erery jxissible case of reasoniuf^ involves the extrac- 
tion of a ]>articnlar partial aspect of the phenomena thought 
•boat, and that whilst Empirical Thought simply associates 
iDouens in th^ir entirety, Heasoued Thought couples 
by the conscious use of this extract 

1, now, to prove the second point: Why are the 
t, cooseqaeDces, nod implications of extracts more 


evident and obvious than those of entire phenomena? Far 
two reasons. 

First, the extracted characters are more general than 
the concretes, and the connections they may have are, 
therefore, more familiar to ns, having been more often 
met in onr experience. Think of heat as motion, and what- 
ever is true of motion will be true of heat ; but we have had 
a hundred experiences of motion for every one of heat 
Think of the rays passing through this lens as bending 
towards the perpendicular, and you substitute for the com- 
paratively unfamiliar lens the very familiar notion of a par- 
ticular change in direction of a line, of which notion every 
day brings us countless examples. 

The other reason why the relations of the extracted 
characters are so evident is that their properties are so 
/en?, compared with the properties of the whole, from which 
we derived them. In every concrete total the characters 
and their consequences are so inexhaustibly numerous 
that we may lose our way among them before noticing 
the particular consequence it behooves us to draw. But, 
if we are lucky enough to single out the proper character, 
we take in, as it were, by a single glance all its possible 
consequences. Thus the character of scraping the sill 
has very few suggestions, prominent among which is the 
suggestion that the scraping will cease if we raise the door ; 
whilst the entire refractory door suggests an enormous num- 
ber of notions to the mind. 

Take another example. I am sitting in a railroad-car, 
waiting for the train to start It is winter, and the stove 
fills the car with pungent smoke. The brakeman enters, 
and my neighbor asks him to " stop that stove smoking.'^ 
He replies that it will stop entirely as soon as the car begins 
to move. "Why so?" asks the passenger. "It altcays 
does,'* replies the brakeman. It is evident from this 
'always' that the connection between car moving and 
smoke stopping was a purely empirical one in the brake- 
man's mind, bred of habit. But, if the passenger had been 
an acute reasoner, he, with no experience of what that stove 
always did, might have anticipated the brakeman's reply, 
and spared his own question. Had he singled out of all the 

aineTQas poiute involved in u stove's not smoking the one 

■f-^eUI point of smoke pouring freely out of the stove-pipe's 

I -nth, he would, probftbly, owing to the few associiitions 

' tliat idea, have been immediately reminded of the law 

iiiil II fluid pftfuiefi more rapidly out of a pipe'n mouth if 

ii'ilbt-r fluid be nt the same time streaming over that 

Kiith ; and then the rapid draught of nir over t)ie stove- 

;}i^'s month, which is oue of the [xjinta involved in the 

iir'it niotioD, would immediately hare occurred to him. 

Tttns a L-ouple of extracted characters, with a couple of 

their few aud ohvioaa cunuectious, would have formed the 

itu<Ml link in the passenger's mind between the phenom* 

Ktuoki' stopping and ciir moving, which were only linked 

wholes in the brakeman'K mJnd. Such examples mar seem 

triTial, but they contain the essence of the most refined Etnd 

truiKruml'-Dtnl theorizing. Thfc reason why physics grows 

more deductive the more the fundamental properties it as- 

moe* lire of a mathematical sort, mtcti as molecular mass 

or WBve-loDgth, is that the immediate consequences of these 

BotioBs are so few that we can 9ur^~e3' them all at once, aud 

promptly pick ont those which concern us. 




Sw/acity ; or the Perception of the Essence. 

To reason, then, we must be able to extract characters, — 
anji characters, but the right characters for our conclu- 
tioa. If we extract the wrong character, it will not lead to 
that conclosiou. Here, then, is the difliculty: How are 
tkamders eairnctett, aitd why does U require the advent f^ a 
• 'vi'iut 111 many cases before the fitting characic^r is Itrought to 
'<lht? Why cannot anylKnly reason hh well as anybody 
l*e? Why does it need a Newton to notice the law of the 
«liiareis a IJarwin to notice the survival of the fittest ? To. 
umwer these (juestions we must begin a new research, and 
«n bnw our insight into facts naturally grows. 

All our knowledge at first is vague. When we say that 

filiitg ifl vague, we mean that it has no subdivisions nh in- 

nor precise limitations <Ji extra .- but still all the forms 

may apply to it. It may have unity, reality, ex- 

i^, extent, and what not — thinghood, in a word, bat 


tliinghood only as a whole.* In this vagae way, probabl___ ] 
does the room appear to the babe who first begins to t— ^ 
conscious of it as something other than his moving nors^ ^^^ 
It has no subdivisions in his mind, unless, perhaps, tl 
window is able to attract his separate notice. In this ti 
way, certainly, does every entirely new experience 
to the adult. A library, a museum, a machine-shop, ai 
mere confused wholes to the uninstructed, but the machi 
ist, the antiquary, and the bookworm perhaps hardly n< 
tice the whole at all, so eager are they to pounce upon tht^ 
details. Familiaritv has in them bred discriminatiocB. 
Such vague terms as ' grass,' ' mould,* and ' meat ' do not 
exist for the botanist or the anatomist Thev know too 
much about grasses, moulds, and muscles. A certain per- 
son said to Charles Kingsley, who was showing him the din- 
section of a caterpillar, with its exquisite viscera, " Why, I 
thought it was nothing but skin and squash !" A layman 
present at a shipwreck, a battle, or a fire is helpless. Dis- 
crimination has been so little awakened in him by expe- 
rience that his consciousness leaves no single point of the 
complex situation accented aud standing out for him to be- 
gin to act upDu. But the sailor, the fireman, and the gen- 
eral know directly at what corner to take up the business. 
They * see into the situation ' — that is, they analyze it — with 
their first glance. It is full of delicately differenced ingre- 
dients which their education has little by little brought to 
their consciousness, but of which the novice gains no clear 

How this power of analysis was brought about we saw- 
in our chapters on Discrimination and Attention. We dis- 
sociate the elements of originally vague totals by attending 
to them or noticing them alternately, of course. But what 
determines which element we shall attend to first? There 
are two immediate and ob>4ous answers : first, our practical 
or instinctive interests ; and, second, our sesthetic interests. 
The dog singles out of any situation its smells, and the horse 
its sounds, bcause they may reveal facts of practical mo- 
ment, and are instinctively exciting to these several crea- 

ses above, p. 8. 



•orei. The infant notices the caodle-fiitme or the window, 
**ni tftuonw the refit of the room, because those objects give 
■Un ft Ttrid pleasare. So, the country bov dissociates the 
olackbarrv, the cbetitnut, and the vintergreeu, from the 
▼wgne DiAw* of other shrulw and ti-ees. for tlieir pmctical 
UiHS, and the savage is delighted with the beiidn, the bitH of 
IcM)king-gla8H, brought bv an exploring vensel, and gives no 
i%*<*4i to thfl features of the vessel itself, whi<^h is too ruach 
>nnd hiH sphere. These aesthetic and practical interests, 
L, are the weightiest factors iu making particular ingre- 
inU stand ont iu high relief. ^V'hat they lay their accent 
I, that we notice ; but what they are in themselves, we citn- 
t say. We tnnst content ourselves here with simply ac- 
ing tbem as irreducible ultimate factors in determining 
r our knowledge grows. 
Nnw, a creature which has few iiistiuctive impulses, or 
wts, practical or lesthetic, will dissociate few charac- 
t*ns and will, at best, have limited rensimiug powers ; 
whihit one whose interests are very varied will reason much 
better. Man. by his immensely varied instincts, practical 
vaotM, and ntitthetic feelings, to which every sense coutrib- 
iitiM>, would, by dint of these alone, be sore to dissociate 
tavtly more characters than any other animal ; and accord- 
ingly we find that the lowest savages reason incomparably 
better than the highest brutes. The diverse interests lead, 
too, to a diversification of experiences, whose accumolatiou 
boeoRMtK a condition for the play of that law of dhHocuilunt 
If vnryrny oonctrmilunts of which I treated in a former i-haf>' 
ler (aee To) I. p. 506). 

^V 7^ Belp <fit»n 6y Association by Sim^Ttty. 

^ It ia probable, also, that man's superior assoaation by 
nmHarittf has much tii do with those discriminations of 
charaoler on which hiti higher flights of reasoning are based. 
A» ifaiti latter is an important matter, and as little or noth- 
ing wa» said of it in tlie chapter ou Discrimi nation, it I>e- 
hooTAa me to dwell a little upon it here. 

What doea the reader do when he wishea Ui see in what 
K prectM likeDOHs or difTerenoe of two objeota lies? He 

348 P87CH0L0G7, 

If so much is clear to the reader, he will be williug to 
admit that the mind in which this mode of association 
prevails will, from its better opportnmtr of extricatim; 
characters, be the one most prone to reasoned thinkiu^'; 
whilst, on the other hand, a mind in which we do uot 
detect reasoned thinking will probably be one in which 
association by contiguity holds almost exclnsiTe sway. 

Geniuses are, by common consent, considered to diffei 
from ordinary' minds by an unusual deyelopment of associft^ 
tion by similarity. One of Professor Bain's best strokes ol 
work is the exhibition of this truth.* It applies to geniuses 
in the line of reasoning as well as in other lines. And as the 
genius is to the yulgarian, so the yulgar human mind is to 
the intelligence of a brute. Compared with men, it is 
probable that brutes neither attend to abstract characters, 
nor haye associations by similarity. Their thoughts prob- 
ably pass from one concrete object to its habitual concrete 
successor far more uniformly than is the case with us. In 
other words, their associations of ideas are almost exclu- 
sively by contiguity. It will clear up still farther om 
understanding of the reasoning process, if we deyote a few 
pages to 


I will first try to show, by taking the best stories I cai 
find of animal s;igAoity. that the mental process inyolyed 
may as a rule be jvrfeotly accounted for by mere eontigu^ 
ous association, backed on experience. Mr. Darwin, in hia 
' Descent of Man.' instances the Arctic dogs, described by 
Dr. Hayes, who scatter, when drawing a sledge, as soon a& 
the ice begins to crack. This might be called by some aii 
exercise of reas*-^n. The test would W. Would the most 
intelligent Eskimo dosis that ever lived act s*-* when placed 
upon ice for the first time tt^nrether ? A band of men from 
the tropics misrht do so easily. Kecogniidng cracking to 
be a siiHi of breaking, and seizini: immediately the partial 
character that the p-.^int of niptur>? is the point of greatest 

hU S:i:.iy of Cbarwser. cfc*?. iv . ijc S^sws and Intellect. 

* Intellect.' chapL n. ;he laster lali 



ittifiB icventigator, and may lead to the noticing of m 

I abstract way. Certainly this is obvious; and no 

knclosioii is left to ns lint to uH»ert tbat, after tlie few 

DMt powerful practical and lostlietic interests, our chief 

\t\y tovrards noticing thotte apecial characters of phenoiu- 

whM, which, when once jiosHessed and named, are nsed as 

■Mua, olaas names, essences, or middle terms, is (hii 

ilion 6y nmilarity. Without it, indeed, the deliberate 

wdarr of the scientific man would be impossible : h& 

roold never collect his analogous instances. But it oper- 

■ ati^of itaelf in highly-gifted minds without any deiihern- 

I tioD, Hpontaneoiisty collecting analogous instances, uniting 

f in a moment what in nature the whole breadth of space and 

tira« keeps separate, and so [lermittiug a perception of 

identical points in the midst of different circumstances, 

which minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity 

could never begin to attain. 

FignrA 80 shows tliis. tf m, in the present representa- 
1 A, cftlls up B, C, T>, and E, which are similar to A in 
ing it, and calls them up in rapid succession, then 
k being aasociated almost simultaneously with such vai 
; concomitants, will ' roll out ' and attract our separate J 

348 P8YCH0L00Y. 

If so much is clear to the reader, he will be williug to 
admit that the mind in which this mode of association n:mt 
prevails will, from its better opportunity of extricating 
characters, be the one most prone to reasoned thinking; 
whilst, on the other hand, a mind in which we do not 
detect reasoned thinking will probably be one in which 
association by contiguity holds almost exclusive sway. 

Geniuses are, by common consent, considered to diffei 
from ordinary minds by an unusual development of associa^ 
tion by similarity. One of Professor Bain's best strokes ol 
work is the exhibition of this truth.* It applies to geniuses 
in the line of reasoning as well as in other lines. And as the 
genius is to the vulgarian, so the vulgar human mind is to 
the intelligence of a brute. Compared with men, it is 
probable that brutes neither attend to abstract characters, 
nor have associations by similarity. Their thoughts prob- 
ably pass from one concrete object to its habitual concrete 
successor far more uniformly than is the case with us. In 
other words, their associations of ideas are almost exclu- 
sively by contiguity. It will clear up still farther oui 
understanding of the reasoning process, if we devote a fe^ 
pages to 


I will first try to show, by taking the best stories I cai 
find of animal sagacity, that the mental process involved 
may as a rule be perfectly accounted for by mere contigu^ 
ous association, based on experience. Mr. Darwin, in hia 
* Descent of Man,' instances the Arctic dogs, described by 
Dr. Hayes, who scatter, when drawing a sledge, as soon a& 
the ice begins to crack. This might be called by some an 
exercise of reason. The test would be. Would the most 
intelligent Eskimo dogs that ever lived act so when placed 
upon ice for the first time together ? A band of men from 
the tropics might do so easily. Becognizing cracking to 
be a sign of breaking, and seizing immediately the partial 
character that the point of rupture is the point of greatest 

* See his Study of Character, chap, xv ; also Senses and Intellect, 
'Intellect/ chap, n, the latter half. 

"^tvn, and that the mnsxing of weight at a given point cou- 
**nlr»U«« th^re the strain, a Hindoo might quicklj infor that 
'M^nlk-riuK woul(] atop the cracking, and, by crying out to 
•^ix (*ouirwlps to disperse, save the party from immersion. 
fial iu the dog'a case we need only suppose that they 
U«rr iiidividuallr experienced wet Kkins after cracking, that 
Hwy h»\x- often noticeii craukiug to begin when thej were 
linddled together, and that they have observed it to cease 
wbfn they scattered. Naturally, therefore, the sound wonhl 
mdinlvgrntit all these former experiences, including that of 
acAttering, which latter they would promptly renew. It 
Tonld be a case of immediate suggestion or of that ' Logic 
of R«oept« ' as Mr. Romanes calls it, of which we spoke 
above on p. 327, 

A friend of the writer gave as a prtMjf uf the almost 
bnniiiD intelligence of his dog thut he took him one day 
down to luM boat on the shore, but found the boat full of 
dirt and water. He remembered that the sponge was up at 
tiie houiH^, a tliird of a mile distant ; but, disliking to go back 
hinuielf, he made various gestures of wiping out the boat 
If M id SO forth, saving to his terrier, "Sponge, sponge; go- 
HHMoh the sponge." But he hud little expectation of a result, 
PPlllket) the doR had never received the slightest training with 
tke boat or the sponge. Nevertheless, off he trotted to the 
hoiwe, uid, to Iiis oniier's great surprise and admiration, 
brooffht the sfionge in his jaws. Hagaoious im thiu was, it 
■ttnoired nothing but ordinary contiguous association of 
^^Btaa. The terrier waa only exceptional in the minuteness 
^Pwhix spontaneous observation. Most terriers would have 
taken no interest in the I>oat-c]eaning operation, nor no- 
ticed what the sponge was for. This terrier, in having 
picked those details out of the crude mass of his boat-expe- 
rience distinctly enough to be reminded of them, was truly 
enoogb ahead of his jteers on the line which leads tj) human 
mutoD. Hut his act was notyet an aotof reasoning proper. 
^^^ night fairly have ]>een called so if. unable to find the 
^^hoiif{e at the house, he had brought V)ack a dipper or a 
^^Plop injttead. Hneh a substitution would have shown that, 
^^■bedded in the very different appearances of these articles, 
he bad been able to discriminate the identical partial attri- 

850 PB7CH0L0GY. 

bute of capacity to take up water, and had reflected, "For 
the present purpose they are identicaL" This, which the 
dog did not do, any man but the very stupidest could not 
fail to do. 

If the reader will take the trouble to analyze the best 
dog and elephant stories he knows, he will find that, inmost 
cases, this simple contiguous calling up of one whole by 
another is quite sufficient to explain the phenomena. 
Sometimes, it is true, we have to suppose the recognition of 
a property or character as such, but it is then always a char- 
acter which the peculiar practical interests of the animal 
may have singled out. A dog, noticing his master's hat on its 
peg, may possibly infer that he has not gone out. Intelligent 
dogs recognize by the tone of the master's voice whether 
the latter is angry or not A dog will perceive whether 
you have kicked him by accident or by design, and behave 
accordingly. The character inferred by him, the particular 
mental state in you, however it be represented in his 
mind — it is represented probably by a * recept ' (p. 327) or 
-set of practical tendencies, rather than by a definite con- 
<;ept or idea — is still a partial character extracted from the 
totality of your phenomenal being, and is his reason for 
<5roucliing and skulking, or playing with you. Dogs, more- 
over, seem to have the feeling of the value of their master's 
personal property, or at least a particular interest in objects 
which their master uses. A dog left with his master's coat 
will defend it, though never taught to do so. I know of a 
dog accustomed to swim after sticks in the water, but who 
alwavs refused to dive for stones. Nevertheless, when a fish- 
basket, which he had never been trained to carry, but mere- 
ly knew as his master's, fell over, he immediately dived after 
it and brought it up. Dogs thus discern, at any rate so far 
as to be able to act, this partial character of being valvable, 
which lies hidden in certain things,* Stories are told of 

♦ Wliolher the dog has the notion of your being angry or of your prop- 
erty being VHlimble in nnv such al>stract way as tcv have these notions is 
more than doubtful. The cx>nduot is more likely an impulsive result of a 
conspiracy of outwanl stinwili ; the beast ff^l* lii:^ acting so when these 
stimuli are pn»stMit. though ivnscious of no definite reason why. The 
<iistinction of nH\*p( and ivnccpt is useful here. Some breeds of dogs, 

ouTTUig coppers to paatrj-cooks to get buns, and it ia 
Uut a certain dog, if he gave two coppeis, would Devei 

t>|. odliet, seem itulinctlvely to defenil their master's properly. Tliu case 
b^ilar Ii> Uutvf adui^s barking fit people ii[(i-r (lurk, at whom be would 
MM b»rk Id dMfliglil. 1 have henrd lliis quoleil us evidence of llie dog's 
rruonin^ power. Ii Is only, as Chapter III has sbowD us. llie IriipiilslTo 
rrrall uf ■ BUtninalinn nf stimuli, and has no <iiiiiie<'lii>a with rcMOuing. 

Id I'ertaiu ita^is of the hypnotic tniiice llie siitijeui seems tii lapse into 
liiv DiKi-aiiKlylic Htal«. If n sheet of ruled fuutHcap paper, or a paper with, 
m fttw iDDaotvQoiis oniaiiicDtal pattern priuted ou it, be shown to lUe sub- 
^T^. Bad oitt of the ruled lines or elements of tlic pattern be pointed to for 
aa Ualaal, and the paper Immediately removed, he will thou almost alwayg, 
wbeu attn a short iiii«Tval the paper is presented lu hlni again, pick out the 
todlolfd line or clement with Infallible correctncxs. The o|ierator, mean- 
wkOe, baa either In lieep his eye fixed upon It, or to innko sure of Its potl- 
lion by cDomltiE, in order not to lose lis place. Jitst so we may remember 
1 frfamfa boune lu a street by tbe sbgle character of Us uumber ralber 
ikaa tif lu jteneral look. The Irance-aubject would seem, in these Instau: 
«Si^ loaWrcDder himself to Ihc general look. He disperses his allentioQ 
tapanlalty ovm- the sheet. The place of the particular liiie touched is part 
of a ' total effect ' which he gets in its entirely, and whieh would be dlslort- 
(d If aBOlher line were touched instead. This total effect Is lost upon the 
anmul looker-oD. bent as he la on concentration, analysis, and emphsxla. 
What W0Dd«r. then, that, under these experimental conditions, llie trance- 
subjccl escels hhn In touching the right line again T If he has time given 
Um locoaat the line, he will excel the trance-subject : but If the time be too 
•Iwrt lu count, be will best succeed by following the iTance-method, ab- 
Mslniag from analysb, and being guided by tbe ' general look ' of the tine's 
pUiM OB ih(i tJicet. One Is surpriiuid at oue's success In this the moment one 
t)>M up one'* hnbiiually analytic stale of mind. 

It It loii much to say that wo have In this dispersion of the allCDtlon 
•Bd sohjvrtlou to tbe ' general effect ' sumelbing like a relapse Into tbe 
flaw -jt mind of brutest Tbe Irauuo-subjei-t never gives any other reason 
loc Usvplkal discrlmltutiona, save that ' it looks so,' So a man, on a road 
iiMC traversed InaitcTitlvety before, takes a certain turn for no reason ex- 
nrfM dial he/itU ax If It must be right. He Is guided by n sum of Impres- 
lioHM. w>l one of which Is emphatic or dlstlngulslied from the rest, not one 
o( whkb la CMenihkl, not one of which is wKvn'enl. but all of whieh 
togMber drive hliu to a conclusion to which nothing hut (/iif sum.tolnl 
loiik- Are not some of the wonderful dliscriminalions of animals cxpli- 
caUe fn ibe Htmc way? The cow Hods her own stanchions In the long 
•table, the horw «1o|ib at the house he has once slopped at In the munoto- 
Bu(iii«crv«i, becauK^TKi other Msiichiooa, no other house, yield impartially iiJt 
th» InprKmions of the previous enperlence. The man, however, by seek- 
iD( In tnakr some one Iiiipressioii chanu-lrristic and essehlbil, prevents Iba 
rrrt from having tlicir effect. 80 that, if the (for himi essential fealurf be 
t«Kell«ii at changed, he Is tuu apt to be thrown off Hliogether, ami ibeo 
ttabnuc or (be tnuice-subjcct may seem to outstrip him lu asgaclty, 

~ ~ s already iiuoled distinction between ' rvcvptunl' and 


leaye without two buns. Tliis was probably mere con- 
tiguous associatioiiy but it is possible that the animal noticed 
the character of duality, and identified it as the same 
in the coin and the cake. If so, it is the maximam of 
canine abstract thinking. Another story told to the writer 
is this : a dog was sent to a lumber-camp to fetch a wedge, 
with which he was known to be acquainted. After half an 
hour, not returning, he was sought and found biting ami 
tugging at the handle of an axe which was driven deeply 
into a stump. The wedge could not be found. The teller 
of the story thought that the dog must have had a clear 
perception of the common character of serving to split 
which was involved in both the instruments, and, from their 
identity in this respect, inferred their identity for the pur- 
poses required. 

It cannot be denied that this interpretation is a possible 
one, but it seems to me far to transcend the limits of ordi- 
nary canine abstraction. The property in question was not 
one which had direct personal interest for the dog, such 
as that of belonging to his master is in the case of the 
coat or the basket If the dog in the sponge story had re- 
turned to the boat with a dipper it would have been no 
more remarkable. It seems more probable, therefore, that 
this wood-cutter's dog had also been accustomed to carry 
the axe, and now, excited by the vain hunt for the wedge, 
had discharged his carrj^'jig powers upon the former instru- 
ment in a sort of confusion — just as a man may pick up a 
sieve to carry water in, in the excitement of putting out a 

' conceptual ' thought (published since the body of my text and my note 
were written) connotes conveniently the difference which I seek to point 
out. See also his Mental Evolution in Man, p. 197 ff., for proofs of the 
fact that in a receptual way brutes cognize the mental states of other brutes 
and men. 

♦ Tills matter of confusion is important and interesting. Since confu- 
sion is mistaking the wrong part of the phenomenon for the whole, whilst 
reasoning is, according to our dethiition. based on the subetitutkm of the 
right part for the whole, it might be said that confusion and reasoDing 
are generlcally the same pro(M*sH. 1 believe that they are so, and that the 
only difference between a muddle- head and a genius is that between ex- 
timcting wrong chaiactem and right ones. In other words. a muddle-liead- 

ThRK, th«n, the rliaractem extracted by aiiiiuals are 
**tT few, aud always related to their Immeiliate iutei-euts 
"ir •MDoUiiuH. That ili^sociatiou hy varyiog ouiicomitautB, 
^liii'h in miui ik liuttetl no largely ou usBociutiou by aimilarity, 
banllr aeenin to take place at all iu the uiind of brutes. 
Oav tot&l thought suggests to them another total thought, 
Itail tboy find theiiiaelves itetiiig nitb propriety, they know 
ifc't why. The great, the Fnudameutal, defect of theu- miadH 
ton w to be the iuability of their groups of ideas to break 
•erona id unaccustomed places. They are enslaved to 
mittiaCi to cut-aiid>tlried thinking ; and if the most prosaiG 
of hanao beinga could Ije tntUHported into liiu dog's miud, 
h« would be appalled at the ntter absence of fancy which 
reigtui there.* Thoughts will not be found to call up their 
■imilarM, but only their habitual auecessors. Sunsets vUl 
aot anggoRt heroes' deaths, but supper-time. This is why 
man i» tite only metaphysical animal. To wonder why the 
inuv«rM should Xte as it is presupposes the notion of its being 
•lifferc^ut, and a brute, which never reduces the actual to 
flaidity by breaking up its literal sequences tn his imagiua- 
tiiin, can never form sncli a notion. He takes the world 
amply for granted, and never wonders at it at all, 

ProfniAor Striimpell quotes a dog-story which is prob- 
kbly a type of many otht-rs. The teat ]>erformed looks like 
■iMtnct reaaomng: but an acqudintauce with all the cir- 
nnwtanreM xhows it to have been a random trick learned 
by habit The story is as ftdlowa : 

" I have two dogs, a siuaII, Inng-lefcged pel dog anil a rather large 
*uch-(Iii|;. ImtnMliati'l; bejroad the hDiiw-ooan is the garden, into 
*tai(^b one enlPDi ihrniifth a low lniti(^--gatH which is closed by a latch 

"1 |«nun U ft genliu ipoilinl in lh« mabiug. I Ihiok It will be admtited 
<Mtl1 trntntnUa mudillti-baulcil pcrwnta luve the lempenmcDt of genhu. 
IWjna eonttaally brMklD^- nway from t)i«i uiual consocuiiom of con- 
<*MaL A cntDinan Haoetiilor hy ronlfgiitly In loo closely tiMl lo routine lo 

*1W htne bt a densely stupid animal, m far u everything goes except 
Wr reckon him inlelHgrnt, panly because be 
m. partly becauni he bun •iich ■ wonderful faculty of 
I and ran b« m i|iilckly moulded Inio a man of Mt 
Wta. Had hr anylhtng of [Taw>nliii.' iiitctllgeiice, he would b« a 
lihbful alatc iliu hr U- 

364 P8YCH0L0G Y. 

on the yard-side. This latch is opened by lifting it. Besides this, 
moreover, the gate is fastened on the garden-side by a string nailed to 
the gate-post Here, as often as one wished, could the following sight 
be observed. If the little dog was shut in the garden and he wished to 
get out, he placed himself before the gate and barked. Immediately 
the large dog in the court would hasten to him and raise the latch with 
his nose while the little dog on the garden-side leaped up and, catching 
the string in his teeth, bit it through ; whereupon the big one wedged 
his snout between the gate and the post, pushed the gate open, and the 
little dog slipped through. Certainly reasoning seems here to prevail 
In face of it, however, and although the dogs arrived of themselves, and 
without human aid, at their solution of the gate question, I am able to 
point out that the complete action was pieced together out of accidental 
experiences which the dogs followed, I might say, unconsciously. 'While 
the large dog was young, he was allowed, like the little one, to go into 
the garden, and therefore the gate was usually not latched, but simply 
closed. Now if he saw anyone go in, he would follow by thrusting his 
snout between gat« and post, and so pushing the gate open. When be 
was grown I forbade his being taken in, and had the gate kept latched. 
But he naturally still tried to follow when anyone entered and tried in 
the old fashion to open it, which he could no longer do. Now it fell 
out that once, while making the attempt, he raised his nose higher than 
usual and hit the latch from below so as to lift it off its hook, and the 
gate unclosed. From thenceforth he made the same movement of the 
head when trying to open it, and, of course, with the same result. He 
now knew how to open the gate when it was latched. 

"The little dog had been the large one's teacher in many things, 
especially in the chasing of cats and the catching of mice and moles; so 
when the little one was heard barking eagerly, the other always has- 
tened to him. If the barking came from the garden, he opened the gate 
to get inside. But meanwhile the little dog, who wanted to get out the 
moment the gate opened, slipped out between the big one's legs, and so 
the appearance of his having come with the intention of letting him out 
arose. And that it was simply an appearance transpired from the fact 
that when the little dog did not succeed at once in getting out, the large 
one ran in and nosed about the garden, plainly showing that he had ex- 
pected to find something there. In order to stop this opening of the 
gate I fastened a string on the garden-side which, tightly drawn, held 
the gate firm against the post, so that if the yard dog raised the latch 
and let go, it would every time fall back on to the hook. And this 
device was successful for quite a time, until it happened one day that 
on my return from a walk upon which the little dog had accompanied 
me I crossed the garden, and in passing through the gate the dog re- 
mained behind, and refused to come to my whistle. As it was begin- 
ning to rain, and I knew how he disliked to get wet, I closed the gate 
in order to punish him in this manner. But I had hardly reached the 
house ere he was before the gate, whining and crjing most piteonalyi 

BEASOyiAV. 355 

for the rain was falling faster and faster. The big dog, to \ihom the 
rain was a matter of |)erfect indifference, was instantly on hand and 
tried his utmost to open the gate« but naturally without success. Al- 
mo8t in despair the little dog bit at the gate, at the same time springing 
into the air in the attempt to jump over it, when he chanced to cateh 
the string in his teeth ; it broke, and the gate flew open. Now lie 
knew the secret and thenceforth bit the string whenever he wisheil to 
get out, so that I was obliginl to change it. 

'' That the big dog in raising the latch did not in the least Av^ou'that 
the latch closed the gate, that the raising of the same opened it, but that 
he merely repeated the automatic blow with his snout which had once 
hjul such happy consequences, transpires from the following : the gate 
leading to the bam is fastened with a latch precisely like the one on 
the garden-gate, only placed a little higher, still easily within the dog*8 
reach. Here, to«), occasionally the little dog is confined, and when he 
barks the big one makes every possible effort to open ttie gate, but it 
has never occurred to him to push the latch up. The brute cannot 
draw conclusions, that is, he cannot think.'** 

Other clasBical differentice of man besideH that of l)eiug 
the only reasouiug animal, alHO seem couHequeuces of hiH 
unrivalled powers of similar association. He has, e.g., been 
called ' the laughing animal.' But humor has often been 
defined as the ree()gniti(m of identities in things different 
When the man in Coriolanus says of that hero that " there 
is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger/* 
l.K)th the invention of the phrase and its enjoyment by the 
hearer depend on a peculiarly p^)lexing power to associ- 
ate ideas by similarity. 

Man is known again as ' the talking animal '; and lau- 

♦ Th Schumann : Joiimnl Dahcim. No. 19, 187b. Quoted by Strl^m- 
pell : Die Oei»ti»ftkrafte cltT Meuwhen vtTjrliclien niit douen der Thiere 
4 Leipzig. 1878). p. 89. CatHiire notorioun for the Bkill with which they will 
o{>en latches, lockfl. etc. Tlieir fentM are usually ascribed to their reaM)n- 
lufT powcrik But Dr. Uoinanes well remarks (Mental Evolution, etc , p. 
Zm, note) that we on^rht Hrst to \ye sure that tlie artionii an* not due to mere 
aiwociatlon. A cat U r^)n»*ljinily playinjr with thiiip* with her pawn ; a trick 
accidentally hit upon may Ih' retained liomnnes notea the fact that the 
aoimala most nkilled in this way Qee<l not be the mo^i i^nerally intelligent, 
but those which have the beflt coqK>rea1 members for handling thiniTM. 
calV pnw», horse's lips, elephant's trunk, cow's horns. The monkey has 
both the corporeal and the intellectual superiority. And my deprecatorj- 
remarks on animal rea«H)nin^ in the text apply far less to the quadnimana 
thao to quadnipe<ls.— On the possible fallacies in interpreting aniioals' 
minda, compare C. L. Morgun in Mind. xi. 174 tl886). 


366 P8YCH0L0Q r. 

guage is assuredly a capital distinction between man and 
brute. But it may readily be shown how this distinction 
merely flows from those we have pointed out, easy disso- 
ciation of a representation into its ingredients, and associa- 
tion by similarity. 

Language is a system of signs^ different from the things 
signified, but able to suggest them. 

No doubt brutes have a number of such signs. When 
a dog yelps in front of a door, and his master, understand- 
ing his desire, opens it, the dog may, after a certain number 
of repetitions, get to repeat in cold blood a yelp which was 
at first the involuntary interjectional expression of strong 
emotion. The same dog may be taught to ' beg ' for food, 
and afterwards come to do so deliberately when hungry. 
The dog also learns to understand the signs of men, and 
the word ' rat ' uttered to a terrier suggests exciting 
thoughts of the rat-hunt. If the dog had the varied im- 
pulse to vocal utterance which some other animals have, 
he would probably repeat the word * rat ' whenever he 
spontaneously happened to think of a rat-hunt — he no 
doubt does have it as an auditory image, just as a parrot 
calls out different words spontaneously from its repertory, 
and having learned the name of a given dog will utter it on 
the sight of a different dog. In each of these separate cases 
the particular sign may be consciously noticed by the ani- 
mal, as distinct from the particular thing signified, and will 
thus, so far as it goes, be a true manifestation of language. 
But when we come to man we find a great difference. H^ 
has a deliberate intention to apply a sign to everything. Th^ 
linguistic impulse is with him generalized and systematic 
For things hitherto unnoticed or unfelt, he desires a sign, 
before he has one. Even though the dog should possess^ 
his * yelp ' for this thing, his * beg ' for that, and his audi- 
tory image * rat ' for a third thing, the matter with him rest» 
there. If a fourth thing interests him for which no sign. 
happens already to have been learned, he remains tran- 
quilly without it and goes no further. But the man jx>^«— 
lates it, its absence irritates him, and he ends by inventinf^ 
it This GENERAL iTRix>sE ctwstitutfs, I take it, the pecyliariftf 
of human speech, and explains its prodigious devdopment 

How. Outa, iloea the general purpose arise? It arises 

•• toon MM th^ uotJon of a sign as stick, apart from auj par- 

r import, is boru ; aud this notioo is bom by dis- 

U»tiou from the outstaodiug portions of a number <>l 

•etc cases of siguiUcutiou. The 'jelp,' the 'beg,' the 

' differ as to their several irajMrts aud uatures. Thev 

f only in ho far a» they have the same -use— to he signs, 

Istaod for H^mething more important than themselves. 

Tka dog whom this similarity could strike would have 

gnuspod the sign per ae as such, and would probably 

thereapon become a general sign-maker, or sjjeaker in 

the banau seuse. But how can the similarity strike 

bin? Nut without the juxtaposition of the similars (in 

virtne of the law we have laid down (p. 506). that in order 

to be segregated an ex]}erieiioe must be repeated with 

v&rying concomitants) — not unless the 'yelp' of the dog 

at the moment it occurs recaSs to him his ''jeg.' ^J t\i^ 

(l«licat« bond of their subtle similarity of use — uot till 

then can this thought flash through his miud : " Why, yelp 

uid beg, in spite of all their uulikeness, are yet alike in 

thio: that tliey are actions, signs, which leail to imjMirtaut 

b<iun&. Other boons, any boons, may then be got by other 

MgUB I" This reflection made, the gulf ts passed. Auimala 

pnibably nover make it, because the bond of similarity is 

&"t delicate enough. Each sign is drowned iu its imjKtrt, 

ud nev<tr awakens other signs and other impoi-ta in jux- 

UpoMtion. The rat-hiiiit idea is too absorbingly interest- 

bft tD itself to be interrupted by anything so nncouttgnous 

toit lUi tho idea of the ' l;eg for food,' or of ' the door-oi>eu 

"'1[>,' Dor in their turn do these awaken the rat-hnut idea. 

In the hnman child, however, these ruptures of coutign- 

'^ atwociutiou are very six)n made ; far off cases of sign- 

iwiig aiwe when we make a sign now ; and soon language 

in Uiutehed. The cliild iu each case makes the discovery 

tor kimsolf. No one can help him except by furnishing 

Mtii with the conditions. Bat as he is coustituted. the coa- 

■ 'I'jBs will sooner or later shoot together into the result,* 

' Thm arc Iwu olber oundltlun* of laugtugc iu iLc Uiinuu l>piD{{. rtddl' 
"■Mkl to modalhn b; aimilartly. Uuit uaUt lU artiou, OT nUhtr pnvo Um 
**7 («r It. Tbne arv: tint. Ilia grvu naiiinl 1»quiciiy; uid, mtrnd. Um 


The exceedingly interesting account which Dr. Howe 
gives of the education of his various blind-deaf mutes illus- 
trates this point admirably. He began to teach Laura 
Bridgman by gumming raised letters on various familiar 
articles. The child was taught by mere contiguity to pick 
out a certain number of particular articles when made to 
feel the letters. But this was merely a collection of par- 
ticular signs, out of the mass of which the general purpose 
of signification had not yet been extracted by the cliild*& 
mind. Dr. Howe compares his situation at this moment to 
that of one lowering a line to the bottom of the deep sea in 
which Laura's soul lay, and waiting until she should spon- 
taneously take hold of it and be raised into the light The 
moment came, ' accompanied by a radiant flash of intelli- 
gence and glow of joy '; she seemed suddenly to become 
aware of the general purpose imbedded in the different de- 
tails of all these signs, and from that moment her education 
went on with extreme rapidity. 

Another of the great capacities in which man has been 
said to differ fundamentally from the animal is that of pos- 

great imitHtiTenesg of man. The first produces the original reflex inter- 
jectioual sign; the second (as Bleek has well shown) fixes it, stamps it, and 
ends by multiplying the number of determinate specific signs which are a 
retjuisite preliminary to the general conscious purpose of sign-making, 
which I have called the characteristic human element in language. Th< 
way in which imitativeness fixes the meaning of signs is this: When a pri 
meval man has a given emotion, he utters his natural interjection; or wbei 
vto avoid sup(X)8iug that the retiex sounds are exceedingly determinate h} 
natun^) a group of such men experience a common emotion, and one takei 
I ho lend in the cry, the others cry like him from sympathy or imitative 
ness, Now, lot one of the group hear another, who is in presence of th< 
ox|HTioni»e, utter the cry: he, ovon without the experience, will repeat th< 
ory frvnu pure iu\ilativoness. But, as he repeats the sign, he will be re 
miudod by it of his own fonuor ex[H?rience. Thus, first, he has the sigi 
with the emotion; thou, without it; then, with it again. It is *' dissociatec 
by ohangi* of iH>niH)mitants "; he feels it as a separate entity and yet as hav 
ing a ctuuuvtiou with the emotion. Immediately it becomes possible foi 
him to oouplo it dolibomtoly with the emotion, in cases where the lattei 
would oithor have pnwokod no intorjtK'tiiuinl en;- or not the same one. Ii 
n woni. his moutnl prvH^nhir^* tends to fix this cry on that emotion; anc 
when this inn-urs. in many instaiuvs ho is pn»vidoil with a stock of signs 
like the volp. In**:, mt of the dog. laoh i^f which suggests a detenninati 
image, ihi this stook. then, similarity works in the way above explained. 

o^aaiog Belf-const'ionsneHs nr reflective knowledge of liim- 
•elf w) ■ thinker. But tbis capacity also flows from our 
trilorioD, for {without going into the matter very deeply) 
^« may say that the brute never reflects on himself as a 
tfainkfr, beoause he has never clearly dissociated, in the 
fnit <»ncn?te act of thought, the element of the thing 
ttum^ht of and the operation by which he thinks it. They 
rwmaiu alwayti fused, (conglomerated — jnut as the interjec- 
tioiuil vocal sign of the brute almost invaiiably merges in 
lus mind with the thiug signified, and is not independently 
Att«>aded to in «e.* 

Now, the dissociation of these two elements probably 
iM-cnm first in the child's inind on the occasion of some 
ermr or fatae expectation which would make him esperienca 
IiAt shfick of ditTi^reuce between merely imagining a thing 
^Bm getting it. The thought experienced once with the 
^wacoinitant reality, and then without it or with opposite 
" ni'oniitant8, reminds the child of other cases in which the 
rii.. provoking phenomenon occurred. Thus the general 
" ;;ie(lient of error may be dissociated and noticed per le, 
will friim the notion of his error or wrong thought to that of 
111' Uiniight in general the transition is easy. The brute, no 
liiuM. has ]denty of instauces of error and disappointment 
< tiis life, but the similar shock ia in him most likely al- 
ii* Kwallowed up in the accidents of the actual case. An 
^iTtation disappointed may breed dubiety as to the reali- 
ix'D of that particular thing when the dog next expects 
Bat that di.'iappoiutmeut, that dubiety, while they are 
ftpat in the mind, will not call np other cases, in which 
'•■ material details were different, but this feature of poB- 

'SMtb* 'Evolutioa ot Self-cuDBcluuBUrsH' in ' PhIlow>phlc»1 DUriu- 

'.•.'byt^hauDCcy WrigliKNew YuTk: Henry Holt 4 Co.. 1877), Dr. Ro- 

>r>n, in tb(! IxKik from which I Lave klrciuly (inulnl, welu U> ibow thai 

' ' TiiDiciotianaB uf truth M truth ' Hni] lliu di'lilHTnle Intenlion to prnll- 

''■ ivlilch an* Um' chainclcriatln ut higher human rt*Biioningi pn-aiippuM) 

1 r>aiM-liiuN)«M of Idrai a« KUfli. ai things djaUnrt from their objects ; idi) 

ikU Ibb ronicloiinni^M ilcpcniU on our having tnailr signs for them hy 

Wfuap' My ti-xl utiiiB U> nu- to include Dr. ItonutDos's facts, and formu- 

»IM tlwdi In *tml lu me U a more eleuH'Dtary way, though the rt^der who 

■faha lo sndmtatid thti nintlirr licitcr ghoii'd pt \<> his clear and [ntlaal 


sible error was the same. The brute will, therefore, stop 
short of dissociating the general notion of error per m, and 
a fortiori will never attain the conception of Thought itadf 
as such. 

We may then, we think, consider it proven that the mo^ 
elementary single difei^ence between the human mind and thai cf 
brutes lies in this deficiency on the brute's part to associate idtas 
by similarity — characters, the abstraction of which depends 
on this sort of association, must in the brute always remain 
drowned, swamped in the total phenomenon which they 
help constitute, and never used to reason from. If a char- 
acter stands out alone, it is always some obvious sensible 
quality like a sound or a smell which is instinctively excit- 
ing and lies in the line of the animal's propensities ; or it 
is some obvious sign which experience has habitually 
coupled with a consequence, such as, for the dog, the sight 
of his master's hat on and the master's going out. 


But, now, since nature never makes a jump, it is evident 
that we should find the lowest men occupying in this respect 
an intermediate position between the brutes and the highest 
men. And so we do. Beyond the analogies which their own 
minds suggest by breaking up the literal sequence of their 
experience, there is a whole world of analogies which they 
can appreciate when imparted to them by their betters, but 
which they could never excogitate alone. This answers 
the question why Darwin and Newton had to be waited for 
so long. The flash of similarity between an apple and the 
moon, between the rivalrv for food in nature and the rivalry- 
for man's selection, was too recondite to have occurred to any 
but exceptional minds. Genius, (hen, as has been already 
said, is identical with the poftsession of similar association 
to an extreme degree. Professor Bain says : "This I count 
the leading fact of genius. I consider it quite impossible 
to afford any explanation of intellectual originality except 
on the supposition of unusual energy on this point," Alike 
in the arts, in literature, in practical affiiirs, and in science, 
association by similarity is the prime condition of 8ucces& 

L Bccording to our \-iew, tlier» are twu stages iu 
Sioaght, one whei-e similai-ity merely operates to 
f) cognate tlionghts, nutl another farther tttage, where 
□d of tdeutity between tlie connate thoughts is 
■ ao minds of geuiun may be ttivitled into two main 
*Oft*, thote who tMrfiw tfte txmd and those who merely obey it. 
Tbe first Kre the nbstru^'t renttouers, properly »o called, 
Uie ineu of Hcifuee, and pliilosopberH — the oualyats, iu 
« vtird ; the Itttter are the poets, the t-ritida — the nrtjuta, 
in • word, the men of intiiitioiiri. Tlie»e jmlge rightly, 
classify ctut^n, c-haracteriKe them by the most fltriking ana- 
lnf(ic fpitht-ti*, but go uo further. At first s^^ht it might 
«««ni that the ouiilytic mind repre»euted simply a higher 
intellectaal stage, and that the intuitive tnind repreaeuted 
an WTpnted stage of iutellectual development ; Imt the dif- 
ference u not so simple as this. Professor Bain has said 
that a man's a<lTau<'e to the scieutitic stage (tlie stage of 
witicinK and abstracting the Ixmd of similarity) may often 
be due to an obsncr of certain emotional sensibilities. The 
Keoite of color, he says, may no less determine a mind away 
from aviBOC« than it determines it toward painting. There 
mtut be a pennrj* in one's interest in the details of particn- 
lir forms in order to permit the forces of the intellect to 
KIk coucentratct] on what is common tu many forms.* In 
^BjAer worda, supposing a mind fertile in the suggestion of 
^niult>gieH, but, at the same time, keenly interested in the 
pvticalars of each suggested image, that mind woiih) lie 
far leas apt to single ont the particular character which 
called op the analogy than one whose interests were \enn 
guwnllT lively. A certain richness of the testhetio nature 
■ajr, therefore, easili keep one in the intuitive stage. All 
the poets are examples of this. Take Homer : 

" L'iyniM. lou. Biiittl round lUe hoURc lo mw if any man were Hlill 
klitD nod Uding, trying to gi-t awuy from gloomy death. Hi- fmind 
then all tollen la tlie blood nnd dirt, and in sucli number a* tbc 6th 
■Ueh Ibr Babenncn to tliu low Htiorv. onl of the roaming aea. drag 
«tlb lb«tr maaby nets. Thusc alt. sirk for thi^ tKc^a water, «n> strewn 
MtKUxl \hm uadc while tlii< liUuing sou tatw their life from Ibem. So 
tlMtv tlw •olton lay «tr«wn round on niiu another." Or itniu : 

* Stodjr at CiMncicr. p. 317. 

362 psrcHOLOor. 

** And as when a Maeonian or a Carian woman stains ivory with 
purple to be a cheek-piece for horses, and it is kept in the chamber, and 
many horsemen have prayed to bear it off ; but it is kept a treasure for 
a king, both a trapping for his horse and a glory to the driver — in such 
wise were thy stout thighs, iMenelaos, and legs and fair ankles stained 
with blood."* 

A man in whom all the accidents of an analogy rise up 
as vividly as this, may be excused for not attending to the 
ground of the analogy. But he need not on that account 
be deemed intellectually the inferior of a man of drier mind» 
in whom the ground is not as liable to be eclipsed by the 
general splendor. Barely are both sorts of intellect, the 
splendid and the analytic, found in conjunction. Plato 
among philosophers, and M. Taine, who cannot quote a 
child's saying without describing the * voix chantanie^ 
itonneey heureuae* in which it is uttered, are only excep- 
tions whose strangeness proves the rule. 

An often-quoted writer has said that Shakespeare pos- 
sessed more intdlectual potoer than any one else that ever 
lived. If by this he meant the power to pass from given 
premises to right or congruous conclusions, it is no doubt 
true. The abrupt transitions in Shakespeare's thought 
astonish the reader by their unexpectedness no less than 
they delight him by their fitness. Why, for instance, does 
the death of Othello so stir the spectator's blood and leave 
him with a sense of reconcilement? Shakespeare himself 
could very likely not say why ; for his invention, though 
rational, was not ratiocinative. Wishing the curtain to fall 
upon a reinstated Othello, that speech about the turbaned 
Turk suddenly simply flashed across him as the right end of 
all that went before. The drv critic who comes after can, 
however, point out the subtle bonds of identity that guided 
Sliakespeare's pen through that si)eeeh to the death of the 
Moor. Othello is sunk in ignomin}-, lapsed from his 
height at the beginning of the play. What better way 
to rescue him at last from this abasement than to make 
)iim for au instant identify himself in memory with the old 
Othello of better days, and then execute justice on his pres- 
ent disowned bodv, as he used then to smite all enemies of 

Translated by my colleague, Professor G. H. Palmer. 

REASONmO. 363 

Bnt Shakespeare, whofie mind supplied these 
ild probably not have told why they were bo 

Bot though thiii is true, and though it, wonld be absurd 
m ui sbaolate way to eaj' that a given analytic mind was 
■ iil>orior to any intuitional one, yet it is none the less true tb«- former represents the higher stage. Men, taken 
i 1 1 1 tiiriiuilly, reason by analogy long Iwfore they have learned 
!(• n^aaon by abstract characters. At^sociatlon by similarity 
and trne reottoning may have identical results. If a philos- 
opher wiaheK to prove to you why you should do a certain 
thing, he may do so by using abstract considerations esclu- 
Mvely ; a savage will prove the same by reminding you of a 
nrnilar cose in whieh yon notoriouslj- do as he now pro- 
pooes, aod this with no ability to state the poifii in which 
tlte caw^fl are similar. lu all primitive literature, in all 
Mva^Ri oratory, we find persuasion carried on exclusively 
by panbles and similes, and travellers in savage countries 
reajily adopt the native custom. Take, for example, I>r. 
Liringstone's argument with the negro conjuror. The mis- 
■ionary was trjing to dissuade the savage from his fetiehistio 
ttays of invoking rain. " You see," said he, " that, afterall 
ynar operations, sometimes it rains and sometimes it doea 
not, fxnctly as when j'ou have not operated at all." " Bnt," 
r«pli(*d tho sorcerer, "it is just the same with you doctors; 
Toa giveyonr remedies, and sometimes the patient gets well 
and sometimes he dies, just as when you do nothing at sU," 
To that the pious miasiouary replied : " The doctor does hia 
iloty, aft<*r which God performs the cure if it pleases Him." 
^^* Well," rejoined the sa^'age, " it is just so with me. I do 
^■^t is necessary to procure rain, after which God aenda it 
^^B withholds it (Uncording to His pleasure."' 
^^H This is the stage in which proverbial philosophy reigns 
^^■preme. "An empty sack can't stand straight" will stand 
^^Hr th« rfaaoii why a man with debts may lose his honesty ; 
^^Bld " a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" will ser^'e 
^H^ back op one's exhortations to prudence. Or we answer 
HHba question : " Why is snow white ?" by saWng, " For the 

* Qdotad fer RnwuTfar. CrttSque PbtloMpbtqne. Octob«r 19, I9TV. 

364 P8YCH0L0QT. 

same reason that soap-suds or whipped eggs are white* 
in other words, instead of giving the reason for a fact, "mr* 
give another example of the same fact This offering a simi- 
lar instance, instead of a reason, has often been criticisecf 
as one of the forms of logical depravity in men. But mani- 
festly it is not a perverse act of thought, but only an in- 
complete one. Furnishing parallel cases is the uecessarj 
first step towards abstracting the reason imbedded in 
them alL 

As it is with reasons, so it is with words. The first 
words are probably always names of entire things and en- 
tire actions, of extensive coherent groups. A new experi-. 
ence in the primitive man can only be talked about by 
him in terms of the old experiences which have received 
names. It reminds him of certain ones from among them, 
but the points in which it agrees with them are neither 
named nor dissociated* Pure similarity' must work before 
the abstraction can work which is based upon it The first 
adjectives will therefore probably be total nouns embody- 
ing the striking character. The primeval man will say, 
not ' the bread is hard,' but ' the bread is stone* ; not 
'the face is round,' but 'the face is moon'; not 'the 
fruit is sweet,' but *the fruit is sugar-cane.' The first 
words are thus neither particular nor general, but vagndy 
concrete ; just as we speak of an * oval ' face, a * velvet ' 
skin, or an *iron' will, without meaning to connote any 
other attributes of the adjective-noun than those in which 
it does resemble the noun it is used to qualify. After 
a while certain of these adjectively-used nouns come only 
to signify the particular quality for whose sake they are 
oftenest used ; the entire thing which they originally meant 
receives another name, and they become true abstract 
and general terms. Oval, for example, with us suggests 
ofily shape. The first abstract qualities thus formed are, 
no doubt, qualities of one and the same sense found in 
different objects — jis big, sweet ; next analogies between 
different senses, as * sharp ' o( Uisie, * high ' of sound, etc. ; 
then analogies of motor oombmaticms, or form ot relation, 
as sini])le, confused, ilitKoult, reciprocal, relative, spontane- 
ous, eti*. The t^xtrome degree of subtlety in analogy is 

RBASOmNO. 386 

^%cbnt iu HQcti cases na when we aaj certaiu En^liMli art 
J*itira' wiititig reminds iia of a close room iii whicli pastilles 
t beoQ bumiog, or that the mind of certain Freuchnieu 
Ike old Roquefort cheese. Here laognage utterly fails 
jjit apon the basis of reseinblauce. 

^ ' B departmeDts of our thought we are still, 

I n», in the savage state. Similarity operates m as, but 
tactiou liaa not takeu place. We kuow what the pres- 
s like, we know what it reminds uti of, we have ati 
mtaitioti of th<- right (*iiur»e to take, if it be a practical mat- 
ter. But analytic thought has made no tracks, and we can- 
not justify' ourselves to others. In ethical, psychological, 
aail esthetic matters, to give a clear reaaou for one's jmlg- 
B«nt is miiversnlly recognized as a mark of rare genius. 
Tbe faplplessness of nueducated people to accouut for their 
Ukea and dislikes is often ludicrous. Ask the first Irish 
girl why «be likes this country better cir worse than hor 
home, aad see how much she can tell you. But if you ask 
ycrnr most edncated friend why he prefers Titian to Paul 
TfrTODCs*", yon will hardly get more of a reply ; and you will 
pmbsbly get absolutely none if you inquire why Beethoven 
reminds him of Michael Angeln, or how it comes that a 
twrf figore with unduly flexed joints, by the latter, can so 
s«ggi*«t thf ni<triil tragwly of life. His thought obeys a 
wma, but cannot name it. And so it is with all those jndg- 
aentH ni crp&rh, which even though unmotived are so valu- 
Saturated with experience of a particular class of 
triaU, an expert intuitively feels whetlier a newly-re- 
] fact is probable or not, whether a proposed hypoth- 
worthless or the reverse. He instinctively knows 
^ in a novel case, this and not that will be the promising 
B of action. The well-known story of the oM judge 
ing the new one never ti) give reasons for his decisions, 
• decisions will probably be right, the reasons will surely 
rong," illustrates this. The doctor will feel that the 
int in doomed, the dentist will have a premonition that 
>th will break, though neither can articulate a reason 
1 foreboding. The reason lies imbedded, but not yet 
t bar», iu all the- countless preinons cases dimly sug- 
V) by the actual one, all calling up the same conclusion, 

866 P8YCH0L00 Y. 

which the adept thus finds himself swept on to, he knows 
not how or why. 

A physiologiccd conduaion remains to he draivn. If the 
principles laid down in Chapter XIV are true, then it fol- 
lows that the great cerebral difference between habitual aud 
reasoned thinking must be this : that in the former an entire 
system of cells vibrating at any one moment discharges in 
its totality into another entire system, and that the order 
of the discharges tends to be a constant one in time ; whilst 
in the latter a part of the prior system still keeps yibrating 
in the midst of the subsequent system, and the order— 
which part this shall be, and what shall be its concomitants 
in the subsequent system — has little tendency to fixedness 
in time. This physical selection, so to call it, of one part 
to vibrate persistently whilst the others rise and subside, 
we found, in the chapter in question, to be the basis of 
similar association. (See especially pp. 578-81.) It would 
seem to be but a minor degree of that still more urgent 
and importunate localized >dbration which we can easiest 
conceive to underlie the mental fact of interest, attention^ 
or dissociation. In terms of the brain-process, then, all 
these mental facts resolve themselves into a single peculi- 
arity: that of indeterminateness of connection between 
the different tracts, and tendencv of action to focalize 
itself, so to speak, in small localities which vary infinitely 
at different times, and from which irradiation may pro- 
ceed in countless shifting ways. (Compare figure 80, p. 
347.) To discover, or (what more befits the present stage 
of nerve-physiology) to adumbrate by some possible guess, 
on what chemical or molecular-mechanical fact this instable 
equilibrium of the human brain may depend, should be the 
next task of the physiologist who ponders over the passage 
from brute to man. Whatever the physical peculiarity in 
question may be, it is the cause why a man, whose brain 
has it, reasons so much, whilst his horse, whose brain lacks 
it, reasons so little. We can but bequeath the problem to 
abler hands than our own. 

But, meanwhile, this mode of stating the matter suggests 
a couple of other inferences. The first is brief. If /ocali- 

BBA80NING, 367 

tntion of brain-activity be the fundamental fact of reasonable 
thought, we see why intense interest or concentrated pas- 
sion makes us think so much more truly and profoundly. 
The persistent focalization of motion in certain tracts is the 
cerebral fact corresponding to the persistent domination in 
consciousness of the important feature of the subject 
When not 'focalized/ we are scatter-brained; but when 
thoroughly impassioned, we never wander from the point 
None but congruous and relevant images arise. When 
roused by indignation or moral enthusiasm, how trenchant 
are our reflections, how smiting are our words ! The whole 
network of petty scruples and by-considerations which, at 
ordinary languid times, surrounded the matter like a cob- 
web, hokling back our thought, as Oulliver was pinned to 
the earth by the myriad Lilliputian threads, are dashed 
through at a blow, and the subject stands with its essential 
and vital lines revealed. 

The last point is relative to the theory that what was 
acquired habit in the ancestor may become congenital ten- 
dency in the offspring. So vast a superstructure is raised 
ui>ou this principle that the paucity of empirical evidence 
for it has alike been matter of regret to its adherents, and 
of triumph to its opponents. In Chapter XXVIII we shall 
see what we may call the whole beggarly array of proof. 
In the human race, where our opportunities for observation 
are the most complete, we seem to have no evidence what- 
ever which would support the hypothesis, unless it possibly 
l)e the law that city-bred children are more apt to be 
near-sighted than country children. In the mental world 
we certainly do not observe that the children of great 
travellers get their geography lessons v^-ith unusual ease, 
or that a baby whoso ancestors have spoken German for 
thirty generations will, on that account, learn It^ilian any 
the less easilv from its Italian nurse. But if the con- 
siderations we have b(»eu led to are true, they explain 
perfectlv well whv this law shonhl vnf be verified in the 
human race, and why, therefore, in hmking for evidence 
on the subject, we should confine ourselves exchisively to 
lower animals. In thoni fixed habit is the essential and 


characteristic law of nervous action. The brain grows to 
the exact modes in which it has been exercised, and the in- 
heritance of these modes — then called instincts — would 
have in it nothing surprising. But in man the negation of 
all fixed modes is the essential characteristic. He owes his 
whole pre-eminence as a reasoner, his whole human quality 
of intellect, we may say, to the facility with which a given 
mode of thought in him may suddenly be broken up into 
elements, which recombine anew. Only at the price of in- 
heriting no settled instinctive tendencies is he able to settle 
every novel case by the fresh discovery by his reason of 
novel principles. He is, par excdlence^ the edtuxMe animaL 
If, then, the law that habits are inherited were found exem- 
plified in him, he would, in so far forth, fall short of his 
human perfections ; and, when we survey the human races, 
we actually do find that those which are most instinctive at 
the outset are those which, on the whole, are least educated 
in the end. An untutored Italian is, to a great extent, a 
man of the world ; he has instinctive perceptions, tendencies 
to behavior, reactions, in a word, upon his environment, 
which the untutored German wholly lacks. If the latter be 
not drilled, he is apt to be a thoroughly loutish personage; 
but, on the other hand, the mere absence in his brain of 
definite innate tendencies enables him to advance by the de- 
velopment, through education, of his purely reasoned think- 
ing, into complex regions of consciousness that the Italian 
may probably never approach. 

We observe an identical difference between men as a 
whole and women as a whole. A young woman of twenty re- 
acts with intuitive promptitude and security in all the usual 
circumstances in which she may be placed.* Her likes 

* Social aud domestic circumstances, that is, not material ones. Per- 
ceptions of social relations seem very keen in i)er80Ds whose dealings with 
the material world are confined to knowing a few useful objects, princi- 
pally animals, plants, and weapons. Savages and boors are often as tact- 
ful and astute socially as trained diplomatists. In general, it is proMible 
that the consciousness of how one stands with other people occupies a rela- 
tively larger and larger part of the mind, the lower one goes in the scale 
of culture. Woman's intuitions, so fine in the sphere of personal relations^ 
are seldom first-rate in the way of mechanics. All boys teach themselves 
how a clock goes ; few girls. Hence Dr. Whately's jest, ** Woman Is tlie 
unreasoning animal, and pokes the fire from on top." 


ititJikes &re formed ; her opinioiiH, to a great extent, the 
mo thkt thej Kill be through life- Her charatiter is, in 
tavt, finutheil in its essentials. How inferior to her is a boy 
r>f * eut_v iu all these resi>eots! His character is still gelat- 
iuDQH. uncertain what uhape to assume, ' trying it on ' in 
ererr directioD, Feeling his power, yet ignorant of the 
(n«auer in which he shall express it, he is, when compared 
«ith Ilia xtster, n lieiug of no dednite contour. But this 
almeiice of prompt tendeuL-y in his braiu to set iiitt) particu- 
lar tuode*i IH tiie very condition which iuHureH that it shall 
nltimKlflly bot'ome »<> much iimre efficient than the woman's. 
The very lack of preai))>ointed trains of thought is the 
gnrnud on which general principles and heads of clussifi- 
catitm grow up; and the masculine brain deals with new 
nod couples matter indirectly by means of these, in a 
uuuiiier which the feminine method of direct intuition, ad- 
mirably uud rapidly its it performs within its limits, can 
Tunly hope to cope with. 

Id looking back over the subject of reasoning, one feela 
how intimatflty connected it is with conception ; and one 
r*»,Uxett more than ever the deejt reach <if that principle of 
Hvleutiou on which so much stress was laid towards the close 
of Chnptor IX. As the art of remliug (after a certain stage 
in one's edncation) is the art of skipping, so the art ol l>eiug 
wi*<« io the art of knowing what to overlook. The first effect 
on tbc tnitid of growing cultivated is that processes once 
multiple get to be performed by a single act. Lazarus has 
called this the progressive ' condensation ' of thought 
^^Ast in the psychological sense it is less a condensation than 
^^■Idhs, a genuine droppiufj out and throwini^ overboard of 
^Hnwcions content. Steps really sink from sight. An ad- 
^^SOcwd thiulcer st^oa tht; relations of his topics in such 
iiWMHW and so iustuutaueously that when he comes to- 
i^xpluD to younger minds it is often hard to say which 
grows the more jwtrplexed, he or the pupil. In every uni- 
Tuvity there aro admirable investigators who are notori- 
Diuljr bad lecturers. The reason is that they never apon- 
teHeoosljr (we the snbject in the minnte articulate way in 
which tbe Htndent needn to have it offered to his slow 

370 P8YCH0L0GT. 

reception. They grope for the links, bnt tbe links do n^^ 
come. Bowditch, who translated and annotated Laplace ^^ 
Mecanique Celeste, said that whenever his author preface^ 
a proposition by the words 'it is evident,' he knew thft^ 
many hours of hard study lay before him. 

When two minds of a high order, interested in 
subjects, come together, their conversation is chiefly 
markable for the summariness of its allusions and the* 
rapidity of its transitions. Before one of them is half 
through a sentence the other knows his meaning and 
replies. Such genial play with such massive materials, 
such an easy flashing of light over far perspectives, such 
careless indifference to the dust and apparatus that ordi- 
narily surround the subject and seem to pertain to its 
essence, make these conversations seem true feasts for 
gods to a listener who is educated enough to follow them 
at all. His mental lungs breathe more deeply, in an atmos- 
phere more broad and vast than is their wonl On the 
other hand, the excessive explicitness and short-windedness 
of an ordinary man are as wonderful as they are tedious to 
the man of genius. But we need not go as far as the ways 
of genius. Ordinary social intercourse will do. There the 
charm of conversation is in direct proportion to the possi* 
bility of abridgment and elision, and in inverse ratio to the 
need of explicit statement. With old friends a word stands 
for a whole story or set of opinions. With new-comers 
everything must be gone over in detail. Some persons 
have a real mania for completeness, they must express 
every step. They are the most intolerable of companions, 
and although their mental energy may in its way be great, 
they always strike us as weak and second-rate. In short, 
the essence of plebeianism, that which separates vulgarity 
from aristocracy, is perhaps less a defect than an excess, 
the constant need to animadvert upon matters which for 
the aristocratic temperament do not exist. To ignore, to 
disdain to consider, to overlook, are the essence of the 
* gentleman.* Often most provokingly so ; for the things 
ignored may be of the deepest moral consequence. But in 
the very midst of our indignation with the gentleman, we 
have a consciousness that his preposterous ininrtia and neg' 



tivMieBs in the actaal emergency is, somebon- or other, 
'''m^ with his general supcriuritv t(i ourselves. It ia not 
'ulr thttt the KentleiDMii i^ores co aside rati not) relative to 
fwudnct, sordid snapicioDH, fears, caifiulations. etc:., which 
tiiit ralgariiiu is fated Ui entertain ; it is that lie is silent 
*li«re the vnlgariau talks ; that he gives Dothing but results 
Vbere the vulgarian is profuse of reasons ; that he does not 
'ttphtiu 4ir a)>oU^Kize; that he uses one sentence instead of 
twenty : and that, iu a word, there is an amount of ivifrsti- 
lial thinking, so to call it, which it is quite impossible to 
ffst hiiD to perfonu, but which is nearly all that the vul- 
miml performs at all. All this suppression of the 
>a<lary leaves the field dear, — for higher flights, should 
hoosf tn come. But even if they never came, what 
:htH there were would still manifest the aristocratic 
MUil wear the well-bred form. 80 great is our sense 
iiamiotiy and ease in pussiug from the compauy of a phi- 
Bntine to that of an aristocratic temperament, that we are 
aluKMt t«mpt«d to deem the falsest views aud tastes as held 
by a man of the w-orhl, truer tlian the truest as held by a 
oomiDon person. In the latter the best ideas are choked, 
obHtraclei), and coutamiuated by the redundancy of tlieir 
(wttry luwociates. The negative umditions. at least, of an 
atnoHphere and a free outlook are present in the former. 
I may appear to have strayed from psychological an- 
alyvis int4i ifsthetic criticism. But the principle of selec- 
tion is HI) important that no illustrations seem redundant 
wliich may help U) show how great is its scope. The 
npwhot of what I say simply is that selection implies rejec- 
i as well as choice ; and that the fanvtiou of ignoring, of 
leotion, is iis vital a factor in mental progress as the 
of attention itself. 




The reader will not have forgotten, in the jangle o 
purely inward processes and products through which th^ 
last chapters have borne him, that the final result of them 
all must be some form of bodily activity due to the escape 
of the central excitement through outgoing nerves. The 
whole neural organism, it will be remembered, is, physio- 
logically considered, but a machine for converting stimuli 
into reactions ; and the intellectual part of our life is knit 
up with but the middle or ' central ' portion of the machine's 
operations. Let us now turn to consider the final or emer- 
gent operations, the bodily activities, and the forms of con- 
sciousness connected therewithal. 

Every impression which impinges on the incoming 
nerves produces some discharge down the outgoing ones, 
whether we be aware of it or not Using sweeping terms 
and ignoring exceptions, k^ might say that every possible/ed'' 
ing produces a movement , and that the movement is a movement 
of the entire organ ism ^ and of each and all its parts. What 
happens patently when an explosion or a flash of lightning 
startles us, or when we are tickled, happens latently with 
every sensation which we receive. The only reason why we 
do not feel the startle or tickle in the case of insignificant 
sensations is partly its very small amount, partly our obtuse- 
ness. Professor Bain many years ago gave the name of the 
Law of Diflfiisiou to this phenomenon of general discharge, 
and expivssed it thus : ** According as an impression is ac- 
companied with Feeling, the aroused currents diffuse them- 
selves over the brain, leading to a general agitation of the 
moving organs, as well as affecting the viscera." 


PHODUcrioy of movbui 

Id casBH where the feeliug is Btroug the luw U too faiuil- 
r In require proof. Ah Prof. Baiu says : 

" Each uf us known in our owu experiunuv Ihat ii eudden shook of 
g i« acvompanied with movemeDtM of the body generally, and with 
vttvvls. When no emotion in present, we »«- quitsount ; a slight 
It U nrcrmipaninl with Rligfat numifeHtations : n more intense shock 
)ntburst. Every pleasure and every pnin, and every 
m, hns a definite wave of efferrls. which oor obaervation 
nkBs known to us : and we apply the knowliKlge to infer other men's 
Tvvliupi from tbeir outward iljHplay. . . . The orgnus first and promi- 
nenlly alTccled, In the dilTuse^l wave of nervoue innuence. are the mov- 
ing meoibeRf, and of ihe«e. by preference, the (ealiirea of the faceCwith 
lb* «sr» in animals), whose movpments constitute the fxprrstion of the 
cuonimanre. But the inrluenue extends to all the jiartM of Ibe moviDg 
aj«l<<ni. voluntary aud iiivohiniary ; while an important series of effecU 
epnxl>"'^ °" iheglaudsand visuera— ihe siomaih, lunge, heart ,kid- 
L, akin. ><igether with the sexual and mummury organs. . . . The 
rnnutance ia seetuiugly universal, the proof of it dooH not require h 
n of instanoes in detail \ on the objectors is thrown the burden of 
hieing unequivocal exceptions to the Inw." * 

Tber» ar« probably' uo exceptions to the diffusion of 

■ iupreasioD through the nerve-centres. The effect of 

I wavf^ through the oentres may, however, often be to 

torfero with procesHes, am) to iliitiijiiith tensions already 

bting there ; and the outward conaetiueiices of such 

kibitiona may be the arrest of ilischargeu from the 

Ubitvd regions unil the <!he<-kiiiK of lioiUly actintieH 

ready in process of ot!«urrence. When this happens it 

jobably is like the draining or siphoniug of certain chan- 

"• by currents flowiug through others. When, in walk- 

[, we suddenly stand still because a sonud, sight, smell, or 

iglit catches our attention, 8ometliiu(j like this occui's. 

U tliere are cases of arrest of peripheral activity which 

lend, not on central inhibition, but on stimulation of 

iBtrea which discharge outgoing currents of an inhibitory 

Whenever we are startled, for example, our heart 

nentarily stops or slows its beating, and then palpitates 

«lerate>d speed. The brief arrest is due to au out- 

5 curreut down the pueumogaatric nerve. This nerve, 

ton Rlimnlated, stops or slows the lieart-beata, and this 

• Emoil0R> and Will. pp. 4. 5. 


particular effect of startling fails to occur if the uerve 
be cui 

In general, however, the stimulating effects of a sense- 
impression preponderate over the inhibiting effects, so that 
we may roughly say, as we began by saying, that the wave 
of discharge produces an activity in all parts of the body. 
The task of tracing out all the effects of any one incoming 
sensation has not yet been performed by physiologists. 
Kecent years have, however, begun to enlarge our informa- 
tion ; and although I must refer to special treatises for the 
full details, I can briefly string together here a number of 
separate observations which prove the truth of the law of 

First take effedts upon the, circulalion^ Those upon the 
heart we have just seen. Haller long ago recorded that 
the blood from an open vein flowed out faster at the beat of 
a drum.* In Chapter IH. (p. 98) we learned how instan- 
taneously, according to Mosso, the circulation in the brain 
is altered by changes of sensation and of the course of 
thought. The effect of objects of fear, shame, and auger 
upon the blood-supply of the skin, especially the skin of 
the face, are too well known to need remark. Sensations of 
the higher senses produce, according to Gouty and Char- 
pentier, the most varied effects upon the pulse-rate and 
blood-pressure in dogs. Fig. 81, a pulse-tracing from these 
authors, shows the tumultuous eflect on a dog's heart of 
hearing the screams of another dog. The changes of 
blood-pressure still occurred when the pneumogastric 
nerves were cut. showing the vaso-motor effect to be direct 
and not dependent on the heart When Mosso invented 
that simple instrument, the plethysmography for recording 
the fluctuations in volume of the members of the body, what 
most astonished him, he says, "in the first experiments 
which he made in Italy, was the extreme unrest of the 
blood-vessels of the hand, which at every smallest emotion, 
whether during waking or during sleep, changed their vol- 
ume in surprising fashion." t Figure 82 (from Fere X) 

♦ Cf . Fer6 . Sensation et Mouvement (1887), p. 56. 
t La Paura (1884), p. 117. Compare Fere: Sensation et Mouvement^ 
chap. XVII. 

t Revue Philosophique. xxiv. 570. 




shows the way in which the pulse of one subject wbb 
modified by the exhibition of a red light lasting from the 
moment marked a to that marked Ik 

Fio. 83. 

The fff'ecis upon respiration of sadden sensory stimuli 
also too well known to need elaborate comment We 
• catch our breath ' at every sadden sound. We * hold our 
breath * whenever our attention and ex]^ctation are strongly 

l>.-. «k Ji^iK^r* -*..%-> ."..-••- v' ?. • » J • ■ -^ -i^Mx ^ ▼::! *'v«» c*rtwl 

ov.c^c*^^.. *v.a i»t sic*!. ^V.s:. iht ici-si r. . : ihxr situation i> 
n^*ioxivi. Whfv. A tVsrfv/; . Vw: :> "i^efrrf "ss we pant ami 
vAr.v.ot illV•v'!^ 'r.syiri- . ^y.fv. t": •- .-V>=-vi r^&kf^ us angry it 
:s. or, tV.o o. v.irxTx i':.: s,: : r\-. :rsi:.- which is hartl 
I s;;Vvv.v. A A^.v.-I* v't t;»:;::v> ::\ :. Tt-V ▼':.::L explain them- 



rhey show the effects of light apon the breathing 
his hysteric patients.* 

piratory ctirrt* of L: a, with yHlow llKht: 6. with tcrwn light: c, with red 
lllfht. The m\ hax the ntrongesl effect. 

^ sioeat-glami^, similar conseqiieDceH of sensorial 
re observed. Tarchanoff, testing the condition of 
t-glands by the power of the skin to start a gal- 

Phil., XXIV. pp. .'566-7.— For further iuforuiatiou about the rela- 
en the brain aud respimtioii. nee Dunilewsky'n Ettsay iu the Bio- 
entralblatt. ii. 69<». 

378 ^ P8YCH0L0GT. 

vanic current through electrodes applied to its snrhoe, 
found that " nearly every kind of nervous activi^, from fte 
simplest sensations and impressions, to volnnta^ motioitt 
and the highest forms of mental exertion, is accompanied 
by an increased activity in the glands of the skin." * On 
the pupil observations are recorded by Sanders which show 
that a transitory dilatation follows every sensorial stimnliiB 
applied during sleep, even if the stimulus be not strong 
enough to wake the subject up. At the moment of awak- 
ing there is a dilatation, even if strong light falls on the 
eye.t The pupil of children can easily be observed to 
dilate enormously under the influence of/ear. It is said to 
dilate in pain and fatigue ; and to contract, on the contrary, 
in rage. 

As regards eff'ects on (he abdominal viscera^ they unques- 
tionably exist, but very few accurate observations have 
been made.^ 

The bladder, bowels, and uterus respond to sensations, 
even indifferent ones. Mosso and Pellicani, in their plethys- 
mographic investigations on the bladder of dogs, found 
all sorts of sensorial stimuli to produce reflex contractions 
of this organ, independent of those of the abdominal walls. 
They call the bladder ' as good an festhesiometer as the 
iris,' and refer to the not uncommon reflex effects of psy- 
chic stimuli in the human female upon this organ.§ M. 
F^re has registered the contractions of the sphincter ani 
which even indifferent sensations will produce. In some 
pregnant women the foetus is felt to move after almost 
everv sensorial excitement received bv the mother. The 
only natural explanation is that it is stimulated at such 
moments by reflex contractions of the womb.j That the 
glands are affected in emotion is patent enough in the case 
of the tears of grief, the dry mouth, moist skin, or diar- 

* Quot«d from the report of Tarckaooff's paper {in PflQger's Archtf, 
XL VI. 46) in the American Journal of Psych., ii. 652. 

f Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vu. 652 ; ix. 129. 

t Sensation et Mouyement, 57-^. 

^ R. Amid, dd Lincei (1881-2). 1 folk>w the report fai HofflMim il 
SchwHlbes Jahresbericht. x. ii. •S. 

I C^. Fm*. StMi^^ation rt Mouvemt-nt. chnp. xiv. 


Bs of fear, tJie biliary ilisturbunfes whifli actnetiiues 
low npoD rage, etc. The watering of the mouth at the 
ht <if Bocculeut food is well kiiowu. It is diffinalt to 
low the smaller degrees of all these retlex changes, but 
an hardlj be doubted that they exint lu some degree, 
n where they cease to be traceable, and that all our 
■stiooM have Home visceral effects. The sneezing pro- 
mi by suushiae, the rougheuing of the skin (gooseflesh) 
idi certain strokings, contacts, and soundH, musical or 
Hmosical, provoke, are facts of the same order au the 
iddering and standing up of the hair in fear, only of less 

l^tdt on VolmUary Mwides. Every sensorial stimulus 
only sendfi a special discharge into certain particular 
>c]es dependent on the s[>ecial nature of the stimulus iu 
ti.iii — t><tnie of these special discharges we huve studied 
: kpler XI, others we shall examine under the heads 
] u-<tiuct and Emotiou — but it innervates the muscles 
crsUy. M, F^re has given very curious px{>erimental 
u(b of this. The strength of contraction of the subject's 
id was measured by a self- registering dynamometer. 
linftrilr the maximum strength, under simple esperimen- 
eoDdltiontt, reiuaiuH the same from day to day. But if 
nltwDeoosIy with the contraction the subject received a 
■nrial impreasiou, the contraction was sometimes weak- 
d, but more ofti^u increased. This reinforcing effect has 
aived tfa« name of dynamogenff. The dynuniogenic value of 
>|^ mHncn/ notes seems to 1>e proportional to their loud- 
■ uhI height. Where the notes are compounded into sad 
Uns. the muscular strength diminishes. If the strains are 
■, it is increased. — The dynamogenic value of colored Ughtn 
ieswitfa the color. In a subject* whose normal strength 
I espreaaed by 23, it became 34 when a blue light was 

' nw Sgiuw given >re from ui byitterical subject, and ihe ilUIaTeai«a 
HW I u IlwD noniMl. M. Firf coocldera that Uie utuUlilr nervous 
■■of ib« l^'Meric (' o» gnDOuIIlc« de la iMychologic ') abom the law 
r<|lM-'l'T'— 'j exagg«niU>d acalc. without altering Iho qualitative r«la- 
I, TIh oflscta nmind u> a lIiUc of iltr inHuMici- of Betuatkua uiion 

■a of oUicr order* diaouvereil by t'rbaaiaclUUok, and iv- 

Itof ihb voltimv. 


thrown on the eyes, 28 for green, 30 for yellow, 35 for onnge, 
and 42 for red. Ked is thus the most exciting color. 
Among tastes y sweet has the lowest value, next comes salt, 
then bitter, and finally sour, though, as M. Fer^ remarks^ 
such a sour as acetic acid excites the nerves of pain and 
smell as well as of taste. The stimulating effects of tobacco- 
smoke, alcohol, beef-extract (which is innutritions), etc, etc., 
may be partly due to a dynamogenic action of this sort— 
Of odorSy that of musk seems to have a peculiar dynamo- 
genic power. Fig. 85 is a copy of one of M. Fare's djiia- 
mographic tracings, which explains itself. The smaller 
contractions are those without stimulus ; the stronger ones 
are due to the influence of red rays of light. 


Fie. 85. 

Everyone is familiar with the paidlar rg^ex, or jerk up- 
wards of the foot, which is produced by smartly tapping 
the tendon below the knee-pan when the leg hangs OYer 
the other knee. Drs. Weir Mitchell and Lombard have 

found that when other sensations come in simultaneoosW 


with the tap, the jerk is increased.* Heat, cold, pricking, 
itching, or faradio stimulation of the skin, sometimes strong 
optical impressii^ns, music, all have this dynamogenic effect, 
which also results whenever voluntarv movements are set 
up in other parts of the IkhIv, simultaneously with the 

These * dynanu^enic ' effeot^s in which one stimulation 

•Miuhill in vPhilaailp^iA Mtxlii-*: Xews-Feb. 13 and 20. 1886); Lorn- 
Ksui in AnuTiv^nn .Knirnal of P>yi bo*.c^\ CKi. 1^7-. 

♦ IV^f. H. r. IV^diioh ha5 mAiit- :he ;c:en?sting discovery tliat If the 
TvmfoTVM'nj; wov^muoiU N^ *s much 45 4 of a secood late, the reinforce- 
nieut f*Us to ixvur. and i* transformwi inio a pK)i5iliTe inhibitioD of the 
kiu*tvj<»rk for TX'UrvUtivHi* of botw<*cp 4 And 1.7. The knee-jerk faiU 
U^ Ih* nuv)it)^\! At all by r^>;;int*r\ :uoT<rn\er:5 made later than 1.7' after 
the |>atelhir lic^mout ;* tapjwl .«^ lV\itro« Mt>i andSoir. Jouni., Mar^. 



IBipl> r«in(urceH another a)rea<ly uuiier way, must not be 
onfotmdMl with reflex acts properly so uilled, in which uew 
BtrritipH are ongiiiat«(l by the stimulus. All iastinctive 
■rfnminiicea anil manifeetations of emotion are retlex actx. 
lot ODderneath those of whieli we are uouscioua there setiiu 
I go on continually others smaller iu amount, which 
rolwbly in most persons might be i-alled fluctuations of 
■turalar lone, but which iu certain uenmtic subjeetfl can 

EnoDBtrnteil ocularly. M. F^r^ fifi;'"'^'^ some of them 
nrticle to which I have already referred.* 
tktng back over all these facta, it is hard todouht the 
rath of ihft Law of diffusion, even where verification iB be- 
'DBil reach. A procega get up anywhfre in tlif ("n^res reverber- 
4m everytchtrr, and tn gome tray or other affects the organism 
hnngkm^, making its activities either greater or less. We 
Uf brought agaiu to the asaimilation which was expressed 
m ft prenoQB page of the nerve-«entral mass to a good con- 
Inctor ciiarged with electricity, of which the teusion can- 
HOI ba chiuiged anywhere without changing it everywhei-e. 

Ban- Schneider has tried to »how, by an ingeuioue and 

i^gjestiTe Eoological review, t that nil the jf/ir^'iWmoveuieuts 

•lutfa highly evolved auimaln make are differentiated from 

it two originally Himple movements, of coutraction and ex- 

■itikm, in which the entire body of simple organisms takes 

'ui. The tendency to contract is the source of all the 

' l>rt>tevtive impulses and reactions which are later de- 

;ied, inclndiug that of flight The tendency to expand 

:■> up, ou the contrary, into the impulses aud instincts of 

a aggmoiive kind, feeding, fighting, sexual intercourse, etc. 

diMider'a articles are well worth reading, if only for the 

ireful ubwnratious ou animals which they embody. I cit« 

Mnn here as a sort of evolutionary reason to add to the 

teebuiical a priori reason why there ovtjht to be the 

lAlsve wave which our a posteriori instauces have shown 

i DOW proceed to a detailed iitady of the more im- 

'Bene Phil., xxir. in% ff. 
tin ib« Vtertel>brKbrifI 

fDrwUt. Ptkilot.. 

382 P87CU0L0GT, 

portant classes of movement consequent upon cer^i/ 
mental change. Thej may be enumerated as — 

1) InstinctiTe or Impulsive Performances ; 

2) Expressions of Emotion ; and 

3) Voluntary Deeds; 

and each shall have a chapter to itself. 



iNSTiifCT is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a 

tcay as to prodttce certain ends^ toithout foresight of the endSy 

and tcUhoui previous education in the performance. That 

iuHtinctH, as thus defined, exist on an enormous scale in the 

animal kingdom needs no proof. They are the functional 

correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain 

organ goes, one may say, almost alwa3'S a native aptitude 

for its use. 

** Ha8 the bird a gland for the secretion of oil ? She knows inntinc- 
tively how to press the oil from the gland, and apply it to the feather. 
Han the rattlesnake the grooved tooth and gland of }x>i8on ? He know^ 
without instruction how to make both structure and function most ef- 
fective against his enemies. Has the silk-worm the function of secret- 
ing the fluid silk ? At the proper time she winds the cocoon such as she 
hati never seen, as thousands before have done ; and thus without in- 
^tmction, pattern, or experience, forms a safe abode for herself in the 
period of transformation. Has the hawk talons ? She knows by in- 
stinct how to wield them effectively against the helpless quarry, "f 

A very common way of talking about these admirably 
definite tendencies to act is by naming abstractly the pur- 
[>o8e they subserve, such as self-preservation, or defence, or 
care for eggs and young — and saying the animal has an in- 
stinctive fear of death or love of life, or that she has an in- 
stinct of self-preservation, or an instinct of maternity and 
the like. But this represents the animal as obeying ab- 
stractions which not once in a million cases is it possible it 
can have framed. The strict physiological way of interpret- 

* This chapter has already appeared (almost exactly as now printed) in 
the form of magazine articU*H in S(TibDc*r's Magazine and in the Popular 
Science Montkly for 1887. 

t P. A. Chadboume . Inntiiu t. p. 'i8 (Ne\% York. 1872). 



ing the facts leads to far clearer results. TheadioMwtecIL 
instinctive aU conform to the general reflex type ; they are called 
forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the 
animal's body, or at a distance in his environment The 
cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows fight before the 
dog, avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns fire and 
water, etc., not because he has any notion either of life or 
of death, or of self, or of preservation. He has probably at- 
tained to no one oi these conceptions in such a way as to re- 
act definitely upon it He acts in each case separately, 
and simply because he cannot help it; being so framed that 
when that particular running thing called a mouse appears 
in his field of ^'isiou he must pursue ; that when that par- 
ticular barking and obstreperous thing called a dog appeal 
there he must retire, if at a distance, and scratch if close by; 
that he m^ist withdraw his feet from water and his face 
from flame, etc. His ner\'ous system is to a great extent a 
preorganized bundle of such reactions — they are as fatal aa 
sneezing, and as exactly correlated to their special excitants 
as it is to its own. Although the naturalist may, for his own 
convenience, class these reactions under general heads, he 
must not forget that in the animal it is a particular sensation 
or perception or image which calls them forth. 

At first this view astounds us bv the enormous number 
of special adjustments it supposes animals to possess ready- 
made in anticipation of the outer things among which they 
are to dwell. Oiw mutual dependence l>e so intricate and 
go so far? Is each thing born fitted to particular other 
things, and to them exclusively, as locks are fitted to their 
kevs? Uudi>ubtedlv this must be l)elieved to l>e so. Each 
nook anil craunv of creation, down to our verv skin and 
entrails, has its living inhabitants, with organs suited to 
the place, to devour and iligest the foinl it harbors and to 
meet the dangers it conceals ; and the minuteness of adap- 
tation thus slu^wn in the wav of strucinre knows no bounds. 
Even Si> are there no Ixniuds tt> the minuteness of adapta- 
tion in the wav of c%^}\duci which the several inhabitants 

The older writing* on instinct are ineffectual wastes of 
wonls, Wcaust* their authors never came down to this defi- 

lySTlNCT. 385 

nite and simple point of -vaew, but smothered everything in 
vague wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic power of 
the animals — so superior to anything in man — and at the 
beneficence of God in endowing them with such a gifi But 
God's beneficence endows them, first of all, with a nervous 
system ; and, turning our attention to this, makes instinct 
immediately appear neither more nor less wonderful than 
all the other facts of life. 

Every instinct is an impulse. Whether we shall call such 
impulses as blushing, sneezing, coughing, smiling, or dodg- 
ing, or keeping time to music, instincts or not, is a mere 
matter of terminology. The process is the same through* 
out. In his delightfully fresh and interesting work, Der 
Thierische Wille, Herr G. H. Schneider subdivides im- 
pulses (Triebe) into sensation-impulses, perception-im- 
pulses, and idea-impulses. To crouch from cold is a sen- 
sation-impulse ; to turn and follow, if we see people run- 
ning one way, is a perception-impulse ; to cast about for 
cover, if it begins to blow and rain, is an imagination-im- 
pulse. A single complex instinctive action may involve 
successively the awakening of im])ulses of all three classes. 
Thus a hungry lion starts to seek prey by the awakening in 
him of imagination coupled with desire ; he begins to stalk 
it when, on eye, ear, or nostril, lie gets an impression of its 
j)resence at a certain distance ; he springs npou it, either 
when the bootv takes alarm and fiees, or when the distance 
is sufficiently reduced ; he j)roceeds to te(tr and devour it 
the moment he gets a sensation of its contact with his 
claws and fangs. Seeking, stalking, springing, and devour- 
ing are just so many different kinds of muscular contrac- 
tion, and neither kind is called forth by the stimulus aj)- 
proi)riate to the other. 

Schneider savs of the hamster, which stores corn in its 
liole : 

** If we analyzo the profH'nsity of storinjx. w«» find that it cnnsisrs of 
thn»e impulses : First, an impulse to pt'rk up the nutritious objiH»t, due 
to pt^H'eption ; second, an impuls<» to rarnj if off into the dwellinicplace. 
due to the idea of this hitter ; and thinl, an impulse to la*/ it doirn 
there, due to the sight of the phu*e. It lies in the nature of tht* ham- 
Bter that it should never sw a full ear of com without feeling a tli'>in' 


to strip it ; it lies in its nature to feel, as soon as its cheek-poncheB tra 
filled, an irresistible desire to hurry to its home ; and finally, it lies in 
its nature that the sight of the storehouse should awaken the impulse 
to empty the cheeks" (p. 308). 

In certain animals of a low order the feeling of hanng 
executed one impulsive step is such an indispensable part 
of the stimulus of the next one, that the animal cannot 
make any variation in the order of its performance. 

NoWy why do the various animals do what seem to us 9uch 
strange things, in the presence of such outlandish stunnli? 
Why does the hen, for example, submit herself to the 
tedium of incubating such a fearfully uninteresting set of 
objects as a nestf ul of eggs, unless she have some sort of a 
prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is act 
hominenu We can only interpret the instincts of brutes by 
what we know of instincts in ourselves. Whj- do men al- 
ways lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on 
hard floors ? Why do they sit round the stove on a cold 
day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety- 
nine times out of a hundred, with their faces towards its 
middle rather than to the wall ? Why do they prefer saddle 
of mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? 
Why does the maiden interest the j'outh so that everything 
about her seems more important and significant than any- 
thing else in the world ? Nothing more can be said than 
that these are human wavs, and that everv- creature likes its 
own ways, and takes to the following them as a matter of 
course. Science may come and consider these ways, and 
find that most of them are useful. But it is not for the 
sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at 
the moment of following them we feel that that is the only 
appropriate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a 
billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He 
eats because the food tastes good and makes him want 
more. If you ask him why he should want to eat more of 
what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philoso- 
pher he will pri^bably laugh at you for a fool. The con- 
nection between the savorv sensation and the act it awakens 
is for him absolute and seibstverstdndlich, an ' a priori syn- 


iliesin" o( the most perfect sort, upedin;; no proof but its 

"*a uridworf. It tiikuM, in short, whiit Berkeley calU a 

I'iail ilelwiivhed by lemming tu currj' the proceauof making 

■ ii- UAtaral seem straiige, so far as tcmsk for the why of imy 

i-^iiiii-tivc hiuuaa act. To the metaphvsiciaQ (Unne cau 

h I i'«tii)ns occur an : Whv do wt- smile, when pleased, 

1 L! ■■! -^cowIV Why are we uoahle to tulk to a crowd 

.- «i- talk to n single frieud? Why does a particular 

maitleii tum oar wito so upside-down ? The oommou man 

eui only t*i»y, " 0/ course we smile, of course our heart pal- 

pitatfiH at thu night of tlie crowd, fif't-ourif we love the maiden, 

thftl li«iiutitn] soul chid iii that perfect form, so palpably 

and flj*(irBiiUy made from all eteniit)- to be loved !" 

And «>, [irohabty, does eai-h animal feel about the par- 
ticular thingM it tends to do in presence of particular ob- 
i«cte. They, t«)'>. are " prti/ri syntheses. To the lion it in 
Uie UoDMis which is made to be loved ; to the War, the she- 
baar. Tn the broody hen the notion would probably seem 
mrawtroiu that there Khouhl be a creature in the world to 
whoni a neatfal of eggs waM not the utterly fascinatinfi; and 
precious and never-to-be-too-raucli-sat-upou object which 
it » to her.* 

Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some 
antmaln' iiiHtiucts may api>eartoiis, our instincts will appear 
uo leas myjtteriouH Ut them. And we may conclude that, to 
liuf animal which oln^ys it, every impulse and every step of 
•very iuatinct shines with its own sufficient liffht, and seems 
tlic moment the only eternally right and proper thing to 
It w done loi its own sake excluaively. What volup- 


* '*It woutd bo rvty iilmpl«-mliideil to nippoae Uiat bees follow their 
VMBB, ukd pmU'Ct bur uid caie for her, because they am aware ihst wlib- 
Dul ber Ibe Llri' would In<<-ouiv eilinct. Tlie ulor or [he ui>«.-t ot lliulr 
quam b» DiaaKMl.v agrMnble to ibe bees— tliat U nhj- they lure her >o 
Dm* Dot all true love bam; llicif on agreeable pcrreplloDH much niun? llikn 
Ml nrpttvnUtlQOi (if utillly r~ (Q. II. Schneider, Uer Tblcrlactin Willi-, 
p. IST.) A priori, Iherc In uo rt-aion to suppOAc that iinyacuiBtloii mlghlnut 
In vaM«nlmal cauw uny emutlUD aod any {mpu\ae. To uii tt neeiiu lU- 
Mlnnl ihnl an ixlor tliniiUI •Ur^rtlj' exclle Hnger or fear; ur a culor, lusL 
Yd there arc crEsturem lo which name smells are ijiiii* t» frtglitful an aiijr 
muiids, Mtd tvrf Ukeljr other* lo whicb color Is u much a teiual Irritant 

388 P8TCH0L0QT. 

tuons thrill may not shake a flj, when she at last discoTeis 
the one particular leaf, or carrion, or bit of dung, that out 
of all the world can stimulate her ovipositor to its dis»- 
charge ? Does not the discharge then seem to her the only 
fitting thing ? And need she care or know anything about 
the future maggot and its food ? 

Since the egg-laying instincts are simple examples to con- 
sider, a few quotations about them from Schneider may be 
serviceable : 

** The phenomenon so often talked about, so variously interpreted, 
80 surrounded with mystification, that an insect should always lay her 
eggs in a spot appropriate to the nourishment of her young, is no more 
marvellous than the phenomenon that every animal pairs with a mate 
capable of bearing posterity, or feeds on materials capable of affording 
him nourishment. . . . Not only the choice of a place for laying the 
eggs, but all the various acts for depositing and protecting them, are 
occasioned by the perception of the proper object, and the relation of 
this perception to the various stages of maternal impulse. When the 
burying beetle perceives a carrion, she is not only impelled to approach 
it and lodge her eggs in it, but also to go through the movements re- 
quisite for burying it; just as a bii*d who sees his hen-bird is impelled 
to caress her, to strut around her, dance before her, or in some other 
way to woo her; just as a tiger, when he sees an antelope, is impelled 
to stalk it, to pounce upon it, and to strangle it. When the tailor-bee 
cuts out pieces of rose-leaf, bends them, carries them into a caterpillar- 
or mouso-hole in trees or in the earth, covers their seams again with 
other pieces, and so makes a thimble-shaped case — when she fills this 
with honey and lays an egg in it, all these various appropriate expres- 
sions of her will are to be explained by supposing that at the time when 
the eggs are n\)e within her, the appearance of a suitable caterpillar- or 
mouse- hole and the perception of rose-leaves are so correlated in the 
insect with the several impulses in question, that the performances fol- 
low as a matter ot course when the perceptions take place. . . . 

** T